Flux: International Relations Review

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Flux operates out of Montreal, located on the traditional territory of the Kanien'keha:ka, a place which has long served as a site of meeting and exchange amongst nations. The Kanien'keha:ka are the keepers of the Eastern Door of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. In writing about political science and international relations we strive to incorporate diverse voices and bear in mind the forces, including (neo) colonialism, which have shaped the way we understand international relations. We encourage all readers to inform themselves on and actively resist, in the diverse forms that resistance can take, (neo) colonialism in Canada and abroad.

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

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

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

Foreword

I am honoured to have overseen the team that made the tenth edition of IRSAM's academic journal, Flux, possible. The tenth edition of Flux is made up of seven insightful articles written by McGill undergrads. You can find the full articles on our website fluxirr.mcgill.ca and at irsam.com/flux. This volume covers a breadth of international relations issues, from migration to political economy, and spans international issues from the past five decades.

Each team of editors and authors worked tirelessly during midterm season to prepare polished, clear, and thorough academic pieces. Every individual in the process has helped contribute to the fantastic papers in the coming pages. I would like to thank our authors and editors for sticking out the process, which can be very grueling and often includes unexpected hurdles, your effort and meticulousness shows in the pages of this journal. I wish all our graduating staff and authors the best in their future endeavors.

This volume begins with Presian Dragiev's "Russia's Legitimizing Narrative for Annexation: Impetus or Pretext?" which discusses how Russia has used Western norms and historical narratives to create pretext post-annexation. Moving to the Americas, Madelyn Evans' "Defending Human Rights Through Social Action: The Role of the Catholic Church in Latin America in the 1960s–1980s" considers the role of organized religion in countering authoritarian regimes and supporting global human rights. Alanna Sereboff's piece takes us to contemporary South American international relations to discuss migration patterns and responses as Venezuela's political crisis grows. Evelyne Goulet, Jillian Horowitz, and Jordana Schiff take us to Africa to discuss the effectiveness of post-conflict development on reducing HIV/AIDS. Sara Elisabeth Hedstrom delves into the mandate of the Arab League to question the design of the institution in "The Arab League Has No Bark and No Bite". Ender McDuff then takes us to the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to discuss the use of sports in diplomacy. Finally, Wing Wong looks to the future of the world order when discussing the Chinese Yuan's potential for becoming the world's top currency.

Over the past three years working on Flux, I never ceased to be amazed by the many avenues of research McGill students pursue for their classes. The journal provides a window into the courses offered in the department and, more importantly, into the issues that our generation cares about most. The unifying thread across all of Volume X's articles is the role of norms in governing international relations, which I believe points to the fact that twenty-first century problems are global in scope. While these articles point to successful cases of cooperation, they also find failures. As political scientists, our authors use these failures to better understand the circumstances that foster international collaboration so that our generation may find success.

I hope you find the papers as insightful as I did and that they inspire you to seek out more international relations literature.

Best,
Marie Fester
President, IRSAM May 2019-April 2020
Interim Editor-in-Chief, Flux: International Relations Review January-April 2020

Our Team

Alicia Wilson
Senior Editor

Asher Laws
Junior Editor
Asher is a second-year student studying joint honours History and Political Science. This is his first time editing for Flux and he's thoroughly enjoyed the range and depth of all the submissions. When not pouring through Poli Sci papers he can be found watching his childhood team, Chelsea, lose or whipping up a cup of the finest English breakfast tea.

Avery Franken
Junior Editor


Avery is a fourth year student pursuing a double major in political science and linguistics. She has found editing for the journal to be the perfect union of her two majors, as she can focus on how big ideas are communicated while immersed in the realm of international politics. Outside of school, Avery spends her time running, listening to podcasts and teaching herself Norwegian.

Celeste Jensen
Copy Editor


Celeste is a second-year student majoring in linguistics and minoring in French language and Italian studies. As she doesn't study political science, Celeste enjoys editing for Flux because she gets to learn about new topics with each paper she edits. Outside of correcting grammar, she enjoys rock climbing, road trips, and watching The Office.

Elizabeth Franceschini
Director of Communications and Public Relations


I am currently completing my second year at McGill University in Political Science and Russian Studies. I had the chance to serve as Flux's Director of Public Relations this past academic year, and have loved working for the publication. I believe that Flux holds a special place in the McGill community, and I am looking forward to display all the hard work the Flux team and its writers have put into this edition of the journal. On campus, I am involved with the McGill Journal of Political Studies and the McGill International Review. Safe to say, I enjoy all things publication related!

Emma Frattasio
Junior Editor


Emma is a second year student studying political science and minoring in international development. As a Los Angeles native, Emma enjoys taking long walks on the beach while listening to true crime podcasts. She would like to thank the wonderful team at Flux for an amazing first semester, and looks forward to growing with the publication in the coming years.



Julia Rosen
Copy Editor

Julia is a second-year student pursuing a joint honours degree in Political Science in History. She loves being involved with Flux because its a great way to get to interact and collaborate with people that have a passion for International Relations. Julia is an avid fan of Philadelphia sports teams. Also dogs.

Kennedy McKee-Braide
Copy Editor

Kennedy is a second-year student studying History and Political Science. As a copyeditor, she has been inspired by all the layers of hard work that have gone into producing this year's edition of Flux. She has especially loved seeing the results of the collaboration between authors and their editors. In her spare time, she enjoys reading, writing and getting wrapped up in the news.

Maëna Raoux
Senior Editor

Maëna is a second-year student pursuing an Honours in Political Science and a Major in Economics. This is her second year working as an Editor with Flux and she loves being inspired by the variety and depth of other student's work. When not editing political science papers, Maëna loves writing, debating, and any outdoor activity that will put her mind to ease!

McEan Taylor
Junior Editor

McEan is a second-year Arts student studying Political Science. He enjoys learning about the formation of political systems around the world and how they develop over time. He focuses on the creation of global systems through a critical lense. He enjoyed his first year editing for FLUX as a way to explore political issues with peers. Outside of his studies, McEan works for the McGill Tribune, volunteers for the Yellow Door, and enjoys making music.

Sara Gangbar
Junior Editor

Sara is finishing her fourth year at McGill, with a joint major in political science and history. Prior to serving as an editor, she was a contributing author to Flux and has found the experience to be incredibly valuable. When she isn't watching documentaries, she can be found cooking, baking, or looking at restaurant menus!

FLUX VOLUME X

Russia's Legitimizing Narrative for Annexation: Impetus or Pretext?

By Presian Dragiev

Author Note "Investigate. Figure things out for yourself. Spend more time with long articles. Subsidize investigative journalism by subscribing to print media. Realize that some of what is on your screen is there to harm you. Learn about sites that investigate foreign propaganda pushes."
-Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century

Abstract Following the Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the Kremlin constructed a legitimizing narrative to justify its inflammatory foreign policy decision. This narrative in turn builds an argument for the legality of the annexation, as well as one for its morality. These arguments were presented as the driving forces for its decision to occupy and annex the peninsula and then diffused by Russia's political class in addition to their security-related justifications. But a closer examination of these arguments and how they relate to realities on the ground suggests they are closer to being pretexts for the annexation than being its driving forces. This narrative offers a glimpse into how the Kremlin uses notions of identity, historical links, and international norms championed by the west to legitimize its foreign policies on the international scene.

This article was submitted to POLI 329: Russian and Soviet Politics

Edited by McEan Taylor and Asher Laws

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Introduction

Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014 marked the first time in the post-war period that a European power forcibly wrested territory from another. Understanding the geopolitical and diplomatic costs this move would incur from the West, the Russian leadership promptly marshalled a set of legitimizing justifications and framed them as the impetus for its decision to occupy and annex Crimea. This "legitimizing narrative" (Knott 2018) built and purveyed by Russia's political class generates two concrete sub-arguments: the right to self-determination for Russians in Crimea and humanitarianism undertaken to protect a threatened Russian population (Rotaru 2019).

Western leaders were quick to expostulate Russia's military excursion into Crimea as a breach of Ukrainian sovereignty and to denounce the subsequent referendum as illegitimate. In covering this event, North American and European media outlets predominantly expressed the consensus of their governments, who widely impugned or ignored Russia's legitimizing narrative and alleged its real motivations to be essentially geopolitical. To determine whether or not the justifications invoked by Russia were the driving force of its Crimean excursion, one must first explicate the narrative and its sub-arguments, then scrutinize them to see if they square with facts on the ground. Ultimately, this account demonstrates Russia's legitimizing narrative to be a pretext for the annexation of Crimea and not, as claimed by the Kremlin, to be the impetus for it.

The Legitimizing Narrative and Sub-arguments

Vladimir Putin's March 14 national address was the first and most widely circulated expression of this legitimizing narrative, it was then echoed and amplified by Russian media outlets. The first part of this narrative begins very broadly from the premise that Crimea is and always has been an integral part of Russia. Its incorporation into the Russian empire in 1783 and historic place in Russia's national consciousness is elevated to nearly mythological heights, while the peninsula's transfer to Ukraine in 1954 is cast as legally tenuous, if not outright invalid. More straightforwardly, the fact that 58% of Crimea's population is ethnically Russian is used to justify Russia's claim to it (Deliagin 2015). Therefore, there is a historical, legal, and demographic case made for Russian annexation. All three of these arguments were relayed in some form by Putin in his March address. He opened the speech by enumerating various milestones integral to Russian history which occurred in Crimea before putting it summarily that, "In people's hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and was passed from generation to generation…" (Putin, March 2014). After noting the multiethnic makeup of Crimea, he highlighted the fact that 1.5 million of Crimea's 2.2 million inhabitants are Russian and then described the 1954 transfer as "a decision made in clear violation of the norms that were in place even then" (Putin 2014).

The second part of the narrative concerns the post-Yanukovych leadership in Ukraine. This argument's most extreme variation holds that 2014's Euromaidan protests were a Western-orchestrated coup that aimed to install a Russophobic, neo-Nazi government to subvert Putin's regime (Deliagin 2015, 8-9, 23). More moderate renditions accuse the West of propping up the post-Yanukovych government and then blithely papering over its far-right elements because of its pro-Western stance. Despite its variation, the crucial part of the narrative remains fixed: Russian compatriots became endangered by a chauvinistic Ukrainian government. The first part of this narrative establishes Crimea as essentially Russian, while the second underlines the dangers posed to Russian compatriots by the new Ukrainian government. A legal argument for self-determination is woven out of the narrative's establishment of Crimea as Russian, and a moral case for humanitarian intervention stems from its claims to a dangerous atmosphere in the region.

Russia's post-annexation justifications are highlighted by much of its political class as hewing to the international values championed by the West, including humanitarian intervention and national self-determination. By highlighting the legality and morality of the annexation, Russia seeks to put itself on par with the West (Rotaru 2019, 3-4). The legal argument for the right to self-determination of Crimea's population serves as a testimony to this. The crux of this rationale is not only that Crimea is Russian for a raft of legal, historical, and demographic reasons and should, therefore, have a right to self-determination, but also that its population actively hankered for secession even before 2014. This desire for secession was allegedly galvanized by the ousting of Ukraine's pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych (Deliagin 2015, 9-11). Due to the budding perceptions of the Euromaidan forces as Russophobic chauvinists who were being held at bay by Yanukovych's leadership, his removal from office augured a threatening climate for the Crimean Russians. According to this argument, Crimea should have the right to secession as an ethnic enclave, especially in light of the precedent set by the West in making the Albanian-majority Kosovo an independent polity against the violent protest of Serbia (Rotaru 2019, 9-10). Putin pays special heed to this Kosovo precedent in his speech, using it to decry the West for hypocrisy by lamenting that "For some reason, things that Kosovo Albanians (and we have full respect for them) were permitted to do, Russians, Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars in Crimea are not allowed" (Putin 2014). This forms the mainstay of the argument for the right to Crimean self-determination: an ethnic enclave, distinct from the state under which it is formally attached, desires and should have the right to determine its national future. This right and desire were prioritized given the enclave's sense of endangerment by a hostile government and the pre-existing desire for self-determination.

The use of a referendum underscores this need to play by the West's rules. In using a widely recognized mechanism, Russia could claim a fair and democratic secession process (Rotaru 2019, 6). Indeed, this was hailed by Sputnik's report of an 83.1% turnout, of which 96.77% voted in favour of reunification with Russia (Sputnik 2018). Not only was the annexation in accordance with an idealized international legal precedent, but it was also facilitated by democratic means and received with soaring popularity by the locals. As shown, the legitimizing narrative's aim to establish Crimea as an indelible part of Russia and to portray its population as longing for secession lends itself quite predictably to the argument made for the legality of the annexation. The allegation that Russian Crimea was potentially in danger from Russophobic forces added a douse of urgency to the situation.

The second part of the narrative builds the moral argument. This is that the occupation of Crimea was a humanitarian mission launched to keep peace in the region and to protect Crimea's Russian population from neo-Nazi elements sanctioned by the new Kyiv government (Deliagin 2015, 9-23). Russia's foreign minister Sergey Lavrov echoed this argument when he said of Russia's intervention that it "prevented bloodshed there. It prevented a rerun of the Maidan type of protests and war, which later erupted in the South-East" (Lavrov 2014). The emphasis on preventing 'bloodshed' as opposed to instability or chaos couches the venture in humanitarian language meant to belie the security concerns at play, which would have detracted from the benevolent aura being built around the occupation. However, the gist of this moral argument is that the Ukrainian far-right, which dominated the Rada, was giving free rein to neo-Nazi paramilitary groups in Crimea. The post-Yanukovych Ukrainian government is hostile to Russian ethnics due to their fascistic ideology which mandates ethnic homogeneity. Therefore, they are not likely to protect the Russian minority in Crimea from being terrorized by neo-Nazi paramilitary groups. Putin's description of the architects of Yanukovych's ousting as "Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites…" who "continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day" brings this

view to bear (Putin 2014). He later points to Kiev's decision to abolish Russian as a regional language as a bellwether for its drift into fascism.

This event was quickly reported by RT, whose article opens by stating "Ukraine's swift abolition of the law allowing the country's regions to make Russian a second official language has worried European MPs and officials and has been condemned outright as a 'violation of ethnic minority rights' by Russian diplomats" (RT February 2014). Furthermore, the violent altercation between pro-Russian and pro-Maidan demonstrators in May 2014 which resulted in the burning of a trade union building and the deaths of 39 people (predominantly Russians), was quickly mobilized as posthoc proof of a neo-Nazi paramilitary presence. RT reported this event in an article published on May 2, 2014, alleging that it was pro-Kiev 'radicals' donning far-right insignia who surrounded the building and set it on fire (RT May 2014). In short, the contention being made is that neo-Nazi paramilitaries and a hostile government pose a danger to Russians in Crimea. Following this, the Russian state has a special obligation to intervene and prevent any such danger from being realized.

Realities on the Ground

While these arguments contain fulcrums of truth, they do not entirely suffice as an explanation for why Russia annexed Crimea. The first and most pertinent legal prerequisite for militarily aiding a self-determination movement is that the movement at hand be *bona fide*. That is, to be genuine it must have sprung into existence organically, often developing over a course of many years (Grant 2015, 8-9). This criterion stems from a consensus reached by a variety of states in dealing with the very same Kosovo precedent Putin likened to the annexation. As mentioned, it also necessarily entails a long-term course of development to be *bona fide*. This requirement is made all the more manifest by another criterion allowing for the use of force only after *protracted* efforts within the legal order (Grant 2015, 9). By stressing the strong Russian identification of the Crimean majority, as well as claiming its desire for self-determination was longstanding, the Kremlin sought to establish the movement for secession as *bona fide* in its legal sub-argument.

However, both the notion of a Russian co-national and the claim of their pre-existing desire for self-determination does not hold up under scrutiny. To begin with, Eleanor Knott's study of identity in Crimea between 2011 and 2013 attenuates the idea of a Russian-majority and completely dispels the claim of a longstanding, majority desire for secession. Much of the research undertaken regarding identity in Crimea poses its questions in unitary terms: Russian *or* Ukrainian, Tatar *or* Jewish, etc.., which is not how many in the region identify, regarding themselves in more mixed terms instead. While it is true that among various identity options a Russian identification prevails, this answer is forced onto certain respondents as a second preference in the absence of more nuanced options. This error in conducting a spate of censuses ratchets up the number of 'Russian' residents, who might otherwise identify in less rigid terms (Knott 2018, 4).

Nevertheless, the Russian population of Crimea still forms an indisputable majority. Though even this fact does not clearly lend itself to Russia's argument for legality. Knott's study finds a two-fold division between self-identifying Russians in Crimea: there are those who feel a cultural loyalty to Russia but no similar allegiance to the Russian Federation and there are those 'discriminated' Russians, who do profess some allegiance to the Kremlin (12-13). However, even among this latter group, an overwhelming majority did not support any kind of separatism in 2012 and 2013, mostly because of its potentially destabilizing effects (14-16). To be sure, the tumult of the Euromaidan movement likely swayed this group's opinions in a pro-secession direction, but a matter of months is not enough time for a *bona fide* self-determination movement to arise (Grant 2015, 86-87). This study shows that the undercurrent pressing for secession among Russians in Crimea was anything but longstanding and that there was, in fact, a splintering of opinion among

them on the question of separatism. In other words, in the years immediately prior to the annexation of Crimea there were extremely low levels of secessionist aspirations among the group most likely to hold them and not all self-described Russians felt a sense of loyalty to the Russian Federation. In light of these facts, the Russian claim to have been acting on behalf of a legitimate self-determination movement does not stand.

As to the referendum itself, the fact that it was widely condemned as not being up to UN standards discredits the Russian claim of a perfectly legitimate secession process (Grant 77). Indeed, this skepticism was voiced in the *Forbes* article "How Russia Rigged the Crimea Referendum", which points to the 123% turnout in the city of Sevastopol alongside a report that a journalist from Kiev was allowed to vote after showing his Russian passport. This raised the possibility that occupying Russian soldiers were allowed to vote by authorities regulating the process. The article also notes widespread allegations of voter intimidation, including a public beating by pro-secession militiamen (Adesnik 2014). The referendum was itself mired in corruption and does not dovetail with the Kremlin's claim to legal legitimacy.

Finally, despite constant reference to 'compatriots', the Russian state has a notoriously amorphous definition of this term. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian policymakers failed to reach a consensus on how a Russian national ought to be defined; vying conceptions ranged along linguistic, ethnic and religious lines, with some proposing even Ukrainians and Belarusians be included (Shevel 2011, 187-188). Rather than settle for a specific national definition, this ambiguity was codified in the 1999 Compatriots Law, which conferred much greater diplomatic and strategic leeway in Russia's dealings with its near abroad. Not only is the legal rationale for the Crimean Russians' right to national self-determination more tenuous in this light, seeing as there is no concrete definition of a Russian national, but it also signals the self-interestedness of the Russian state. The fact that this ambiguity was codified rather than resolved for the sake of flexibility in its foreign policy indicates the Federation's designs on most of the post-Soviet space. During deliberations over the Compatriots Law and its 2010 amendments, one of the greater dilemmas was whether or not to categorize Russians living in Ukraine as compatriots. If they did not, they would doom their ethnic kin to disaffection. Though if they did, they ran the equally undesirable risk of alienating all of Ukraine, which was as much their province (Shevel 195-196). The intentionally ambiguous definition of a Russian national indicates opportunism on the part of the Russian state, which in turn suggests insincerity in its claim to be acting for self-determination.

The moral argument for the occupation and annexation stands on sturdier ground, though it too cannot be an impetus. In an opinion piece published by *The Guardian*, Ukrainian academic Olexiy Haran accurately points to the multi-ethnic, liberal nature of the Euromaidan protests, which were sparked by an Afghan-born journalist's social media post and whose first victim was an ethnic Armenian. Haran frames the Kremlin's rhetoric regarding the far-right presence in Ukraine as a mere ploy to justify its aggression (Haran 2014). By cloaking the developments in Ukraine with terms such as 'fascist' and 'Nazi', the Russian leadership shrewdly capitalizes on the enormous reserve of anti-fascist sentiment imbued by the Russian national consciousness after the Soviet Union's epochal war with Nazi Germany. This is meant to garner domestic support in addition to foreign sympathy for its occupation (Biersack and O'Lear 2014, 254-255).

While one might argue Haran underplays the far-right presence in Ukraine, another Guardian article published the same day scrutinizes the Kremlin's allegations of a far-right putsch in greater detail. Luke Harding draws attention to the minority presence of the once-avowedly fascist *Svoboda* in the Rada, though notes its perception among Western observers and minority communities within Ukraine as having been largely moderated since a leadership change in 2004.

In emphasizing the multi-ethnic makeup of the post-Yanukovych leadership and drawing attention to the murkiness surrounding far-right paramilitaries in the east, the reader is compelled to draw the same conclusion Haran puts forth in his op-ed (Harding 2014). Namely, that the far-right menace is at best an exaggeration of grotesque proportions. The alarmist bent of Russian media on this point starkly contrasts with more tempered Western reporting. The Odessa building fire, for instance, was rightly reported by CNN as being in an ongoing state of investigation, such that the perpetrators could not be identified. Perhaps unfairly, the article ignores all mention of a reported far-right presence (Walsh, Carter and Butenko 2014).

Furthermore, the Russian claim to have been preventing the 'bloodshed' of which Lavrov speaks, as well as the threat to the Russian minority more generally were not backed up by any governments or international organizations at the time (Grant 2015, 81). Within a year of the annexation, the only other states to acknowledge Crimea as a part of Russia were Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela (Sterio 2015, 296-297). Conspicuously absent were some of Russia's most reliable international supporters, including Kazakhstan and Belarus, whose dithering on recognition dealt a partial rebuke to the Russian leadership's pretension to legitimacy. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko's description of the referendum as a "bad precedent" days after it was held only furthered this taint on Russia's narrative (RFE 2014). Indeed, the mass exodus of Ukrainians and Tatars following the annexation and not after the ousting of Yanukovych indicates minorities were more apprehensive at the prospect of Russian rule than post-Euromaidan Ukraine (Grant 2015, 86-87). In sum, the notion that the Ukrainian government is a far-right junta is demonstrably false, while the alleged paramilitary presence was far too nebulous to plausibly constitute an impetus for invasion and annexation of the peninsula.

Conclusion

Russia's legitimating narrative cannot itself be invoked as a justification for the annexation of Crimea, but the sub-arguments it generates are more substantive. The essence of this legitimating narrative is that Crimea is an indispensable part of Russia- legally, historically, and demographically- and that Russian Crimea was endangered by far-right elements in post-Yanukovych Ukraine. However, the derivative arguments for legally aiding a self-determination movement and protecting a threatened population in a humanitarian mission do not hold up under scrutiny. The facts outlined suggest the legitimizing narrative's components were more likely pretexts for annexation as opposed to the actual driving forces for it. Russian anxieties about neo-Nazism in Ukraine are understandable, given its history of occupation by Nazi Germany and Stepan Bandera's concurrent puppet regime in Ukraine. However, this history was also cynically wielded by the Russian elite in a bid to offset the blowback from an invidious foreign policy decision.

The sub-arguments proffered by Russia are essentially pretexts for Crimea's annexation and therefore one can extrapolate its entire legitimizing narrative to be an ad hoc maneuver. This is not necessarily predictive of its real motivations, many of which are still being debated, but rather indicative of the way the Kremlin mobilizes history, identity, and Western international norms to project power in its near-abroad. A similar narrative accompanied Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 (Rotaru 2019), and such means of legitimization are sure to persist in Russia's future foreign policy.

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

Defending Human Rights Through Social Action: The Role of the Catholic Church in Latin America in the 1960s–1980s

By Madelyn Evans

Author Note "The who have a voice must speak for those who are voiceless." -- Oscar Romero (Salvadoran Roman Catholic archbishop and activist, c.1917-1980)

I would like to thank my parents for instilling a love for writing, reading, and a curiosity about the world around me from a young age. I would also like to thank Professor Manuel Balan for furthering my interest in Latin American politics and for putting so much passion into his lectures. Additionally, this paper would not have been possible without the help of my POLI 319 TA, Aidan Gilchrist-Blackwood. Finally, I would like to thank my editors, Avery Franken and Sara Gangbar, for their guidance and insight along the way. As someone passionate about human rights, it was fascinating to delve into a crucial moment in the human rights movement in which the idea of human rights became a legitimate force in national politics and international diplomacy. I hope you enjoy reading.

Abstract Since the earliest days of colonization, religion – in particular, the Roman Catholic Church – has been a driving force in the Latin American politics, economics, and society. As the region underwent frequent political instability and high levels of violence, the Church remained a steady, powerful force in society. This paper will explore the relationship between the Catholic Church and the struggle to defend human rights during the particularly oppressive era of bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America throughout the 1960s–1980s. This paper seeks to demonstrate that the Church undertook the struggle to protect human rights because its modernized social mission sought to support the oppressed suffering from the political, economic, and social status quo. In challenging the legitimacy of the ruling national security ideology and illuminating the moral dimensions of violence, the Catholic Church became a crucial constructive agent in spurring social change, mitigating the effects of violence, and setting a democratic framework for the future.

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Introduction

Since the earliest days of colonization, religion – particularly the Roman Catholic Church – has been a driving force in Latin American politics, economics, and society. Following independence in the early 1800s, the Catholic Church maintained its dominance and was established as the official religion in many countries across the region (Anderson, Ramirez, and Smith 2018). As Latin America underwent frequent political instability and high levels of violence, the Church remained a steady, powerful force in society. In the 1950s, processes of social activism began to emerge throughout Latin America, and encouragement coming from within the Church to abandon the institution's historic ties to the political and economic elite emerged (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 224). The Church's inclination to prioritize the concerns of the socially disadvantaged intensified with the wave of military-backed bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes which swept through Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. The bureaucratic-authoritarian state, composed of high-level technocrats and the upper bourgeoisie, sought to develop more stable political systems to ensure future economic progress (221). These objectives, however, were pursued in an atmosphere of severe political and social repression with little regard for the economic well-being of the poor (221). In the process of promoting political stability, regimes systematically violated an extensive spectrum of human rights by arresting, deporting, or killing anyone who opposed government policies (Smith 1979, 89). The events, which occurred under the harsh bureaucratic-authoritarian rule across Latin America, became a major focus for the emerging human rights movement, giving global prominence to issues of violence and violations of civil liberties. During this period of largely state-sponsored violence, forms of Church-based activism took on a particular urgency (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 221).

This paper explores the relationship between the Catholic Church and the struggle to defend human rights in Latin America throughout the 1960s–1980s. First, this paper analyzes the factors which spurred the Church's growing involvement in the human rights movement and renewed commitment to social justice, and explains why its impetus to take part in constructive social action can be traced to institutional changes within the Church, the emergence of Liberation Theology, and societal pressures from below. Next, this paper assesses strategies the Church employed to enact social and political change, including public condemnations at the national level through letters and position papers, Church-sponsored "base ecclesial communities," and the establishment of grassroots humanitarian social programs. Finally, this paper discusses the impacts of the Church's involvement in the human rights cause, examining how it redefined its relationship with the State, provided alternate forms of participation, and illuminated the moral dimensions of violence. Overall, this paper demonstrates that the Church undertook the struggle to protect human rights because its modernized social mission sought to support oppressed groups suffering from the political, economic, and social status quo. In challenging the legitimacy of the national security ideology and empowering the poor, the Catholic Church became a crucial constructive agent in spurring social change, mitigating the effects of violence, and setting a democratic framework for the future.

Impetus for Change: Factors for Church-Based Activism in Defense of Human Rights

Historically, in Latin America, the Catholic Church was associated with perpetuating a status quo which favoured elites. By the 1950s, however, many began to question the Church's political role as the defender of privilege (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 221). As actors within the Church began to engage with social movements, many clergy members were inspired to advocate politically on behalf of the poor (Hale 2019). The relationship which evolved between the Church and the lower socioeconomic classes of society during the authoritarian era of state violence was partly spurred by major institutional changes in the Church on an international scale. A preeminent

change was the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II), held from 1962 to 1965, which addressed relations between the Catholic Church and the modern world and set the institution's course for the future (Teicher 2012). Vatican II initiated fundamental theological developments which challenged the Church to *aggiornamento* – the notion of rethinking and "bringing up to date" its religious mission concurrent with modernization (Teicher 2012). The Council's adaptation of a universal church, referring to the entire body of the Church collectively, to national and local cultures, acknowledgment of the presence of God in other religions (such as Latin America's indigenous communities), and additional reforms led to the reshaping of the Latin American religious and political landscape (Cleary and Steigenga 2004, 9). Following Vatican II, the Catholic Church adopted an active social mission and began publicly defending human rights against repressive regimes (Wilde 2016, 2). Under the influence of new pastoral ministries, missionaries, and internal reform initiated by bishops, the Catholic Church was renewed in numerous sectors (Cleary and Steigenga 2004, 8). The 1968 Medellín Conference of Latin American Bishops (CELAM) held in Medellín, Colombia reinforced these trends (9). At Medellín, Latin American bishops pushed for an intensified engagement with secular social forces in order to "remove obstacles holding back fuller, freer lives for the majority of the region's people" (Wilde 2016, 8). As a result, millions of lay persons became more active with the Church and its social justice mission.

A second crucial factor which prompted the Church's growing involvement in the human rights movement was the emergence of Liberation Theology. Spurred by the 1968 Medellín Conference, Liberation Theology was an original body of religious thought addressing how Christians should respond to historical injustice, inequality, and poverty in the context of ongoing political violence (Wilde 2016, 8). Described as the "true inspiration for the region's human rights movement," Liberation Theology was crucial in providing the ideological foundation for religious action; it proposed that the Church, both as a people and an institution, should exert a more active role in society (Estévez 2014). Supporters of the theology advocated social action to promote justice, upholding the role of lay and clerical leadership as the basis of change (Cleary and Steigenga 2004, 9). Some based their argument for social action upon Bible scriptures that described the mission of Jesus Christ, interpreting the sacred text as a call to action against poverty to achieve Christ's mission of justice (Meredith 2016). The Peruvian priest, Gustavo Gutiérrez, became the theology's primary proponent, publishing his groundbreaking work entitled *A Theology of Liberation* in 1971 (Dault 2014, 46). Gutiérrez emphasized the Church's mission to support powerless individuals who lived on the margins of society and is credited for popularizing the phrase "preferential option for the poor," a central tenet of Liberation Theology (Dear 2011). The "preferential option for the poor" refers to a trend throughout biblical texts where there is a distinct preference given to the poorest individuals in society (Cleary and Steigenga 2004, 9). The Liberation Theology movement fully embraced the concept, specifically associating the plight of the poor, oppressed, and vulnerable with Jesus himself (Dault 2014, 46). Following this liberation argument, later theologians, such as Ignacio Ellacuría, advanced the idea of human rights as "rights of the poor" (Dault 2014, 46). The development of Liberation Theology was monumental because, for the first time, formal religious theology used biblical interpretation to "promote the political and social influence of the Church in the empowerment of the poor" (Singer).

The development of Liberation Theology largely influenced Latin American society. It catalyzed religious debate about violence which lead to broader social action and challenged followers of the Catholic Church to serve as "active witness[es] in a violent world" (Wilde 2016, 8). The theology created an ideological frame that both emboldened clergy to support political causes for the poor and encouraged Catholic laity to live their faith through organized social action (Hale 2019). Moreover, Liberation Theology led to the general acceptance among Church followers that

faith should take a progressive role in societies afflicted with conflict. Such activism would not only allow the faithful to embrace scripture, but also to maintain religious influence over society. Interconnected with the ideological framework created by Liberation theology are fundamental biblical tenets of Christian faith espousing nonviolence, which, in turn, necessitates religious action. In the Bible, scripture dictates "thou shalt not kill" and "blessed are the peacemakers" (Wilde 2016, 7). The Church hence felt obliged to take action against violence, poverty, and human suffering, especially as violence was perpetuated by the State. In response to the expansion of theological trends, proponents of Liberation Theology used human rights discourse to defend those tortured, detained, and kidnapped under the regimes of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia, as well as other countries (Estévez 2014). Overall, it is evident that the remarkable growth and influence of Liberation Theology served as an ideological foundation and catalyst for religious action.

A final crucial factor which spurred Church-based activism was the need to meet popular dissatisfaction with the status quo. Although the policy of promoting human rights was legitimized in the Medellín documents of 1968, the agenda for human rights did not become a conscious priority of the Church's national hierarchies until they were compelled to act by pressures from below (Smith 1979, 116). Such pressure came from base-level activism among lower churches and from outside ecclesiastical institutions (116). Though the Church's "preferential option for the poor" provided the theoretical foundations for supporting the underprivileged, the Church's priorities shifted to more closely identify with the lower classes when the poor placed urgent demands on the Church's time and resources. Under authoritarian regimes throughout the period, there were abrupt economic changes as Latin American states pushed for nationalization efforts, such as import substitution industrialization, to create economic systems independent from the global economy (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 221). The effects of such rapid economic changes disproportionately impacted the poor, increasing their demands for political and social reform (Singer). The Church acted in response to public pressure because many impoverished members of society had nowhere else to go for aid (Smith 1979, 116). In the context of a repressive society, churches were one of the last remaining organizations with any relative degree of freedom to act because authoritarian rulers found it particularly difficult to suppress religious identities, movements, and associations (Mantilla 2016, 272). Furthermore, the lower classes demonstrated the greatest willingness to participate in the Church's new evangelical efforts, offering the Church opportunities to enhance its institutional power by aiding them (Smith 1979, 119). The cause for human rights, including the protection of basic civil and political rights, was highly relevant in society, particularly in the context of severe repression. The Church promoted "human rights" as a broad ideal which encompassed social, economic, and cultural dimensions—all the rights they deemed necessary for the "fuller life that God intended for humanity" (Wilde 2016, 11). Advocating for the protection of human rights became a new priority for the Church and allowed them to maintain a say in political matters. By involving itself in the human rights cause, the Church could uphold its relevance in ordinary people's lives. Hence, in the context of the abrupt changes occurring throughout Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, the Church needed to continue addressing the needs of its followers to ensure that it remained a predominant force in society (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 227).

Addressing Violence and Injustices in Society: The Strategies of the Church

After adopting its new active social mission in defense of human rights, the Catholic Church employed various strategies to spur political, economic, and social changes to the status quo. To address different forms of violence in society, the Church utilized public condemnations both to criticize governments' social and economic policies and to disclose their human rights

violations. At the 1968 CELAM conference, bishops proposed the theological/pastoral method "to see, to judge, to act" as a primary strategy to spread the Catholic faith and meet the social, economic, and political needs of their followers (De La Torre 2009, 114). Inspired by the methodology, Catholic bishops and priests took public stands against human rights injustices and abuses of power at the national level (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 222). Members of the clergy exposed the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes through the wide distribution of statements, letters, and position papers which highlighted the injustices committed. Pastoral letters of bishops in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile, for example, emphasized the "connection between violation[s] of classic civil rights and the desire upon the part of wealthy elites to preserve their economic power" (Smith 1979, 90). These letters blamed those who benefited from military rule at the root of the problems disadvantaging the poor. They also denounced crimes committed under military regimes, including murder, torture, kidnapping, and the denial of rights to a fair trial and habeas corpus. In distributing these letters, bishops underscored what they believed were the deeper underlying causes of the unjust economic structures, maldistribution of land and wealth, and systematic violations of human rights. Through the dissemination of information, bishops were empowered to criticize the pervasiveness of the era's ideology of national security which subjugated the rights of citizens to the dominance of the State. (90)

The tactic of episcopal and pastoral letters was also utilized to articulate the Church's call for social and economic change. Episcopal letters urged secular leaders to redistribute land and economic resources, respect independent labor unions, and fairly apply the law to limit government power (90). Catholic leaders identified with the plight of the poor, vigorously defending the rights of those violated and imploring existing governments and landed elites to enact change (90). In addition to public statements and letters, the Church's "see-judge-act" method was underscored by the establishment of research centers and intellectual networking among pastoral agents across the region (De La Torre 2009, 114). Church bodies produced research which publicly exposed the defections and harm caused by government action and inaction (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 222). In utilizing widely distributed rhetoric to enact social change, the Church exposed the systematic violations of human rights committed under political regimes and the inherent flaws within their institutional structures.

Church-sponsored mass movements, known as "base ecclesial communities" (*comunidades eclesiales de base* or CEBs), were another key strategy used to enact social and political change (De La Torre 2009, 114). In essence, base ecclesial communities were transnational religious associations engaged in various devotional practices and enable their members to "live out their Christian faith more fully in the world" (Smith 1979, 122). Though not fundamentally created for political purposes, these organizations had profound sociopolitical implications for the societies where they operated. Many CEBs throughout the 1970s and 1980s were involved in collective political activism, including workers' strikes, mass rallies, and petitioning campaigns to improve the local quality of life (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 224). The rise of CEBs can be traced to the early 1960s, in the midst of the new, socially progressive Church teachings emerging from the Second Vatican Council which drew attention to the problems facing the lowest social classes (Beezley and Ewell 2001, 240). The importance of CEBs' role in society was reaffirmed at subsequent episcopal meetings in Medellín, Colombia in 1968 and Puebla, Mexico in 1979 (241).

At the heyday of the CEB phenomenon (during the late 1970s and early 1980s), there were approximately "3 to 4 million people active in many tens of thousands of these groups" across the region's rural areas and urban outskirts (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 224). The extent of the CEBs across Latin America reflected the desire for political expression among the poor and oppressed. Following 1960, after the military seized power in multiple countries and cut off

traditional avenues of protest, the lower classes increasingly looked to the Church for guidance and protection (Beezley and Ewell 2001, 241). To address their grievances, the Church offered the CEBs as spaces where the poor could voice their dissatisfaction with repressive government policies without fear of persecution. Linked to what was described as a "culture of repression" was the notion that many in Latin American society, particularly the lower classes, remained disengaged from politics because they believed their involvement would make no difference (Smith 1994, 123). In an atmosphere where many had become disenchanted with politics, cynical about government corruption, and fearful of state-sponsored violence, CEBs fostered a critical "attitude of engaged criticism" (122). CEBs thus served as a vital force for institutional activism, giving a voice to those previously excluded from a restrictive political arena.

A final tactic the Catholic Church employed to address human rights was the establishment of grassroots social programs and humanitarian aid efforts. Starting in the early 1970s, churches across Latin America created social and pastoral programs to respond to the needs of those who bore the brunt of repression under military dictatorships (Smith 1979, 91). Church-sponsored organizations focused on the promotion of human rights, carrying out both legal and humanitarian functions. Programs funded by the Church bolstered the defense of classic civil rights, including "the right of habeas corpus, the right to a fair trial, [and] the right to be protected against torture" (117). Church services also aided in improving the living conditions in jails, including permitting prison visits, enhancing communication between detainees and their families, and providing medicine, clothing, and food for relatives of prisoners (117). In Northeastern Brazil, a region well-regarded for its grassroots self-help programs, Archbishop Dom Hélder Câmara founded "Operation Hope" in 1967 (122). The agency sponsored projects in literacy training, health, housing, and recreation across thirteen urban and rural communities in the Recife-Olinda diocese, demonstrating the importance of such initiatives (122).

The Church also supported the lower classes by funding various regional agencies and commissions. In Brazil, for example, the Church supported agencies protecting specific interest groups, including the Pastoral Land Commission, the Indigenous Missionary Council, and the Peace and Justice Commission (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 224). In Chile, the Committee of Cooperation for Peace was formed in 1973 as the first active human rights organization in the country. The Committee established a wide range of services for those suffering under General Augusto Pinochet's military regime, including soup kitchens in urban working-class areas, assistance to arbitrarily dismissed workers, self-help projects for the unemployed, and medical aid in areas lacking public health clinics (Smith 1979, 122). Between 1973 and 1975, the Committee for Peace sponsored over 100,000 people in need of legal, medical, or economic assistance (122). In each of these countries, the new Church-sponsored programs were sustained through the financial and material support provided by churches across Western Europe and the United States. International networks along with grassroots efforts facilitated a transfer both of aid and information regarding the extent of the human rights violations. The international network of churches thus gave the Catholic Church in Latin America an important capacity for action to defend human rights through its humanitarian efforts (116).

Impacts and Implications of the Church's Active Defense of Human Rights

The Catholic Church's robust expansion into social and political issues throughout the 1960s–1980s, after its renewed mission of social justice, left several lasting legacies. One of the most significant implications of the Church's social actions was that it redefined the Church's relationship with the State. By denouncing violent acts perpetrated by state agents as violations of fundamental human rights, the Church refused to legitimize the regimes, arguing that the State was not upholding its intrinsic responsibility to protect legally-enshrined liberties (Wilde 2016, 7).

Furthermore, the commitment to modernize its religious mission at Vatican II and the emergence of Liberation Theology encouraged a break from elitist notions of the Church and instead promoted the prioritization of the lower classes (Singer). Liberation Theology associated itself with the plight of the impoverished, and in promoting the poor's interests in the Church's religious, social, and political agenda, both the relationship between the Church and the State *and* the Church and the people were dramatically transformed (Singer). In the context of the intensifying repression under the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the Church felt obliged to address violence because it was the State perpetrating it. Bishops, pastors, and other religious figures explicitly condemned governments' economic and political policies and exposed the injustices they orchestrated. In some cases, national churches went so far as to commit themselves institutionally to an oppositional stance against the State (Daudelin and Hewitt 1995, 221). In retaliation, military regimes jailed, deported, or murdered many who opposed the government's policies, including those within the Church (221). The Church's various forms of religious activism and criticism—and the government's response to it—strained the relationship between the institutional Church and the State "to the breaking point," a transformation which left lasting implications (221).

Another significant impact of the Church's social involvement was its success in providing alternate forms of participation at the domestic level. The base ecclesial communities and other lay training programs served as "social incubators" for future generations of leaders among the lower classes (Smith 1979, 118). Not only did these associations offer opportunities for oppressed members of society to participate in the Church's mission, but they also provided the poor with a sense of hope and solidarity (118). These organizations nourished "a critical consciousness" as well as a "spirit of resistance" among peasants, laborers, and Indigenous people – a development which was crucial in setting the stage for future social and political engagement (118). The CEBs also empowered members to develop their organizational, communication, and leadership skills, providing the experience necessary for future political mobilization (Smith 1994, 124). The proliferation of these associations among civil society contributed to the bottom-up process of democratization which would occur in Latin America over the next several decades. Overall, the alternate forms of participation created by the Church successfully alleviated the impact of repression generated by military regimes and, simultaneously, laid the foundations for eventual structural transformations towards democratization (Smith 1979, 118).

A final crucial impact to address was the Church's role in illuminating the moral dimensions of violence through its defense of human rights, which, in turn, challenged the legitimacy of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes' national security ideology. The sociopolitical circumstances of Latin America in the 1960s to 1980s gave the Church a new way to understand and address violence (Wilde 2016, 6). As a region of primary focus for the global human rights movement, churches across Latin America served as significant actors in legitimating the notion of human rights and establishing methods to address and protect them (6). Thus, one of the most profound ways in which the Church influenced society throughout the era of bureaucratic-authoritarianism lies at the deeper ideological level. In providing an alternative moral perspective and force, the Catholic Church challenged the legitimacy of the national security ideology— an ideology underlying the systemic violence and human rights violations during the era (Smith 1979, 118). The Church accepted that certain values – those rights "fundamental to human life, universal and inherent in the human condition" – should be enshrined in law (Wilde 2016, 7). The grounding of human rights in law implicitly carried with it a moral commitment to nonviolence (7). Though the Church made similar theological and moral appeals before, their involvement in the human rights cause was transformative in that it called for concrete means of protecting such rights via laws

and legal institutions. The Church, therefore, played a crucial role in laying the groundwork for future political shifts in the region.

Conclusion

Over the course of this paper, the relationship between the Catholic Church and the human rights movement in Latin America during the era of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes was examined. In assessing the factors which spurred the Church's sociopolitical involvement, the Church's renewed commitment to take part in social action was traced to institutional changes within the Church, the development of Liberation Theology, and pressures to respond to popular dissatisfaction among the poor. The methods the Church used to enact social and political change were also examined, including public denunciations of the regimes' injustices, the widely influential base ecclesial communities, and the funding of humanitarian programs aimed at underprivileged members of society. Finally, the impacts of the religious institution's embrace of human rights were assessed, including the implications of the Church's redefined relationship with the State, the opening of civil society through alternate forms of political participation, and the Church's moral success in challenging the legitimacy of the regimes' national security ideology. Above all, it is evident that in modernizing its social mission, the Church and its internal agents were empowered to embrace the plight of the lower classes. By responding to the state-sponsored violence of the various military dictatorships in defense of the people, the Church served as a catalyzing force in the human rights cause. The violations of basic civil and political rights endemic throughout the 1960s–1980s remain a relevant and pressing concern in Latin America today. The advancement of human rights, though of less focus for religious advocacy groups now than in the past, persists as a necessary cause in conflict-plagued societies. Although the Church has adapted its approaches throughout history, progressive Catholic activists continue to embrace human rights as a touchstone in addressing conflict and violence. It is important to note that the role of the Catholic Church cannot be generalized across Latin American society as a solely positive force; its conservative branch still pushes a hardline agenda on issues of sex, sexuality, and reproductive rights. However, in civil society, Church-linked actors remain active in the lives of citizens through ecumenical efforts to educate people – especially women, rural populations, and indigenous communities – about their rights (Wilde 2016, 11). Thus, in spite of the wrenching changes the region has endured over the last half-century, the Catholic Church remains an influential presence in Latin America. In the years to come, the world will witness the Church's potential to continue evolving and embracing social action for a more just, peaceful, and democratic society.

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

The International Role in the Response to the HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa Following Violent Conflicts

By Evelyne Goulet, Jillian Horowitz, and Jordana Schiff

Author Note Our paper analyzes the response from the international community to the spread of HIV/AIDS during and after wars and genocide, with a particular focus on three case studies: Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Working on this paper allowed us to gain a greater understanding of an important, but often overlooked aspect of peacebuilding. We are extremely grateful for this unique opportunity to write a team research paper; it was definitely challenging, but also an extremely valuable experience. We would like to thank our editors, Sara and Maëna, for their detailed comments and dedicated work to help us improve this paper.

Abstract HIV/AIDS has been a global health issue for decades, one which has often been accelerated by genocide and civil war. This paper analyzes the effectiveness of the international community in dealing with the growth of the HIV/AIDS crisis following a period of violence, by focusing on three different case studies: Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. It concludes that the most effective and successful help from the international community against HIV/AIDS is comprised of financial, technical, and structural aid to counter the crisis, and includes collaboration with local governments. However, the international community faces shortcomings if the help it provides is only financial.

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Introduction

Human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) has been a global health crisis for decades. Africa, specifically, has struggled with this epidemic as there are almost 26 million Africans currently living with the disease (WHO Report 2009). This paper focuses on the HIV/AIDS health crisis that many African countries continue to face. Since these countries share certain socio-economic and environmental climates, they serve as strong case studies to explain the rapid increase in rates of HIV/AIDS-positive individuals as scholars can isolate certain variables to help account for the rise of the virus. In the contemporary context, Africa is enduring widespread challenges, ranging from economic marginalization to major health crises and political instability. Additionally, many African countries have weak security forces and, in numerous cases, cannot always provide adequate public services to their citizens (Olivier, Neethling, and Mokoena 2009, 49).

This paper presents societal conditions following civil war or genocide as major factors accounting for the dramatic spread of HIV/AIDS. Essentially, in conditions of poverty, powerlessness, and social instability, rates of infected patients will increase (Gisselquist 2004, 115). While some research points to war as a leading causal factor for higher rates of HIV/AIDS transmission, other research contradicts this claim. In his piece on violent conflict and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa, David Gisselquist cites cases in which HIV/AIDS prevalence rates decreased in periods of elongated wars, thus showing that there is no causal relationship between transmittance and extended periods of conflict. This approach explains the transmittance of HIV/AIDS during wartime conditions as a result of a lack of access to healthcare (115). This argument shifts the blame for transmittance from individuals to the use of unsterile equipment in healthcare infrastructure. According to this hypothesis, since war disrupts access to healthcare, the transmittance of HIV/AIDS is lower: people cannot access healthcare and are therefore not in contact with unsterile equipment. In times of peace with functioning healthcare infrastructure, HIV/AIDS transmittance emerges as a problem (115).

This paper analyzes the impact of wars and genocide on the spread of HIV/AIDS in three countries: Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. Each case presents a nuanced approach that offers insight into the effectiveness of international intervention during the peacebuilding processes in containing the spread of HIV/AIDS. This piece argues that the fight against HIV/AIDS is most successful when the international community provides financial, technical, and structural aid to counter the crisis, and works in collaboration with local governments; however, there are shortcomings if this international help is only financial. In Uganda, the use of the internationally sanctioned strategy to fight HIV/AIDS, as implemented by local NGOs, the local government and international organizations, proved a winning formula. In Sierra Leone, interventions orchestrated by the international community during the peacebuilding stage allowed the country to improve its HIV/AIDS prevalence rates and HIV/AIDS education. In contrast, in Rwanda, the government used the international community's lack of policy instruction on HIV/AIDS as a way to consolidate power in the state. Before delving into specific case studies, it is important to understand the steps taken by the international community at large to fight the epidemic in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these broader policies will also be applied to subsequent case studies.

The International Community and HIV/AIDS

HIV/AIDS is an ongoing, international struggle with detrimental outcomes that need to be addressed. This struggle has gained significant attention from international bodies, such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization (WHO). In 2001, the African Union (AU) took major steps to address the epidemic, including the Abuja Declaration. This pledge declared a state of emergency against the HIV/AIDS epidemic and committed the AU to fighting against it by

directing 15% of the AU's budget to the health sector (Opeyemi 2012, 46). It ultimately failed to achieve this commitment, instead relying on donor support for projects. The Abuja Declaration did succeed in improving HIV/AIDS diagnostics care, support, and prevention, and created space for higher coverage towards HIV/AIDS treatment (46-47). In 2005, the WHO passed the Maputo Resolution on the acceleration of HIV prevention efforts in the African region. This resolution called on member countries to declare 2006 a year for accelerated efforts towards HIV/AIDS prevention. Many UN agencies signed the Declaration to ensure synergy in implementing a joint plan to support containing the epidemic (47).

AU members also gathered in 2005 to sign the Gaborone Declaration, which advocated an integrated AIDS approach along detrimental to African communities (47). In 2006, the Brazzaville Commitment was launched, promising universal access in Africa by 2010 for HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, care, and support. Key principles of the agreement included the expansion of health, social, and development programs and services, recommendations for overcoming the main obstacles for HIV/AIDS, and highlighting areas that needed support, including finance, human resources, building and strengthening systems, affordable commodities, technology and essential medicines, human rights and gender, and fostering accountability (48). However, none of these efforts adopted by the AU and external international bodies considered frameworks for mitigating impacts of HIV/AIDS in the security sector. Instead, the approaches were heavily focused on the public health and development sectors (48).

The World Bank has become a major international actor in the fight against HIV/AIDS, initially launching its projects to combat HIV/AIDS in 1988. However, few African countries mounted projects with the help of the World Bank: countries' activities were sparse, program coverage was low, and few resources reached domestic civil societies or communities (Mohammad and Blankhart 2007, 11). At this point, the World Bank lacked an overarching strategy to combat HIV/AIDS. While demand from governments for support and assistance was low, few donors besides the World Bank were active; the World Bank averaged about 18 million dollars per year from 1988 to 1999 in funding to African countries. Nevertheless, African governments and the World Bank were failing to adequately confront HIV/AIDS (11).

By 1998, the World Bank recognized the need to offer proper support to African countries regarding the HIV/AIDS crisis. In 1999, they implemented a new plan called the Strategy Intensifying Action Against HIV/AIDS in Africa: Responding to a Development Crisis, which was a partnership between the World Bank, African governments, and UNAIDS (12). It called on the World Bank to increase its advocacy to boost demand for action against HIV/AIDS as a central development issue, strengthen the banks' capacity to meet the anticipated increase in demand, expand resources for AIDS programs, and circulate knowledge about the epidemic and effective response mechanisms (12). The goal was to put HIV/AIDS at the centre of the development agenda in Africa, with the World Bank as the leaders in this effort. After studies demonstrated that the World Bank was responding too slowly to the crisis, the international institution created a new program: The Multi-Country HIV/AIDS program (MAP), designed to ensure a faster, more comprehensive, and renewable strategy (12). MAP gave African nations the authority to approve individual countries or regions into the program if they met certain qualifications, including a unified approach to HIV/AIDS, high levels of AIDS coordinating bodies, agreement to both use accelerated implementation arrangements, and channel some of the project support to NGOs, faith-based groups, and the private sector (13).

Through MAP, there was a rapid increase in World Bank support for HIV/AIDS as the number of HIV/AIDS projects increased substantially. By the end of 2005, investment for HIV/AIDS reached over 2.75 billion dollars. Employing MAP's mechanisms, the World Bank

committed 1.286 billion dollars for HIV/AIDS support to Africa in just six years, which accounted for 47% of the World Bank's investments in fighting HIV/AIDS (13). MAP provided comprehensive support for national programs, supported strategic investments at the national level, and channeled funds directly at communities and civil society organizations while recognizing the role of social mobilization in combating HIV/AIDS. MAP was effective, so it raised the funding benchmark for other donors and helped countries by ensuring long-term support through guaranteed funds for 12-15 years to any country with a sound HIV/AIDS action plan (13-14). It also addressed four critical needs: a strong political and governmental commitment to an HIV/AIDS response, the creation of a conducive institutional and resource appropriate environment where HIV/AIDS interventions could be scaled up to a national level, the increase in community participation in HIV/AIDS efforts by providing financial resources and building capacity, and the move to a multi-sectoral approach involving many governmental and NGO actors, with improved coordination (14).The World Bank recognized that the initial HIV/AIDS mechanisms were too narrowly focused on the health sector and that they instead needed to develop mechanisms that were more complex in their approaches to social and individual behaviour. As a result, they shifted to a multifaceted approach (15).

International bodies made it a priority to help combat HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. While initial approaches aimed solely at the public health sector were failing, these organizations assessed their original initiatives' flaws and adapted them to make a difference. Countries realized that they needed to adopt a multifaceted approach, venturing beyond the health sector. Through initiatives like MAP, financial aid was distributed in strategic ways. Before a country was deemed eligible to receive funds, they needed plans in place on how to most effectively use the money they were receiving. While the global sphere's response was originally imperfect, these new mechanisms employed by the international community saw tremendous success and worked to create lasting efforts to combat HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Uganda

Following six years of fighting, the Ugandan civil war ended in 1986 with the National Resistance Army's (NRA) overthrow of President Tito Okello. This marked the first time in modern history that a locally based guerilla group successfully deposed an indigenous government (Kasozi 1994, 175). Yoweri Museveni, one of the main leaders of the NRA, became president and still serves today.

In "Civil War and the Spread of AIDS in Central Africa," M. R. Smallman-Raynor and A. D. Cliff explore the impact of the Ugandan conflict on the spread of HIV/AIDS in the country. Using least squares regression techniques, they illustrate the link between the ethnic recruitment of the Ugandan National Liberation Army and the spatial patterns of the spread of HIV in the 1980s through to the development of AIDS in the 1990s (Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 1991, 69). For example, many soldiers from northern Uganda travelled to the southern part of the country during the war, where HIV was spreading unnoticed, then brought back the disease with them after the war (78). The spread was facilitated by the widespread rape of women, who were potential carriers of the virus (Schoepf 2003, 554) as well as the use of prostitutes by soldiers (Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 1991, 78). Concurrently, the spread of HIV/AIDS in Uganda was also facilitated by existing behavioural norms, with condoms, one of the methods used to prevent the transmission, not well-regarded. For example, brides were often expected to get pregnant soon after their weddings, prompting many to abstain from using condoms without checking if they, or their partner, had a sexually transmissible disease (Schoepf 2003, 560). Furthermore, women in Uganda (and particularly Southern Uganda, where HIV/AIDS spread the most during the war) historically have not received support from the state and society when it comes to protection

from HIV/AIDS (Muriisa 2010, 609). Focus groups organized after the war revealed several misconceptions about the use of condoms; some believed that "condoms can slip off inside a woman during sex and will remain, causing infection and sterility," that they can spread HIV/AIDS, or are inefficient at protecting against HIV/AIDS (Schoepf 2003, 559). Therefore, the civil war in Uganda created a perfect storm for the spread of HIV/AIDS. While no data really exists as to the proportion of the population affected by HIV/AIDS before the war (partially because it was in the 1970s, when the disease was not well-documented), there is widespread consensus among scholars that the civil war dramatically increased the spread of the disease.

Nevertheless, Uganda is widely regarded as a success story when it comes to the control and reduction of HIV/AIDS after violent conflict. In 1986, at the end of the civil war, approximately 30% of adults in the country were HIV/AIDS-positive. By 1999, that number lowered to 9.9%, further decreasing to 5% by 2004 (Chickwendu 2004, 247). While HIV/AIDS is not eradicated in the country and 5% is considered a high rate according to international standards, the major decrease in the proportion of the population is a testimony to the effective strategy that was established during the peacebuilding process. The plan to counter the spread of HIV/AIDS consisted of a joint initiative between the Ugandan government and international organizations, which also involved local NGOs and faith-based organizations.

When Yoweri Museveni came to power at the end of the civil war, he immediately acknowledged the vast HIV/AIDS epidemic in Uganda, doing so publicly during a World Health Assembly in Geneva (247). This public recognition of the issue was significant in two ways. First, Museveni admitted to the problem before many other world leaders, particularly in Africa, were willing to discuss the virus publicly. This swift acknowledgment meant that potential solutions would come faster than they would in other countries, which likely reduced fatalities. The other reason why Museveni's public announcement was important is that it immediately involved the international community. As such, during the early days of the peacebuilding process in Uganda, Museveni made it clear that fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic would be a priority under his government and the international community was encouraged to help.

In the 1990s, the general strategy used in Uganda to combat HIV was based on the ABC method - A for "Abstinence," B for "Be Faithful," and C for "Condoms" developed by the WHO and UNAIDS (Schoepf 2003, 555). Therefore, to counter the spread of HIV/AIDS, the government relied on promoting tactics like increased abstinence, a decrease in the number of sexual partners, and more frequent use of condoms; however, these changes in behaviour cannot happen overnight. For the ABC method to prove efficient, it required structural efforts to enact behavioural changes. In the case of Uganda, these efforts came from four main places: the government, NGOs, faith-based organizations, and the international community.

Soon after his speech in front of the World Health Assembly, Museveni established the National AIDS Control Program (ACP) under the Ministry of Health (Hogle 2002, 4). The ACP, which was the first major governmental step towards a behavioural change, consisted of an "aggressive public media campaign that included print materials, radio, billboards, and community mobilization for a grass-roots offensive against HIV" (4). In 1992, the ACP was replaced by the Uganda AIDS Commission (UAC), which was tasked with duties including preparing a National Operational Plan to guide agencies and coordinate efforts between ministries (4). In 1989, the Ministry of Education, coordinating with UNICEF, introduced a 'family life' curriculum in schools to preach abstinence (Schoepf 2003, 556). The same year, the ministry also mandated that teachers integrate HIV and sexual education into their curricula (Hogle 2002, 5). There was also a focus from the government to empower girls and young women, including a new law to ensure that at least one-third of Parliament was female (5). This effort by Museveni and his party to correct

gender inequalities was due in part to the uneven burden placed on Ugandan women regarding HIV/AIDS. A study from a hospital in Kampala, Uganda's capital city, revealed that "only 12 percent of spouses of hospitalized seropositive men were aware of their husbands' HIV+ status" (Schoepf 2003, 557). Furthermore, Museveni ordered the Ugandan military to hold mandatory sex education courses that included condom demonstrations (561). When discussing the government's role, it is also important to note Museveni's powerful leadership on the issue. A UNICEF report on the actions taken in Uganda to fight the epidemic highlight his actions:

> In 1986, after 15 years of civil strife, Uganda's new head of state, President Yoweri Museveni, responded to evidence of a serious emerging epidemic with a proactive commitment to prevention that has continued to the present. In face-to-face interactions with Ugandans at all levels, he emphasized that fighting AIDS was a patriotic duty requiring openness, communication, and strong leadership from the village level to the State House (Hogle 2002, 4).

Museveni took personal responsibility to confront the HIV/AIDS crisis as soon as the war ended. He used the burgeoning civil society and new institutions, like the ministries, to implement concrete actions. Since Museveni took over a country destabilized by war, he had leeway to create his own path to respond to the crisis. By prioritizing the fight against HIV/AIDS, he led the creation of various government-sponsored programs that coordinated and supported the response to the crisis.

With this said, the Ugandan government did not handle the HIV/AIDS crisis on its own. NGOs played a large role in providing services and contributing to behavioural changes in Uganda. More generally, NGOs are recognized as an effective tool to deal with an HIV/AIDS epidemic, and Uganda is no exception (Muriisa 2010, 606). NGOs in Uganda emerged from the post-civil war society, providing tools for conversations about HIV/AIDS and helping to mobilize communities (608). An example of such an NGO is The AIDS Support Organisation (TASO), formed in 1987 by people directly affected by HIV/AIDS. TASO, which still exists today, is one of the largest organizations providing prevention, care, and support services for those with the virus. TASO volunteers mobilized both individual interactions and broader campaigns to share the experiences of those affected by HIV/AIDS and helped foster dialogue between spouses on sex and condom use. The organization also created a newsletter targeted at teenagers that circulated comprehensive information about sex and reproductive health (Schoepf 2003, 561). Further, it provided counselling, particularly for family members and men affected by the epidemic (Muriisa 2010, 617). International organizations used external funds to provide material help for the fight against HIV/AIDS, including distributing millions of condoms to Ugandan clinics (Hogle 2002, 8).

Furthermore, in post-war Uganda, the government did not have the means to create specialized counselling centres focused on HIV/AIDS, so it relied on TASO and other NGOs to fill in the gap. (Muriisa 2010, 618) The impact of TASO and other NGOs cannot be overstated:

> The new government fostered a vibrant civil society of voluntary associations that eventually included more than 1,000 AIDS NGOs. The extent of collaborative social mobilization is unique in Africa. This exemplary openness created an enabling context for change, with debate, dialogue and action. Rising numbers of deaths frightened many people and, along with the policy of openness, led to frank discussion and considerable culture change (Schoepf 2003, 554).

The peacebuilding process offered a unique opportunity for the creation of NGOs because the government could start on new foundations. The same can be said of voluntary associations because the end of the civil war created new opportunities.

Faith-based organizations, like churches, were also a prominent part of the effort to counter the HIV/AIDS crisis after the war. Since they wield important power in Africa, Museveni mobilized these institutions from the start to help fight the epidemic (Hogle 2002, 6). Mission

hospitals run by churches provided some of the first hospitals that developed programs to care for HIV/AIDS-positive individuals. In addition, they participated in education programs that advocated abstinence and a limited number of sexual partners (the A and the B of the ABC strategy) (6). The Protestant Church of Uganda organized a workshop for bishops and religious leaders to help with the implementation of AIDS education programs in dioceses (7). The Catholic Church of Uganda led programs for HIV/AIDS widows and children, including organizing mobile, home-based AIDS projects (7). Furthermore, these two churches were involved with the Uganda AIDS Commission. Out of the three chairpersons of the commission, one was an Anglican bishop and the other, a Catholic bishop (7). On the contrary, the involvement of religious organizations also had negative impacts on HIV/AIDS efforts. More precisely, they opposed the "C" in the ABC strategy – the use of condoms. The UNICEF plan to fight HIV/AIDS in Uganda was forced to downplay the importance of condom usage and education due to pressures from the Vatican (Schoepf 2003, 560). Furthermore, Museveni had to fight religious leaders in Uganda to allow NGOs to discuss and promote condom usage (561). Therefore, in this case, religious organizations tried to impose their restrictive views of contraception to limit the fight against HIV/AIDS. Without a strong leader like Museveni, the promotion of condoms might have been curbed because of these objectives.

Uganda was one of the first countries to heavily invest in the fight against HIV/AIDS. Its strategy was largely successful, as evinced by falling rates following the war and the start of international intervention. What made Uganda particularly effective was that it was able to combine international expertise with local groundwork and the plan, developed by external actors, was implemented by people with a succinct understanding of Ugandan's needs. The leadership of President Yoweri Museveni is notable, as he quickly asked for help and was personally involved in the crisis. One of the main lessons to draw from Uganda is the necessity of international actors to create broad strategies, and local actors to implement those strategies. The other main lesson comes from the reluctance and pressure of religious officials and organizations to promote the usage of condoms. While the help of the international community and faith-based organizations had positive outcomes for Uganda, it could also have limited the efficiency of the strategy. In sum, the host country needs to remain in control of the overall picture and implement a strategy that is not limited in its scope because of the values of external actors.

Sierra Leone

Between 1991 and 2002, Sierra Leone faced an 11-year civil war, bringing widespread human rights violations, massive population displacements, and over 50,000 deaths (Larsen et al. 2004, 240). The beginning of the civil war was marked by Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels invading from Liberia and terrorizing the rural and urban populations, living off profits from diamond mines. Soon, the government was unable to ensure the security of its people as RUF forces abducted children for forced labour, executed civilians, amputated legs, and perpetuated sexual violence (Gisselquist 2004, 116). Approximately 80% of schools and health clinics were destroyed or severely damaged as a result of wartime violence. By 2001, only 38% of peripheral health care units and 70% of district hospitals were functioning (Larsen et al. 2004, 240). When the war officially ended in 2002 with a UN declaration (Gisselquist 2004, 117), Sierra Leone was left in a primed condition for the dramatic spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic due to several risk factors. These included: massive population displacement, destruction of healthcare infrastructures, high prevalence of war-related sexual violence, including rape as a terror tactic and the abduction of women into sexual slavery, peacekeeping troops from countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence, increased commercial sexual activity, and widespread poverty and illiteracy rates (Larsen et al. 2004, 240-241).

While the civil war in Sierra Leone left brutal legacies, a major repercussion was HIV/AIDS. Due to a lack of large-scale research and the country's shifting population, minimal data exists on HIV/AIDS transmission in Sierra Leone around the time of its civil war (Richter et al. 2001, 48). As a result, there is a wide range of reports on both the transmittance rates of HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone and the effect of civil war. In 2002, the CDC conducted a survey to determine the prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. While the initial rate was 4.9%, further testing showed a rate of just 0.9% (Larsen et al. 2004, 240). Similarly, smaller studies demonstrated a variety of different results. A study from the late 1980s-1990s conducted in Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, showed that the HIV/AIDS prevalence rates among commercial sex workers were 27.5%, 7.1% among blood donors, and 4.5% among patients with STIs (241). Another study from 1994 estimated a 3% prevalence rate (Richter et al. 2001, 49). In 1997, another report claimed that among women, the prevalence rate was 7% (Larsen et al. 2004, 241). In 1999, the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) found a 21.3% prevalence rate among men applying for military status (241). In 2000, Sierra Leone's Ministry of Health and Sanitation conducted their own research and found a 70.6% prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in commercial sex workers in Freetown (241). While the results of all of the smaller studies may be statistically insignificant, they help to create a more complex picture of the struggle of HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone. The dramatic differences suggest that more work is needed to determine prevalence rates in various subpopulations in Sierra Leone and highlights the fact that HIV/AIDS is a national struggle (241).

A significant source of HIV/AIDS transmission in Sierra Leone is believed to come from foreign peacekeepers. As HIV/AIDS is transmitted mainly through sexual intercourse and conflict often stimulates an increase in sexual activity, the increased military presence helps explain the rise of HIV/AIDS in wartime Sierra Leone (241). The main groups affected by HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone were commercial sex workers and peacekeeping forces. This had detrimental effects, as to condition spreads to their respective communities and creates lasting problems (241). Since the early 1990s, peacekeepers have been present in Sierra Leone and these forces frequently intermingled with commercial sex workers. The trend is a result of peacekeeping forces often possessing more wealth than the surrounding population, thus being able to purchase sex (241). Studies show that HIV/AIDS prevalence rates in military forces are typically two to five times greater than rates found among civilian populations. A study by Lori M. Newman et al. demonstrated an HIV/AIDS prevalence rate of 39.1% among military blood donors compared to a 15.3% rate in civilian blood donors. In times of conflict, military infection rates may rise to approximately 50% higher rates than in peaceful periods (241). Additionally, rates tend to be higher among military officials stationed far from home because personnel often seek respite from stress, loneliness, and sexual tensions through high-risk activities. This is evident among the many Nigerian peacekeeping forces stationed far from home in Sierra Leone for extended periods. The high risk they take in the field translates to a risk when partaking in sexual activities, as peacekeepers participate in the commercial sex trade and engage in intercourse without condoms (241-242).

Commercial sex workers represent another at-risk group because of their high number of sexual partners (ranging daily from three to ten) and low use of condoms. Studies found that commercial sex workers in Sierra Leone were willing to negotiate abstaining from using a condom in exchange for higher profits (242). Many women are forced into the commercial sex work industry because of demands to support their families, and as limited economic opportunities are available to these women, sex is often seen as a 'currency' which allows women to pay for goods. Specifically, women can leverage sex for water, food, education for their children, and passage over borders (242).

The population groups of peacekeeping forces and commercial sex workers are heavily intertwined with each other. In Sierra Leone, 32% of peacekeeping forces come from nations with HIV/AIDS prevalence rates of over 5%. This makes sex dangerous, especially given the fact that peacekeepers are primary clients of commercial sex workers. The combination of foreign military presence and the poverty of powerless women which strengthened their reliance on sex as a means of survival contributed to setting the stage for the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sierra Leone (243).

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) played a large role in the spread of HIV/AIDS through their peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone. They deployed a monitoring group, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with the mandate to restore peace in Sierra Leone. As their priority was armed conflict, this resulted in serious neglect towards human security dimensions and helped escalate the HIV/AIDS crisis (Opeyemi 2012, 145). The group also failed to safeguard humanitarian aspects of the mission and neglected civilian populations, resulting in the absence of monitoring or record-taking during the HIV/AIDS crisis (147). Peacekeeping forces were not tested for HIV/AIDS before or after deployment, and there was no official HIV/AIDS program in army ranks and no existing data regarding the Sierra Leone population's relationships with the ECOMOG troops. This was especially problematic due to the many interactions between Nigerian peacekeeping forces and Sierra Leone's commercial sex workers (148). While the interactions were not properly documented in Sierra Leone, this claim can be corroborated with the rising trend of HIV/AIDS prevalence in Nigeria, coinciding with the return of Nigerian ECOMOG troops back to Nigeria. Although ECOMOG troops eventually provided relative peace and security in Sierra Leone, this peace was threatened by the Nigerian peacekeeping forces who contributed to the already impending HIV/AIDS crisis. (148-149).

In the peacebuilding stage following the civil war, a major problem remained in Sierra Leone in the form of rising HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. The WHO cites a rise in prevalence of HIV/AIDS cases in the nation from 0.9% in the period directly following the war to 1.53% by 2005 (World Health Organization 2009, 6). The international community, with varying degrees of success, utilized different mechanisms in the country to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The WHO was highly involved in the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sierra Leone. A report released by WHO analyzing Sierra Leone from 2008-2013 highlighted the WHO's first strategic priority as increasing the burden of fighting HIV/AIDS, as it is quickly rising and becoming a threat to social and economic development. WHO identifies the main challenges to fighting HIV/AIDS as follows: inadequate access to key services for prevention diagnosis and care, low uptake of the PMTCT and art service, poor laboratory capacity at various levels, stigma, and discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS (6-7).

After initially slow progress in combatting HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone, the international community eventually established programs and mechanisms with successful results. It was concluded that success is dependent on collaboration with the government, the military, NGOs, and the community. Levels of education surrounding HIV/AIDS increased, demonstrating the success of new outreach efforts as initiated by international bodies; with this said, there is still much work that needs to be done (Larsen et al. 2004, 251).

Efforts were made to successfully implement HIV/AIDS policies in the armed forces, specifically to protect military personnel from service dismissal based on their HIV/AIDS status. This policy allows personnel free access to ARV drugs to provide a safe environment for people suffering from HIV/AIDS and ultimately helps combat the stigma against the disease (Opeyemi 2012, 55). The army also introduced policies that involve education on HIV/AIDS,

integration of HIV/AIDS training activities into army curriculum and sensitizing trainers to the importance of such HIV/AIDS workshops. The army also trained soldiers' wives, female soldiers and women's groups to act as peer educators. Additionally, the army trained counsellors from each brigade and battalion on reproductive health, distribution of condoms, and the provision of ARV drugs (55).

Surveys from the 1990s found that knowledge about HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone was insufficient. Young people, ages 13-19, largely believed there was an existing vaccine for HIV/AIDS and that it was curable. In addition, many believed only people with symptoms could transmit HIV/AIDS and were, for example, unaware that a mother could transmit HIV/AIDS to her unborn child (Richter et al. 2001, 49). These attitudes put Sierra Leone's youth at risk. Further, 19% of college students in Freetown believed that HIV/AIDS was a conspiracy theory to prevent Africans from reproduction; of those college students, most believed it is the man's responsibility to promote safer sex (49). Therefore, because of various misperceptions, the perceived threat of HIV/AIDS was low. For cultural reasons, people preferred injections over pills but generally did not care if their medical equipment was sterile, which did not help the situation (50-51). While combating HIV/AIDS in Africa, it is important to remember the developed world's history of abusing Africans, which can account for certain issues, including distrust among college students regarding the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It is also important to remember that in addition to HIV/AIDS, Africa is suffering from many factors that result in a more immediate threat to their survival, such as waring rebel groups and health threats like malaria (52). The international community recognized the dire need for education to stress the importance of using sterile equipment and to normalize the use of condoms while suppressing the notion that women are subordinate in sexual relations (52-53).

As such, there are countless internationally led efforts channelled towards preventative training among Sierra Leone's civil community. They offer testing and counselling services, which enable individuals to get pre-tested for HIV/AIDS, including same-day testing and a risk assessment test (Bhoobun 2014, 514). They also offer post-testing follow-ups, HIV/AIDS preventive counselling and, when necessary, referral for medication and support groups. Programs like this have been successfully implemented by the global community throughout sub-Saharan Africa and often lower cases of HIV/AIDS. In Sierra Leone, research surveys, aided by WHO, found that only 13% of women and 8% of men have ever received an HIV/AIDS test. Statistics show HIV/AIDS testing is more common among people with higher levels of education and wealth, those who have never been married and reside in urban areas; the survey also found that young adults are more willing to receive testing than the older population, confirming the importance of education efforts (Bhoobun 2014, 515-518).

While the benefits of education and prevention programs are evident and young adults in urban areas are willing to be tested, other useful strategies have been implemented by the international community (519) including recognizing the importance of cultural factors. For example, healers are an integral part of Sierra Leone society and were considered as a useful resource to promote HIV/AIDS education. Additional methods included the use of theatres, another important cultural institution in Sierra Leone, to spread HIV/AIDS prevention messages as well (Richter et al. 2001, 53-54).

Additionally, there was also a need to better treatment systems, as it has been revealed that even with increased knowledge about HIV/AIDS, those who contracted it did not seek out treatment (Larsen et al. 2004, 251). It was also found that many are heavily reliant on access to free condoms provided by international bodies. Even when humanitarian support groups begin to leave Sierra Leone, it is vital to ensure condoms are left reasonably priced. While success has been

proven with the international community's aid in Sierra Leone, the work is not yet complete. The nation requires the remaining presence of international bodies to help maintain their HIV/AIDS prevention programs (252).

When thoroughly analyzed, Sierra Leone embodies international involvement in terms of its country's experience with HIV/AIDS. Firstly, international peacekeeping forces played a large role in the spread of HIV/AIDS during its civil war because there were no mechanisms in place to monitor the incoming soldiers or their interactions with the native population of Sierra Leone; this was particularly evident for commercialized sex workers. What can be learned from this is that HIV/AIDS is an issue extending well beyond the public health sector; it is instead a wide-ranging epidemic that demands a multifaceted approach. That approach was used by the World Bank and further acted on (Mohammad and Blackhart 2007, 15). The second way the international community was crucial in Sierra Leone's battle with the HIV/AIDS epidemic was through shaping mechanisms to combat HIV/AIDS as evinced by programs provided by the military and civil society. As learned from past mistakes, the military now takes precautions to monitor HIV/AIDS and educate its ranks about associated dangers (Opeyemi 2012, 55). The international community also found that the civil society in Sierra Leone lacked proper HIV/AIDS education and that the misconceptions found about HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone are not only troubling but also detrimental to public health (Richter et al. 2001, 49-53). People also need access to condoms and HIV/AIDS medication. While programs led by the international community are starting to show success in terms of education, there is still much to be done in Sierra Leone.

Rwanda

Conflict in Rwanda existed in two stages from October 1990 to March 2002. Stage one, spanning from 1990 to 1994, involved internal fighting within Rwanda and involvement from external countries (Mcinnes 2011, 500). Stage two, from 1997 to 2002, mainly occurred outside of Rwanda, as the spread of Rwandan refugees to the Democratic Republic of Congo helped trigger conflict there. Going into the war, Rwanda was already quite vulnerable to HIV due to an outbreak in the decade before the genocide, as there had been in other Sub-Saharan African countries (501). This outbreak was in part due to the fact that Rwanda had a relatively high population density, which caused outbreaks in cities to multiply. Furthermore, Rwanda was and remains an impoverished country, with over half of the country living below the poverty line, thus facing issues with accessibility to HIV/AIDS treatment and information (501). Consequently, by being in an already susceptible position prior to conflict, there was a credible possibility that conditions would worsen during the war.

During the genocide stage, external forces from neighbouring countries and the UN became involved in Rwanda and countries like Zaire, Uganda, and Burundi deployed troops to help quell the fighting (500). This could have led to a mixing of different groups with, for example, soldiers who had multiple sexual partners during their time in Rwanda, increasing the chances of becoming HIV-positive and spreading it to others. Furthermore, refugees were fleeing Rwanda during the conflict; over one million left in 1994 and another two million left after the genocide ended (500). Sexual intercourse between refugees or host country nationals provided another avenue for transmission in West Africa.

One of the most pressing issues regarding the spread of HIV was the rise in rape during the genocide. There were high rates of Tutsi women who were raped by the Hutu with the intention of both deliberate attacks and chaos (502). This number varies between 200,000 and 500,000 women raped with many survivors, especially in and around the capital city of Kigali (Elbe 2002, 167-168). There was a belief held by some Hutu that they needed to rape the Tutsi and that raping was a weapon to help bring down the enemy side by killing them through the

spreading of diseases. Thus, the raping of Tutsis became an important organized method of the genocide, along with murder (Mcinnes 2011, 502). Witnesses to the genocide claimed that they heard HIV-positive people announce that they aimed to infect Tutsi women through rape "as an ultimate punishment that would guarantee long-suffering and death" (502). Furthermore, there were claims from the Rwandan Minister of Health Joseph Karemera that “captured women were taken to HIV-positive soldiers specifically to be raped” (Elbe 2002, 169). It is difficult to determine how many women were infected because of this, and how many people who thought they were transmitting HIV to others actually had the disease. This is due to a lack of access to proper testing throughout the conflict. Moreover, the violent nature of rape, prevalent during the genocide, allowed for more open cuts and wounds on women's bodies, meaning there was a higher chance of the virus entering the body (170). As men deliberately aimed to infect the women, it is likely that women were repeatedly raped, thus increasing their odds of contracting HIV (170).

Using HIV as a weapon of war brings up many complex issues. The first one is that it is hard to draw a line between rape with the intent to give them a fatal disease versus another reason. Although both are brutal acts, one involves deliberate murder, while the other does not, though it is still a severe crime (170). While dealing with war crimes at the end of the genocide, it was difficult to prove who was perpetrating the crimes, which meant that people could get away with actively trying to infect women while they continued to suffer and die from the transmission of diseases. Another issue that emerged pertaining to war crimes was the differentiation between combatant and civilian (170). In using HIV as a weapon, and with the genocide in general, everyday citizens who were not necessarily in armies raped Tutsis with the intent to spread HIV. Contracting HIV/AIDS in the midst of conflict created a deadlier scenario than if diagnosed during a time of peace. During periods of stability, a person can go to a doctor, get tested, and ultimately undergo treatment for the disease. However, during wartime, concerns are about more immediate issues, such as avoiding conflict-related death and injury. Therefore, when faced with an illness that does not require immediate care to survive, it would go ignored and untreated, making treatment more difficult for the individual in the long-run and increasing their likelihood of spreading the disease to others (173).

Although statistics on HIV-positive Tutsi women show increasing rates during the conflict, there was an overall decline in infected people, specifically during the second stage of conflict (Mcinnes 2011, 503). Following the end of the genocide, the government actively introduced large-scale measures to combat the spread of HIV, including allowing citizens to access treatments, testing, and guidance. The next section will provide a more detailed evaluation of the government and the effectiveness of government-mandated HIV treatments.

Prior to the genocide, Rwanda was dealing with an outbreak of HIV/AIDS. The previous government tried to implement services to help people afflicted, yet they were forced to stop addressing it once the genocide began (Thomson 2010, 557-558). During this time, the number of people affected by the illness drastically increased, while the number of available health professionals decreased, as the health infrastructure in the country crumbled and people – including medical personnel – fled to safer areas (556). Within the population of Rwanda, eleven to thirteen percent of the population was infected, making it one of the most gravely affected African countries at the time (557). Furthermore, during the genocide, sexual violence, particularly against women, occurred with over 250,000 women raped, facilitating the spread of HIV/AIDS (557). Afterwards, women, who were particularly vulnerable to the disease's spread, were left as the country’s majority.

With a significant sector of the population affected by HIV, the post-genocide government felt it was essential to implement treatment and prevention programs. The government

contributed large sums of money and resources to ensure a drastic reduction in HIV (557). The government then took this aid and distributed it domestically. Local health centers led in administering services and counselling to those with HIV/AIDS, which was overseen by provincial committees to ensure that resources were delivered (558). This commitment to aiding civilians was highly praised by the international community, and, in 2007, Rwanda was named one of eight countries for the One UN Reform Initiative in celebration of the government's efforts in treatment, aid and support for those living with HIV (558). Furthermore, the government rolled out its Vision 2020 plan to deal with HIV, which granted universal access to treatment and care services (558) and gave the impression that the country was on a positive, and even progressive path, towards dealing with citizens living with HIV/AIDS.

Regardless of how effective the government's plans may have seemed at first, in practice, it was a fraudulent scheme in order for the government to consolidate power. The genocide ended in 1994 with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) victorious and in power, and they have since tried to shift the country into a state of autocratic rule through a combination of securing power and weakening those who dissent against the government (559). Actions removed the fear of political opponents and silenced those critical of the government in both the media and human rights circles (560). To this day, the RPF aims to gain total control over both the citizens and the entire country.

This consolidation pertains to the issue of HIV/AIDS treatment in the country because RPF loyalists are placed in low-level administration positions, such as those that provide HIV aid services (559). National policies may appear abundant and as sending Rwanda towards their goal of universal treatment and eradication of HIV/AIDS. However, in reality, only certain people can receive this treatment. With local government facilities administering treatments, the services act as instruments of state power by forcing citizens to be dependent on the state for continued care (559). Moreover, the state possesses the power to deem only certain people eligible to receive care based on arbitrary requirements that reward RPF supporters. In order to be treated, a person must have membership in either a non-governmental organization or in a community-based organization (560). These groups do not allow automatic membership and individuals require approval by local government officials who are, as previously mentioned, RPF loyalists who only accept government supporters.

The international community applauds the work done in Rwanda yet is misled by the government, which presents skewed information to prove that their supposedly universal program is working. Rwanda claimed that seventy percent of those with HIV/AIDS use antiretroviral services administered by the government's programs (560). Yet, this has been distorted by only giving the international community data from within government-approved organizations and claiming that this is the case for the entire country (560). This raises the question of why the international community has not looked deeper into the programs run in Rwanda to see where their aid is going. International donors should feel an obligation to investigate considering how much aid Rwanda receives annually – in 2015, 30 to 40 percent of the country's national budget came from international aid (Hasselskog et al. 2017, 4). In an interview with international donors, almost all interviewees said there were "worrying trends of authoritarianism within the political leadership" in the country (Thomson 2010, 573). Despite this, they have continued to allow Rwanda to take charge because "politically the donors need success stories as much as the recipients need the aid" (Zorbes 2011, 110). A second and more pressing reason is that Rwanda made it nearly impossible for international donors to have any say in their national policy process. The country has been commended for its ability to "ensure national ownership of development policies and programs," and they developed an aid policy plan to dictate the exact relationship

between donors and the government (Hasselskog et al. 2017, 4). This relationship is understood to be Rwandan officials handling the policy process, which is deemed only “Rwandan business” (5). From here, the government decides where exactly international aid goes without any consideration of how the donor may want to allocate their aid. Furthermore, if the donors are unsatisfied with the programs put in place, Rwanda operates according to a general sentiment: “if you don’t like it, we don’t need your money” (7). Consequently, these two reasons made it nearly impossible for international donors to look deeper into or try to involve themselves more in the Rwandan policy process.

Due to its lack of involvement, the international community has seemingly ruined its chances of peacebuilding with the aim of strong governance in Rwanda. The RPF dictated its terms for acquiring aid and how it should be distributed, thus continuing on their track of strengthening their power by using aid to rule the lives of citizens. What one can learn from this scenario is that the international community should not accept having no say in the policymaking process and should fight to increase their power. This may seem like a sharp contrast to the general notion of the nation-donor relationship, as most people currently believe in “national ownership" of aid that must be "consistent with a recipient state's own priorities" (2). However, there is a fine line between national ownership and complete control, with no input and monitoring from the donors. This can be seen as worrisome as it raises the following question: how are unbiased people expected to evaluate the implications of the policies and their accurate success rates? In the case of the HIV/AIDS programs, the international community cannot monitor how these are doing; they can only rely on false reports from the RPF.

In sum, the international community must strive to hold nations accountable for their aid and enact policy inspections to ensure that they are used and implemented to avoid elite political gain. Aid from international donors has provided the Rwandan government with an unprecedented degree of strength, and simultaneously, international praise. Rwanda's government was rewarded for incorrect data, allowing them to consolidate power by winning over the support from other countries for their work on HIV/AIDS. This further prevents international donors from looking deeper into the issues within the country.

Conclusion

A common pattern is evident mong Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. HIV/AIDS rates increase during periods of prolonged conflict, leaving the issue to be dealt with during the peacebuilding stage to deal with the issue. Programs are then implemented with or without the help of international aid and supervision. As this paper demonstrated, the amount of foreign intervention, or lack thereof, shaped the outcome of the containment of HIV/AIDS.

HIV was present in Uganda because of certain social norms. People often did not check if their partners had HIV, there was an inconsistent use of condoms, and a widespread lack of knowledge about HIV/AIDS. During the Ugandan civil war, HIV/AIDS spread through northern forces, contaminating southern civilians through rape and prostitution. However, after its civil war, Uganda has been successful in reducing its HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. By announcing its state of crisis about HIV/AIDS, Uganda gained support from many international bodies. Therefore, during its peacebuilding stage, efficient strategies were put in place to deal with the epidemic. Through the use of aid from international organizations, NGOs and faith-based groups, the Ugandan government is currently in a solid position to fight HIV/AIDS.

Sierra Leone also underwent a mass spread of HIV/AIDS as a result of its civil war. This is in part attributable to rape, but mainly to the relationship between commercial sex workers and international peacekeeping forces from countries with high HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. The international community was and remains highly involved in the reconstruction phase of Sierra

Leone to combat HIV/AIDS. With the help and contribution of international bodies, Sierra Leone successfully implemented re-education programs about HIV/AIDS into its military and civil society. While there is still much advancement necessary, progress has been made to reduce the rate of HIV/AIDS in Sierra Leone and educate people about the importance of contraception and HIV/AIDS knowledge. The work is not yet done in Sierra Leone as they still rely on the continued aid of international bodies to educate their people about the dangers of HIV/AIDS, the strategies to avoid the disease as well as provide financial support to prevent it.

Rwanda was in a prime position for the increase of HIV/AIDS, seeing as how the country was amid a surge in HIV/AIDs before the genocide began. Therefore, given that people did not have time for proper treatment or were deliberately trying to transmit the disease during the conflict, rates of transmission became even higher. Following conflict, the government made it a priority to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic, or so it seemed. The international community of donors was enthused to see a supposedly successful program implementation and was also kept outside of helping to create these programs. This, in turn, allowed the RPF to implement programs in line with their agenda. Consequently, the Rwandan government used the HIV/AIDS program as part of its strategy to consolidate power. Only certain people were given access to HIV/AIDS treatment, specifically, those who were supportive of the RPF, as well as members of RPF-approved community groups. Therefore, citizens are then dependent on treatments and aid, and the government can become increasingly autocratic, as people are forced to support it regardless. Foreign influence on these programs is also nonexistent as Rwanda actively discouraged donors from involving themselves in policy, and they continue to receive misleading statistics to indicate greater successes of the program, which causes a belief that these programs are working and that they should not press for more involvement. Ultimately, Rwanda and international donors in the country are not as successful in fighting HIV/AIDS as it may appear.

As shown, Uganda, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone all experienced conflicts which resulted in the spread of HIV/AIDS. Similar factors found in these cases were the influence of foreign peacekeeping forces, the effects of rape, and the presence of commercialized sex workers. Each country used different approaches to address these issues. Specifically, Rwanda limited international intervention, and while the international community believes in the success of the Rwandan government in combatting HIV/AIDS, the reality is that without international presence and supervision, the government has used the crisis to consolidate its power. In Uganda and Sierra Leone, the international community is part of the equation. They provide aid, help with implementing strategies, but most importantly remain present. Donors conduct research to track the effectiveness of their programs and aid, therefore ensuring that this aid is allocated to people who need it. In the end, when the international community intervenes in countries struggling with reconstruction and HIV/AIDS, positive patterns emerge. Stress should be placed on international bodies to continue their aid programs as, when present, they are mostly successful.

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The Arab League has No Bark and No Bite

By Sara Elisabeth Hedström

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Abstract Along with a moment of peace in the middle of the 20th century came large changes in the world order; namely the rise of newly independent nations and the formation of supranational organisations. The Middle East was the first region to establish an intergovernmental security network after 1945 when the Arab League was created. While the institution has had several opportunities to prove itself capable of uniting and pacifying a region often described to be "without regionalism," it has rather served as a tool in the toolbox of Arab nationalist leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser to solidify their political legitimacy and maintain a strict policy of non-interference. The League's failure to provide a place for mediation and resolution of regional conflicts further undermines its effectiveness. The Arab Spring that swept across the region beginning in 2009 brought optimistic projections for the League's capacity to deal with the conflict, particularly following the League's suspension of Syria following brutal repression of demonstrations in 2010. Is the failure of the League a product poor design at its offset or could it provide a hopeful forecast for increased regional cooperation and peacebuilding in the Middle East? Without bark and without bite, the latter will be difficult to achieve.

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Introduction

The end of the Second World War ushered in a new world order based on international cooperation and collective security, demonstrated by the dozens of international organizations founded in the years shortly following. Another result of the war's end was a dramatic shift in the Middle Eastern political landscape, as several nations gained independence and raced to assert themselves regionally and internationally. The Middle East is often described as a "region without regionalism" (Aarts 1999, 915) despite the Arab League's standing as the first regional organization established after 1945 (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 181). This can be difficult to understand considering the ethnolinguistic and cultural resemblances that might lead one to believe Middle Eastern nations could coexist with relative ease. In the Middle East, state formation occurred in parallel with the development of regional institutions (Pinfari 2016, 3). After centuries of European and Ottoman rule, emerging political elites were unable to mobilize strong national identities when asserting their independence, forcing them to rely on a common Arab identity instead. Rather than serving its purpose as a supranational body, the Arab League was institutionally designed to serve the domestic motivations of Middle Eastern leaders and has thus failed to foster regional cooperation.

This paper will begin with a brief account of the Arab League's formation and then explore how the complicated history of regionalism in the Middle East shaped the League's institutional structure. Next, it will demonstrate how the League was designed to fail as an effective supranational institution, serving instead as a platform for Arab leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser to draw legitimacy and ensure individual sovereignty. Then, a quantitative analysis of the League's success in mediating regional conflicts will be considered to better understand when and where the League has chosen to intervene. Finally, the League's performance in the outset of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 will be evaluated to determine whether its actions represented more of the same, or if there exists a real potential for institutional reform. This analysis will focus on the League's effectiveness as a facilitator of conflict resolution and regional security. However, it is important to acknowledge that the League has played a significant role in the region as a cultural mechanism through its influence over language, education and the preservation of heritage sites.

The Arab League: Institutionalizing Weak Middle Eastern Regionalism

By the 1930s, a region of independent Arab nations began to form. For Egypt, seeking to fully free itself from Britain's grasp, becoming more involved in Arab affairs was an opportunity to establish itself as a regional leader. Informal discussions between Egypt and Iraq began in the late 1930s and focused chiefly on the prospect of forming a regional body tasked with promoting and working towards common Arab values and objectives (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 186-8). From the offset, Egypt's motivation was clear: Arab leaders viewed each other as potential threats to their sovereignty and survival, and Egypt would rather control the Arab agenda than be controlled by it (Lerman 1995, 291). In October 1944, the Alexandria Protocol was signed by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan, and Lebanon, committing them to the formation of the joint Arab organization Egypt had envisioned years earlier (Hourani 1947, 129-32). On March 22, 1945, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia joined the original five nations in Cairo to sign the Charter of the League of Arab States, officially founding the Arab League. The Charter advocated cooperation in social, economic and cultural matters between members and laid out a threefold purpose: to strengthen relations between member states, coordinate policies to further cooperation and maintain independence and sovereignty, and promote the general welfare and interests of the Arab states (134). Ostensibly, the Charter institutionalized cooperation and Arab unity; however, its formal institutional structure and rules made it a safeguard for political leaders, guaranteeing sovereignty and strict respect of their territorial states.

Politics of Arab nationalism and shared identity encouraged the founding members of the League to embrace the rhetoric of Arab unity to legitimize their regimes, despite fears that Arab unity, in practice, would greatly threaten their autonomy. Within the forty-eight articles of the Charter, the concern for state sovereignty is explicitly repeated twenty-two times (Korany 2017, 94). Thus, from the beginning, the League was designed to fail as a binding regional institution promoting political and economic cooperation. Instead, it was utilized as an instrument by Arab politicians hoping to bolster their status by positioning themselves as champions of Arab nationalism both domestically and regionally (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 192). Resolutions could only be passed unanimously and were only binding for members who participated in the voting, thus tying the Arab Council's hands on all issues involving a member state and providing a defection route for all members (Kechichian 1994, 7). Soon after its founding, scholars began questioning whether the League was meeting its objective as a body intended to "support and stabilize" rather than "strengthen and consolidate" ties within the existing network of sovereign states (Little 1956, 140).

The League's failure to promote effective regional cooperation can be understood through the lens of the weakness of Middle Eastern regionalism. The relationship between regional integration and state-building has been historically complex, as political elites consistently experienced tension between advancing *wataniya*, state interests, and *qawmiya*, pan-Arab ideals resonating among different Arab populations (Pinfari 2009, 7). Because the process of decolonization underscored the establishment of the League, it had to address the legacies of European colonialism. Due to arbitrarily drawn colonial borders, regional capital, and energy surpluses were separate from areas of high demographic, military, and administrative capacity, which prevented the development of large, internal markets (Lustick 1997, 654). Due to low complementarity between regional economies, there has been a persistent absence of substantial economic incentives for regional economic integration. Integration is known to have the spillover effects of facilitating political integration and multilateral security initiatives (Pinfari 2016, 2).

The role played by Western imperial powers in actively tampering with Middle Eastern power structures and suppressing policy coordination further elucidates the weakness of the Arab League and the absence of a regional hegemon that could have provided the direction and resources necessary to better establish a strongly binding regional institution (Lustick 1997, 665). At the time of its conception, Egypt might have been viewed as a potential nation to fill the position of regional hegemon. The Arab League chose Cairo as the location for its headquarters, reflecting Egypt's relative socio-political weight in the region (Korany 2007, 94). However, Egypt's failure to reconcile the tension between *wataniya* and *qawmiya* prevented it from becoming what the region perhaps needed to end the Arab League's cooperation stalemate by orienting regional attitudes towards multilateralism and common security.

Arab Unity as an Instrument in Nasser's Pan-Arab Toolbox

Following his involvement in the 1952 overthrow of King Farouk's monarchy, Gamal Abdel Nasser was elected President of Egypt in 1956 (Lustick 1997, 666). His proud and successful defiance of a joint Israeli, French, and British invasion in November 1956, following his nationalization of the Suez Canal, made him a champion of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialism (667). By placing himself at the center of the Arab League before assuming the presidency, Nasser signalled his power and Egypt's increasing role in regional and world politics. Additionally, by the 1940s, Nasser was growing reluctant to rely on Britain for defence given the mounting Israeli threat (Pinfari 2016, 6). Thus, Egypt proposed a collective security pact to the League in the late 1940s. League members signed the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Among States of the Arab League in April 1950, pledging to settle conflicts through non-violent means,

engage in collective defence, and integrate their military and foreign policies. In the context of the 1940s, the passing of this pact blocked the potential for an Iraqi-Syrian unification that had been in talks for several years, thereby preserving the balance of power in the region and rejecting an essential part of Arab unity (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 212).

Despite advocating increased policy coordination and cooperation, the 1950 pact did little to change the nature of the protectionist, inward-looking, militarily active regimes characteristic of the Cold War Middle East, whereby the maneuverings of political leaders power politics were defined by the prioritization of relative gains over absolute gains (Beck 2014, 9). The pursuit of relative gains limits cooperation as states base their decisions on the maximization of domestic power and reduction of power of other states. An incredibly competitive dynamic amongst regional political leaders meant doing whatever possible to limit the political power of neighbouring regimes, as demonstrated by Egypt's blocking of an Iraqi-Syrian unification. Ironically, Egypt sought to secure its sovereignty and restrain the power of one of its largest competitors by establishing a political union with Syria in 1958. Nasser's ability to outsource Egyptian nationalism was thwarted by intense Syrian anti-union opposition, leading Syria to withdraw from the United Arab Republic in 1961 (Beck 2015, 198). Nations also expressed relative power concerns by refusing to open their markets to regional trade. In 1965, the Arab League established an Arab Common Market with the intention of providing a platform for regional trade between Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. This is just one example of countless League initiatives and programs that existed largely on paper and minimally in practice. Since the 1950s, inter-Arab trade has only constituted between 7% and 10% of the region's total trade flows (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 197). The fear of strengthening a regional counterpart through mutually beneficial political collaboration or economic liberalization guided the domestic policy of many states. This political outlook reflects how the conditions of Middle Eastern state formation served to solidify the power of authoritarian regimes in the region. When state consolidation occurs prior to the establishment of multilateral organizations, domestic actors can secure their power domestically and realize the benefits of regional coordination. However, in the Middle East, legacies of colonialism and decolonization meant that domestic consolidation and the formation of the League occurred simultaneously. Leaders were reluctant to strengthen their neighbours through cooperation, fearing this would undermine their domestic power and stability. Thus, with the support of Western governments, authoritarian leaders were propelled into power during the process of state formation, preventing regional cooperation. Unfortunately, the prioritization of relative gains by authoritarian regimes undermined meaningful economic development and regional security.

Nasser's death in 1970 symbolized the death of Arab nationalism and thus represented a decline in the League's perceived usefulness to political leaders as an index of Arab unity (Harb 2017). During the 1970s, the Middle East underwent a shift in the balance of power toward oil-rich Gulf states like Saudi Arabia, the rise of Islamist politics, and increased involvement of the United States in the region's affairs (Pinfari 2009, 5). In the 1980s, the absence of regional stability and cooperation was a key barrier facing Middle Eastern states welcoming foreign investment, financial assistance and Western technology. The Arab League's failure to act swiftly or effectively during the bloody Lebanese Civil War further demonstrated its incapacity to secure the region. Between 1945 and 1980, the League had passed over four thousand resolutions, 80% of which were never implemented (Aarts 1999, 917). The League was also criticized for its refusal to condemn genocidal human rights abuses inflicted by the Iraqi regime during the Iraq-Iran War, citing its founding principles of sovereignty and non-interference as justification for its silence. For many members of the international community, it was difficult to point to any example where the

Arab League had made an impact – directly or indirectly – on advancing regional cooperation or resolving a Middle Eastern conflict or crisis.

The Arab League's Successes and Failures in Numbers

A quantitative approach analyzing the successes and failures of the Arab League illustrates not only the number of times it has successfully mediated or resolved a conflict, but also in what contexts it has chosen to get involved in the first place. According to a 2009 study of 56 regional conflicts and crises between 1945 and 2008, the League only mediated nineteen, and successfully resolved the conflict on just five occasions (Pinfari 2009, 10). Furthermore, the study identifies the Arab League itself as the primary cause of success in only one of 56 conflicts, being the Lebanese presidential crisis from 2007 to 2008. Based on this data, the League appears not only to strictly limit the number of conflicts it chooses to become involved in, but also to fail in most cases to contribute to the successful resolution of those conflicts.

When broken down further, the data reveals how the performance of the League significantly differs based on the type of conflict. Due to the pact's clearly dictated respect for the autonomy and territorial sovereignty of Arab states, it is generally hesitant to involve itself with internal strife, only intervening in five of twenty-two major civil wars since 1945 (10). When the Lebanese Civil War erupted in 1975, the extent of the League's involvement was to call upon all parties to "exercise wisdom and restraint" in the conflict (11). After over a year of silence, in June 1976, the League released another public statement expressing the same sentiment. By that time, thousands of civilians had been massacred by the Kataeb Christian militia and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (Dakhlallah 2012, 406).

In line with balance of power theory, the League has demonstrated a commitment to safeguarding the independence of smaller Arab states (Waltz 1979, 11). Leading up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the League held two summits to resolve the dispute over oil between both countries. These failed, leading to the internationalization of Gulf security through direct foreign intervention by the United States and the United Kingdom, pointing to a third pattern in Arab League involvement (Dakhlallah 2012, 409). In conflicts and crises where a foreign power or international organization has intervened, the Arab League has traditionally taken a backseat or chosen to remove itself from the conflict resolution process completely. This is evident in the League's negligible effort in mediating the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Waltz 1979, 13-4). In recent years, the League has stopped excusing its inaction by referring to its founding principles. This could be due to the rise in the active role of non-state actors as both initiators and interveners in Middle Eastern conflict. Now, the League has more opportunity to rely on foreign powers, sectors of state populations, and insurgents to attempt to provide security for the Arab collective it was created to represent.

The Arab Spring: Why Should We Expect Reform?

Turmoil in the Middle East has not ceased to exist as the region entered the second decade of the century. An optimistic projection of League reform and increased regional cooperation developed within scholarly circles as a result of the Arab League's involvement in the early days of the Arab uprisings that spread across the Middle East in late 2010, specifically in Syria. Following the Syrian regime's violent and swift suppression of a large wave of protests calling for the removal of President Bashar al-Assad, eighteen of twenty-two Arab League states voted to suspend Syria from the League (Rami 2011). In its statement communicating the suspension, the League referred to the importance of upholding values such as the expectation a government should refrain from the use of disproportionate violence against its own people. This was the second time the League addressed human rights principles like those of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the first instance being its condemnation of Israel's occupation policy in the

early 2000s (Beck 2015, 197). For the first time in its history, the Arab League modified its strict principle of respecting the sovereignty of member states in the interest of protecting human rights and overall regional security. In January 2012, the League backed Morocco as it presented a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council calling upon President Assad to step down and transfer power, which failed to be adopted following vetoes from China and Russia (Borger 2012). Economic sanctions imposed by the League on Syria in 2011 have also failed to completely strip Assad of his power or influence a change in regime behaviour. Aside from these "declaratory level" initiatives (Beck 2015, 197), the League has been unable to coordinate any meaningful joint-Arab military or economic action, demonstrated in its failure to act decisively as the Islamic State encroached on territory in Iraq and Syria (Harb 2017).

Understanding the domestic position of the two key regional security players, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, helps to determine whether or not the potential of a reformed Arab League, in which attitudes reflecting a responsibility to protect are prioritized over fear-based expressions of individual sovereignty, is realistic. At the outset of the Syrian crisis, Egypt was preoccupied with reversing its extreme economic contraction and insecurity crisis that resulted following the seizure of power by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and the presidency of Mohammed Morsi (Beck 2015, 199). Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, with its system of extremely low political participation based on a conservative political interpretation of Islam, was on the defensive (Beck 2014, 16-8). When moderate manifestations of Islamism came to power in Tunisia and Egypt, Saudi Arabia faced domestic pressure to reform. However, the regime's stable economic status as a wealthy Gulf oil state afforded it the ability to distract its population from demonstrating, as they reaped the benefits of increased rent income from very high global oil prices beginning in 2010 (16). Saudi Arabia's recent gains in relative power vis-à-vis Egypt provided it with the platform to exert influence on a global scale, utilizing the Arab League as it took a clear lead of joint-Arab policy toward Syria.

The major incentive for Saudi Arabia to become involved with multilateralism was the presence of regional challenges ignited by the Arab uprisings that threatened its domestic stability. Although it continues to remain involved in the Syrian conflict through the large-scale provision of weaponry to various rebel groups and its engagement on other frontiers as instructed by the United States, Saudi Arabia's role in mobilizing the Arab League toward action in Syria has diminished (Bremmer 2018). Because the League's role in Syria during the early stages of the Spring was a direct consequence of Saudi Arabian domestic and regional security concerns, its involvement was an ad hoc vitalization rather than a meaningful departure from its long-held status as merely a "podium for grandstanding" (Dakhlallah 2012, 411). Sustainability of the League's active involvement in regional issues would require a lengthy reform process extending to amending the League's original pact and institutional structure. As Syria's Civil War roars on into its eighth year, there is no indication that regionalism is on the rise or that institutional reform is occurring in the Arab League. Relative power concerns continue to trump absolute ones, as states cling onto concerns of sovereignty, which will continue to "check and balance any cooperative project" (Fawcett 2004, 444).

Conclusion

After the League's failure to play a meaningful role in resolving the Second Gulf War, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa was asked if the League was "dead." He replied the League would not work as long as the Arab body remained weak and that some "Arab forces" were interested in expanding the League's mandate slightly but never to the point where it would represent a major voice in the Arab world (Barnett and Solingen 2007, 216). The Arab League has failed to accomplish the relationship strengthening, cooperation and policy coordination initially

laid out in its pact. However, after nearly 70 conflicts and crises within the region, it has become clear the League was not intended to serve as a regional body for collective security action and conflict resolution. The League's institutional structure, namely its principle of unanimity, as well as the way Arab leaders such as Nasser have employed the League as an expression of Arab unity while simultaneously using it to institutionalize the protection of authoritarian regimes, paint a clearer picture of the shape regionalism has taken in the Middle East post-World War II. In a region where "the building blocks of order have been continuously contested," the Arab League has failed to provide temporary or lasting security for its members (Dakhlallah 2012, 399).

In a world lacking global governance, multilateral organizations are a safeguard against excesses of power politics, which promote security in the process (395). The Middle East remains unstable because state sovereignty concerns continue to drive nations of the region toward unilateral, defensive political, military and economic activities in efforts to maintain relative power superiority over one another. While the Arab League had only been involved in the successful mediation of 9% of Middle Eastern conflicts between its conception and 2008 (Pinfari 2009, 10), its legendary suspension of Syrian membership in response to Assad regime atrocities in 2011 led some to predict the League was turning a new page. Just as Egypt used the League to advance its policy agenda and secure its sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s, Saudi Arabia, concerned regional instability would seep into its borders, saw leading League policy toward Syria as an opportunity to reassure itself of its territorial autonomy and domestic security. The Arab League, in its inability to develop a useful joint-Arab response to the crisis in Syria, remains incapable of resolving conflicts plaguing the region. Until nations view exerting regional influence and power based on cooperation rather than zero-sum competition (Nolte 2010, 887), it will be difficult for the Middle East to attain regional security with or without the Arab League.

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Sport Diplomacy: Sport's Impact as a Form of Soft Power on Peacebuilding and Nation-Building in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

By Ender McDuff

Author Note I would like to thank Majka Hahn, my POLI 347 TA, for inspiring me to explore the topic of sport diplomacy in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As a lifelong lover of sports, researching and writing this paper afforded me a rare opportunity to combine my academic interests with athletics, all while exploring the incredibly important topic of peacebuilding. My further thanks go to Professor Daniel Douek for the excellent education he provided to me and every student in POLI 347. His insightful lectures and even-handed approach to the material make the class one of McGill's best. Lastly, I would like to thank my editors, Asher Laws and Alicia Wilson, for all their help and guidance. Their insight and suggestions greatly benefitted my paper.
It was a great delight to write "Sport Diplomacy" and I hope all enjoy reading the article.

Abstract Since the founding of the first Israeli and Palestinian soccer clubs in 1906 and 1908, respectively, sport has played an intimate role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Whether as a training ground for counter-insurgency operations or an extension of the nation's foreign policy apparatus, sport has been utilized by both parties as a tool for peacebuilding and nation-building. The purpose of this article is to examine whether sport, through what is termed sport diplomacy, can help establish the conditions necessary for successful peace negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To this effect, the paper adopts the analytical lens of sport as a form of soft power. Following this framework, the paper considers how sport diplomacy operates as a tool for image-building, constructing a platform for dialogue, trust building, and as a catalyst for reconciliation in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The article concludes that sport can indeed help establish the conditions needed for successful peace negotiations; however, sport should not yet be employed as a path to reconciliation until such time as a political peace is firmly established.

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Introduction

The conflict in modern day Israel and the occupied territories of Palestine – the West Bank and Gaza – has an intimate association with sport that dates back to the foundation of the first Israeli and Palestinian soccer clubs in 1906 and 1908, respectively (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 334). While George Orwell once described sports as "war minus the shooting," this observation may have journeyed a step too far in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Orwell 1950). At various times throughout the conflict's history, sport has acted as a catalyst for so-called muscular Jewish identity, as a training ground for both Israeli militias and Palestinian youth preceding the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the First Intifada, and, most recently, as a highly politicized arena in which each actor's respective football league – the Israeli Football Association (IFA) and the Palestinian Football Association (PFA) – is acting in coordination with the nation's foreign policy interests (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 50, 52; Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 346). In this manner, sport has been integral to a conflict in which, as of yet, peace remains elusive. Even so, what role might sport play in an eventual process of peacebuilding and future reconciliation?

By examining select historical events in which sport played a critical role through the lens of soft power, this paper argues that sport can help establish the conditions necessary for successful peace negotiations through the mechanisms of image-building, trust-building, and constructing a platform for dialogue. The paper finds, however, that sport cannot bring about meaningful reconciliation until a prior political peace is established. This will be illustrated by presenting soft power as an analytical framework through which to explain the role of sport in political conflicts and peacebuilding, then by analyzing the role of sport in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict pursuant to this framework. First, sport will be considered and critiqued as a means for image-building and, thereby, nation-building. Next, the role of sport in building a platform for dialogue and trust will be explored and these conditions will be compared to those situations present in the successful 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1993/95 Oslo Accords. Lastly, sport as a tool for reconciliation, integration, and the promotion of anti-racism will be examined and a critique of such practices, at this stage in the conflict, will be levied. In so doing, this paper concludes that sport serves as an effective means of soft power that can help establish the conditions necessary for successful peace negotiations, but that it should not be employed as a path to reconciliation until political peace is firmly established.

Analytical Framework: Soft Power and Sport

To understand the role sport has played in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this paper uses an analytical framework based on the concept of soft power and its relation to peacebuilding and nation-building. First proposed in 1990 by neoliberal theorist Joseph Nye, soft power refers to "the ability to affect others to obtain what one wants through attraction" or, more simply put, to get another to want what you want (Rugh 2009, 4). This notion adds a second constitutive piece to the traditional notion of hard power which previously referred exclusively to the ability of an actor to influence others through either coercive threats or inductive payments.

Recent literature on the subject has begun to critically study how sport is used as a form of soft power through what is termed sport-diplomacy. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duval identify institutional and representational power as two specific types of soft power pertinent to sport-diplomacy (2005, 43). The former considers how "institutions that mediate between actors"—including traditionally non-partisan bodies like the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)—can be leveraged to control other actors. The latter articulates the status-seeking behaviour of actors as a means of "enjoy[ing] a high representation in the international community [which permits them] to coerce other actor[s]" (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 331). In instances of peace negotiations specifically, sport also offers a venue through which actors can

engage in the politics of persuasion, a critical component of any negotiation process (Nygård and Gates 2013, 237). Håvard Mokleiv Nygård and Scott Gates identify four key mechanisms through which sport diplomacy can help facilitate such outcomes: image-building, building a platform for dialogue, trust-building, and reconciliation (2013, 237).

Image-Building

The first mechanism of sport-diplomacy is image-building. This strategy traditionally involves an economic investment to host a major sporting event, like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup, as a means of establishing political capital (Nygård and Gates 2013, 238). Hosting such an event acts as a form of public diplomacy—"a deliberate act designed to communicate with [a] foreign public" to amplify soft power and prestige—by signaling the state's arrival on the world stage and bestowing upon that state the world's undivided attention (Nygård and Gates 2013, 238; Rugh 2009, 14). Recent work by Patrick Rhamey and Bryan Early demonstrates, however, that image-building is not only reserved for an event's host, as doing well in the competition or even simply being present can enhance international prestige (2013, 245). This is because, at its core, image-building is an appeal to nationalism—an ideology intimately tied to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Nationalism, according to an ethno-symbolic approach, is largely a modern phenomenon because a nation's foundation rests on a culture that is (re)constructed by the interaction of its members with one another as a distinct, imagined community (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 329). Ethno-symbolism acknowledges, however, that such nationalism contains pre-modern roots, as "nations reach back to the myths, memories, and symbols of a pre-modern era in order to (re)construct the nation" (330). The historical Israeli-Palestinian conflict is predominantly a result of competing Arab and Jewish nationalisms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Both movements were founded on ethnic nationalism: Zionism first as a "quest… for the creation of a Jewish state [in Palestine]" and Palestinian nationalism following as an "intimately intertwined" result (Caplan 2010, 4; Khalidi 1998, 146). As such, both movements believe that "their existences require a geographical reference point" located in the modern-day territory of Israel and Palestine (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 334).

Sport is intrinsically connected to such attempts at nation-building, as "sport constitutes a charged [ritual of] interaction… out of which imagined national communities arise" (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 331). As such, sporting events can provide recognition to national communities and can foster political socialization amongst fans and athletes alike (332). The overt national symbols present at sporting events further emphasize the reconstruction of the nation and "serve as a substitute for the unifying frameworks that modernity has eroded" (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 46). The context of nationalism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is somewhat unique, however, in that rather than involving nationalism between nation-states, it involves an asymmetric nationalism involving "submerged" nations. The first of which is the Zionist nation of Israel within British Mandate Palestine and the second is the Palestinian nation, distinct from the sovereign state of Israel, in Gaza, the West Bank, refugee camps in neighbouring countries, and in the larger global Palestinian diaspora (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 332; Dart 2019, 4). In this case then, both Israeli and Palestinian nationalism have "use[d] sporting events as opportunities to stimulate self-awareness and political mobilization… [which]… push[es] toward the creation of a nation-state" (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 332).

For both Israel and Palestine, nationalism and sport have been connected through forms of image-building as each party aims to be included as a member of and hold relative standing in defined clubs that signify the legitimacy of their nationalist claims (Nygård and Gates 2013, 238). The first historical occurrence of such image-building took place in 1929, when Russian-born Jew and football enthusiast Josef Yekutieli founded the forerunner to the IFA and secured its

membership in FIFA (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 335). While such membership theoretically mandated that the league maintain equal representation of all races and religions, the IFA "*de facto* comprised mainly Jews" (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 51). The Zionist movement would also go on to represent the Mandate territory at the 1936 Olympic Games (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 51). Following Israeli independence after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Israel sought to further establish its legitimacy by applying to the International Olympic Committee in 1952 and both the Asian Football Confederation and the Asian Games in 1954. These actions constituted the exact status-seeking behaviour predicted by representational power and serves to bolster Israel's image as well (51, 53).

Palestinians have likewise since pursued an image-building strategy. Nygård and Gates note that sporting events "present an opportunity for third-party political actors to further their own cause". This form of image-building was used by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September when they kidnapped and ultimately killed 11 Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games to "maximize the symbolism of [the Palestinian] cause". (2013, 238) Following the first Oslo Accords in 1993, the PFA has adopted the representational power model utilized by Israel, applying to the International Olympic Committee in 1994 and FIFA in 1998 (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 53).

Palestine and other Arab states have also sought to counter the image-building efforts of Israel. One method is with boycotts, which is widely supported by the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. This was exemplified at the 2007 Youth Olympic Games when Israeli Gili Haimovitz won gold because his competitor abstained from the match (Nygård and Gates 2013, 238; Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 53). Most consequentially, however, the PFA also sought to remove Israel from FIFA in April 2015 for its "occupation policy and discrimination against Palestinians… [which] hinder[s]… the development of Palestinian athletics" (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 54). This agenda allowed the PFA to internationalize the conflict, delegitimize Israel by labelling it an Apartheid state, and increase the standing of the Palestinian national team (55). While the United States – for unclear reasons, according to Demetrios Xenakis and Nikos Lekakis – intervened two days before the decisive vote by announcing indictments against FIFA, the PFA was still able to widely publicize Israel's wrongdoings and extract key concessions that allowed the first football game in 15 years between a West Bank team and a Gaza team on August 4, 2015. These results also leave open the possibility for the future suspension of Israel's football membership. (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 345) This episode demonstrated Israel's unwillingness to recognize the PFA for fear that "it [would] signal the [PFA's] symbolic representation of a Palestinian nation-state [and] not an enclave within Israel," which shows how institutional and image-building soft power "has emerged as a potent weapon for the Palestinians" (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 346).

There is, however, a substantive critique of the image-building mechanism. While sporting events can be used as a means of building trust and peace between adversaries, there may be unintended consequences too, as hostilities between peoples can be mirrored in the game. Nationalist tensions can be exacerbated when sports become "jingoistic [and] create tension… rather than understanding". (Nygård and Gates 2013, 240) Research by Raul Caruso and Marco Di Domizio suggests further that sport, rather than building trust, tends to reflect the larger political environment within which it is occurring (2013, 13). Meanwhile, nationalism in sports has contributed to the creation of ethnic hierarchies and other forms of division (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 240). While these concerns are valuable to understand, they should not on their own preclude the use of sport-diplomacy as a means of image-building and peacebuilding. In a conflict as fervent as that in Israel-Palestine, any option poses the risk of heightened nationalist

sentiments. The proven successes thus far, however, indicate how image-building as a form of public diplomacy, with the added support of representational and institutional power, can help actors establish themselves as nation-states within the international community. This was successfully completed by the Israeli nation in forming the state of Israel and is currently being used by the Palestinian nation in an effort to construct their own state.

Building a Platform for Dialogue and Trust-Building

The next two mechanisms, building a platform for dialogue and trust-building, are related as they both directly establish the conditions necessary for peace negotiations. With respect to the former, sporting events "strengthen ties between nations… and provide a venue for peaceful cultural exchange, which can serve as the basis for the further normalization of political relations" (Nygård and Gates 2013, 239). With respect to the latter, sport can also foster trust-building between communities and their leaders. This is engendered through the personal interactions that occur on and off the field during sporting events, through which understandings and friendships can develop. Essentially, peace can be a bottom-up development established through the interaction of individuals. In this sense, efforts to build a platform for dialogue and trust building encourage relationship building between states, whereas image-building—as discussed prior—was concerned with a state's self-promotion over another state. (239) Nevertheless, these two mechanisms do pose the threat of harming relationships, should athletes or fans act in a manner that is hostile to one another.

It is also advantageous to examine how these two conditions relate to the broader literature on successful Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. This is pertinent to explore because several of the components that academics have highlighted as integral to traditional diplomatic efforts are also mirrored in sport-diplomacy through the mechanisms of building a platform for dialogue and trust-building. Reflecting on the 1978 Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, Janice Gross Stein argues that the expansion of each leader's domestic win-sets – the outcomes acceptable to a state's public – were critical to the negotiation's success. Such an expansion was achieved through public diplomacy, which appealed to public opinion in the foreign country. This provided a moment of connection between communities and their leaders that "created…psychological and political symbols [that] would mobilize public opinion" and could not be undone (1993, 86). Additionally, reflecting on the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords, President Bill Clinton emphasized the importance of trust between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat in engendering peace (TOI Staff 2015). These two conditions, which are necessary for successful peace negotiations, can be facilitated by sport because sporting events – like Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's speech to the Israeli Knesset prior to the 1978 Camp David Accords – are permanent, offer powerful symbolism, and provide a platform for leaders to connect. In addition, sport fosters trust amongst the public and between leaders, as was so critical to the Oslo Accords. In these ways, sport-diplomacy recreates the same conditions that have already proven effective in prior diplomatic efforts. This suggests that sport does indeed constitute an effective means of soft power for establishing the conditions necessary for peace negotiations.

This connection between sport-diplomacy and traditional diplomacy may, in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even go a step further: historic sporting events notably occurred before or at the same time as the aforementioned peace negotiations. It must be acknowledged, however, that while the following connections demonstrate strong circumstantial evidence, the analysis is limited as available literature is insufficient for drawing direct causal links. In 1976, two years before Camp David, Rifaat Turk and Ali Othman made history as the first Arab players to join the Israeli national soccer team (Schleifer and Tamir 2018, 49). This development created the

possibility of a "joint symbol for both the Jewish and the Arab citizens of [Israel]," which eventually led to the Israeli soccer team becoming a national symbol for Jewish and Arab Israelis alike. This development may well have helped build trust and the conditions necessary for the subsequent dialogue between Israel and their main Arab adversary, Egypt. (49) Subsequently, the 1995 Norway Cup – an international youth football tournament – was the first time since state formation that a Palestinian team played an Israeli team. This was such an important event that when the Palestinian team traveled to Oslo, Yasser Arafat momentarily left the peace talks to go to the airport to wish the team good luck. (Nygård and Gates 2013, 239) This situation initially offers an instance of reverse causality, as it is likely that the ongoing peace negotiations in Oslo were responsible for establishing the trust necessary for the game to occur in the very same city. It is difficult to deny, however, that the successful completion of the Israeli-Palestinian game contributed in turn to furthering the trust between Israeli and Palestinian peoples and negotiators, as was critical to the successful Oslo II Accord signed later that year. In this respect, sport diplomacy and traditional diplomacy can be viewed as mutually reinforcing activities. This would suggest that while sport alone cannot establish a political peace, it does indeed offer a mechanism for building a platform for dialogue and trust-building, as seen in each of these cases, respectively.

Catalyst for Reconciliation, Integration, and the Promotion of Anti-Racism

Lastly, sport can operate as a catalyst for reconciliation, integration, and the promotion of anti-racism (Nygård and Gates 2013, 240). Reconciliation is a component of peacebuilding that focuses on establishing a genuine moral and psychological change in attitudes between parties after a conflict. To quote Jon Dart, a Senior Lecturer in Sports Policy and Sociology, "peacebuilding involves not only the ending of violence but also a transformation in the relationship among those affected" (Dart 2019, 6). Most sport-based reconciliation efforts build off the success of the 1995 Rugby World Cup, which was held in South Africa only a year after President Nelson Mandela was elected in the country's first elections since the disestablishment of Apartheid (Steenveld and Strelitz 1998, 9). Rugby, once a symbol of Apartheid, allowed Mandela to "promote a vision of South Africanism [that] transcended the primordial view of ethnic identity promoted by Apartheid ideology" and united all behind the South African rugby team (609). While Israel has not been granted the opportunity to host such an event, there are still 13 micro-level attempts to engender reconciliation through sport (Dart 2019, 7). These so-called sport-for-peace initiatives purport to establish a bottom-up approach to reconciliation that build peace and resolve conflict within communities (Dart 2019, 7).

Dart levies a harsh critique, however, against the premature use of such reconciliation processes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The sport-for-peace approach is not, according to Dart, "an appropriate vehicle for peacebuilding between Israelis and Palestinians because there is no peace – a necessary precursor for reconciliation" (2019, 1). As the most contemporary author cited in this paper, Dart's argument is informed by the Palestinian people's ongoing struggle for human rights due to the West Bank barrier and the expansion of Israeli settlements into the West Bank. Dart concludes that these actions by the Israeli government make ever more unlikely a possible two-state solution. (5) On this basis, Dart asserts that reconciliation initiatives undermine "the principles of passive resistance to the occupation" and legitimize a situation wherein Israel continues ever closer to absorbing the West Bank (8, 18). This asymmetric relationship is made evident by considering that the exchange goes entirely in one direction, as there are no Palestinian-led sport initiatives seeking to build bridges with Israelis (18). Given this critique, it is important to assert that the time for reconciliation initiatives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have not yet come. The actions of the current Israeli government under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to increase settlements considered illegal by international law precludes sport from

effectively encouraging reconciliation (Kershner 2019). Instead, sport-for-peace initiatives at the micro-level threaten to legitimize a status-quo wherein there is no two-state peace agreement. As such, sport as a tool for reconciliation is best reserved for use until a lasting political peace can first be established.

Conclusion

Both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have utilized and continue to employ sport as an "essential instrument in their nation-building efforts," and it is near doubtless that this trend will continue (Xenakis and Lekakis 2018, 337). Yet, as Israel expands settlements in the West Bank, the two sides seem further away from peace day by day. For those still driven by the pursuit of a two-state solution, however, sport may still provide a valuable soft power tool for peacebuilding.

This paper began by arguing that sport can be and has been used effectively as an image-building tool. When paired with the soft power structures of institutional and relational power along with public diplomacy, sport was valuable in allowing the Israeli state to gain a place within the international community. While Palestine has not yet been entirely successful in this endeavour, the PFA's effort to remove the IFA from FIFA amply demonstrates the potential for the PFA to further build its image through sport. These two presentations of image-building also serve to discount the risk that sport, as an unpredictable medium, may further heighten nationalistic tensions. Next, this paper established the role of sport in building a platform for dialogue and trust-building, and how these two elements both replicate the conditions of successful peace negotiations and correlate with such successes. Based on these three mechanisms, this paper confidently concludes that sport, as a form of soft power, has a valuable role to play in establishing the conditions necessary for successful peace negotiations. With this said, the current Israeli sport-for-peace initiatives constitute a premature act of reconciliation that only serves to legitimize a status-quo that is trending away from a two-state peace agreement. Therefore, sport as reconciliation may ultimately harm the peace process and should be reserved for after a lasting political peace is established. In this sense, while sport diplomacy and traditional diplomacy may play a mutually reinforcing role in building relationships and, eventually, a lasting peace, this peace may not be attainable for a considerable amount of time.

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

"The only thing one can do in America is emigrate": South American Responses to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis

By Alanna Sereboff

Author Note In this paper, I explore how countries in Latin America, as well as the region as a whole, have responded to the influx of Venezuelan asylees since 2015. I hope to counteract predominant discourse that portrays Latin American countries solely as refugee-producing states and take seriously the role that the region plays in shaping forced migration outcomes. By focusing on both the accommodative and restrictive measures, I emphasize the complex ways in which states chose to protect—or not to protect—refugees. I would like to thank Professors Iwa Nawrocki and Manuel Balan, who's masterful teaching and insightful perspectives have fundamentally changed how I view both Latin America and the world. I am eternally grateful to Professors Megan Bradley and Diana Allan for sparking and sustaining my interest in refugee and forced migration studies, and for their continuous guidance and support. Finally, thank you to Alicia Wilson and Avery Franken, whose care, patience, and masterful edits have transformed this piece into what it is today.

Abstract Since 2015, approximately 4.8 million Venezuelans have fled from their homes in search of refuge from the country's economic crisis and increasingly volatile political climate. As in other instances of mass displacement, they have not moved far, as nearly 80% of Venezuelan migrants have remained in continental South America. This essay analyzes how states and citizens have responded to the sudden influx of Venezuelan refugees from 2015 to the present. First, it shall offer a brief overview of the history of immigration policy in Latin America from the twentieth century to the early 2000s, exploring both regional and international initiatives. It then analyzes the novel, early responses of South American governments to Venezuelan refugees, finding, that, while regional and national policies were often devised with the intent of accommodation, in practice, these measures suffer from uneven implementation. Next, the paper interrogates the rightward shift in migration policy and discourse in recent years. While the extent and scope of policy change remain to be seen, the discursive and political turn towards restrictionism represents an alarming turn towards securitized immigration policy in the context of a conflict that shows no signs of stopping. Ultimately, this essay finds that the South American response to this crisis has been limited in its ability to provide accessible solutions, cooperate on a regional level, and maintain the same policies over time. Thus, it presents a challenge not only to individual states, but to the region's ability to coordinate meaningful solutions.

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Introduction

After finding refuge in colonial Jamaica, a zealous Simon Bolivar wrote of his dream of an independent, unified republic on the continent now known as South America. A prolific figure of nineteenth century independence movements in South America, Bolivar wished "to see America fashioned into the greatest nation in the world, greatest not so much by virtue of her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory." (Bushnell 2003, 23) By 1830 however, Bolivar was disenchanted with this dream, declared that America was "ungovernable," and asserted that the only viable course of action for those in Latin America was emigration (146). Nevertheless, Bolivar's core message of regional unity and solidarity has remained a prominent feature of intra-regional political dynamics in Latin America, resurging with vigor at the dawn of the twenty-first century. But Bolivar's resignation regarding emigration, too, foreshadowed a crisis in his own country nearly two centuries later.

Since 2015, approximately 4.8 million Venezuelans have fled their homes as a result of the country's rapidly worsening economic crisis, political repression, and state-led violence. Nearly 80% of the emigres have settled elsewhere in Latin America, a region that has never before experienced such an extensive internal stream of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants (Hazán, Selee, and Muñoz-Pogossian 2019, 2). This crisis has tested the region's bureaucratic and administrative capacities, the public's accommodation of migrants, and perhaps most importantly, the strength of intra-regional solidarity.

While Mexico and Costa Rica host approximately 72,000 and 29,000 Venezuelan asylees respectively, the remaining 3.8 million remain on continental South America (Selee and Bolter 2020, 4). As such, this paper analyzes South American political, discursive, and normative responses to the inflow of Venezuelan migrants from 2015 to the present, focusing on regional trends and country-specific case studies. First, this paper offers a brief overview of the history of immigration policy in South America from the twentieth century to the early 2000s, exploring both regional and international initiatives, with particular attention paid to the left-turn governments of the late 1900s and early 2000s. Then, it analyzes the early responses of South American governments to Venezuelan refugees and argues that, while governments were largely accommodating, the policies they enacted suffered from uneven implementation. Next, it interrogates the rightward shift in migration policy and discourse in recent years, which has coincided with dramatic increases in emigration from Venezuela and demographic changes among emigres themselves. While the extent and scope of the policy change remains to be seen, the discursive and political turn towards restrictionism represents a turn towards securitized immigration policy in the context of a conflict that shows no signs of stopping. Ultimately, this paper argues that, while initial responses were characterized by accommodation and regional solidarity, the South American response to this crisis has been limited in its ability to provide accessible solutions, cooperate on a regional level, and maintain the same policies over time. The Venezuelan migration crisis presents a challenge not only to individual states, but to the region's ability to coordinate meaningful solutions and act in the spirit of unity and solidarity that Bolivar dreamed of.

Contextualizing and Defining Venezuelan Migration

To understand the Venezuelan migration crisis and the regional responses to it, it is first pertinent to understand the different legal statuses and labels afforded to displaced people in different contexts. While terms such as refugee, asylum-seeker, economic migrant, and migrant are often used colloquially and interchangeably, each has unique political and legal implications, as well as dissimilar rights and associated protections. As outlined in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is someone who:

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> Owing to well-founded fear[s] of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. (UNHCR 1951)

This definition was expanded in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, which stipulates that those fleeing internal armed conflicts, generalized violence, widespread human rights violations, or hunger and poverty resulting from the breakdown of rule of law also qualify as refugees (Van Praag 2019). Those recognized as refugees legally gain access to humanitarian resources, like food, housing, and healthcare, and legal protections, the most critical of which is the right to not be returned to their countries of origin. This process is often political, as by recognizing someone as a refugee, a country can be taken to be implicitly condemning the refugee's country of origin, as doing so implies that the country of origin has failed to protect its citizens. The most recent data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) suggests that, as of June 2019, only 21,000 Venezuelans had officially been recognized as refugees. An asylum seeker is someone who is outside their country of origin who is seeking refugee status, but who has not officially received it (Giles 2013, 81-82). As of January 2020, approximately 768,146 Venezuelans had lodged asylum claims, and are currently waiting for their claims to be adjudicated. The most common term used in reference to Venezuelans, then, is "migrant," which refers to one who leaves their country of origin by choice in search of a better life, but who does not face any barriers or risks in returning to said country. This term largely depoliticizes the context that has led to such widespread displacement from Venezuela, thereby undermining the responsibility that states might otherwise have to extend legal protection to Venezuelans in their countries. Thus, despite the low number of Venezuelans with formal refugee status, this paper shall intentionally employ both "migrant" and "refugee" in reference to those who have fled Venezuela since 2015. This choice stems from the intention to accurately portray the complex legal and political statuses Venezuelans occupy while simultaneously calling into question the legitimacy of the distinctions.

Historical Trends in Latin American Migration Policy

Immigration to and within Latin America has long been a prominent phenomenon. As early as the late nineteenth century, countries such as Brazil and Chile promoted European immigration to their countries – though this was notably a function of their desire to retain ethnically European and racially white populations (Fitzgerald and Cook-Martin 2014, 266). Before and during the early years of World War Two, South American (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay in particular) countries served as havens for Poles, Jews, and other Europeans fleeing Nazi Germany—but also later welcomed Nazi officers fleeing prosecution (320-322). Most countries in South America are signatories both to the 1951 Convention and the Cartagena Convention, the latter of which was spearheaded by countries in Latin America itself in response to mass displacement that occurred in the wake of civil wars and dictatorships in the region (Van Praag 2019). Immigration policy was securitized and restrictive during the military dictatorships of the 1960s-80s, however it has since liberalized to varying degrees and across different indicators since the 1990s (Canto et al. 2015, 16).

This liberalization foreshadowed the "left turn" in the region, which began in 1999 with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Aptly named Bolivarianism, the ideology of the Venezuelan Revolution, amongst other policies, promoted regional solidarity and citizenship and prioritized Latin American sovereignty and interests over the interests of the Global North (Maya 2011, 221). The rise of Chavez initiated a domino effect of leftist electoral victories across the region in Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Bolivia. While none of the other left-turn governments can be

characterized as equally radical or progressive as that of Venezuela, they nonetheless initiated several key reforms centered on migration. For example, the 2004 immigration law passed under Argentine President Christina Kirchner formally recognized of the right to migrate as "essential and inalienable to the person," a move mirrored by her Chilean counterpart, Michelle Bachelet, in 2008 (Arcaroza and Freier 2015; Reveco 2018). Governments also loosened entry and visa requirements for citizens of other countries in the region as a means of promoting freedom of movement (Hazán, Selee, and Muñoz-Pogossian 2019, 4). One particularly striking case is that of Ecuador. Migrant rights are embedded within the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, which mandates that the government protect the rights of citizens and foreigners in the country alike. Ecuador also adopted a policy of open borders in 2008, thereby allowing any foreign national to remain in the country without a visa for up to three months (Arcarazo and Freier, 678-679). While some of these policy shifts represented normative changes, others merely formalized patterns and relations that had been prominent for decades. Colombia and Venezuela, for example, have long shared a porous border characterized by informal, temporary migration (Testa 2019, 23).

On a regional level, one of the most significant developments was the Mercosur settlement agreement, which dictates that the citizens of the member states (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) and associated states (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) do not need a passport or visa to travel around the region, and can do so with only a national identity card or other document considered valid. The UNASUR member states indicate similar goals of regional integration and cohesion. The aforementioned focus on intra-regional migration reflects the fact that most migration patterns within Latin America (with the exception, perhaps, of Colombia) are not widespread refugee flows, but instead informal and temporary movements motivated by the potential for economic gains (Acosta 2016). What distinguishes the Venezuelan case is not the fact of intra-regional migration, but the features of migration itself: it represents neither the informal temporary movement for economic reasons nor the historical emigration out of Latin America for political reasons. Instead, it represents an amalgamation of both trends.

Initial Responses to the Venezuelan Crisis

This section shall provide an analysis of South American responses to Venezuelan refugees in the earlier years of the crisis until approximately 2018, including in policy shifts, regional actions, and concrete outcomes. Crucially, most of these responses have favored alternative forms of legal residence and status rather than the formal asylum processes, and only two countries (Mexico and Brazil) have applied the 1984 Cartagena Convention when evaluating asylum claims (Selee and Bolter 2020, 24). While asylum adjudications have been present in most countries, this paper largely focuses on these alternative forms of recognition and their role in this situation.

First, countries have created new classifications and legal statuses specifically for Venezuelans who have emigrated since late 2015. By far the most common destination for Venezuelans emigres is Colombia, where, as of December 2019, approximately 1.6 million Venezuelans were living (4). In addition to its own temporary visa program, Colombia began to issue Border Mobility Cards in 2017, which allows Venezuelans to travel freely between the two countries (Parent and Freier, 2018). Peru, the second-largest recipient of Venezuelan migration, introduced a Temporary Stay Permit (Permiso Temporal de Permanencia, or PTP), in 2017 which granted temporary residence to Venezuelans living in the country. This program was formulated with the goal of regularizing migration to Peru, as opposed to previous systems that led to informal or undocumented immigration. Temporary status, however, does not come with a work permit, which has led many migrants to choose to apply for asylum instead (Testa 2019, 30-31). Colombia, Chile, and Brazil adopted similar temporary protection visas of one to two years, with a few notable differences. For instance, Chile's Visa of Democratic Responsibility for Venezuelan

Citizens, launched in April 2018, may only be obtained by applying at the Chilean embassy in Caracas, thereby servicing only those with the resources to remain in the country and obtain the required documentation (Parent and Freier 2018).

Other countries have responded by drawing on existing frameworks or laws and applying them to the Venezuelan situation itself. Argentina, for example, has drawn upon the existing framework of MERCOSUR residency agreements and has issued unrestricted, two-year, renewable visas to Venezuelans. Critically, these visas allow holders to work and have been reformed to address the inaccessibility of certain identification documents, thereby positioning them as a more accessible option as a whole. Ecuador has taken a hybrid approach by citing relevant frameworks and applying broader laws to the Venezuelan crisis, as well as by introducing new mechanisms. In 2018, it introduced the Ley de Movilidad Humana (Human Mobility Law), which expands upon previous mechanisms by dictating that any South American may enter the country and remain there for 180 days so long as they have a national identity card. This can be understood as an adaptation of the UNASUR visa policy, which mandates the same provisions. These visas, however, have proved to be expensive and inaccessible to most (Cantor et al., 20).

On a regional level, the most important development at this time is the Declaration of Quito, signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, as well as by three states in Central America (Mexico, Panama, and Costa Rica) in September 2018. At its core, the goal of the Declaration is "to enhance regional cooperation, including additional international community financial support for countries facing large influxes of Venezuelan refugees. It also aims to provide domestic legal protections for Venezuelan migrants, including access to basic social services and acceptance of expired travel documents as proof of identity." (Restrepo, Sutton, and Martinez 2019, 19) The parties met again in November 2018 to discuss an action plan, which covers three main areas: the regularization of Venezuelan nationals living in foreign countries, regional cooperation with Venezuela, and cooperation with states in the region. Subsequent meetings in April and July of 2019 enabled signees to update each other on the extent to which they implemented the action plan. Additionally, countries would commit to new actions, such as facilitating refugee integration. These actions would have the effect of rallying the international community for increased support (Testa 2019, 11-12).

The Quito Process, as it is now called, has seen a rocky start. As of June 2019, most of its plans for regional cooperation and relaxed borders have failed to come to fruition. Nevertheless, at a bare minimum, the fact that these countries made a commitment, to begin with, is reflective of a sense of regional trust and cooperation between states that are not equally impacted by the crisis and that do not all have the same capacity to respond. At its best, however, the Quito Process indicates a strong sense of regional solidarity and desire to help fellow South Americans escape from a brutal and oppressive regime. In the face of increasingly hostile attitudes towards foreign-born nationals in the same hemisphere, this sense of comradery and compatriotism could be transformational.

As a whole, these responses have seen varying degrees of success, implementation, and impact, which shall be discussed in the following section. The fact that many mechanisms have been created specifically and exclusively to respond to the Venezuelan crisis could be interpreted in a number of ways. On the one hand, it may be true that a dynamic and specific response to Venezuelan displacement draws attention to the exceptionality of the current crisis and meaningfully targets Maduro's government and its legitimacy. Conversely, given the inherently political nature of formal refugee recognition, it is possible to understand these alternative measures as a mechanism for depoliticizing country and region-level responses. In the same vein, it may be true that relegating the intake of Venezuelan migrants to their own sphere de-legitimizes

formal asylum claims, and arbitrarily limits the scope of the benefits that migrants may receive. It is also pertinent that refugee status is permanent, while the visas granted to Venezuelan emigres are largely temporary. This not only reflects the predominant patterns of migration patterns themselves in the region but could also be indicative of the initial expectation that Venezuela would stabilize, that migration outflows would cease, and that refugees may be able to repatriate their countries. As the situation in Venezuela shows no signs of improvement, this outcome appears unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, as the following sections shall demonstrate, the increasingly protracted nature of displacement suggests that such temporary measures may prove to be fundamentally insufficient responses.

Restrictionism, Retraction, and Securitization

This section analyzes the recent rightward shift in Latin American immigration policy towards Venezuelan refugees, which began just as the Quito Declaration was signed at a regional level. Both the concrete policy outcomes and normative indicators of a shift in the region's openness to immigrants, such as opinion polling, electoral outcomes, and xenophobic incidents are considered. Critically, policies and attitudes have become more restrictive, both as the number of Venezuelan migrants has increased and as the profile of these refugees themselves has shifted. Migration during the earliest years of the crisis consisted largely of educated adults and working-aged men who were ultimately attractive assets to the countries they immigrated to. As the economic situation in Venezuela has worsened, poorer, less educated, and less skilled workers have joined their compatriots, seeing no other choice than to flee (Camilleri and Hampson 2018, 9-10).

While most politicians have continued to discursively support Venezuelan refugees, many have quietly narrowed the scope of their visa programs and increased the amount of identification needed to obtain legal status. Colombia, for example, blocked those who had entered the country after June 2018 from qualifying for PEP, and ceased issuing border mobility cards after just one year (Testa 2019, 13). The Peruvian government announced that it too would cease issuing PTP visas at the end of 2018, citing a sharp rise in the number of applicants (Camilleri and Hampson 2018, 15-16). Both Peru and Ecuador implemented passport requirements for Venezuelan migrants in the summer of 2018. Although it was struck down by Ecuador's courts for being in violation of the human mobility law, Ecuador further restricted immigration by mandating that Venezuelans present their criminal records to authorities in order to receive any form of status (Restrepo, Sutton, and Martinez, 19). However, many simply cannot access their criminal records and thus cannot prove their innocence. Notably, these policies have not stymied the flow of refugees from Venezuela but have merely redirected it to other countries or transformed it into informal, undocumented forms of migration. These policies are fundamentally in contrast with their predecessors, as they ultimately limit the degree of regularization possible and present new barriers to accessing legal status.

Some South American governments have taken more active measures to limit the presence of Venezuelan refugees. Brazil, for example, began to militarize its northernmost region in 2016, where most Venezuelans enter and remain (John 2019, 444). Colombia, once the most consistent haven for Venezuelan refugees, slowly began deporting them, citing irregularities in their entrances or linkages to crime. For instance, in November 2019 the Colombian government deported fifty-nine Venezuelans, citing their involvement in political protests and alleged participation in acts of vandalism (The City Paper Staff 2019). Some instances of deportation have also been reported in Ecuador, especially since the February 2019 restrictions were implemented (The City Paper Staff 2019). This is diametrically opposed to the principle of non-refoulement, the element of the 1951 UNHCR Convention that forbids countries from deporting asylum seekers to

their countries of origin unless they represent a clear threat to national security. This exemplifies the complex and dissimilar protections afforded to those recognized formally as refugees as opposed to those without this status.

Crucially, however, right-wing and centrist governments have also implemented more welcoming policies that do not line up with existing expectations. Perhaps no case illustrates this more than that of Jair Bolsonaro, a far-right nationalist who once described African and Haitian refugees fleeing to Brazil as the "scum of the earth," elected to the presidency in October 2018. While his past and present xenophobia and concern for Brazilian sovereignty may suggest a different outcome, thus far, Bolsonaro's government has not undertaken significant attempts to stem Venezuelan migration into the country. In December of 2019, Brazil began granting refugee status to Venezuelans on a *prima facie* basis, thereby foregoing the proceedings for individual status determination (Selee and Bolter 2020, 28). While this has unquestionably led to positive outcomes for many Venezuelans in Brazil without status, it is critical to take seriously the potential motivations behind this decision. From this, it becomes clear that, due to the aforementioned political nature of refugee recognition, it is politically expedient for Bolsonaro to accept Venezuelan refugees into Brazil as a means of signalling his opposition to socialism and to Maduro. Additionally, while Bolsonaro has embraced this particular international standard for this particular circumstance, his government continues to display opposition to other international organizations and laws related to migration, as demonstrated by the country's departure from the UN's Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in early 2019 (Corrales 2019). These selective measures suggest that a welcoming migration policy may not be replicated if the tides shift such that widespread recognition and assistance are no longer politically expedient. Combined, rising restrictionism and capricious decision making suggest that future displacement crises may not be met with the spirit of comradery outlined by Bolivar, Bolivarianism, or the number of regional agreements that embody these ideals.

Conclusion

Governments, of course, are far from the only relevant actors: the public, too, has demonstrated similarly varied attitudes. In Argentina, most surveyed individuals displayed positive or neutral attitudes towards Venezuelan migrants. However, 38% of respondents indicated that they had witnessed overt discrimination directed towards Venezuelan migrants (Corrales 2019). Public opinion data in Chile offers perhaps the most striking portrait of this increasingly restrictive attitude. One survey conducted in the spring of 2017 showed that 41% of Chileans believe migrants increased crime, a 6-point uptick from the last poll in 2003, and just one-third agreed that immigrants were good for the economy (Reveco 2018). Other polls indicate that 68% Chileans are in favor of restricting immigration and 75% agreed that the number of immigrants in the country was too high (Corrales 2019). In Ecuador and Colombia, xenophobic mobs have terrorized predominately Venezuelan communities, and in Brazil, 1,200 Venezuelans were extrajudicially deported by angry citizens in northern Pacaraima. While popular reactions have been marked by everything from ambivalence to accommodation to acceptance, these trends suggest that South America may be as vulnerable to the tides of xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment that have come to characterize responses in the United States, and much of the European Union. Thus, an understanding of regional responses to the Venezuelan migration crisis serves not only as a tool for understanding the present situation, but also as a means of looking towards possible future responses.

The outlook, then, is mixed. On the one hand, many South American countries have demonstrated notable willingness to provide protections to Venezuelan asylum seekers in their midst. They have done so by using several existing national and regional laws, compacts and

norms, creating new forms of protection, and by coordinating on a regional level. While these creative policies have resulted in some successes, they have also faced widespread barriers to implementation, bureaucratic challenges, underutilization, and outright reversals. For a time, it seemed as though support for Venezuelan refugees was more rhetorical than concrete. Now, however, even the rhetorical support regarding this issue has waned, taking policy and public opinion with it. In the context of political instability as well as the emerging threat of climate change-induced migration, it is this restrictive trend that poses the biggest challenge not only in terms of securing protection and justice for Venezuelan emigres, but also because it represents the most significant barrier that future crises may face. The question remains: will South America become the beacon of solidarity and freedom that Bolivar once dreamed of, that twentieth century leftist governments elucidated, and that contemporary institutions suggest it can become? Or, will the region mirror the xenophobic and protectionist patterns of its North American neighbors by treating them as strangers in their midst? Ultimately, what will decide this is that which those fleeing violence, persecution, or disaster do not have: time.

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Monetary Overextension: Why the Chinese Yuan will not become the next Global Currency

By Wing Wong

Author Note My name is Wing Wong, and I am a U2 student studying political science and computer science. The paper that you are about to read was written for POLI 445, a fascinating course which delves into the intricacies of international monetary relations. As someone who has roots in Hong Kong, this paper was especially compelling to write as the city plays a critical role in facilitating trade between China and the rest of the world. I would like to thank Professor Mark Brawley for igniting my interest in international political economy, and the field of economics in general. I would also like to thank my parents for providing me the unique experiences which have given me the inspiration to write this paper. Finally, a big thanks to Emma Frattasio and Maëna Raoux for their hard work and encouragement.

Abstract In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, the People's Republic of China has experienced massive growth to become the world's second largest economy. Along with this rise, China has taken steps to expand its economic power and influence overseas. One of the ways it has pursued this is to promote the Chinese Renminbi as an alternative to the US Dollar, which has served as the international currency since the end of the Second World War. By analyzing the features of the Chinese economy through various paradigms, this paper will argue that, despite the best efforts of the Chinese government, the RMB will be unlikely to displace the USD as the premier currency in the near future.

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Introduction

In 2009, the Chinese government launched a campaign to internationalize the Chinese Yuan (RMB) by formally promoting its use outside of Mainland China for the first time. This stood in stark contrast to China's previous monetary policy, which – until 2004 – forbade any amount of RMB from leaving mainland China (Cheung 2014, 3). Since then, China has ensured a steady supply of RMB in the global market by negotiating swap lines with central banks around the world, issuing RMB-denominated bonds, and authorizing global financial centres to engage in the official trading of the currency (Prasad 2017, 106). Consequently, the Yuan has seen a rapid rise in popularity as both a reserve currency and a currency used to record transactions for foreign governments and investors alike, reaching the point where it is now the eighth most traded currency in the world (121). These developments, along with China's massive growth to become the world's second-largest economy, have led scholars to ask an important question: What are the chances that the RMB will replace the US Dollar (USD) as the international medium of exchange?

By adopting an analytical liberal standpoint, this paper will argue that although China publicized its intentions to make the Yuan an international medium of exchange and has aggressively pursued this goal, the chances that it will overtake the US dollar in its role as an international currency remains small. Focusing on the domestic front, there are three main factors preventing the Chinese Yuan from becoming the next global currency: China has yet to 1) develop its economy to its maximum potential, 2) fully liberalize its economy, and 3) resolve the lack of efficiency and transparency of its financial institutions. Thus, it simply lacks many of the same factors that enabled the USD to become a global currency in the first place. Instead, a more likely scenario is that the Yuan will move up the currency hierarchy to become a dominant regional currency.

Premature Ambition

For the Chinese government, the internationalization of the Yuan would bring about numerous advantages. First, the increase in demand associated with an international currency means that domestic banks and other financial institutions will receive more business, as they can gain a competitive edge over foreign banks by receiving security network protection and concessions from the government (Zhang 2011, 210). This enables Chinese banks to provide additional services to their customers, such as deposit insurance and fraud protection, which in turn allows them to recuperate potential losses and increase consumer confidence. Furthermore, through the process of seigniorage, the issuing country can profit by printing currency that is worth more than the cost of producing it (210). Additionally, the issuing country can cut back its debt burden by increasing the money supply, thereby reducing the value of any outstanding debts (211).

Despite the many benefits, currency internationalization also comes with several drawbacks, some of which would be particularly damaging to the Chinese economy. One of the key obstacles preventing the Chinese Yuan from challenging the USD is timing, as the Yuan is undergoing internationalization at a time when the Chinese economy has not yet been fully developed. Although China enjoys growth rates much higher than its Western counterparts – including several years of double-digit growth before 2008 – a significant wealth gap continues to exist (Breznitz and Murphree 2011, 2). As of 2018, the Chinese Gross National Income per capita stood at $17,841, or slightly more than one-quarter of the US (World Bank 2019). By contrast, the Pound Sterling and the USD were both adopted only after their issuing countries became undisputed leaders in the international economy during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Eichengreen and Kawai 2015, 54). This means that the Chinese government has continued to prioritize sustained economic growth as part of its long-term goals. Nevertheless, this also

presents a dilemma for policymakers, as the internationalization of the RMB would run counter to creating growth. Should the Yuan be successfully adopted as an international currency, the increase in foreign demand would inevitably cause its value to rise relative to other currencies. This change in value would make exports look more expensive to potential customers, hurting sales, and slowing economic growth. Moreover, at the time of writing, the growth rate in China has already slowed to 6%, the lowest in 27 years (Tang 2019). Without slowing further plans for internationalization, the Chinese economy could completely stagnate or even begin to experience negative growth, which would prove to be extremely unpopular amongst a population that has enjoyed decades of economic prosperity (Zhang 2011, 140).

Given that China has become much more central in the global economy in recent years and considering the advantages of currency internationalization, some may argue that the RMB will inevitably become a global currency. However, if such an occasion did occur, the disadvantages mentioned above would become amplified, creating an additional incentive for the Chinese government to reverse course. To reduce the appeal of the RMB, the government can simply devalue the currency or implement additional capital controls. The former would reduce the value of foreign holdings of RMB, undermining foreign confidence in the currency as a store of value. Meanwhile, additional capital controls would reduce the supply of RMB overseas, reducing the number of transactions involving the RMB and increasing transaction costs.

Structural Realists would argue that a shift in the international medium of exchange towards the Yuan is inevitable, given China's swift rise as one of the world's largest economies with a growth rate that far outpaces that of the United States (Casetti 2003, 665). They would predict that as China gains economic and political clout, it will be able to influence the international monetary regime to its own liking and impose the Yuan on smaller states. Meanwhile, under analytical liberalism, the unit of analysis begins with the preferences of individuals. As they identify the preferences of others, they begin to form interest groups that compete with one another until a dominant group emerges and can influence government policy. As such, changes can only happen when the breakdown of preferences begins to change. Using this perspective, the government would face growing opposition from several influential groups. First, China's massive manufacturing sector would oppose further attempts to internationalize the currency, as the appreciation of the Yuan would directly impact their profits. Second, internationalization would make it more difficult for the Central Bank of China (PBOC) to manage monetary policy that suits domestic interests. Once growth continues to decline, the central bank would be forced to lower interest rates to encourage borrowing and spending. This can only be done to a limited extent, however, as too much stimulus can lead to high inflation, causing confidence in the Yuan to plummet (Helleiner 2008, 356). To satisfy these groups, the government will most likely be forced to slow or completely stop further efforts to internationalize the Yuan, eliminating any chance the USD would be displaced in the short-term.

Institutional Barriers

A second issue facing the internationalization of the Chinese Yuan is that it continues to be hampered by heavy restrictions on capital flow and monetary exchange, both of which have been long abandoned by the world's advanced economies. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, the central government severely restricted Chinese banks' ability to borrow from foreign sources and limited the amount that foreigners could purchase from Chinese stock markets (Prasad 2017, 132). These decisions helped reduce stock market volatility and "hot money" which entails short-term investments that are quickly withdrawn by investors (Eichengreen and Kawai 2015, 71). However, the continued use of these policies into the present also prevents more foreign companies and individuals from establishing business ties with mainland China and

circulating RMB around the world. To make matters worse, the Yuan is still not fully convertible at the time of writing. Instead, a separate onshore (CNY) and offshore (CNH) rate provides importers with a source of RMB while still protecting the country's capital account (Cheung 2014, 5). Whereas trading for the CNY is tightly controlled by the PBOC, the CNH can be freely traded on the international market (5). This dual market is a source of worry for businesses and investors alike, as the two rates can differ by up to 10%, significantly increasing transaction costs (16). Moreover, even with the opening of official clearing centres and currency markets outside of mainland China, the Yuan is still largely unavailable in large quantities outside major financial centres such as London or Geneva (Prasad 2017, 111). Although no official statement has been made, the fact that China has not opened any new offshore clearing banks since December 2016 suggests that this is an intentional move by the Chinese government to avoid internationalizing the currency too quickly.

Beyond constraints on the financial and exchange markets, Chinese and foreign investors alike are concerned by the fact that Chinese financial institutions simply lack the transparency that has become the norm in the developed world (Eichengreen 2005, 22). These concerns are symptomatic of the fact that China continues to be ruled by an authoritarian regime, which prevents state-owned financial institutions from being constrained by formal checks and balances or held accountable for their actions. Over time, this has resulted in corporations suffering from weak corporate governance, weak auditing standards, and shoddy accounting practices (Prasad 2017, 132). Therefore, investors' perceived risk of the currency increases as the lack of transparency introduces the possibility of unforeseen fluctuations.

By contrast, not only has the US dollar been free from any capital controls since the closing of the gold window in 1971, but it is also regulated by the Federal Reserve, which acts independently of the US government. These policies mirror international norms that have gradually shifted in favour of a free-market system over the twentieth century. Particularly, investors have an incentive to spend in countries that respect contracts between individuals, as well as between individuals and the government. These incentives are further increased if an independent and impartial judiciary can resolve potential disputes. Furthermore, a free-market system often entails strong property rights, preventing investors' assets from being at risk of government expropriation. As such, unless serious efforts are made to implement institutional reform, there is little incentive for foreign actors to use the RMB in transactions outside of China.

The Fate of the Chinese Yuan

Despite the current challenges facing the Yuan, the currency will almost certainly play a larger role in the international economy. In 2015, the Yuan was added as a basket currency for the International Monetary Fund (IMF), representing 10.92% of the Special Drawing Rights and making it the third reserve currency after the USD and the Euro (Prasad 2017, 121). This was a symbolic acknowledgement from the global community that the RMB has risen to become a major reserve currency. At the same time, the RMB has seen a massive increase as a settlement currency. The volume of RMB used in cross-border mainland trade settlement has increased from 3% in 2010 to 11% in 2013 (Eichengreen and Kawai 2015, 62). Finally, beginning in 2011, China has signed a series of bilateral trading agreements between the RMB and the currencies of major trading partners including Russia, Japan, and Australia (Prasad 2017, 112). This eliminates the need for the USD as an intermediate currency, allowing for a substantial reduction in transaction costs for both sides. Although the pursuance of such an aggressive internationalization policy has many disadvantages as discussed earlier, it is clear that for the time being the Chinese government sees the benefits of influence and prestige to be more valuable than any economic repercussions.

Conclusion

Under the present domestic conditions, it is unlikely that the Chinese Yuan will replace the USD as the international currency. Currently, the Chinese government chooses to pursue internationalization as it seeks to reap its numerous benefits, such as increased business for Chinese banks and influence over countries which use the Yuan for a large proportion of their transactions. Nonetheless, it has failed to recognize how a significant reduction in economic growth would eclipse such benefits. While these benefits may have been sustainable during years of double-digit growth, with growth rates at their lowest level since the 1990s, it has become necessary to re-evaluate the merits of continued internationalization. Moreover, China's financial markets and monetary regime are still under heavy restrictions, undermining investor confidence in the value of the Yuan and preventing it from freely flowing in the international market. Most importantly, the lack of transparency and accountability in Chinese financial institutions makes it difficult for the public to believe that the Yuan will be free from unexpected interventions.

While it is unlikely that the Chinese Yuan will replace the US Dollar anytime soon, it is well on its way to becoming a dominant regional currency. Already, the USD no longer plays a role as a currency of intermediation between China and some of its largest trading partners. Additionally, neighbouring countries have begun issuing RMB-denominated bonds and are holding an increasing amount of RMB in their reserves. Moving forward, if the Chinese government wishes to maximize the chances of internationalization, they must first abandon their overambitious goals. Next, they must work to solidify the Yuan's regional status and to resolve more immediate economic and institutional problems persisting in the domestic sphere. Should they succeed in doing so, the Chinese government will likely find that internationalization will occur in a smooth and orderly fashion.

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