FLUX

International Relations Review

Volume XIV • Issue I

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Volume XIV: Issue I Flux: International Relations Review

Flux operates out of Montréal, located on the traditional territory of the Kanien'keha:ka, a place which has long served as a site of meeting and exchange amongst nations. The Kanien'keha:ka are the keepers of the Eastern Door of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. In writing about political science and international relations we strive to incorporate diverse voices and bear in mind the forces, including (neo) colonialism, which have shaped the way we understand international relations. We encourage all readers to inform themselves on and actively resist, in the diverse forms that resistance can take, (neo) colonialism in Canada and abroad.

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the second issue of Volume 14 of Flux: International Relations Review! Once again, our devoted team here at Flux—from writers and editors to graphic designers and peer reviewers to executive directors—has worked tirelessly to create an insightful collage of youth scholarship on contemporary world issues.

Volume XIV, Issue I, contains twelve original essays written by undergraduates from universities across Canada, as well as Flux's first article from the University of Toronto. Within Flux's broad theme of international affairs, these pieces of scholarship touch on political issues in many corners of the globe from the disciplinary perspectives of political science, history, and economics.

To start, Joshua Kim explores the ways in which great power politics silences local voices in his article The Kashmir Question: Victim of British Colonialism and Site of Post-Colonial Communal Violence. Second, David Mickelson raises and refutes a number of counterarguments against Saudi nuclearization in his article Nuclear Peace in the Middle East: The Realist Case for Saudi Nuclearization. The third article The Drug Trade in Peru: Don't Get High On Your Own Supply-Side Economics, also authored by David Mickelson, offers an international economic politics perspective over the effectiveness of the United States' anti-narcotics policy against Peruvian Coca farming in the 1980s. Next, Eric Duivenvoorden examines in the article The Interaction of Buddhism and Forestry Conservation in Bhutan how a small state at the eastern edge of the Himalayas has successfully applied an extensive forest conservation program while much of the world has struggled to adequately respond to the climate crisis.

In "This is Not A Song, It's An Outburst" How Musical Moral Entrepreneurship Fueled the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement, through semantic and musical deconstructions of Paul Simon's "Graceland" project and the Voëlvry punk movement, Alex O'Neill examines their role in dismantling the tenets of racial governance at the grassroots level in South Africa. Next, Sarah Booghs in Les changements climatiques comme enjeu de sécurité: Le Sahel, une région vulnérable explores how climate crisis has intersected with regional conflicts. In Women in leftist rebel movements: The Nicaraguan FSLN and Salvadoran FMNL, Solene Mouchel analyzes women's significant involvement in leftist rebel movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador, challenged traditional gender roles in the male-dominated sphere of guerrilla warfare. The eighth article, authored by Deeba Mehr The UN Mission in Bosnia: An Exploitative Failure shines the light on how the UN failed in its peace mission to Bosnia (UNMIBH), playing an actively detrimental role in the victims' experience of sexual exploitation and human trafficking, and an insufficient role in holding accountable those who were at fault.

Bianca Cialone, in her article Ruination of Sacred Space in Hawaii: Mauna Kea and the Thirty Meter Telescope explores the planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea in Hawaii and reflects the island's long and historical struggle with colonialism. Next, Isabel Siu-Zmuidzinas, in Different Words, Same Results: The Perils of Populism in Ecuador and Brazil in the 21st Century, examines the detrimental role of populism to South American democracies by examining the case studies of Ecuador and Brazil. Reyanna Bridge, in the article Grave New World: The Foreseeable Resurgence of Proxy Warfare in Africa analyses the continent of Africa as a region of theatre of tension for international ambitions in the 21st Century. Lastly, Aden Gill in Lessons from Montréal: Creating MNC Support for Environmental Regulations, explores how the 1986 Montréal Protocol was an unprecedented success in the United Nations campaign to tackle climate change.

I congratulate each of the writers and editors for their achievements in this issue. As always, special thanks go to our graphic designer, Luiz de Oliveira Freitas, and our layout editor, Wendy, who are responsible for this publication's visual appeal. I hope you enjoy reading the articles as much as the Flux team enjoyed working on them. I am proud of all the authors and the entire Flux's team for making this edition possible.

Best,
Tito Almeida
Editor-in-Chief of Flux: International Relations Review 2023-2024.

The Kashmir Question: Victim of British Colonialism and Site of Post-Colonial Communal Violence

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Edited by Elena Lee and Noème Fages

ABSTRACT

Kashmir has been a site of communal and international violence for the past decades ever since the decolonization of the Indian sub-continent in the late 1940s. Due to British colonial rule and subsequent religious tensions, the region has faced a complex situation, which has resulted in a political crisis. As a result of competition between three great nuclear powers —China, India, and Pakistan— Kashmiri voices for peace and sovereignty have been silenced and crushed with violent force by the Indian state. By exploring first the history of Kashmir from the British colonial era, and then the region's alignments to surrounding powers, this essay explores the ways in which great power politics silences Kashmiri voices.

Introduction

Kashmir, a region tucked away in the Himalayas, is mired in a territorial dispute between three nuclear powers: India, Pakistan, and China. It is home to different religious and linguistic groups with competing claims to the region. The region has always been strategically important; for example, Britain invaded Punjab after concerns that the Sikh Empire was no longer reliable in the face of the Great Game in the region between Russia and Britain (Rai, 2004). It is also the case that the voices of Kashmiri locals are often drowned out by Indian and Pakistani loyalists whenever violence breaks out in the region. During the decolonization of the Indian subcontinent, in the face of growing communal violence, the ruler of Kashmir acceded his state to then-secular India in hopes of settling peace in the region. Yet, Kashmir remains a site of violence and international bickering at the government level while Kashmiri lives are in jeopardy.

The root causes of the Kashmir conflict can be attributed to the communal violence between Muslims and Hindus, a lingering aftermath of British colonial policies in India. The results of the colonial policies still affect Kashmir, as it is divided into states led by religious nationalist governments vying to win their rivalry over the region. This paper will examine the history of Kashmir from the decolonization of British India to the start of the conflict through the various Indo-Pakistani Wars, Chinese involvement, and the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. By doing so, the essay will argue that the Kashmiris do not hold the keys to their national destiny due to the politics of stronger nuclear powers, which forcibly situate Kashmir in the middle of conflicting interests and futures set out for the region.

Kashmir Before 1948

Coming out of the Second World War, the Indian subcontinent saw communities separated by religious affiliation: Muslims and Hindus. This identification as one of the two religious groups resulted from the British colonial policy of categorizing its colonial subjects for effective governance (Lange and Dawson 2009). Differentiation between Muslims and Hindus allowed the British to favour one over the other unjustly, increasing animosity between the two groups artificially categorized by the British (Lange and Dawson 2009).

Kashmir was not immune to this division between Muslims and Hindus, as the ruler of Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh, was Hindu, while the majority of his subjects were Muslims. This created dissonance during the Partition/Accession period (Rai 2004). Animosity grew among communities and between the subjects and the ruler, exploding as communal violence during the decolonization process of the subcontinent, including in Jammu and Kashmir with the 1947 Jammu massacres. The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was initially set on remaining independent during the chaotic partition and accession period. This position gained support from various groups except for the Muslim Conference. This led to the 1947 Poonch Rebellion against the Maharaja and resulted in the mass migration of Hindus and Sikhs to Jammu with stories that incited fear among the locals against the Muslims (Ganguly 1995). The fear led to the massacres targeted against Muslims in Jammu (Snedden 2001).

Due to the eruption of communal violence across his princedom, Maharaja Hari Singh signed an agreement to accede his princedom to then-secular India. In exchange, he sought the defence of his princedom against the Pakistani-backed militias and, later on, against the Pakistani army (Qadri 2021). Additionally, the accession guaranteed autonomy for Kashmir within India under the Instrument of Accession, signed by Lord Mountbatten, representing the Dominion of India, and the Maharaja, representing Jammu and Kashmir. This guarantee of Kashmiri autonomy would later be ingrained into the Indian Constitution in 1949 with the passing of Article 370 (Qadri 2021). The notion of Hindu-majority India being a secular state, the Maharaja being Hindu himself, and rebellions incited by Pakistani-backed militias across the princedom made India a more viable option for accession than Pakistan (Varshney 2010).

The First Indo-Pakistani War started over Kashmir when Indian soldiers entered Kashmir to defend the newly acceded princedom and when the Pakistani-backed militias, and later the Pakistani army, also entered Kashmir (Wolpert 2010). The United Nations had to intervene and lay out a peaceful resolution that laid out terms, such as the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and minimal Indian troops stationed in Kashmir for a plebiscite on the future of Kashmir to be held (Qadri 2021). Hopes for a standing peace quickly dissipated as neither the Pakistani nor the Indian army withdrew their armies in suspicion of each others' motives. The plebiscite never happened, and the Kashmir region was divided between India and Pakistan (Varshney 2010). The origins of the Kashmir conflict are evident; the British pursued a colonial policy of categorizing and differentiating its subjects into groups, setting them against each other to govern the colonies more easily and quash any united movements for independence. This policy of communal animosity resulted in communal violence committed in the Indian subcontinent as princedoms and states were forced to choose between joining the Muslim-majority Pakistan or the Hindu-majority but secular India. When faced with the choice between two newly independent and powerful states, the Maharaja of Kashmir had to concede his initial wish to remain independent, leading to its conditional accession to India as Pakistan-backed rebellions broke out in his princedom, which planted the seed of a decades-long conflict continuing to this day.

20th Century Indian-Pakistani-Chinese Influence over Kashmir

After Kashmir acceded to India and received constitutional guarantees of autonomy, Sheikh Abdullah was appointed the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir in 1948. Sheikh Abdullah spoke strongly against the Kashmiri accession to Pakistan, describing the nation as "an unscrupulous and savage enemy" due to its strongly religion-oriented government compared to secular India (Guha 2019, 92). Abdullah's strong opposition to Pakistan portrays the general Kashmiri attitude on the issue of the Kashmir question during this time. Indian Muslims also opposed Pakistan, blaming

their reckless risking of Indian Muslim lives through their provocative handling of the partition issues and encroaching upon Kashmir. This further incited anti-Muslim violence in India (Varshney 2010).

After the First Indo-Pakistan War, Pakistani attitude, the motivation for Kashmiri independence, and Abdullah's stance on the issue changed. Abdullah was increasingly wary of the potential rise of Hindu nationalism in India (Varshney 2010). Hindu-nationalist politicians were increasingly hostile against Indian Muslims and were suspicious of their loyalty towards India as animosity with Pakistan grew with various conflicts. It was this ambiguous position taken by Abdullah that allowed the rise of Hindu nationalism in India as the populace of India grew increasingly suspicious of Kashmir's loyalty and true intentions of joining India. However, it was unfair for India to demand unquestioned loyalty from Kashmir, a Muslim-majority country, rightfully concerned with the potential scenario where Hindu nationalists could gain popular support, meaning that Kashmir would no longer benefit from its constitutional guarantee of greater autonomy. Nevertheless, the rise of Hindu nationalism materialized in India throughout four wars with Pakistan. The concerns that Abdullah, among other Kashmiris, had of the fate of secularism in India seemed increasingly valid (Basu 1996).

The Second Indo-Pakistan War erupted in 1965 when Pakistan decided to infiltrate Jammu and Kashmir amidst increasing discontent among Kashmiris with the integration of Kashmir into India and the overreaching actions of the Indian government despite the guarantee of autonomy (Wolpert 2010). Although the war ended with no territorial gains made by either side, the subsequent dissatisfaction felt by both sides on the Kashmir Question led to more wars and skirmishes in the region between the two countries (Wolpert 2010). With the continuation of violence in Kashmir, as well as increased dissatisfaction from Kashmiri locals on the integration process, the movement for an independent Kashmir emerged. Both violent and non-violent mobilization were met with brutal suppression by the Indian military and police forces, breeding more support for Kashmiri independence and local hostility towards India.

While India and Pakistan were going to war multiple times over Kashmir, the People's Republic of China annexed Tibet in 1959, leading to rising tensions with India over the drawing of the border between India and China in the Himalayas. The tension between the two countries worsened after India provided refuge to the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan religious and political leader fleeing the Chinese government (Malik 2019). The two countries pushed the border conflict into a full-blown war in 1962 when the Chinese troops crossed the disputed McMahon Line (Malik 2019). The Chinese intended to build a road connecting their regions, Xinjiang and the newly-annexed Tibet, which went through the disputed Aksai Chin territory in Kashmir (Sen 2014). The war ended with the Chinese consolidation of Aksai Chin, increased animosity between India and China, and increased cooperation between Pakistan and China due to Pakistan's strategic interest in gaining a regional ally to check India's power. While the great powers started to prey upon the politically and socially fractured Kashmir, Kashmiri locals were caught in the crossfire of Chinese, Pakistani, and Indian military operations and strategic interests, which contributed to the civil unrest and an unstable region making the lives of many Kashmiris difficult and unable to choose their national destiny.

Kashmir Today - Escalating Conflict and the Lost Kashmiri Voice

Today, Kashmir is a site of border skirmishes, civil unrest, and constant fear for one's life by the local population. Cries for Kashmiri independence and police brutality against peaceful protesters have resulted in more protests against the Indian government. In 2019, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Indian government, with Narendra Modi at the helm, revoked Article 370 of the Constitution to remove Kashmir's special status and autonomy (Lunn 2019). Critics of the revocation of Article 370 called it a move that would strip the autonomy of the only-Muslim majority region in India in order to completely integrate it into the Indian Union. The integration would further destabilize the region amid growing support for Kashmiri independence (Al Jazeera 2019). In the lead-up to the revocation of Article 370, it has been reported that thousands of Indian troops were sent to Kashmir, a curfew was imposed, and communications in and out of the region were shut down (Lunn 2019). Ever since protests for independence rose in India and Pakistan, Kashmiris on each side of the border have grown tired of the regular state-led violence, leading to protests and demonstrations, which were consistently met with brutality. In 2022, ten protesters were reportedly killed in Kashmir when a protest broke out after a Kashmiri pro-independence leader, Yasin Malik, was sentenced to life (Al Jazeera 2022). On the other side of the border, the pro-independence movement gained momentum, with thousands of Kashmiris pouring out into the streets regularly in response to interstate violence that affected the community in Azad Kashmir (Shams 2019). The original hope of Maharaja Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah of an autonomous Kashmir under a secular, democratic India was no longer a realistic scenario, as a Hindu nationalist Indian government stripped Kashmir of its autonomy in a coercive and almost militaristic manner.

Other than the stripping of its autonomy within the Union of India, Kashmir has also seen multiple border skirmishes occur, such as the 2022 skirmishes between China and India. The altercation was over the increasing infrastructure construction on both sides of the Galwan River valley near the Line of Actual Control. This line separates Chinese-controlled territory from the Indian-controlled territory in Kashmir. The violence broke out after years of infrastructure construction and military buildup on both sides, each accusing the other of violating its territorial sovereignty (Wu and Myers 2020). The Chinese were "testing the limits" of the Line of Actual Control by expanding their claim over the valley (Wu and Myers 2020). Despite the cessation of the skirmishes along the border, thousands of Chinese and Indian soldiers remained stationed near the Line of Actual Control near Galwan Valley, which re-

sulted in continued tension in the region (Singh 2022).

Rising tensions in Kashmir due to the stripping of its autonomy in India and the border clashes between China and India are compounded by the increasing Chinese-Pakistani cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative. The Pakistani government has been hoping to leverage the strengthened Sino-Pakistani relationship to pressure India on the Kashmir Question as they expedite various infrastructure projects related to the Belt and Road Initiative in Pakistan (Aamir 2019). The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the main part of China's Belt and Road Initiative, also goes through Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir, which led to objections from India (Blah 2018). The Chinese government maintains that the CPEC's involvement with Pakistani Kashmir does not signify their taking a stance on the Kashmir Question between India and Pakistan (Blah 2018). Still, Pakistan hopes that the development of the CPEC will lead to further Chinese involvement in the issue and its siding with Pakistan. In response to the development of CPEC, India is constructing a railway line connecting Jammu and Kashmir to other strategically essential border regions of India, leading to competition for infrastructure development in the region between China-Pakistan and India.

Conclusively, the current situation in Kashmir reflects an increasingly Hindu nationalist Indian state stripping Kashmir of its autonomy through suppressive measures. This is all happening while India and China's border skirmishes are incited along the Line of Actual Control in Aksai Chin and increasing cooperation between Pakistan and China, which encroaches upon India's strategic interest in Kashmir. All of this occurs while the police and military brutally crush those who strive for an independent Kashmir, and both Indian and Pakistani loyalists drown out the voices of everyday Kashmiris in the elections and media coverage on the issue. The question of whether the various economic and developmental initiatives will benefit the Kashmiri population in the long run or if they will stand to serve the interests of the Great Powers, leading to greater conflicts in the future, will unfold in the coming decades.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the decades of violence and tragedies occurring in Kashmir today and the various geopolitical games between nuclear powers in the region derive from the British colonial policy and their chaotic departure from the subcontinent in the 1940s. The British policy of differentiating, categorizing, and favouring one religious group over another has deepened animosity between Muslims and Hindus. It led to all-out communal violence across the subcontinent, including Kashmir, where the Maharaja was Hindu and the populace Muslim. Despite hopes for its independence, Kashmir quickly found itself pressured into choosing a side between newly-formed India and Pakistan. The Maharaja's indecisiveness impeded the two powers' desire for Kashmir's integration.

Consequently, Kashmir was met with militant insurgencies and invasions from Pakistan, leading to its accession to India under the condition of certain sets of autonomy within the union. The increasing dissatisfaction with the integration process, the fear of rising Hindu nationalism, and increasing brutality by Indian forces have bred the rise of the Kashmiri independence movement in the region. Frequent protests today are met with violent suppressions, breeding a cycle of violence. The current Hindu nationalist government stripped Kashmir of its constitutionally guaranteed autonomy for greater integration of the Muslim-majority Kashmir into Hindu-majority India, which only sparked more unrest in the region. The frustration with daily violence also led to the rise of the Kashmiri independence movement in Pakistan. All this is happening while China solidifies its strategic interests and encroaches upon the region, leading to the Sino-Indian War in the Sixties and recent border skirmishes with India. China is also strengthening its ties with Pakistan through the CPEC, which further integrates Azad Kashmir into the Chinese-Pakistani cooperative partnership.

The origins of the Kashmir conflict, the historical progression of the conflict, and the current status of the conflict depict the region as tragically stuck in the crossfire between three great powers. Kashmir is unable to decide its own national identity and is forcibly separated along artificial and ambiguous lines due in large part to centuries-old British colonial policy.

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Nuclear Peace in the Middle East: The Realist Case for Saudi Nuclearization

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Edited by Myriam Tounekti and Noème Fages

ABSTRACT

This paper raises and refutes a number of counterarguments against Saudi nuclearization, and through an argument centred around Waltzian conceptions of neorealism, argues that it could stabilize the Middle East whilst fulfilling KSA's foreign policy goals in the event Tehran nuclearizes as well. It analyzes key details, such as the effect of nuclearization on the Gulf's immediate paradigm, the possibility of a nuclear cascade amongst other prominent Islamic nations, as well as the consequences of nuclearization on Saudi-American relations.

Introduction

Nuclearization in the Persian Gulf has been a primary driver of Western foreign policy since the 1980s when Israel's bombing of the Osirak Reactor in Iraq sparked an inquiry into nuclear proliferation throughout the Arab Middle East (Wilson 1991, 11). International attempts to regulate weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) have largely focussed on Iraq and Iran, and the Second Gulf War is an example of Western states behaving irrationally due to fears of a nuclear Gulf. However, in the wake of America's unilateral withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a treaty designed by the US, UN, and EU to curb Iran's nuclear ambition, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS) stated that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Tehran acquired them (Sabga 2020). This marks a stark departure from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's (KSA) usually dovish foreign policy and forces a reconsideration of security paradigms in the Gulf (Michnik 2021). This paper argues that a nuclearized Saudi Arabia would stabilize the Middle East under the realist Nuclear Peace Theory. The essay will begin with an analysis of Saudi's current security paradigm and the routes through which it may acquire nuclear weapons. It will then define Nuclear Peace Theory and contextualize it in Middle Eastern regional power dynamics. This paper will address and refute counterarguments against Saudi nuclearization, grounded in their geopolitical context and neorealist theoretical frameworks.

Nuclear Acquisitions

There are two routes toward developing a nuclear bomb for Saudi Arabia. First is creating a bomb using domestic enrichment plants –KSA's most logical path forward. This route would involve the purchase of enrichment infrastructure from pre-existing nuclear nations like France and South Korea to create reactors capable of producing weapons (Crail 2008, 4). MBS publicly stated his intention to create these kinds of institutions in his Vision 2030 plan, announcing the development of nuclear power plants as part of his intention to diversify the country's energy sector with renewable sources (Sabga, 2020). Assuming MBS' plans follow their schedule, this would give KSA nuclear capabilities within the next five years (ibid).

The plan for local development is not without its issues. First, KSA's ability to develop nuclear weapons is regulated through a variety of international treaties. Saudi Arabia is a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention and has ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CBT) (Bahgat 2006, 423). The development of WMDs would violate these treaties, incurring penalties and minimizing Saudi Arabia's recent efforts to integrate into the larger international community. Second, the development of nuclear facilities could prove a security risk for KSA, as Israel has a historical precedent of unilaterally attacking countries it believes to possess the potential to develop nuclear weapons (Ross 2005, 63). The likelihood of conflict is increased by Israel's perception of Saudi Arabia as an Islamic fanatic state, one that uses its massive resources to promote and fund hatred of the Jewish state (Bahgat 2006, 429). Although nuclear facilities would be constructed away from population centres, thus minimizing human costs, attacks from Israel would still place a financial burden on MBS' government, which would raise the already high costs of nuclear development. Finally, the creation of nuclear facilities plans to utilize Chinese funding, which would also hamper KSA's relationship with the United States (Chaziza 2022). The crux of Saudi Arabia's current deterrence strategy is its relationship with the US, the loss of which would force a massive re-evaluation of military strategy (Bahgat 2006, 436-7).

The second option is the purchase of a nuclear bomb. This would prove highly advantageous to KSA as the kingdom possesses the financial means to buy one outright and would thus skip the logistic and financial headache inherent in developing one "in-house" (Bahgat 2006, 441). The purchase of a nuclear weapon would likely come from Pakistan, with whom KSA has –allegedly– already shared nuclear strategies and materials (ibid). However, this is unlikely for two reasons. First, Pakistan has a low supply of nuclear weapons and requires them for its ongoing conflict and persistent existential threat from fellow nuclear state India (Kristensen and Korda, 2021). Second, there is no precedent for nuclear weapons sales, and this would prompt huge re-evaluations of nuclear non-proliferation as a concept in nuclear states (Bahgat 2006, 442).

Security in Saudi Arabia

Despite being the largest Gulf Nation in terms of landmass, the population of KSA is considerably lower than its neighbours, largely because most of the country is composed of an uninhabitable desert (Bahat 2006, 425). This has caused 85% of Saudi Arabia's 30 million citizens to live in urban areas, prompting fear of invasion due to defensive blind spots in rural areas (Lackner, 2022). The huge amounts of empty land, combined with its economic potential as the dominant power in the global energy market and its 25% share of the world's oil supply, have made Saudi leaders paranoid about foreign domination (Bahgat 2006, 425). This fear has been heightened by the hostile nature of Saudi Arabia's neighbours and the shifting security paradigms, which have seen Iraq and Iran's military threats rise and fall precipitously, thus creating an unstable environment (ibid).

First, to the north-west, KSA has a rivalry with Israel. Although it sympathizes with the plight of Palestinians and its roots in Arab Nationalism, Saudi Arabia differs from the rest of the Arab world in that its animosity towards Israel is derived from the latter's control over the Al-Aqsa Mosque (ibid 427). This is due to KSA's self-perception as the centre of religious Islam and definitive status as the centre of Sunni Islam, which it justifies through its control over the religion's two holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, and its vocal opposition to Iran's endorsement of Shi'ite tenets. As such, Saudi Arabia refuses to recognize Israel while it controls Islam's third holiest city, Jerusalem (ibid). In recent years, this has caused KSA to refute the increased integration of Israel into regional dynamics by holding out against the Abraham Accords and diplomatic normalization with Israel (Feierstein, 2022). This is not to say there has been no room for collaboration between KSA and Israel, as atheist communism and Arab secularism pose greater threats to the Muslim state than religiously motivated Zionism (Bahgat 2006, 426-7). However, relations have historically been and are likely to remain, hostile.

To the south, KSA is rivalled by the Republic of Yemen (ROY). At first glance, they are strikingly similar, as both have similar populations in size and demographic composition (Lackner, 2022). However, while Saudi Arabia is a firmly autocratic regime, Yemen was the region's only republic whose government had checks and balances (ibid). It also has one of the worst economies in the region due to its low oil production and large rural population, which has isolated ROY from the region's main industries (ibid). This poor economic performance has caused Yemeni citizens to emigrate to Saudi Arabia en masse. Today, thirty percent of Saudi's population are Yemeni workers (ibid). Hostilities between the nations

have permeated their existence, ranging from early conflicts over Yemen's communist history to more recent rivalries between Houthi rebels and Saudi forces during the Yemeni civil war (Kessler, 2022). This civil war and consequent humanitarian crisis have been especially problematic for Saudi security - creating instability at home while also stretching its defence budget. Moreover, KSA's role in the current air and maritime blockades, destruction of medical infrastructure, social fragmentation, and other causes for the ongoing humanitarian crisis have stoked latent tensions between the nations, creating instability at their shared border (Lackner 2022).

Finally, to the northeast are the powerful Gulf nations, Iran and Iraq. Before the Second Gulf War, Saudi Arabia relied on Iraq and Iran, offsetting each other's military threats through repeated conflicts and proxy wars (Bahgat 2006, 438). This allowed Saudi Arabia to accumulate a nest egg of military resources and alleviate fears of direct invasion from either state, which, in either case, would prove disastrous due to KSA's significant material advantages (ibid, 441-2). However, in the wake of the Second Gulf War, this buffer has fallen, causing a new security paradigm to emerge wherein Iran is Saudi Arabia's primary rival and Iraq is a non-threat. Their rivalry falls along economic and ideological lines, as Iran holds 20% of the world's oil supply, second only to Saudi Arabia, and is the spiritual leader of Shi'ites, the second largest faction of Islam (ibid, 425). This rivalry has taken the form of a 'cold war,' wherein the two nations avoid direct conflict by battling through proxy rebel groups throughout the Middle East.

This act of patronage is emblematic of KSA's usual foreign policy of soft power, which it yields to great effect in diplomatic and economic arenas. The collapse of Middle Eastern nations patronized by Iran, such as Syria and Lebanon, has opened the door for Saudi Arabia to curb Iran's regional sphere of influence through political interference and the funding of rebel groups (Ilishev 2016). In fact, with the notable exception of Yemen, Saudi Arabia is hesitant to get involved directly, preferring instead to patronize small groups and exercise its position as the world's largest oil exporter to strategic effect. The most notable case of this latter point occurred in the Yom Kippur War, during which KSA reduced its oil production to exert pressure on the United States to create a favourable peace treaty for Egypt. This has been a fixture of KSA's foreign policy with Israel, lobbying Western countries to exert pressure on the Jewish state, in addition to patronizing smaller states closer to Palestinian frontlines like Syria (Bahgat, 2006, 427). This strategy is what Saudi Arabia has used against Iran, avoiding military confrontations and utilizing Western relationships to sanction them and proxy groups to fight Shi'ite non-state actors like Hezbollah and Syrian rebels (IEMed, 2014).

Nuclear Peace Theory

Having established Saudi Arabia's security concerns and goals, it is now crucial to define how the acquisition of nuclear weapons would simultaneously achieve KSA's strategic objectives and stabilize the Middle East. The theoretical crux of this argument relies on Waltz's Nuclear Peace Theory (NPT), which emerged as a realist argument to explain international peace in the wake of the Cold War. He notes that peace comes from interdependence, but while neoliberals attribute this to integrated financial markets and constructivists to the collective shift of combat norms, the possibility of mutually assured destruction was a nuclear war to ensure de-incentivizes nations with nuclear capabilities from attacking each other (Waltz 2000, 24). Waltz notes that realism is often misunderstood as the endless pursuit of power instead of state behaviour placing primacy on self-interest (ibid, 28-32). Possessing WMDs enables nations to exert influence for improved fiscal and diplomatic arrangements, utilizing the threat of their military capabilities to gain these "non-traditional" realist concessions (ibid). This theory is further proven by Rauchhaus, who notes that direct conflict between states is greatly reduced when both states have nuclear weapons (Rauchhaus 2009, 271).

The condition of Nuclear Peace Theory aligns perfectly with Saudi foreign policy. The focus on soft power, achieved through resource superiority, would allow KSA to continue extending its economic and diplomatic advantages, while nations, seeing a strategic disadvantage, would be too afraid to retaliate. Traditional Nuclear Peace Theory dynamics would also parallel those currently existing between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as each nation opts to pursue conflict through patronized non-state actors in anarchic states instead of direct conflicts (Harrison 2021). However, there are a few counterarguments against the stabilizing effects of this weapon in the Middle East.

The first is derived from Waltz's philosophy, which argues that regional polarity is a determiner of regional stability. He states that unipolar systems tend to produce the most unstable international systems, as all nations have a clear rival with which to balance power, and the hegemony is forced to overextend its resources to defeat rivals (Wohlforth 1991, 5). A nuclear Saudi Arabia, given its economic power and political presence throughout the region, could easily be construed as becoming a Middle Eastern hegemon, which would be especially contentious given the vast array of constructivist ethnic, religious and political rivalries throughout the region. In fact, a sudden concentration of power could prove extremely destabilizing, as the region has not had a singular, clearly defined military power since Egypt in the 1950s and mid-1960s (IEMed 2014). Due to the multitude of identities present in the region, as well as the large number of strategic/commercial interests for international actors, any hegemon would be destabilized not only by powerful actors within the region trying to power balance but also through attempts by hegemonic international actors seeking to maintain their space within the global power system

This counterargument, however, ignores two key principles. First, if Saudi Arabia nuclearized, it would not be the only power in the region with nuclear weapons, as Israel has allegedly possessed them since the 1960s. Saudi Arabia attributes the 20th-century instability of the Middle East to this unilateral nuclear imbalance, and thus, its acquisition would move the Middle East away from a unipolar nuclear system towards one in which multiple powers are able to balance each other (Bahgat 2006, 427). Second, KSA's nuclearization is conditional on Iran's development of nuclear weapons, rendering the Gulf regional ecosystem multipolar, as well as the larger Middle East-North Africa region (Sabga 2020). Saudi nuclearization would create a multipolar system wherein both Shi'ites and Sunnis possess the atomic bomb.

The second counterargument is based on Rauchhaus' findings that while NPT is true in the case of two nuclear powers, possessing WMDs increases the likelihood of conflict in situations of asymmetrical power (2009, 271). He notes this through the stability-instability paradox, wherein the power imbalance between nuclear and non-nuclear states enables the former to default into force more frequently without fear of retaliation and wherein wars have higher levels of fatality due to the devastating weapons used by the non-nuclear side to balance power (ibid, 260). This argument, however, is based on data accumulated mostly through the framework of traditionally power-

ful states exerting power either during the Cold War or in subsequent NATO conflicts and fails to account for how localized regional asymmetry affects the use of force (ibid, 264-5). In this case, a good counter-example is France, which, despite having many non-nuclear nations in its proximity, has been less likely to engage with states forcefully than before the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which can be at least partially attributed to this military development. As such, while the point may hold up given the fractious modern history of the Middle East, there is precedent for asymmetric nuclear imbalances not resulting in increased violence through a strictly regional context.

Nuclear Cascades

There is a fear that Saudi Arabia's acquisition of nuclear weapons would lead others in the region to do the same. The theoretical basis of this argument originates from the region's ambiguous polarity, whereby other prominent nations, such as Egypt, the UAE, and Turkey, may fear their loss of influence in the region and pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons to compete with Saudi Arabia's power and influence (Crail 2008, 40). Guzansky notes that Sunni countries threatened by Saudi nuclearization will increase their nuclear activity, encouraging Iran to entrench its program (Guzansky 2022). Each nation has its own legitimate reasons to be threatened by Saudi nuclearization and the capabilities to create its own nuclear programs.

First, Egypt must be considered a regional power due to its undisputed status as the regional hegemon during the mid-20th century and its immense soft power in the Arab world. The trend of power dynamics during the latter half of the twentieth and the twenty-first centuries saw Egypt's power wane whilst Saudi Arabia's grew. This loss of power can be attributed to two narratives. First is the waning of Arab nationalism, which lent credence to Egyptian power through its association with Nasser and its effectiveness in fighting the "Zionist" threat. As of late, this philosophy has been supplanted by political Islam, most notably through the Muslim Brotherhood, which has centred KSA, the home of Sunni Islam, in political discourse. The second was Egypt's maiden peace treaty with Israel, which went against Middle Eastern ideals for a united Arab front against Israel (Quandt 1986, 357). Egypt's close diplomatic relationship with the United States further delegitimized its standing as a regional leader, causing its standing within the Arab community to diminish (ibid). Utilizing the realist framework on which this paper is built, Egypt is unlikely to cede its position to Saudi Arabia as the region's leader without a fight (Ross 2005, 63), following the Peloponnesian War principle wherein a rising power challenges a hegemon (Bagby 1994, 134). Additionally, Egypt already has the infrastructure to begin a nuclear weapons program due to its experimentation with nuclear energy to desalinate water (Crail 2008, 40).

However, it is unlikely that Egypt will pursue nuclear weapons for three reasons. First, the premise of a Peloponnesian paradigm, in the context of Egyptian and Saudi power structures, ignores the case of Saudi Arabia becoming the predominant Arab power in the region. It would be doing so by having been the region's predominant "soft" power for a long period, and it would be entering a multipolar system, not a unipolar system led by Egypt. Second, Egypt's diplomatic relationships with the US, Saudi Arabia, and Israel would be negatively impacted by its development of a nuclear weapons program. US-Egyptian relations rely heavily on the military aspect of having a close friend in the Arab world. The possibility of nuclear conflict or escalated hostility between them and fellow American ally Saudi Arabia would likely lead to a reduction in foreign aid, on which the Egyptian economy strongly relies. Meanwhile, KSA is responsible for sending defence materials to Egypt under its Palestinian support strategy, so conflict would place Cairo at a strategic disadvantage (Bahgat 2006, 426). Finally, due to its geographical proximity with Israel, known for its proclivity towards unilateral strategic action against Arab nuclear programs, Egypt would be putting itself at risk of Israeli retaliation. There is also the counterargument that Egypt has constantly advocated for global denuclearization, championing the destruction of all Middle Eastern WMDs in 1990 and co-sponsoring a UN resolution to ban nukes earlier in the century (Glaser 2015). However, Iran was also a champion of this resolution, so the changing norms of the region call this anti-nuclear precedent into question (ibid).

Turkey also has sufficient infrastructure to begin a nuclear weapons program and may choose to pursue one to reaffirm its growing economic presence and regional influence (Crail 2008, 40). This expansion of influence is especially relevant given the increased military presence of Turkey in anarchic states such as Syria, whereby Erdogan has been a massive patron of rebel groups and deployed Turkish forces in Northern Syria, recently launching ground attacks of its own after attacks from Kurdish militias (BBC 2022). However, Turkey is unlikely to acquire nuclear weapons due to its NATO membership, which, according to its guiding foreign policy principles, is a key element in Turkish National Military Strategy (Yazigioglu 2019). NATO membership allows for a nuclear sharing program, which means that Turkey cannot develop its own nuclear weapons but that it will be protected by America's nuclear umbrella in the event of an invasion (ibid). As such, Turkey is unlikely to develop nuclear weapons.

Finally, of the three nations mentioned earlier, the UAE has the most robust nuclear program as it possesses the Arab world's first fully functional nuclear reactor, Barakah (Sabga 2020). It also holds a coveted 123 Agreement with the United States, which allows for the bilateral sharing of civilian nuclear components, materials, and know-how (ibid). Nuclear energy specialists question the use of nuclear fission for decarbonization in a region far more suited to cheaper solar energy, prompting questions of whether this program may serve a dual, militaristic purpose (ibid). However, this statement ignores that these treaties with the US have strict provisions concerning the violation of the arrangements which stop uranium enrichment and the reprocessing of spent fuel, which could have disastrous economic and diplomatic consequences. As such, the UAE is unlikely to be caught up in a regional nuclear cascade (ibid).

American Relations

The most prominent nation which must be considered in nuclearization is the United States. In the context of Waltz's world system, the US arguably leads a unipolar system, and as such, any nuclear program that threatens that country's position in the international order may be met with retaliation (Wohlforth 1999, 6). The US has three strategies to minimize this threat. These include diplomatic strategies using treaties like NPT and the Budapest Memorandum to limit proliferation, military intervention as seen in the Second Gulf War, and economical means like the current sanctions on Iran and North Korea. However, in the case of Saudi Arabia, there are definite arguments as to why nuclearization may not lead to intervention from the US.

First, there is precedent within the Middle East whereby the US begrudgingly allows allies to develop nuclear weapons to defend against existential threats. Israel is alleged to have developed nuclear arms in secret even after norms

against nuclear weapons were established, and non-proliferation treaties were added to international law (Wilson 1991, 8). This is also true for India and Pakistan, which established their nuclear programs after the introduction of NPT (ibid).

All three of these nations are crucial American allies and justified their development through the existential threat of hostile neighbours (Bahgat 2006, 442). Saudi Arabia could easily argue the same due to the new Gulf Security paradigm and the low odds of surviving a direct attack from Iran. There is a caveat to this argument: none of these nations ratified NPT, whereas KSA has (ibid, 423). However, due to their role in OPEC and active hostility from Iran and Russia, sanctions are unlikely to be overly punitive to mitigate the risk of a global energy crisis.

This caveat factors into the second point that Saudi Arabia's economic relationship with the US prevents any massive retaliation from taking place. Saudi Arabia holds undue economic influence due to its role as the world's largest oil supplier, shielding itself from financial

retaliation from international institutions. With its role in this economy becoming even more important, given the interruption of Russian pipelines during the current war on Ukraine and the need for American industrialization to compete with China during its ongoing trade war, sanctions are unlikely to be overly punitive (BBC 2022; Huang 2021). In many ways, the US cannot afford to prevent Saudi nuclearization.

Third, under the Peloponnesian understanding of unipolar systems, America is likely to be challenged by China's rising power and, as such, requires more forces to combat Beijing's emerging threat. Therefore, America needs to remove or reduce its military presence in the Middle East, where it currently spends an exorbitant amount of resources and manpower to remedy conflicts throughout the region (Kessler 2022). A strong military and nuclear ally in the region would reduce the need for direct involvement in such countries such as Syria. The close relationship shared with Saudi Arabia would allow America to do this, especially as the absence of strong allied forces to combat backsliding has led to disasters in disengagement from Iraq and Afghanistan. This point of American regional disengagement is actually threatening to Saudi Arabia, which views US military cooperation in the region as crucial to its foreign policy goals (Bahgat 2006, 430). As such, MBS could use the prospect of taking the lead as an American military proxy in the region to improve American economic and diplomatic relations further.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a nuclearized Saudi Arabia would, from a theoretical perspective, restore relative balance to a multipolar regional system in which a nuclearized Iran existed. It would likely not cause a further cascade throughout the region, nor would it interfere with Saudi Arabia's own foreign policy goals in regard to the United States. However, in practice, there are many reasons to suspect Saudi Arabia will not pursue nuclearization, which are outside the scope of this paper. However, for the purposes of this essay, a nuclearized Saudi Arabia would be not only a possibility but a positive force in regional MENA politics.

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

The Drug Trade in Peru: Don't Get High On Your Own Supply-Side Economics

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Edited by Susie Strachan and Jeanne Gonelle

ABSTRACT

This paper covers the effectiveness of the United States' anti-narcotics policy against Peruvian Coca farming in the 1980s. It finds that a supply-side oriented approach to targeting drug use, which made use of extradition, interdiction and eradication of relevant "players" was an ineffective strategy at curbing global cocaine use. It also highlights how this policy failed to account for or curb the emergence of the Shining Path, as well as Peru's bureaucratic inefficiencies which, through organizations like ENACO, continued to make illicit coca production highly profitable for farmers.

Introduction

When President Reagan declared the United States would "fly the flag of battle" in their War on Drugs (Friesendorf 2007, 79), the hawkish maxims used in Cold War foreign policy were re-appropriated to disrupt the global cocaine and heroin industries. The Andean nations of South America became a hotbed of US intervention and military presence due to their cultivation of coca, the psychoactive leaf containing the alkaloids necessary to refine cocaine (Biondich and Joslin 2016). Of the nations in this region, Peru received a disproportionate amount of American attention due to their 60% share in coca leaf production (Seligman, 2019, Abstract). Despite massive investment into eradicating coca crops, the United States' attempts to mitigate the issue proved largely unsuccessful. This paper argues that a failure to account for the financial importance of coca production and a poor understanding of rural-urban political and economic dynamics caused the failure of the American "War on Drugs" in Peru during the 1980s.

This paper will articulate America's anti-narcotic approach, including its core principles of extradition, eradication, and interdiction, as well as the reasoning behind a supply-side approach to mitigate drug use. It will then elucidate the state of coca in rural Peru, specifically its historical and economic significance, and the means through which the Peruvian government and America attempted to mitigate its production. These methods will subsequently be analyzed, denoting what factors were ignored in policy implementation and how the failure to consider these elements contributed to unwanted consequences, such as the strengthening of the Shining Path, economic downturns in rural Peru, and rivalry between the National Army and police force. The paper will conclude by analyzing the impact of these policies on Peru's government structure and the cocaine trade.

The War on Drugs

When US President Nixon declared the 'War on Drugs' in 1971, its scope was initially domestic. The war looked to criminalize American drug usage through the dramatic expansion of federal drug control agencies and mandatory sentencing for possession (Drug Policy Alliance 2022). This 'battle' of deterrence would become a 'crusade' under Reagan, whose 1980 campaign platform of "protecting the family nucleus" attributed the degradation of American values to the use of narcotics (Friesendorf 2007, 79). He noted that prior administrations had "flown a flag of surrender" in the face of foreign production and shipments into the US. The Reagan administration opted for a supply-side elimination of drugs, targeting raw materials, refinement, and cartel distribution as opposed to syndicates and consumers at home. This strategy relied on two philosophies. First, was the overly simplistic thought that the elimination of the product would eliminate its consumption, paralleled domestically by Nancy Reagan's "Just Say No" campaign (Stanford Sphere 2020). Although total abstinence was undeniably optimistic, there was at least hope that reduced supply would, in turn, lead to a lower prevalence of drug abuse among the US citizenry and reduce the influence of organized crime (Del Olmo 1993, 11). The second theory was that increasing the risk of shipping narcotics would raise prices, limiting the accessibility of hard drugs and thus the spread of consumption (Stanford Sphere 2020).

However, neither of these philosophies was sufficiently thought through; both justifications for supply-side policy had crucial and predictable counterproductive outcomes which were conveniently ignored. In the case of abstinence, the focus on eradication on a state-by-state basis ignored the strong possibility of drug industry displacement and its potential for increased production in less-regulated states. The Reagan administration could have taken note of the Nixon administration's unintended restructuring of the heroin industry after eradicating the French trafficking network of Turkish opium (Friesendorf, 2007, 73). These policies allowed poppy production in Central Asia and Mexico to thrive, enabling more low-level, unsophisticated products to enter the American market without an entrenched monopoly to compete with (ibid). This influx of players in the heroin market enhanced its usage domestically (ibid). The coca industry thus had a strong possibility of anticipating America's presence and shifting their plantations' geographic position, be it within the state or internationally, accordingly. This 'supply-oriented' drug policing philosophy also failed to account for the uses of targeted raw materials outside the drug trade. This is especially true for coca, as its ubiquitous prevalence in traditional customs and importance in Andean medicine would prevent blanket criminalization of the plant (Biondich and Joslin 2016). The second philosophy ignores the potential effects of a 'crime tax' on the supply end, failing to account for the possibility that cartels would opt to increase the size of shipments to accommodate for greater risk instead of increasing sale prices (Friesendorf 2007, 81). The cartels took this approach, causing cocaine prices to drop in the United States as larger shipments increased domestic supply and consequently caused consumption to soar (ibid).

Despite these issues, the United States continued its war against international cocaine supplies, utilizing soft and hard power to do so. The crux of these soft power strategies was economic, as the United States adopted the method of selectively distributing foreign aid, with Congress passing amendments allowing for the suspension of funds to nations that did not cooperate in the War on Drugs (Murphy 1990, 1263). This power was wielded frequently to ensure compliance with the strictest anti-narcotic measures and militant ventures, many of which were reliant on foreign aid for economic development. The United States also used force in its global anti-drug mission, carrying out raids like Operation Snowcap to eradicate coca farms in the Andes, thus involving the previously disengaged Pentagon in drug enforcement matters. This latter detail proved highly unpopular, with prominent generals criticizing direct intervention as an unwinnable conflict that would only serve to diminish already faltering morale (Friesendorf 2007, 83) while also stretching thin defence and intelligence resources.

Extradition, Interdiction, Eradication

The crux of the United States' military pres-

ence oriented immovably around extradition, interdiction and eradication (Schifter, 2007, 58). Each of these principles operated in a kinetic tandem to ensure not only the adequate elimination of drug supplies but also punishment for drug suppliers. This latter point was especially true of extradition, which relied on the American imprisonment of narco-criminals. Domestic imprisonment was ineffective for two reasons. First, judicial weaknesses in narco-states allowed powerful individuals to bribe their way into lenient sentences or release (Friesendorf 2007, 84-85). Second, the localization of offenders into domestic prisons allowed for continued coordination by militias and trafficking groups, perpetuating distribution and cycles of violence (ibid).

Interdiction, or the delay, disruption, or destruction of enemy supplies en route to the United States, was another Reagan administration tactic once the eradication of raw materials proved costly and ineffective. The administration concentrated on breaking the trafficking link, instead of the production one, by catching drug smuggling operations at American borders and through discovered narco-routes (Murphy 1990, 1264). Towards the end of the Reagan administration, interdiction made up 21% of the federal drug budget (Friesendorf 2007, 13).

The United States used two methodologies to fulfill their goal of limiting cocaine use. First were positive eradication measures oriented around developing alternatives to raw materials. Some examples of positive measures were crop substitutions, alternative development, and harm reduction for those entrenched in the drug market. Second were coercive measures, defined as the forceful demolition of the narcotic industry. This consisted of eradicating supplies, expanding law enforcement, increasing arrests, and forfeiting suspected perpetrators' assets. Finally, eradication involved the destruction of the raw materials used to refine drugs and the dismantling of criminal organizations and networks.

The United States in Peru

Peru's status in 1980 as the world's largest producer of coca leaf (Palmer 1994, 67) made it a prime target in the War on Drugs. Much of Peru's coca production was concentrated in the Valle de los Ríos Apurímac, Ene y Mantaro (VRAEM), a geographic region comprising the valleys formed by the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro rivers. The VRAEM was ideal for growing coca due to its fertile soil and comparative isolation. Within this region, perhaps the most important area was the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV), wherein the vast majority of coca was exported and grown. The UHV is an extremely poor, primarily Indigenous, agrarian region (Peru Reports 2021). However, the economic opportunities presented by the cocaine trade caused migrations into the valley, with Tingo Maria, the region's most populous city, experiencing huge population growth during the 1980s. Thus, due to its geographic conduciveness to coca growth, the UHV bore the brunt of American drug enforcement in Peru (ibid).

The positive enforcement methods used by the United States in this region were conceived with the understanding that coca sales were a significant portion of the region's GDP. This led to the formation of ENACO, or the National Coca Enterprise –a legitimate company tasked with buying and selling coca from farmers. Failure to sell coca leaves to ENACO resulted in the corporation designating these crops as illicit. Farms growing these crops were seized and destroyed if larger than 24 acres, and the farmers faced legal repercussions (Friesendorf 2007, 79). Once this designation occurred, farmers were given a two-day grace period to evacuate or risk ENACO burning their harvest (ibid). In addition to ENACO, the United States encouraged Peruvian farmers to replace coca plants with cocoa and coffee crops, providing subsidies to farmers willing to transition towards alternative products (Carpenter 2003, 107). In terms of coercive actions taken, the United States justified direct military action in Peru to the international community by claiming they were experiencing a homeland invasion by Peruvian drugs. This retaliation included military ventures like Operation Snowcap, wherein bomber jets flew over Andean coca farms razing coca crops (Friesendorf 2007, 82), and Operation Verde Mar, wherein the American army, alongside the Peruvian army, set fire to plantations in Tingo Maria (Morales 1990, 101). The United States also incentivized the Peruvian government to adopt coercive measures of its own through conditional funding for drug enforcement agencies and the police force. The most prominent of these agencies was the Control and Eradication of Coca in Upper Huallaga (CORAH). CORAH was the primary arm of eradication in the VRAEM, burning or using pesticides to destroy coca plantations not registered with ENACO.

Underestimated Bureaucratic Inefficiency

Conceptually, ENACO and CORAH were both solutions that sought to mitigate the trade of coca for cocaine production without fully eradicating its economic significance to farmers in the region and may have run smoother in a more bureaucratically efficient nation. However, the United States failed to acknowledge how Peru's government, centralized around the capital Lima, might experience bureaucratic difficulties when enforcing policy in hard-to-reach rural areas (Grisaffi 2020). This slowed the transfer of information, causing rampant disorganization and miscommunication. Some notable instances of this structural weakness included failure to compensate farmers for sales or log ENACO registration. This latter bureaucratic error proved especially problematic for legitimate coca farmers, as CORAH would destroy coca farms already registered with ENACO (Streatfeild 2003, 417). This led to an extremely negative public image for ENACO among the farming population, who failed to see the benefits of registration when it would not protect their crops from destruction nor result in a timely payout.

ENACO also contained some inherent design flaws, which promoted mistrust between its executives and farmers. First, there was a significant lack of communication between the corporation and its farmers, leading to unrealistic expectations for growth and production due to a lack of industry consultation (ibid). Second, the government rarely fulfilled its promises, such as larger payments or improved conditions for farmers, causing farmers to distrust ENACO's capability to fulfill their economic

needs (ibid). Third, an 18% sales tax on crops sold to ENACO cut heavily into profits on harvests (Grisaffi 2020), especially as ENACO struggled to sell coca leaves once harvests were purchased, causing it to be known as a "money-losing enterprise" (ibid). Thus, on top of CORAH's perceived 'random' destruction of coca crops, registration with ENACO seemed like a futile and expensive venture. This can be seen through the state of illicit coca in 1992, wherein of the 247,000 hectares of coca plantation believed to be in Peru, only 18,000 were registered with ENACO, meaning between 2-11% of Peruvian GDP was tied up in illicit coca leaf sales (Pedroni and Yepes, 2011, 24-52).

Further Economic Misunderstandings

ENACO's, and by extension the United States, failure to fully account for the economic importance of coca went beyond just organizational inefficiencies. First, coca harvests were the sole source of income for 300,000 farmers in the UHV (Palmer 1994, 67), meaning that any failures in policy implementation had severe and far-reaching consequences for the region. Efforts to encourage alternative development failed to account for what made the crop so prominent in the first place. Coca yielded four harvests a year, which could be sold at four to thirty-four times as high a price as alternative crops such as cacao and corn (ibid). Subsidies offered by the Peruvian government and funded by the United States failed to account for the farmers' loss in revenue. These allowances focussed almost exclusively on the costs associated with making the transition, with a supplementary allowance designed to make the sales more "attractive," which failed to create competitive pricing with unregulated sales. Additionally, the financing provided by the Peruvian government contained high interest rates to compensate for the nation's poor overall economic performance (Morales 1990, 95). The allowance provided was insufficient to cover their debts, which, combined with the sharp decrease in profitability for plantations growing substitute products, left farmers unable to pay back these loans (ibid). This problem was worse for land in close proximity or targeted by CORAH raids, as the herbicide Spike, which was used to destroy illicit plantations, caused infertility in previously arable land (Palmer 1994, 67). As such, beyond the failings of ENACO itself, Peru's alternative development program also caused many farmers to continue growing illicit coca to avoid dealing with the added economic hardships of product substitution.

Strengthening the Shining Path

Perhaps the most damaging consequence of the United States' failure to implement effective anti-narcotic legislation in the UHV was the inadvertent strengthening of the Senderos Luminoso (Shining Path), whose violent tactics were hugely detrimental to rural communities. The organization was founded in 1970 by Abimael Guzman and presented itself as a Maoist- communist political body. The Shining Path was also a cult of personality oriented around four key principles. First was an emphasis on the primacy of class struggle, which was especially attractive to low-class farmers (Starn 1995, 405). The second was a need to combat imperialism, which was unique in highlighting the semi-feudal relationship between Lima's bureaucratic dominance over Andean society (ibid). The third was the importance placed on the party's vanguard, utilizing a stricter hierarchical system than other leftist revolutions in the developing world (ibid). Finally, the Shining Path placed a huge emphasis on violence, which it believed to be a universal law, drawing influence from the infamous Gang of Four in China (ibid).

The Shining Path evolved from a student group to an anti-regime guerilla insurgency group during the 1980s, beginning their reign of terror with a poll office bombing in 1980 (Starn 1995, 399). Although it could be argued that the Shining Path would have gained supporters regardless of US intervention, this statement ignores two crucial details. First, the localization of the group's success was concentrated primarily in areas affected by American coca crackdowns, thus drawing a link between US involvement and the insurgents' popularity (Palmer 1994, 76). Second, the large gap between its inception as a student movement and concrete revolutionary action taking place reduces the likelihood that college campuses were the primary driver in Shining Path's success (ibid). The crux of support for the Shining Path can be attributed to its positioning as the defender of coca farmers, using violence to fight back against CORAH and American forces. This positioning was so strong, in fact, that coca farmers were willing to side with the Shining Path despite their propensity to combatively force farmers into illegal coca trades and increase violence within their supporter demographics (ibid).

The Shining Path's political goal was to sever the already frayed relations between the nation's capital and periphery, utilizing selective yet effective and brutal force to instill fear in the general Peruvian population. The Shining Path killed over 3000 individuals a year during the mid to late 1980s (ibid). Despite its roots in crime, the Shining Path's goals were ostensibly political. The group attempted to legitimize a "new democracy" through candidates in the Peruvian election, whom they funded using cocaine trafficking in a bid to gain greater legitimacy as part of Peru's overarching political processes (75). The patronage of the Shining Path resulted in their entrenchment in all sectors of Peruvian society. Thus, by the United States creating an environment conducive to the Shining Path's rise in influence through the perceived othering of Andean farmers by CORAH, American drug enforcement policy had immediate and dangerous ramifications for Peruvian society.

Military v. Police Force

The emergence of the Shining Path created an additional obstacle in America's War on Drugs by introducing rivalries between different branches of Peru's defence force. The Peruvian government, lacking the funds to crack down on insurgencies and drug trafficking simultaneously, allocated the handling of each issue to the Minister of the Interior and Minister of Defence. The Minister of the Interior was responsible for the police force, while the Minister of Defence controlled the military.

These responsibilities remained separate, as the Minister of the Interior was believed to handle the UHV's unique 'autochthonal independence' better than a combined effort (Palmer 1994, 70). The army, meanwhile, was tasked with shutting down insurgencies and guerilla acts of violence by the Shining Path. As the conditional aid, on which Peru's faltering economy relied, was dedicated to the comprehensive eradication of the illicit coca industry, a majority of the state's funding, as well as remittances from the US, went towards police organizations, causing tensions between the two bodies (70-71). These rivalries were brought to a head in 1989 when the Shining Path launched a large-scale attack against the Uchiza police force while the army sat idly by despite the commander's direct cries for help (71). The imbalance of funding also caused the army to seek out alternative revenue streams, leading them to provide protection and weapons to drug traffickers in exchange for money (ibid). Thus, failing to finance the military caused America's law enforcement efforts to reinforce the drug trade.

The Bush-Bennet Plan

By the end of the 1980s, it was evident that the centralized supply-side approach adopted by the United States in Peru had failed, as seen by the continued expansion of coca fields, the emergence of alternative distribution networks, and a societal destabilization associated with a weakened government and economic downturn. George Bush Sr realized that changes needed to be made to America's supply-side approach, and as such, in 1990, the National Drug Control Strategy, or Bush-Bennet Plan, was brought to Congress (Del Olmo 1993, 12). It adopted lessons from Reagan's hard-nosed approach to create a strategy incorporating more of Peru's needs. Some crucial differences in this plan included limited but unconditional economic assistance to cocaine-producing countries, greater emphasis on interdiction, less destruction of farming activities, and greater levels of participation by Andean armed forces in anti-drug operations (ibid). This latter point was especially crucial in eradicating the Shining Path, as patronage of the Rondas Campesinas, a protestant vigilante force composed of farmers sick of the Shining Path's harassment, helped Peruvian forces capture Guzman (Peru Reports 2021). This, in turn, caused the insurgents to fracture and the Shining Path's influence to wane dramatically. Increased patronage also helped the Peruvian economy restabilize itself, as failures to deal with insurgency and illicit coca sales had decreased the GNP by 30% across the prior decade (Del Olmo 1993, 66). As such, by properly accounting for the economic consequences of a reduced coca trade through an improved allowance and the empowerment of Indigenous people in the UHV, the US was able to rectify many of its prior mistakes.

Consequences Today

Three decades later, it is necessary to analyze the consequences and efficacy of America's policing in the Andes during the 1980s. The first and most telling ramification of these policies has been their total non-effect on Peruvian coca growth. In 2020, it was estimated that illicit Peruvian coca farms could produce 810 metric tonnes of pure cocaine, whilst unregistered coca farms made up 88.2 thousand hectares of land (The White House, 2021). The University of Reading notes that Peru is the only Andean nation to see the amount of farmland dedicated to the growth of coca increase. This is despite CORAH's continued eradication efforts, seizing 63 tonnes of coca and destroying 25.5 hectares of farmland in 2019, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the institutions put in place by America to mitigate its growth (Grisaffi 2020).

It is also necessary to analyze the quality of human life in areas targeted by these policies. Due to a concentration of economic opportunity in Lima, new economic development and migration have slowed to rural regions. The Human Development Index (HDI) notes a drastic contrast between parts of Peru that grew coca and non-coca-producing regions. Of the 120 districts that farm coca, 68% scored an HDI decile of 5 or below (UNODC, 9). Crucially, the disparity between coca-producing and non-coca-producing regions increased over time, with a disparity of 0.0466 points below the regional average in 2003 and 0.0984 points below average in 2012 (ibid). As such, latent trauma and stunted development have increased inequality in Peru.

Finally, the precedent set by the Peruvian government in combating the Shining Path has led to the increased use of Emergency Zones (EZ). These are areas wherein narco-terrorists presence justifies unchecked power and military force. The constitutional basis for these zones, which can be used to subvert the democratic process in Peru, is grounded in the US' desire to take down and extradite drug barons and traffickers in the most expedited fashion possible (Grisaffi 2020). As such, the institutional frameworks put in place by the US have opened ways for the Peruvian government to circumvent checks and balances and increase their use of force. Thus, in conclusion, by failing to fully ascertain the ramifications of mitigating the coca trade, the United States' drug control policies in Andean Peru during the 1980s failed and continue to have negative consequences today.

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The Interaction of Buddhism and Forestry Conservation in Bhutan

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Edited by Elena Lee and Lily Mason

ABSTRACT

While much of the world has struggled to adequately respond to the climate crisis, Bhutan, a small state at the eastern edge of the Himalayas, has successfully applied an extensive forest conservation program. The Bhutanese constitution mandates the protection of 60% of the state's forests in perpetuity, though conservation efforts over the last 20 years have led to their surpassing this goal by over 10%. Bhutan sequesters twice its annual carbon footprint, and climate change is considered both a key policy priority and a pressing concern in daily life. The interaction of Buddhist faith and ecosystem management in Bhutan has led to an unprecedented and globally unique degree of conservation.

Introduction

Balancing conservation with increasing demands for resources has proved difficult for many states due to the overwhelming weight of market considerations in government decision-making. This has deeply destabilized the ecosystem health of over half of the world's forests, and, lacking a dedicated effort at broader forest management, large-scale exploitation has the potential to produce a global crisis and exacerbate climate change (Grantham et al. 2020). Bhutan is perhaps the most prominent outlier to this figure, vastly exceeding ambitious conservation goals and maintaining high public support. The interaction of Buddhist faith and ecosystem management in Bhutan has led to an unprecedented and globally unique degree of conservation. Despite its adjacency to two global superpowers, Bhutan has been highly isolated throughout much of its history, largely due to its rugged geography. Having never been colonized, Bhutan has enjoyed continuous and uninterrupted cultural development going back thousands of years. The isolated nature of their culture and beliefs has made them much more comfortable charting a globally distinct path and privileging spiritually derived values. The success of this policy in fulfilling the conservation goals set out by the Bhutanese constitution has required a high degree of ideological consensus, a non-linear conception of time, a limited engagement with the market, and the need to respond to the climate emergency.

Profile of Bhutan

Bhutan, a small state at the eastern edge of the Himalayas, is unique in many key respects, which have allowed it to successfully apply an extremely rigorous program of conservation. 62% of Bhutan's population of 730,000 people live in rural areas and survive through small-scale, community-based subsistence farming (AFoCO-EML 2021). The natural segmentations within Bhutan are so stark that different dialects and cultural groups can exist in adjacent valleys (Tshewang et al., 2021). The same effect can be seen in its forests, many of which contain globally unique species. In addition to being the backbone of rural subsistence lifestyles, forests provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits.

Conservation efforts are also borne in part out of practical concerns, as Bhutan's rugged terrain makes it highly vulnerable to extreme weather events and the effects of climate change (Tshewang et al. 2021). Many overlapping trends, such as the increasing rate of glacier melt, risk producing environmental catastrophe if left unchecked. Bhutan began conservation efforts in 1958, the most prominent change being the nationalization of forests in 1969, following an increase in natural resource exploitation that threatened to upset its delicate ecosystems (Wangdi et al. 2013). Most of Bhutan's population lives in a very limited altitude range at the bottom of the sharp Himalayan valleys, meaning clearing forests has the potential to destabilize topsoil, exacerbate flooding, and disrupt the network effects of ecosystems at higher altitudes (Chogyel et al. 2020). The Bhutanese constitution mandates the protection of 60% of the state's forests in perpetuity. 72% of the state is covered by forests, up from 66% in 2000. Bhutan sequesters twice its annual carbon footprint, and climate change is considered a key policy priority and a pressing concern in daily life. Under the Environmental Assessment Act (2000), Bhutanese legislators are required to verify the sustainability of their policies in the processes of formulation, implementation, modification, and renewal (Wangdi et al. 2013). Whether this approach is determined by faith, history, or a necessary pragmatism cannot be said for certain, but all three factors hold enormous importance in determining policy.

Bhutan engages minimally with the global market and measures the aggregate productivity of the state through Gross National Happiness (GNH) rather than Gross Domestic Product. GNH focuses on four key pillars: sustainable and equitable socio-economic development, environmental conservation, the preservation and promotion of culture, and good governance. The trending of this measure, which is derived from the findings of an annual survey revealing the roots of the nation's happiness and discontent, serves to guide the decisions of the state and inform good development (Karma et al. 2012, 8).

The decision to measure the performance of the state according to levels of happiness has deep historical roots. The first Zhabdrung (regional religious leader) Ngawang Namgyal, the founder of Bhutan, embodied both political and spiritual authority and established the penultimate imperative of government as assuring the greatest good for its subjects (Ginsburg & Schonthal, 2023). The GNH was first established as the measurement of progress and growth by Bhutan's fourth king, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, in 1972, as the Gross Domestic Product was seen to be incapable of delivering widespread happiness and well-being (Tshewang et al. 2018). This departure from international norms and its underlying rationales is extremely important in understanding Bhutan's policy formation and governance. Their transition to democracy is relatively recent and occurred through a royal mandate, as the Bhutanese head of state viewed the granting of political agency as necessary to advance collective happiness.

The Gross National Happiness Commission is a government organization which attempts to assess the means by which policy can best improve the lives of its citizens and enhance the "harmonious co-existence of the people with their varied traditions and the natural world" (Tshewang et al. 2018). The Commission considers a wide variety of aspects it deems necessary for an enjoyable and fulfilling life, including community vitality, enhanced living standards, and education, among many others (Karma et al. 2012). The interlinkage between the human quality of life and the health of the surrounding biosphere is a non-negotiable rationale for development (Tshewang et al. 2018).

The Impacts of Buddhist Faith on Conservation Efforts

A key point in understanding the means by which Bhutan is capable of achieving such a high degree of publicly sanctioned environmental conservation is the religious faith shared by the overwhelming majority of its inhabitants. Though Buddhism was not established as the state religion, it served as the guiding philosophy for much of the foundational legislation

and is, therefore, deeply embedded in government (Ginsburg & Schonthal 2023). Bhutan first emerged as a constitutional democracy in 2001 through a royal order for the writing of its first constitution, which was completed in 2008 (Ginsburg & Schonthal 2023). The constitution frames Buddhism as the "spiritual and cultural heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace, non-violence, compassion, and tolerance." The deep devotion of the Bhutanese to their Buddhist faith cannot be overstated; spiritual and political authority are considered to be deeply intertwined, and Bhutan has been governed by bodies of senior religious figures throughout most of its history. Mahayana Buddhism, the most popular religion in Bhutan, places a strong emphasis on community and the duty of the enlightened to pass on their enlightenment to others.

Ethical conduct under Mahayana Buddhism is derived from three key foundations, the first of which is karma. Karma is not applied by any individual or spiritual entity but is rather a universally applicable natural phenomenon which serves to balance individuals' fortunes according to their conduct (Long 2019). The second principle is that moral actions and ethical virtues serve as the antidote to damaging and antisocial behaviour such as anger and greed. The third is that good conduct flows from treating others as you would want to be treated. These principles manifest most prominently in a collective obligation to both the community and the environment.

Another key contributor to Bhutan's success, which is both culturally- and spiritually-derived, is their non-linear conception of time. Time is imagined as a spiral, with actions in the present affecting and being affected by the future and the past (Ginsburg & Schonthal 2023). The obligation to preserve the environment extends both forward and backward in time as well as to others in the community. This philosophy, embodied by the government in conservation policy, entirely avoids issues of uncertainty in long-term conservation by defining consumption patterns and the relationship with nature in Buddhist terms. Ecosystems in Western understandings of forest management are characterized as large and vastly complicated technologies or networks, whereas in Buddhism, they are a karmic entity (Carse 2012). Care for the ecosystem brings generational prosperity, and reckless exploitation brings disaster and ruin. Though arriving via faith and cultural belief more than scientific evidence, Bhutan understands the mutualistic network approach to ecology and embeds long-term consequences in its environmental policy better than the vast majority of other states.

Conservation Initiatives

Bhutan's conservation network includes five national parks, four wildlife sanctuaries, and one strict nature reserve in which all human presence is prohibited (Tshwang et al. 2018). Nine biological corridors connecting the protected zones were established by the monarchy in 1999 to limit harmful 'edge' effects and increase the genetic diversity of the animals within them (Tshewang et al. 2018). All forests in Bhutan are required by law to have a management plan focusing on sustainability and must actively remove any barriers which prevent such a plan from being imposed (AFoCO-EML 2021).

The connection of agriculture and local resource extraction with welfare –and often survival– means conservation efforts and their enforcement are an extremely difficult issue. Enforcement of strict conservation mandates without the support of rural peoples who rely heavily on forests succeeds only in growing resentment towards the government, an issue Bhutan has effectively circumvented with their community forest initiative (Sears et al. 2018). Community forests, a system which grants some autonomy to communities to establish a sustainable program of natural resource exploitation, are a key mechanism through which the state balances the needs of rural peoples with conservation (Wangdi et al. 2013). There currently exist 804 functioning community forests covering 40,000 hectares (51% of the land) in Bhutan, each of which is policed by a village forest guard elected by their community on an annual or biannual basis (AFoCO-EML 2021). Communities are allocated 2.5 hectares per rural family (FAOUN 2007). This system recognizes that forests – even those of the same type – are not generalizable and that the communities attached are best equipped to determine the ideal course of action. The natural segmentations within Bhutan are so stark that different dialects and cultural groups can exist in adjacent valleys (Tshewang et al. 2021). The same effect can be seen in its forests, many of which contain globally unique species. In addition to being the backbone of rural subsistence lifestyles, forests provide recreational, aesthetic, and spiritual benefits (Wangdi et al. 2013). In surveying forests, the Bhutanese government found them to have highly specific material and spiritual value attached to communities, often containing religious spaces whose importance was highly localized (Sears et al. 2018). The cultural segmentation in Bhutan under the umbrella of a common Buddhist faith has produced common and community-specific imperatives to conserve forests.

There are several overlapping trends which have the potential to wreak havoc on Bhutan and, therefore, make widespread sustainability efforts an attractive policy direction. Included in Bhutan's forest conservation efforts are a wide range of accessory initiatives such as soil and watershed integrity, both of which are deeply interlinked with forestry. Bhutan, like many other South Asian countries, has an extreme precipitation cycle, and 70% of its rainfall is concentrated in an approximately two-month period (Tshewang et al. 2021). In addition to monsoons, much of Bhutan's water comes from glacial melt in the Himalayas. Increased annual melt, similarly confined to a single season, places a greater strain on watersheds and increases the risk of floods (Tshwang et al. 2021). Paired with increased timber extraction and heightened risk of forest fires caused by a warming climate, these trends have the potential to do enormous and irreversible damage to the ecosystem in a short period.

Globally, the parameters of forest management tend to be determined largely by demand rather than genuine concern for the ecosystem's integrity. Bhutan has proven that it can establish a set amount of land and time necessary to ensure sustainable forestry through its community-managed planted-forest initiatives, thus

removing considerable ambiguity from sustainable forestry practices (Rai et al. 2020).

Barriers and Policy Gaps

This strict program of conservation has not been without drawbacks; as a result of their refusal to exploit their natural wealth, Bhutan is lacking in financial resources. This manifests most clearly in their inability to conduct high-level research on the integrity of their forests, thus producing a serious bottleneck of the state's research and monitoring capacities. The tools necessary to conduct such research on the health of Bhutan's ecosystems are largely beyond the means of the state, research which would likely have only limited generalizability due to the enormous biodiversity created by its geographic segmentations and sharp differences in altitude. Without knowledge of the specific consequences of extraction, Bhutan can choose to be stricter about regulations to avoid the issue entirely, but it also lacks the means to adequately police its forests to prevent rising illegal exploitation (Wangdi et al. 2013). Bhutan is highly selective about the foreign aid they accept in order to avoid trade conditions, relying in large part on philanthropic organizations and the United Nations Convention on Biodiversity fund.

There are serious tensions between conservation and economic development in Bhutan, as is often the case. Among the most serious pressures faced by Bhutan is the reconciliation of the increasing development of the energy sector and forest preservation. The export of hydroelectric power to India is among the largest contributors to Bhutan's GDP (14.3%), and trends of increasing urbanization have increased domestic demand (Tshewang et al. 2018). Despite sustainability being a key consideration, the expansion of Bhutan's hydroelectric generation infrastructure has the potential to wreak havoc on sensitive watersheds and undo decades of conservation work (AFoCO-EML 2021). Large swaths of the forest must be cut to make way for hydro lines, which have the potential to nullify the progress made by the establishment of conservation corridors – though there is functionally no other choice. Although GDP growth is not a central consideration for the Bhutanese government, the funds produced by the sale of power are key to financing the increasingly expensive infrastructure necessary for the surveillance and management of protected areas.

Related to this issue is the reliance on wood heat in rural areas, which has driven increases in illegal exploitation in protected zones and air pollution (Wangdi et al. 2013). Consumption patterns are extremely low compared to their more developed counterparts but have the potential to be extremely damaging given the limited resource base from which they are drawn. The Bhutanese government has sought to enact a program of infrastructure improvement which would make electric heat more widely available, though a further expansion of the hydro network would require cutting disruptive pathways through forests (AFoCO-EML 2021).

Rural lifestyles and growing populations have placed increasing political and resource pressures on the state. The benefits of forestry conservation tend to appear extremely diffuse (slightly less so in Bhutan due to flood risk), while their consequences affect the small neighbouring communities in measurable ways. Livestock are an important source of income in rural areas, but grazing on common lands is highly limited due to a fear that clearing the underbrush will push out animals that are necessary for the health of forests. This is a difficult political issue; many such animals are considered pests. It is exceptionally difficult to convince rural peoples of the importance of tigers to the ecosystem while their livestock are being killed.

Though forestry policy and decisive action to mitigate the effects of climate change are broadly supported, they can be locally controversial. Community forests are not a perfect system, and prohibitions on extraction combined with population pressures have produced some localized resentments. Social stratification is widely considered to be a serious issue in Bhutanese society, and extraction rights in communal forests have been found to be scaled according to social stature (Buffum et al. 2010). Just as members of the community are best equipped to assess its needs, they are also vulnerable to being influenced by its petty dynamics.

At the same time, rural people are increasingly choosing to move to urban centres. While Buddhism has allowed conservation processes to be self-regulating, population pressures and the allure of consumption-heavy urban lifestyles have strongly influenced preferences and behaviours. The move from rural to urban lifestyles has the potential to make conservation efforts much easier. However, it produces a different set of political and economic demands which will likely manifest as greater incorporation with the liberal economic regime. Bhutan is not immune to the adverse effects of modernity, and some trade-offs must therefore be made.

Conclusion

Bhutan is a case study of the successes and limits of non-economic governance. Buddhist principles of governance have allowed Bhutan to preserve the majority of its biodiversity and its associated cultural value by essentially internalizing the butterfly effect and a direct spiritual imperative to conserve the environment. Bhutan's success is, in large part, a matter of non-linear time and the obligations produced by Buddhism. Policy decisions for the present are made by considering their long-term consequences, which have a clear potential to be extremely severe. Western forest management has recently begun to imagine forest health as a largely immaterial but invaluable piece of infrastructure, a concept which has existed in Bhutanese culture since time immemorial (Carse 2012).41

Though inevitability has increasingly entered discussions of the effects of climate change, Bhutan is a clear example that this sort of evaluation is entirely determined by ideological frame. As to whether Bhutan holds any generalizable keys to success in improving forest management, the answer is both yes and no. Though they have not received the global renown they deserve, Bhutan's policies have been influential within their cultural sphere. Community forests have been established in India and Nepal and have succeeded in increasing

conservation mostly due to their shared ideological and cultural foundations (Buffum et al. 2010). Bhutan is located at the top of vitally important watersheds which serve many populous regions throughout southeast Asia, meaning their conservation policies have concrete impacts which go beyond their borders. Bhutan has achieved something remarkable through the coalescence of its religious faith and collective obligation, clearly demonstrating that large-scale conservation is possible without compromising the quality of life.

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“This is Not A Song, It’s An Outburst” How Musical Moral Entrepreneurship Fueled the South African Anti-Apartheid Movement

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Edited by Sophia Khiavi and Jules Borgetto

ABSTRACT

Challenging traditionally-conceived narratives surrounding the dialectic of Apartheid, many Afrikaners became facilitators of in-state resistance alongside their black peers after becoming disillusioned with the South African regime’s foreign policy initiatives during the 1970s and 1980s. Afrikaner men were conscripted to fight in their country’s dirty wars in Rhodesia and Angola, which destabilized the regime’s legally-enshrined white privilege and fueled resistance expressed through musical movement. This idea connects to tactics used by the American government to assert racialist sovereignty as a tenet of stratifying South Africa’s domestic society through soft power. This paper demonstrates through semantic and musical deconstructions how and why Paul Simon’s “Graceland” project and the Voëlvry punk movement worked to dismantle tenets of racial governance at the grassroots level in South Africa. From the usage of the English language to the usage of Western instrumentation with “reclaimed” rhythm, these cases show a broader yet calculated transgression from mediatic expressions of Apartheid through moral entrepreneurship.

Introduction

Moral entrepreneurship is defined as the ability of an individual actor or an organization to successfully shape social and political norms (Boli and Thomas 1997, 171). Actors involved in moral entrepreneurship (a moral entrepreneur) include non-governmental organizations, grassroots political parties, and celebrities, whereas the narratives they seek to advance are not premised on economic gain but on moral welfare. Grassroots movements started by such actors often blindside key domestic and foreign political projects by organizing what James Scott refers to as "everyday forms of resistance" –actions outside of the periphery of the ruling elites that are often organized in isolated or rural communities. Yet, little emphasis is made in existing literature regarding these actors' abilities to procure moral capital and thus wield substantial political power against national governments (Holzscheiter 2005, 739). A deeper analysis of the activities of moral entrepreneurship showcases its role in dismantling the apartheid regime in South Africa, which resulted in the National Party's fall from grace in 1994. Above all, music provided the incendiary spark in equipping populist movements with moral enterprise within and outside South Africa and for historically marginalized and privileged backgrounds.

Two case studies will defend this assertion. First, the cross-racial collaboration by Paul Simon on Graceland – a Grammy-award-winning record released in 1986 featuring grassroots collaborations from black South African musicians. Second, the Voëlvry Movement, an Afrikaner-led blues rock movement from Johannesburg. Both projects capitalized on anti-establishment sentiment within the Afrikaner population (Grundlingh 2004, 483). These case studies will be preceded by a discussion of theoretical concepts surrounding moral entrepreneurship. They will be framed within the context of how music affected South Africa's broader policy initiatives and how the United States played a key role in maintaining them until the fall of apartheid.

Moral Entrepreneurship and Its American Musical Origins

Flores-Yeffal and Sparger (2022) define moral entrepreneurship as a procedural process. It starts by seeking out a common ideological enemy known as a "folk devil." It then seeks to instil a collective consciousness against this social actor through grassroots social movements. This is only possible through the galvanization of a collective consciousness, which is manifested and sustained through the continued adoption of these beliefs through formal and informal streams.

Cohen further notes moral entrepreneurs are either characterized as rule creators or rule enforcers (1972, 2). Within the framework of grassroots political movements, popular musicians first identify a root cause for concern of a particular demographic and then express this collective social identification through lyricism that identifies with the cause. Through time and growth in popularity, an increased level of political legitimacy surrounding their performance gives musicians the moral agency to craft and shape the social movement in question. In turn, it is the duty of the musician to continuously enforce their agenda onto their fanbase, ensuring their movement's successful political result. Thus, musicians maintain the role of managing what Jean Baudrillard calls the signifier and its signified – which, within the framework of international relations scholarship, can be treated as a form of soft power. This role allows musicians to engage in the construction of a political economy that objectifies cultural capital rather than being premised on monetary gain to spread and maintain political influence (Meger 2016, 154).

To better understand musical-political grassroots movements in apartheid South Africa, we may consider the role of American moral entrepreneurs in shaping American foreign policy. Prior to the Second World War, Nelson Rockefeller, as an imperialist endeavour, collaborated with governmental authorities to "win hearts and minds" in Latin America with jazz diplomacy. Jazz bands, consisting of historically marginalized African American musicians, travelled across Latin America in a stream of performances, upholding American idealism within the framework of expansionist motives – such as the later involvement in deposing Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 to assert an American agenda in that region (Rosenberg 2012, 66). This coincided with the state-sponsored touring of symphony orchestras in the region, who, according to Gienow-Hecht, "performed the nation" – an idea that helps in actualizing the abstract concept of the imagined community (Anderson 1983). As was openly stated by a US agency known as the Office of Inter-American Affairs, or OIAA, these tours were created as a form of cultural propaganda to ensure that Latin American countries maintained favourable diplomatic ties with the United States. With Leonard Bernstein, a born-and-bred American, conducting this musical operation, audiences and governments remained inclined to interpret these endeavours not as outright imperialism but as the installation of a legitimate and stable political authority via the United States (Campbell 2012, 30). This foreign policy initiative evidently follows the model outlined earlier regarding rule creation and rule enforcement through means of soft power (Cohen 1972, 2).

Erstwhile, Dudziak (1988) demonstrates how global media enterprises were responsible for questioning the moral authority of the United States' involvement in African foreign affairs, providing the usage of segregation within their borders. As per a 1952 decree at the United Nations, the United States, as a way of circumventing the Nuremberg Laws that explicitly prohibited the discrimination of "non-Aryans," proclaimed that while apartheid was a social project diametrically opposed to the UN Charter, interference with South Africa's domestic affairs did not lie within the UN's scope (Lauren 1983, 1). On the global stage, the United States continues to be publicly framed as a saviour of human rights in international law while at the same time engaging in support of overtly racist policymaking. This produces a double standard that middle-power countries such as South Africa have had to wrestle with to maintain their political survival (Goldstone 2005, 874). Criticism on this matter was paradoxically provided by then-South African Ambassador to the United States, H.L.T. Taswell, who re-

called that the Americans are incapable of "appeasing liberal and negro sentiment by taking a hardline" against apartheid policy (Morgan 2003, 14). This required Richard Nixon to rectify his position on South Africa – which he did through the enactment of the Southern Strategy. These tactics, which came to fruition during the early 1970s, appeased Nixon's white voter base in the southern United States and were founded on the premonition that "there had never been an adequate black nation" (Morgan 2003, 6). Even so, in the grand scheme of the United States' complex web of diplomatic ties, apartheid remained a secondary issue; they did not de facto condone it, which appeased domestic left-leaning critics (Thomson 2005, 52).

This double standard in America's foreign relations essentially shaped how South Africa manifested its own international relations propaganda techniques, for it is ultimately in opposition to these American-inspired social projects that reactionary moral enterprise developed in marginalized South African social circles (Rosenberg 2012, 67). Above all, grassroots social commentary, through transnational webs of advocacy, became central to popular discourse on apartheid in the West by the early 1980s. Near the end of the decade, this discourse became heavily centred around the freeing of Nelson Mandela from imprisonment on Robben Island, eight kilometres off the coast of the South African mainland. Mandela, who had initially been conceived as an almsgiver of communism to the black South African population, was, therefore, an enemy of the United States (Bortelsmann 2001, 156). As such, Mandela's situation became the subject of Western celebrity fanfare – much of which was done in self-interest.

Paul Simon and Graceland

Above all, celebrities used their moral authority, vis-à-vis their social status, to mobilize action through popular mediatic networks in their country of origin – otherwise referred to as "rooted cosmopolitanism" – for an international cause (Cohen 1992, 479). Rooted cosmopolitanism is linked to a 2004 study undertaken by Tsutsui and Wotipka, whose results showcase a direct correlation between celebrity-backed mobilization and increased adherence to grassroots movements (Huliaras and Tzifakis 2010, 257). In South Africa, celebrity activism beginning in the early 1980s provided an impetus for both apolitical movements and ones of a systemic nature, such as the African National Congress (ANC), the integrationist political party that has governed South Africa since the downfall of apartheid, to thrive. Of these celebrities was Paul Simon, an American singer-songwriter previously known as one-half of the folk-rock duo Simon and Garfunkel. Simon understood his role as a celebrity actor with a high degree of moral agency. He lent himself to causes such as Artists United Against Apartheid's Sun City, a protest track denouncing the eponymous casino and hotel resort open to whites only in the former Transvaal province (Ullestad 1987, 67). In the same year, Simon released Graceland. This project wrestled with systematic opposition to apartheid policy on two levels: one, it involved a collaboration between Blacks and whites to create collective social change through music, and two, it provided an internationally recognized forum to marginalized peoples in South Africa to express their cultural identities.

In 1951, the South African government passed the Bantu Authorities Act, which relegated black members of South African society to small, isolated, and largely infertile swaths of land outside of the country's main cities. This was coupled with the Bantu-Self Government Act of 1959, which established these entities as semi-autonomous regions. Through complex webs of bureaucracy that alienated Bantustan residents, it was nearly impossible to leave at one's own volition. Informally, Bantustan residents were used as bait for much wealthier white patrons, who would hire them for menial tasks such as domestic work (Kaur 1994, 43). Because Bantustans were treated as territorially autonomous, with their own laws and respective governing bodies within the South African constitution, this labour was considered 'migratory.' This created an intrastate governing system that emulated interstate relations between two state actors with opposite viewpoints, ideologies, and political agendas.

As an attempt to subvert this political alienation, Paul Simon made a controversial trip in 1986 to several townships – urban, non-white settlements in Bantustans that lacked running water and electricity, among other life necessities – to engage in fieldwork with local musicians (Meintjies 1995, 52). This trip opposed the ANC's informal academic boycott, which soft-pressed foreign governments to cease academic and cultural exchange activities with the apartheid regime. This position informed various international policy measures, most notably of which was the United Nations' International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, passed in July of 1976. Ironically, the ANC would have no role whatsoever in Simon's decision to create Graceland.

Academics point to the fact that these boycotts while targeting white South African scholarship, had an indirect impact on diminishing any potential socio-academic progress within non-white communities. Like sanctions, informal measures, like these actions, failed to consider the obvious racial and economic nuance between social actors within an international political framework, instead wrongly treating the population as one collective entity. By 1986, the ANC realized the counterproductivity of these informal measures. Given the political climate at the time in which cross-racial movements to free Nelson Mandela were occurring internationally, they believed that Simon could add to this momentum (Meintjes 1990, 54). Even so, in a 2012 interview at the Sundance Film Festival, Simon proclaimed that had the ANC asked him for a statement of support, he "would have been very happy to do so" (Martin 2012). Despite a lack of direct involvement from established anti-apartheid activism, the album assigned moral enterprise to social actors that helped dismantle South Africa's international reputation as a racialist state. Simon and his colleagues – which included male vocal group Ladysmith Black Mambazo, bassist Bakithi Kumalo, and saxophonist Barney Rachabane, among others – would create a fusion of American and South African music that would resonate with and be legitimized

by a wide audience. This is expressed through musical fluidity, which involves a mixture of "township" rhythm with Western musical idiom alongside racially integrated group membership (Bennighof 1993, 227). For example, a mbaqanga polyrhythm, a style of dance music from Soweto that incorporates Zulu and jazz elements alongside a complex rhythmic structure, permeates the entirety of The Boy in the Bubble. Overtop a rock bass groove, the song's melody is played on an accordion – a through-and-through European invention – by Forere Motloheloa, a Basotho musician who did not speak English (Coplan 1991, 181). Marginalized social circles' identities fight for moral agency and thus involve exchanges that are not through speech but through acts of performative musical expression.

Even so, lyricism in apartheid South Africa underwent heavy censorship. As a result, authors turned to Aesopian Language, a form of cryptic meaning construction through words, to circumvent this (Drewett 2003, 189). Their performance constitutes oral tradition, a concept that has been noted in IR scholarship as an "ideal vehicle for cultural resistance" (Scott 1990, 160). Rhetoric surrounding Black empowerment diametrically opposed Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd's initiative of "separate development" – an idea driven by the foreign policy concern that black South African human development needed to occur separately for apartheid interests to flourish on the global stage (Richardson 1978, 186). Under African Skies criticizes this idea through cross-spatial framing. Simon uses a character named Joseph, after Ladysmith Black Mambazo's lead vocalist Joseph Shabalala, who explores the links to his Zulu ethnicity through music while also proclaiming that he is from "Tucson, Arizona" (Meintjes 1990, 61). Having Joseph rekindle his heritage through these means alludes to a dichotomy that permeates land assertion claims in apartheid states more generally: while Indigenous groups claim ethnic ties and patronage, foreign claims to the land justify their presence through economic growth, which leads to a relentless identity clash (Adam 1994, 15). This persisted in South Africa for so long due to the international community's continued insistence on non-intervention in domestic apartheid activities.

Furthermore, the album is conveyed in the English language. It can be seen as an ideological failure by the apartheid educational system to have a marginalized group use this language of imperial control to elicit collective action. English, alongside Afrikaans, became a legally enshrined weapon against non-white natives: in 1955, post-primary curriculums became taught exclusively in these two languages (Wheeler 1961, 245). This policy was designed to prevent the mobilization of grassroots anti-apartheid moral enterprise. Instead, the policy resulted in events such as the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, where over 7,000 Zulu nationalists, who demanded an end to 'pass' laws that mandated all non-whites to carry internal passports limiting their freedom of movement and educational opportunities, were mercilessly killed. After this event, instead of conceding to non-white political demands, Apartheid authorities officially banned the ANC, fueling the fire of racial tensions even further (Gurney 2000, 142).

These authorities justified these laws by proclaiming it would be "too expensive" to continue delivering curriculums in a plurality of languages; this curtailing of literacy led to the sidelining of potential criticism of apartheid on the domestic level (Hirson 1981, 221). This statement is rooted in colonial rhetoric. Identical sentiments were echoed by British MP T.B. MacAulay's "Minute on Indian Education," a memorandum that prefaced the United Kingdom's passage of the 1835 English Education Act within its colonies (Gupta 1995, 73). Within a South African context, this was expressed through Hendrik Verwoerd's mission to "undo the tribal system" and "progressively transplant [non-whites] into a Western form of society," as stated at the 1961 National Party congress (Reagan 1987, 301).

These views became reinforced by domestic broadcast law: the South African Broadcasting Corporation, or SABC, imposed a total ban on lyrics that could be interpreted as critical of the apartheid regime (Jury 1996, 99). Additionally, religious institutions such as the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Kerk, or Dutch Reformed Church, were recruited by the state to weed out content seen as contradictory to official policy on international airwaves. At the same time, they attempted to defend the country from 'moral indecency' – an extension of missionary activities into the postcolonial realm. Similarly, the United States believed that the advocacy of racial integration would mobilize a collective misunderstanding of South Africa's political orientation towards communism on the global stage, thus posing an external security threat to the country's sovereignty. To illustrate, a confidential letter sent in 1983 by the US Foreign Secretary Robert Eagleburger to his South African counterpart Pik Botha outlines the potential "public humiliation" from the Soviet Union if South Africa were to make this choice (3). Despite Graceland succeeding in its lyrical temperance, the featuring of a lineup of mixed-race performers led to its ban on state-owned radio airplay; this was done in an effort to continue to uphold an ethno-nationalist and anti-communist global order.

The Voëlvry Movement

Subsequent anti-apartheid grassroots movements arose across the African continent and within the African diaspora throughout the globe. Surprisingly, most of these movements come from within South Africa's white minority, who became a crucial force in dismantling apartheid from within. The Voëlvry, or 'Outlaw' Movement, formed in Johannesburg around 1989 by and for Afrikaners and toured South Africa. This scene developed parallel to black South African music circles; it was predicated on the anger of a sizeable minority of Afrikaners who became disillusioned with their government's predatory foreign policy measures. To this end, the movement arose due to two primary factors: one, the recruitment and exploitation of lesser-educated white South Africans, who hid behind the privilege of their skin colour to evade poverty, and two, as a rebirth of South African creative culture, which had been controlled by the state as to uphold its racialist image on the international stage (Grundlingh 2004, 485).

The Gereformeerde Blues Band – whose

name is a mockery of the Dutch Reformed Church's religious and musical censorship activities – developed the most sizable following of any group in the movement. Indeed, its success has been described as "Boer Beatlemania" (Grundlingh 2004, 485). By playing blues music, an African-American conception, the band challenged the country's cultural framework since the 1960s. In accordance with official American government positions on the matter, then-Prime Minister P.W. Botha declared the emergent Hippie Movement in San Francisco as "alien and dangerous" to South African values (Grundlingh 2004, 487). Consensus on this matter was maintained for the following two decades. This stance was a result of collective self-actualization by white South Africans of their relative privilege in comparison to their non-white counterparts.

However, a critical juncture in Afrikaner privilege arose around the same time as the passage of the 1967 Defense Amendment Bill, which made two years of military service mandatory for white South African males (Berat 1989, 139). Identical to the Vietnam War draft policy, the law affirmed that university students were exempt from conscription. This meant that lesser-educated white South Africans became political pawns for South Africa's war-faring role in Namibia, Angola, and Rhodesia. As such, certain members of the Voëlvry Movement were victims of this law, including James Phillips, frontman of the punk band The Corporals, who served two years fighting in Rhodesia, as well as Dirk Uys, a former South African Defense Forces officer, who safeguarded musicians using covert tactics he learned during his service (Jury 1996, 100). Thus, the impetus for constructing tangible moral enterprise within the movement was created by the shortcomings of the state itself to satisfy the political demands of a population it deemed as intrinsically superior.

The Voëlvry Movement's lyrical criticism was much more direct than that of Paul Simon. As members of the privileged ethnic minority, the Voëlvry could engage in more extensive dissent with fewer consequences and criticism. This is explored in Gereformeerde Blues Band's song Sit Dit Af ("Sit It Down"), which lunges personal attacks against Pik and P.W. Botha for being figureheads of apartheid. A translation of the song's third verse reads, "[…] it was PW's face / And next to him stands Uncle Pik / Well… I'm going to choke" (Kerkorrel 1989). Lyrical criticism of the apartheid regime was also done in irony. Moral entrepreneurs instilled rebellion in Afrikaners by corrupting the lyrics to popular South African vernacular songs. These included nursery rhymes and Boer military songs with altered lyrics, both of which were frequently chanted at Voëlvry concerts (Grundlingh 2004, 492). This coalesces with pseudonyms that members of the Voëlvry Movement adopted to protect their identities from potential arrest. Of these was Johannes Kerkorrel, whose alias translates from the Dutch for 'church organ.' This satirized long-standing colonial traditions that existed within South Africa and, by extension, criticized "Christian Nationalist" propaganda that was channelled through the National Party's political discourse (Jury 1996, 100).

The political ramifications of the Voëlvry Movement on South African governmental affairs were immense. Within a year of its conception, the movement grew from its initial base of "acne-faced stoners" to garner the support of educated urban elites, which brought with it legitimacy within circles of the traditional political establishment (Grundlingh 2004, 499). Higher education institutions, such as the University of Stellenbosch, thus became breeding grounds for anti-apartheid sentiment despite remaining restricted to white enrolment. The National Party, which had held power since the advent of apartheid in 1948, split into two ideological factions: one that served to satisfy this burgeoning political dissent and another which remained hardline on apartheid policy and that relied on increased intervention from the Broederbond – an all-male, white ethnonationalist secret society that nefariously controlled governmental affairs from behind the scenes (Adam 1994, 15).

Towards the end of 1990, the National Party caved to its more progressive faction's political demands and officially rebranded itself as a civic nationalist party. It was only at this point in South Africa's history that political collaboration between systemic non-white movements such as the ANC and progressive factions of the white population occurred. This upset the United States, which relied on apartheid as a means of upholding the global anti-communist order; this cross-ideological and cross-racial collaboration corrupted the traditional dichotomy between patronage and economic expansion, which led to a loosening of diplomatic ties with South Africa (Manby 1995, 35).

Conclusion

Both Graceland and the Voëlvry Movement expose South African foreign policy with utmost accuracy, something inspired by its American equivalent. South Africa portrayed itself as a beacon of human rights practice on the international stage while at the same time engaging in a systematic disenfranchisement of its domestic population (Manby 1995, 37). Laws of anti-racial integration, mixed with inflammatory rhetoric informed by pseudoscientific conceptions of race, remained in place for five decades of de jure apartheid rule. Through a multifaceted approach underscored by musical performance, Paul Simon and the Voëlvry Movement, among other musical acts, would remarkably shift moral enterprise from authoritarian authority to the vox populi.

It was ultimately the regime's uncompromising position on racial policy that led to the corruption of racialized and anti-communist order; the system, in essence, became its own worst enemy. Yet, international relations scholars still grapple with mitigating historical cleavages in human development and infrastructure that still plague non-white South Africans en masse to guide post-racial South Africa into being a global power. What remains clear, however, is that the political reclamation of pre-apartheid ethnic identity through moral enterprise has resulted in a concerted effort to overcome geopolitical hypocrisy and construct a pluralist state underscored by a constitution that mandates equitable opportunities for all South Africans (Manby 1995, 51).

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*N.B. The title for this essay is taken from the “The Establishment Blues”, recorded by Sixto Rodriguez, an American folk singer who became an “accidental pop star” in South Africa after unsold records from the United States were – and unbeknownst to the artist – shipped overseas to record shops in the townships. Refer to the film Searching for Sugar Man for more.

Les changements climatiques comme enjeu de sécurité: Le Sahel, une région vulnérable

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Edité par Pauline Arnaudin et Jeanne Gonelle

RÉSUMÉ

Au cœur des enjeux socio-politiques et des conflits régionaux, le Sahel est aujourd'hui confronté aux conséquences du changement climatique. Cet article explore l'intersection entre le changement climatique et deux types de conflits régionaux : les tensions agro-pastorales et les activités des organisations terroristes. En s'appuyant sur diverses études et rapports, l'analyse met en lumière le rôle exacerbant des facteurs climatiques dans les conflits préexistants, sans les considérer comme leur unique origine. Néanmoins, il souligne l'influence significative du changement climatique en tant que facteur aggravant, suggérant un impact important sur l'évolution future du Sahel.

Introduction

Les changements climatiques sont considérés comme l'un des enjeux les plus importants de notre époque du fait de leurs impacts sur la sécurité mondiale. Les conséquences économiques, environnementales et sociales des changements climatiques se font ressentir fortement et exacerbent les inégalités mondiales et les tensions déjà présentes. Ainsi, celles-ci peuvent être la cause d'instabilités comme le témoignent les migrations climatiques causées par des catastrophes naturelles ou des conflits à plusieurs niveaux dans certaines régions. Aujourd'hui, le lien entre les changements climatiques et la sécurité internationale est indéniable. Les phénomènes météorologiques extrêmes exacerbent les conflits liés à l'accès aux ressources naturelles comme l'eau, en provoquant notamment des mouvements de population massifs et des perturbations à l'échelle de l'économie mondiale. Face à ces défis, les efforts visant à atténuer ses conséquences se multiplient. On peut notamment faire référence aux conférences climatiques des Nations Unis qui ont lieu tous les ans, réunissant 120 chefs d'État pour discuter des enjeux climatiques, des solutions et des actions concrètes qui peuvent être menées collectivement (ONU 2021a, 1). Malgré les efforts de la communauté internationale pour freiner les effets des changements climatiques, ces derniers ne semblent pas s'atténuer, comme l'illustre la hausse des températures et conséquemment la fonte des glaces suivie de la hausse des niveaux des eaux. Ainsi certaines régions du globe sont déjà assujetties à des conditions climatiques extrêmes dues à ces changements. C'est tout particulièrement le cas de la région sahélienne qui est depuis longtemps sous le feu des projecteurs dus à ses nombreux conflits, crises humanitaires et catastrophes naturelles notamment causées par son climat aride. Situé entre le désert du Sahara au nord et la savane au sud, le Sahel est composé de six principaux pays : le Sénégal, le Mali, le Niger, le Tchad, le Burkina Faso et la Mauritanie. En plus d'être impacté par des conflits politiques et géopolitiques régionaux, le Sahel est fortement touché par les changements climatiques. Ceux-ci s'expliquent notamment par une augmentation des températures 1,5 fois plus rapide que dans le reste du monde, engendrant des sécheresses, des inondations extrêmes et une raréfaction des ressources naturelles. Ces pénuries peuvent alors occasionner des conflits entre les différentes communautés vivant dans la région.

En ce sens, nous allons chercher à comprendre dans quelle mesure les changements climatiques peuvent être considérés comme étant une menace pour la sécurité dans certaines régions du monde, en nous appuyant sur le cas du Sahel. Pour ce faire, nous allons tout d'abord voir comment les inondations et la désertification de la région sahélienne accentuent les tensions communautaires. Ensuite, nous allons chercher à comprendre de quelle manière les changements climatiques accentuent les conflits intraétatiques et permettent l'essor du terrorisme au Sahel.

Lien climat-politique dans le sahel

La région sahélienne a vu son paysage longtemps rythmé par différents défis et conflits, notamment des conflits agro-pastoraux, la rendant instable. Ce phénomène est de nos jours d'autant plus exacerbé par les changements climatiques. En revanche, bien que ces changements représentent une menace additionnelle, il existe un certain nombre d'origines sous-jacentes aux tensions que la région connaît aujourd'hui. Tout d'abord, le Sahel subit une explosion démographique sans précédent, ce qui provoque une augmentation de la compétition pour les ressources naturelles causée par l'extension de surfaces cultivées. En effet, cette dernière aggrave la dynamique des concurrences puisqu'elle empiète sur des terres qui étaient initialement destinées à d'autres usages. Par exemple, un agriculteur va chercher à étendre son champ mais empiètera ainsi sur une terre initialement destinée au pâturage, ce qui va créer des conflits directs entre les deux partis (Hellendorff 2012, 8). Ainsi, c'est dans la combinaison de ces extensions et des changements climatiques que les conflits agro-pastoraux trouvent leurs origines (ONU 2021b, 7). En effet, le réchauffement climatique a pour conséquence des sécheresses extensives rendant l'agriculture plus difficile. Cela étant combiné à l'extension des surfaces cultivées, on observe une raréfaction des surfaces disponibles pour tous. On peut notamment prendre l'exemple du Niger qui connaît une croissance démographique exponentielle avec l'un des taux de natalité les plus élevés du monde. Cette croissance démographique a causé une expansion agricole pour répondre aux besoins de la population, mais celle-ci a intrinsèquement entraîné une forte concurrence liée à l'accès aux ressources naturelles. De plus, il est important de souligner l'implication d'acteurs internationaux dans l'augmentation de la compétitivité internationale menant ultimement à l'intensification des conflits déjà existants entre éleveurs et agriculteurs. En effet, l'extension des surfaces cultivées favorise la « marginalisation, politique et socio-économique, des populations nomades et transhumantes » (8). Cela est combiné à l'appauvrissement des sols, causé notamment par des techniques inadaptées des partenaires internationaux qui ne tiennent pas compte des coutumes et pratiques locales plus adaptées. Ces populations ayant un mode de vie traditionnel, impliquant des déplacements réguliers et dépendant étroitement des ressources naturelles, se retrouvent particulièrement touchées par l'expansion agricole qui limite leur accès à ces ressources. Ainsi, les conflits agro-pastoraux peuvent aussi être induits par des obstacles à la mobilité des pasteurs qui ne peuvent plus emprunter leurs itinéraires traditionnels sans empiéter sur les cultures des fermiers (ONU 2021b, 24).

Dans un second temps, l'instabilité politique dans les pays du Sahel ainsi que les nombreux conflits ont intensifié les crises liées aux changements climatiques, et donc aux manques de ressources naturelles. En effet, les populations locales sont souvent livrées à elles-mêmes quant à la gestion de ces crises mal gérées par les autorités en premier lieu, car il existe un dysfonctionnement des institutions et des normes encadrant les interactions des communautés (Hellendorff 2012, 12). Inversement, les conflits entre les agriculteurs et les éleveurs, multipliés par les pressions exercées par les changements climatiques, contribuent à l'érosion de la confiance envers les institu-

tions (ONU 2021b, 18). Les éleveurs peuvent donc se sentir impuissants face aux politiques d'expansion agricole par exemple, qu'ils considèrent comme discriminatoires, ce qui peut entraîner une perte de confiance dans les institutions. On peut notamment prendre l'exemple de la région du Gourma, qui comprend le Mali, le Burkina Faso et le Niger, où l'absence de réponse adéquate aux préoccupations des éleveurs, ainsi que les abus commis par l'armée contre les civils, aggravent les tensions et perpétuent un climat de violence. L'émergence de milices ethniques d'autodéfense reflète également le désespoir des communautés locales qui se sentent abandonnées par les institutions officielles (Rangé, Magnani, et Ancey 2020, 9).

Enfin, en raison de l'équilibre fragile entre l'homme et l'environnement, le changement climatique est devenu un défi majeur qui menace non seulement les moyens de subsistance des populations de la région du Sahel, mais aussi s'entremêle de manière intrinsèque à la paix sociale. En effet, au Sahel, les conditions climatiques imprévisibles exacerbent les tensions et transforment les conflits agro-pastoraux en véritables défis communautaires. En outre, la météorologie propre à la région sahélienne aggrave ces conflits régionaux en rendant la saison des pluies irrégulière et donc imprévisible (Alex et Detges 2022, 1). Ces périodes de sécheresses et l'imprévisibilité des pluies causent alors des inondations puisque les terres trop sèches n'arrivent pas à absorber la montée des eaux. Ainsi, les impacts environnementaux de ces changements renforcent les dynamiques conflictuelles entre éleveurs et agriculteurs et l'essor des groupes armés. En ce sens, les conséquences des changements climatiques s'entrelacent avec l'érosion des systèmes de gouvernance communautaires, l'expansion démographique ainsi que la corruption, ce qui rend la gestion des changements climatiques complexe et délicate, entraînant alors une escalade des conflits agro-pastoraux (4).

Nous constatons par conséquent que les arguments avancés convergent vers l'idée que les changements climatiques jouent aujourd'hui un rôle important, bien qu'indirect, dans l'amplification des conflits. Cependant, nous avons souligné que ces changements ne sont pas la cause principale des tensions. Les facteurs sociaux, tels que la faiblesse du contrat social, la perte de confiance dans les institutions étatiques, ou encore les multiples problèmes de gouvernance, sont des facteurs clés sous-jacents au changement climatique qui contribuent de manière significative aux conflits entre éleveurs et agriculteurs. Les sources employées pour la réalisation de cette recherche mettent en lumière qu'il y a un manque de données empiriques solides pour établir un lien de corrélation directe entre le changement climatique et les conflits agro-pastoraux. En effet, le réchauffement climatique affecte les conditions de production et d'élevage, mais son impact sur les conflits est difficile à quantifier avec précision. En outre, les changements climatiques, notamment les différences de précipitations, sont complexes et ne peuvent être attribués uniquement au changement climatique comme le font Alice Baillat (2018) et Oriol Puig Cepero et. al (2021). De plus, même si l'importance du changement climatique est reconnue, il persiste un manque de solutions des plus perplexes. En effet, un grand nombre d'experts notamment Bruno Hellendorff (2012) conviennent que la compréhension de la dynamique complexe des conflits agro-pastoraux nécessite une approche holistique prenant en compte à la fois les facteurs écologiques et sociaux. Ainsi, le débat autour de la question des effets des changements climatiques sur l'exacerbation des conflits au Sahel souligne l'importance d'une analyse détaillée et nuancée afin de développer des stratégies réduisant les conflits dans la région du Sahel.

Conséquences profondes

Dans un contexte marqué par la vulnérabilité géopolitique et socio-économique, les effets des changements climatiques au Sahel se révèlent être un multiplicateur de menaces engendrant un redoublement des conflits et l'essor de groupes armés. En effet, il existe un lien de corrélation entre les conséquences des changements climatiques, l'essor de milices et l'intensification des conflits. La multiplication des tensions a pour source une combinaison de risques existants évoqués précédemment, et des effets du réchauffement climatique qui est considéré comme un facteur multiplicateur de ces menaces (Baillat 2018, 3). Ces facteurs donnent donc lieu à des conditions favorables aux organisations terroristes qui profitent de ce climat d'insécurité et d'animosité à l'égard de l'État pour étendre leurs influences (4). L'ensemble de ces fragilités exacerbent ainsi la vulnérabilité des populations, ce qui les rendrait à la fois plus sensibles aux dégradations environnementales, et plus perméables à la stratégie des groupes djihadistes (5). On peut notamment prendre exemple sur le cas du Mali, où les agriculteurs se sont retrouvés dans l'embarras : les politiques censés protéger leurs droits fonciers et leurs moyens de subsistance préfèrent favoriser l'expansion agricole, laissant les agriculteurs Maliens impuissants et aliénés de leurs terres. C'est de cette façon que les groupes djihadistes ont su se développer en faisant le choix d'exploiter ce sentiment d'impuissance et de frustration parmi les milieux défavorisés, notamment auprès des populations nomades à faibles moyens. Ces groupes ont réussi à attirer en proposant une alternative à l'État et aux élites traditionalistes et religieuses, perçues comme corrompues et prédatrices (Rangé, Magnani, et Ancey 2020, 9).

L'essor du terrorisme et l'intensification des conflits sont aussi promus par les fragilités socio-économiques et géopolitiques sous-jacentes au changement climatique. Ainsi, les pertes de moyens de subsistance induites par le climat peuvent accentuer les tensions déjà existantes en créant des opportunités pour les groupes armés de recruter plus facilement des agriculteurs et des éleveurs démunis à la recherche de nourriture, d'argent ou de protection (Puig Cepero et al. 2021). Dans cette perspective, les groupes terroristes considèrent les communautés rurales comme des réservoirs potentiels de recrues. Ces groupes tirent parti des tensions et de l'instabilité engendrées par le changement climatique, ainsi que de la fragilité des relations entre l'État et ses citoyens, pour les convaincre de rejoindre leurs rangs (29). Le manque d'opportunités économiques, en particulier pour les jeunes, ainsi que le statut social et le prestige qui accompagnent la prise d'armes, ont égale-

ment été identifiés comme des facteurs importants dans le recrutement dans des groupes terroristes (46).

De plus, les migrations climatiques causées par le réchauffement du climat combinées à la rareté des ressources naturelles peuvent aussi être propices aux recrutements par des groupes terroristes (Arcanjo 2019). Les populations se retrouvent fréquemment contraintes de quitter leurs foyers et leurs moyens de subsistance pour fuir vers d'autres régions. Cette migration massive exerce une pression considérable sur les communautés d'accueil, pouvant alors perturber la dynamique sociale et créer un environnement précaire pour les résidents locaux. Ainsi, les changements climatiques modifient le contexte et les conditions dans lesquelles les groupes armés opèrent sans être la première cause du terrorisme. Ces conditions fragiles sont souvent exploitées par les groupes terroristes qui ciblent les individus vulnérables, envahissent les camps de réfugiés et les zones à fort taux de déplacement pour recruter de nouveaux membres, amplifiant ainsi les défis sécuritaires dans ces régions déjà instables. Ainsi, en 2018, le Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies a noté que le changement climatique était un moteur de conflits et permettait l'essor du terrorisme au Sahel –et en Afrique de l'Ouest– mais il est important de souligner que ces changements climatiques modifient le contexte dans lequel les groupes armés opèrent sans être la première cause du terrorisme (Arcanjo 2019).

Ainsi, on peut constater que les liens entre les changements climatiques et le terrorisme ou l'intensification des conflits sont indirects. Autrement dit, en nous basant sur les documents étudiés, on ne peut pas conclure que le changement climatique crée des terroristes, mais plutôt que celui-ci exacerbe les fragilités socio-économiques et géopolitiques sous-jacentes permettant l'essor du terrorisme. En ce sens, les changements climatiques ne sont pas directement responsables de l'essor du terrorisme, mais ils contribuent de manière significative à la création des conditions propices à sa montée en puissance.

Conclusion

En conclusion, il est clair que le réchauffement climatique représente un enjeu de sécurité pour certaines régions du monde déjà sujettes à un climat extrême. En revanche, dans le cas du Sahel, bien que certains effets du changement climatique se manifestent légèrement, on ne peut pas considérer celui-ci comme un enjeu de sécurité imminent. En effet, la région sahélienne est confrontée à de nombreux conflits et à l'essor de groupes armés qui profitent de cette instabilité politique pour étendre leurs influences. Or dans le cas des conflits communautaires entre éleveurs et agriculteurs ou dans celui de l'essor du terrorisme et de l'intensification des conflits, le changement climatique n'a été jusqu'ici qu'un facteur aggravant et non pas la cause première du problème. En revanche, à la vue de l'augmentation extrême des températures dans un futur proche, le changement climatique deviendra inévitablement la source principale de conflits au Sahel, en particulier en ce qui concerne les ressources.

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Women in leftist rebel movements: The Nicaraguan FSLN and Salvadoran FMNL

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Edited by Gaya Karalasingam and Annie Ding

ABSTRACT

In the late twentieth century, women's significant involvement in leftist rebel movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador challenged traditional gender roles in the male-dominated sphere of guerrilla warfare. This research paper examines the driving forces behind this surge in women's participation in the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN). Structural changes, including shifts in land ownership and economic disparities, created opportunities for women to escape traditional domestic roles and engage in revolutionary activities. Decades of repressive dictatorships and increasing inequality further motivated women to join these movements.

Introduction

Leftist ideologies that promoted gender equality and integrated feminist thought into Marxist philosophies played a pivotal role in encouraging women's participation. Strategic interests led to organizational changes within these movements, emphasizing the importance of women's involvement as they transitioned to mass-based political strategies. Additionally, pre-existing social and family networks were critical in mobilizing women and reinforcing identity-based participation. This research underscores the complex interplay of structural, political, ideological, strategic, and individual factors that contributed to women's remarkable participation in these leftist rebel movements, shedding light on the broader implications of women's involvement in revolutionary struggles.

In the late twentieth century, women represented thirty percent of armed combatants in leftist rebel movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador. This influx of women's contributions to armed struggles is surprising, as guerilla warfare in Latin America was, until recently, exclusively in the male domain of political action. This was because women faced greater organizational barriers to participating in guerilla movements than men due to longstanding patriarchal attitudes that reinforced their subordination to the domestic sphere (Reif 1986, 148). Therefore, women's participation in the public sphere through revolutionary activism challenged traditional gender relations and roles in these regions. The study of leftist revolutionary organizations must be analyzed through gender relations to understand their incorporation. In the 20th century, Latin America was arguably considered the region of revolutions. New leftist insurgencies entailed guerilla warfare to overthrow capitalist and dictatorial states. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) was a revolutionary coalition composed of four leftist political-military organizations (160). In 1980, it was broadened by its alliance with the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR).

On the other hand, during the 1960s and 1970s, the rebel group in Nicaragua fighting against the Somoza dictatorship was called the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). In both leftist rebel movements, women had a crucial role in domestic guerillas at all levels of the organization. They were involved in a wide variety of roles within the groups, ranging from support operations to active command warfare troops, medics, and leaders. The cases of the FSLN in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador encounter many similarities in the causal factors leading to increased women's participation in guerilla warfare. However, a comparison must be made regarding the differences in the nature of each country's dictatorship and the rebel's goals as they impact women's participation. This essay will explain the extent of women's participation in the FSLN and FMLN leftist rebel movements as a response to widespread repression in authoritarian regimes, structural changes in the rural crisis, appealing universalistic leftist goals, new guerilla recruitment strategies, and pre-existing social networks. First, structural crises emerged as a chain of events in the twentieth century, beginning with shifts in land ownership, causing inequality between large landowners and peasants. It resulted in increased rural unemployment, urban migration, and family disruption. Ultimately, it culminated in women entering the workforce and revolutionary movements. This is heightened by the decades of repressive dictatorships and extreme inequality, which set the stage for women's involvement. There are also similarities in social and feminist ideologies that motivated women's participation in revolution as a means of emancipation. The new strategy of leftist guerillas further promoted the recruitment of women, as pre-existing networks played an important role in preconditioning some women to join revolutionary groups.

Structural change and Socioeconomic Crisis

In both Nicaragua and El Salvador, structural changes from the middle of the twentieth century allowed many women to escape the constraints of their traditional domestic roles and thus increased their potential for revolutionary mobilization by choice or due to external pressures (Kampwirth 2002, 1). Like most Latin American countries, Nicaragua and El Salvador were integrated into the world economy since the nineteenth century as primary product exporters — exporting cotton, beef, tobacco, sugar, and bananas (Midlarsky and Roberts 1985, 168; Reif 1986, 158). The expansion of export-oriented agriculture starting in the 1950s resulted in changes in landholding patterns, which in both countries increased the unequal distribution of land between large landowners and peasant smallholders (Midlarksy and Roberts, 166). Thus, in less than a decade, many small farmers lost their land, while large plantations of more than 350 hectares gained control over more land. In 1961, small farms in Nicaragua represented 51 percent of all farms compared to 43.8 percent in 1971 (Kampwirth 2002, 24). In El Salvador, the abolishment of communal lands also shifted land from the food production of the peasantry to export-crop farmers (49). The promotion of agro exports deeply harmed the rural economy. Among the effects of rising land concentration, the dispossession of small farmers lowered wages as limited jobs were available, increased rural unemployment, and lowered standards of living and life expectancy (Reif 1986, 158).

Those transformations created not only an incentive for leftist upheavals against capitalist development but they also shifted gender relations. Temporary migration of men in search of rural work and higher wages was a common solution to the growing agrarian crisis (Kampwirth 2002, 25). However, many ended up abandoning their families, which caused the destabilization of the traditional family structure. Male desertion left many women as the sole providers of their children (Molyneux 1985, 247). In Nicaragua, scholars estimate that one-third of all families in 1978 were female-headed (Reif 1986, 158). Due to fewer economic opportunities for women in rural agriculture and the greater advantages in urban settings, many migrated to the cities to search for work (Kampwirth 2002, 26).

Ultimately, the mass migration of women to cities and their large-scale entrance into labour facilitated their path to join community and guerilla struggle (29). Indeed, working-class

women faced the double disadvantage of gender and class, which increased their potential to develop class consciousness but also their vulnerability to political action. They could acknowledge the pattern of social inequality by comparing themselves to other women from different social classes in their cities. Two out of five Latin American women in the labour force were domestic servants; hence, they shared the inequalities of their low socioeconomic class, such as low education, low income, and few marketable skills (Reif 1986, 151). Therefore, the perception of the state's role in promulgating inequality motivated women's political activism in insurgencies. Moreover, female heads of working-class households grappled with added inequality and responsibilities as they balanced their traditional reproductive roles and their disadvantaged economic status. Therefore, women were the most vulnerable to the costs of radical political action, which could limit their involvement. However, the daily barriers they faced actually heightened their motivation to perceive participation as an obligation (Kampwirth 2002, 9). This was further aided by the opportunities available in cities, as they serve as prosperous places for collective political organization due to their large populations (7). Thus, the social and economic context in Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s pushed women into new public roles in the labour force, increasing women's contact with issues of inequality outside of the family and consequently enhancing their capacity to organize in revolutionary groups (Viterna 2006, 7). However, the economic crisis was not the only reason for women to join revolutionary movements.

Political Crisis and Women's Discontent

Overall discontent from decades of right-wing dictatorships in Nicaragua and El Salvador reinforced social and gender inequalities and drove women to join leftist rebel movements. However, the difference in the nature of each dictatorship shaped the social classes involved in rebel coalitions, and thus, the extent of women's participation differed.

On the one hand, the FSLN in Nicaragua carried on a multiclass and dual-gender revolutionary coalition against the Somoza dictatorship during the 1960s and 1970s. The Somoza dynasty, which ruled in Nicaragua since the 1930s, is characterized as an autonomous personalist dictatorship, a regime in which all power lies in the hands of the leader and a small elite of collaborators (Midlarsky & Roberts 1985, 183). Because the hegemonic and repressive dictatorship alienated most of the population, opposition to the regime was not only constituted by the lower classes but also by the upper and middle-upper classes, who were excluded from economic and political power (Kampwirth 2002, 22). Consequently, women from diverse social and economic backgrounds participated in the generalized character of the opposition to Somoza. The FSLN united everyone against the dictatorship regardless of class, age, or gender (Molyneux 1985, 228). Therefore, large numbers of women from all social classes joined the leftist coalition (227). Indeed, the FSLN largely recruited women from urban and educated sectors as they were freer to violate their traditional gender roles and thus had more possibilities to join rebel movements (Kampwirth 2002, 43). Women were particularly drawn to leftist movements because of their discontent with the unaccomplished promises of the state to extend certain rights to women (23).

On the other hand, the Marxist guerilla group FMLN conducted a class-based redistributive revolution against the government of El Salvador and the military. The military dictatorship was an instrumentalist state, which is characterized as impersonal and collective since it serves the interests of the dominant class (Midlarsky & Roberts 1985, 181). The right-wing state was highly unified and implemented even harsher repressive actions than its Nicaraguan counterpart because it greatly benefited from the military support of American President Ronald Reagan. Thus, the higher risks associated with supporting guerillas in El Salvador discouraged many women and men (Kampwirth 2002, 47). Still, the rejection of the state's violence pushed women into radical movements as self-defence (52).

El Salvador had greater land scarcity and inequalities than Nicaragua due to the systematic impoverishment of the peasant majority for the empowerment of a small elite. Therefore, leftist rebel movements emphasized issues related to the unequal distribution of land, conditions of scarcity, and rural poverty (Midlarksy and Roberts, 180). The focus on class struggle implied a limited coalition composed only of the low and middle classes. Thus, women's organizations in leftist movements focused almost exclusively on issues related to mothers living in poverty (Vázquez 1997, 139). In El Salvador, the great majority of women involved in the guerilla war were from the most marginalized social class, rural women, as it was their only way out (Tazreena 2004, 6). It is also important to underline the difficulty of any opposition force to mobilize masses against an impersonal target with neither a name nor a face (Kampwirth 2002, 46). Despite the overall rise of women in guerilla warfare due to equally long-lived repressive dictatorships, Nicaraguan leftist rebel movements have higher numbers of women involved than in El Salvador due to their openness to all social classes. Overall, the economic and political crisis in both countries increased the appeal for women to unite with leftist rebel movements.

Leftist Ideology and Gender

Marginalized women in the realms of socioeconomics and politics viewed the social goals of revolutionary groups as being in line with their feminist values. This convergence of objectives was particularly evident in the leftist movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador, which drew on the Marxist philosophies of class struggle and underscored the imperative for a social revolution to overthrow the capitalist system. At that time, the dynamics of capitalism had exacerbated the tensions between the privileged bourgeoisie and the labouring masses, intensifying the need for radical change. Thus, it paved the way to be overthrown by socialism, which would reach its end in a socialist revolution. In both countries, the focus of rebellions to 'liberate' the population influenced their attitudes towards patriarchy and gender hierarchies (Wood & Thomas, 34). Marx's theory had already argued that women were systematically oppressed by the patriarchy and suggested that women's liberation was

a crucial step in the social revolution. Therefore, women's struggle was seen as part of the class struggle (33). The social revolution must fight against patriarchy and capitalism as they jointly reinforce economic exploitation and gender oppression.

While the correlation between class and gender has been explored since Marx, the women's liberation movement from the late 1960s is the one that familiarized activists with feminist issues (Lobao, 214). Indeed, the upsurge of "new feminism," which promoted radical upheaval for change, preceded the Nicaraguan revolution (Molyneux 1985, 236). The diffusion of feminist thought sensitized the guerilla movements to the inequities in the sexual division of labour and the traditional patterns of women's subjugation to the domestic sphere (Lobao, 217). Therefore, from the 1970s onward, modern leftist rebel movements in Latin America increasingly integrated ideas and policies for gender egalitarianism and encouraged women's incorporation into their movement (Wood & Thomas, 33). The dedication of leftist ideologies to egalitarianism and deep structural transformation of the traditional society justifies their incentive to welcome women into their rebellions and offer non-traditional roles such as joining the militia. Conversely, ultra-conservative and reactionary political ideologies support the traditional gender-based division of labour, thus dissuading rightist rebel movements from employing women (34). There is a widespread belief that women in Latin America are more likely to support conservative politics and that they are controlled by the conservative Catholic Church. Historically, women and peasants have been more likely to support a stable dictatorship. However, the Somoza dictatorship demonstrated that clientelism, such as supporting the family's legitimacy in politics, failed to mobilize women. Instead, many women sided with the opposition, the FSLN (Kampwirth 2002, 23). The revolutionary values of the FSLN and FLMN motivated many women to become members.

Women's initiation into political life is rooted in the liberation theology movement of the 1960s. The Vatican was reformed to deepen its commitment to resolve worldly injustice and thus was often called to political action. In 1968, the Vatican's reformist thought was applied to Latin America. The progressivist transformation of the church enabled women to participate in religious groups directly and extend egalitarian values, which promoted the feminist idea that men and women were equal in the eyes of God (Kampwirth 2002,179). Women were mostly motivated by the functionality of achieving universalistic goals, such as social welfare, social equality, and development, as preconditions for their emancipation (Molyneux 1985, 245). Welfare provisions from the left would bring substantial improvements to women's liberation within the socialist society. In Nicaragua, Sandinistas would implement legal reforms in the family, such as making men responsible for the welfare of their families by sharing the domestic work among members of the family and attempting to challenge gender stereotyping by giving positions of responsibility to women in the militia (249). The FMLN and FSLN both promoted women's incorporation into the struggle by establishing woman-focused organizations seeking feminine support (Shayne, 98). In 1977, a leader of the FSLN even founded the Association of Women Confronting the National Problem (AMPRONAC) to recruit more women into the Sandinista army (Gonzalez-Perez 2006, 320). It was later transformed into the Luisa Amanda Espinosa Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE) (Molyneux 1985, 237). In Nicaragua, no directly associated women's organization to the FMLN existed, but independent collective actions sharing a leftist ideology arose, such as the Association of Salvadoran Women (AMES). Therefore, feminist movements prioritized economic development over their gendered interests, and they depended upon the political agenda of leftist rebel movements. In Nicaragua, the AMLAE stated that it prioritized the social revolution, which would reinforce the link between the latter and gender equality and would bring women's emancipation (250). Even though it would not directly satisfy the feminist's strategic gender interest of attaining gender equality, practical interests such as women's politicization would be increased (233). Thus, the implementation of feminist struggle in recent Marxist ideologies in Central America can explain the high prevalence of female combatants in the FMLN and FSLN (Wood & Thomas 2017, 33). Further, the leaders' political interests must also be considered to understand the recruitment of women in rebel movements.

Strategic Interests and Guerilla Methods

Leftist revolutionary movements in Latin America underwent several organizational changes to encourage women's involvement as new and significant forces in their political agenda (Vázquez 1997, 139). Before, Latin American guerillas followed the 'foquista model', a doctrine of revolution drawn from the Cuban revolution and popularized by Che Guevara (Kampwirth 2002, 33). The guerilla force is a small group of revolutionaries operating military action (Lobao, 213). After the military failure of Che Guevara in Bolivia, revolutionary movements gradually shifted toward mass-based political organizations.

The FSLN was the first coalition in Latin America to drop foquismo and implement a new political strategy focused on extensive popular support (Kampwirth 2002, 32). It was in line with the Maoist revolutionary strategy of the 'prolonged people's war' in which popular support is sustained for a protracted war against an enemy (Reif 1986, 213). Therefore, guerillas were strongly incentivized to overcome their sexism to attract female recruits and thus overthrow the state. Given the need for much larger numbers of supporters, all individuals interested ought to feel welcome to join. They could not afford to ignore the importance of women's participation, which was an essential part of the productive forces and citizenry, as women represented roughly 50% of the population (Kampwirth 2002, 9).

Women played a crucial role in the social, economic, and political transformation of revolutionary movements through political mobilization, active labour force, and legal reform. Their participation in political groups would increase their sensitivity to class struggle and, consequently, make them crucial agents in the radicalized leftist change. Their mobilization

was also part of the overall economic strategy to increase the size and quality of the active labour force by educating and giving opportunities for women to enter the workforce. Lastly, women are perceived as important agents of socialization in the pre-revolutionary legal reform and into the next generation. As previously said, women play a critical role in the family, which is the basic unit of society and a strong force for social cohesion. The family introduces a child to moral values and norms which shape their identity in the community. Because women teach their families what society expects of them, they can restructure it to make it compatible with revolutionary values (Molyneux 1985, 240). Thus, women's great potential to develop and spread class consciousness into the family structure increases the desire for leftist organizations to mobilize women. In the FLMN, women were seen as revolutionary bridges between the revolutionary movement and the civilian base. They could strengthen the coalition and increase mass support because they seemed less violent and more trustworthy to newer or unincorporated members than their male counterparts. Therefore, women had strategically significant roles as individuals and collectives that men could not replicate (Shayne, 86).

The leaders' strategic objectives led to the politicization of women's protective role in the family as mothers with whom they are traditionally associated but did not dissolve them. Even the women's organization AMPRONAC in Nicaragua encouraged the transition to 'combative motherhood' (Molyneux 1985, 228). Therefore, in both the FSLN and the FMLN, women were mainly appointed secondary roles in military efforts, such as logistical and backup support. Even though women were rarely recognized, they performed crucial work, without which military action could not have happened. For example, armed interventions depended on women's transportation of weapons (Shayne, 94). Thus, the participation of women in political activity was part of the wider strategic process of popular mobilization.

Social Networks and Identity-Based Participation

Lastly, political, religious, and family networks are critical factors that increased women's mobilization into leftist guerilla movements in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Some personal aspects, such as their biography, their involvement within networks, and the situational context, predisposed some women to follow paths to political activism (Viterna 2006, 2). The most important pre-existing network was the history of resistance in the family that girls were born into. The family is an important agent of socialization, which extensively shaped children's values, such as fairness, justice, and responsibility, and thus set them on the path toward leftist revolutionary activism. Families with traditions to resist authority and join rebel movements increased the probability of women being socialized into resistance, even in a male-dominated sphere. Further, individuals widely consider family loyalties more important and trustworthy than political ones. Thus, their reliance on family networks supporting leftist values provided many recruitment opportunities for the FSLN and the FMLN. Sandinistas largely benefited from the strong and widely dispersed family networks. Since the socioeconomic crisis, mass migrations have spread out families with their political cultures across the country. Therefore, Sandinistas could find support in many rural and urban areas (Kampwirth 2002, 38).

The FMLN also illustrates the utility of network analysis to understand the strong causality between pre-existing networks and the probability of women mobilizing. In the 1980s, the interviews of thirty-five women who were previously involved in leftist revolutionary movements in El Salvador demonstrated the importance of pre-existing networks. Twenty-three of them mentioned that members of their families influenced their political views and decision to take part in the revolutionary coalition (61). Other social ties, such as student and religious organizations, promoted leftist activism in both countries. Fourteen of the thirty-five women interviewed were members of student protest activities before becoming revolutionary activists. They shared concerns about economic inequality and political authoritarianism with leftist revolutionary groups. Thus, belonging to one or more pre-existing networks increased women's incentives to later become leftist revolutionary activists. However, the same social network might mobilize some but inhibit high-risk activism for others. The contradictory effects of identity-based mobilization demonstrate that it is not a generalizable path since individuals have competing identities even within a network (Viterna 2006, 2). For example, the interaction between a woman's 'mother' and 'political activist' identities might limit her probability of mobilizing. Thus, individuals must acquire the 'participation identity' condition to make sure they prioritize their participation above any other aspect of their identity (5).

Conclusion

To conclude, the cases of the FSLN and FMNL leftist guerilla coalitions demonstrate that a combination of structural, political, ideological, strategic, and individual factors led to the mobilization of large numbers of women beginning in the late 1960s. Despite the extremely high price of supporting guerillas, some chose to join the revolutionary coalition. The cumulation of the socioeconomic and political crises generated widespread opposition to both capitalism and long-lasting dictatorships. Indeed, the structural changes caused by globalization and the decades of right-wing repression and widening class and gender inequalities gradually pushed women's entry into the public sphere and paved the way for women to take political action. The convergence of these structural and political factors further amplified women's appeal to unite with leftist rebel movements. These movements, while prioritizing economic and social transformation, also implemented gender issues into their political agenda. Furthermore, at that time, the egalitarian approach was encouraged by the spread of feminism, liberation theology, and the adoption of a new mass mobilization strategy. Lastly, the participation of women in leftist rebel movements was identity-based. Those who were involved in pre-existing social networks had a higher probability of joining revolutionary coa-

litions. While the FSLN and the FMNL had similar gender relations in their fight to overthrow the capitalist state, the divergence of goals and state structure shaped the extent of women's contribution. The Nicaraguan FSLN mobilized higher numbers of women than the Salvadoran FMLN because of its multiclass revolutionary coalition. It also succeeded in taking power when the FMLN failed to overthrow the old regime and never had a revolution. Therefore, it could be interesting to identify if there could be a link between women's participation and the success of leftist rebel movements.

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The UN Mission in Bosnia: An Exploitative Failure

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Edited by Pauline Arnaudin and Olivia Barnaby

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that the UN failed in its peace mission to Bosnia (UNMIBH), playing an actively detrimental role in the victims' experience of sexual exploitation and human trafficking, and an insufficient role in holding accountable those who were at fault. The immediate response was intended for the benefit of the UN's public image rather than the victims, and the Zero-Tolerance Policy that was later implemented made insufficient changes in the prevalence of abuse. This paper recommends implementing mechanisms to remove UN immunity from those who have committed such violent acts, such that they face consequences more serious than merely returning home. Other recommendations include expanded understanding and training regarding organized crime presence in post-conflict zones, more precisely defined measures regarding the accountability of private military companies, and an improved reporting mechanism for victims of sex crimes on peacekeeping missions. While this problem is certainly deep-rooted, tangible change must be made and experienced by those who depend on the UN.

According to the Ten Rules Code of Personal Conduct given to the United Nations (UN) Peacekeepers, the Blue Helmets are not allowed to "indulge in immoral acts of sexual, physical, or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local population or United Nations staff, especially women and children" (1999). Unfortunately, this rule has been repeatedly broken during UN Peace operations, including the UN Peace Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in the late 1990s aftermath of the war in Bosnia. Whistle-blowers Kathryn Bolkovac and Ben Johnston uncovered an elaborate human trafficking scheme, one of the first UN sexual exploitation scandals, though certainly not the last. The trafficking scheme involved an array of different actors, including organized crime groups, the local Bosnian police, the UN-affiliated International Police Task Force, NATO, and the private military company DynCorp, sub-contracted by the UN via the American government (Simm 2013, 88).

This paper argues that in the Bosnia peace mission, the UN's role was both inadequate and directly conducive to the human trafficking operation. Not only did UN personnel participate in the exploitation, but the organization failed to take adequate measures to halt and prevent further sexual abuse, allowing more scandals to emerge in future humanitarian operations in Haiti, the DRC, and West Africa. This paper will first explore the role of UN personnel as a perpetrator in the scandal itself before discussing the organization's response once the operation was exposed. The largest response made by both the UN and its subcontractors was a Zero-Tolerance Policy, and this paper will evaluate its strengths and limitations before discussing potential recommendations to help avoid these humanitarian catastrophes from being repeated in the future. This case in Bosnia is situated within a wider context of UN sexual exploitation scandals, and though it has some unique features, like the use of a private military company, the system within which the harm is committed remains constant enough for the lessons learned to be quite generalizable across cases.

The UN consists of 193 member states, with its core mandate summarised by the phrase "Peace, dignity and equality on a healthy planet" (UN 2023a). It is the largest international organization in the world and has a vast spread of departments and topic areas in which it acts. One of these is peacekeeping in post-conflict zones, where the UN sends troops and police from its member states to help civilians in the post-conflict areas rebuild and return to a state of stability and peace. The UN peacekeepers wear a pale blue beret or helmet on these missions for identification purposes from a distance, hence why they are referred to as 'Blue Helmets.' After the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina ended in 1995 with the Dayton Peace Accords, the UN's peace mission in the region was mandated to establish a Human Rights Office and to use an International Police Task Force (IPTF) to "contribute to the establishment of the rule of law," and encourage training in human dignity, among other peacebuilding measures (UN 2023b). During the preceding conflict, there were over 200,000 fatalities, 20,000 people missing, and 1.2 million were internally displaced. This was a deeply hurt nation, and its people had already suffered heavy losses and trauma as a result of the war (ibid).

The IPTF comprised 1650 people from 34 different countries, all bringing their expertise to foment peace (IPTF 1997). However, this UN operation was unique in that it was the first peacebuilding mission to involve a private military company in DynCorp (Hirschmann 2018). Private military companies, also known as private military contractors or private security companies, are private corporations that hire primarily highly trained ex-soldiers. While they are often hired by government contracts to enter warzones alongside the army, the UN has used them increasingly since the 1990s for help with security and other operations. In this case, they were brought in to help train the local police force and provide assistance with rebuilding the state. DynCorp is a private corporation, but its role as a UN subcontractor meant that its actions were a direct representation of the UN mission and the UN-affiliated International Police Task Force. As mentioned, the main actors in the trafficking were DynCorp employees contracted to be part of the IPTF on behalf of the USA and the Bosnian local police. The main actors and international organizations that this paper focuses on are the UN, though the US and Bosnian governments were also involved in the aftermath of the trafficking, as well as local humanitarian groups.

Despite having been hired within the legitimate framework of the US government, some of DynCorp's employees were found to be involved in the trafficking of women and girls from Eastern European countries such as Romania, Ukraine, and Moldova to Bosnia (Simm 2013, 2). Statistics remain unreliable, but it is estimated that up to 2,000 women and girls as young as 15 were working as prostitutes and dancers at bars, being forced to perform sexual acts or face punishments like beatings, confinement, starvation, and rape (Wilson 2002). The women were also at high risk of injuries and sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS that created a further dangerous cycle within their working environments as these diseases proliferated and created an immediate threat to their lives and well-being (HRW 2002, 18). Many of these bars were visited by UN police officers and humanitarian workers, with international staff making up 30 to 40 percent of the clientele and around 70 percent of human trafficking revenue in Bosnia at the time, much of which was ending up in organized crime groups (Simm 2013, 2).

The UN's immediate response upon finding out about the trafficking and exploitation was two-pronged and contradictory. First, they assembled a Special Trafficking Operations Program (STOP), intending to conduct high-profile raids on identified and suspected brothels. These raids were sometimes broadcast on television and were not conducted with sufficient thought to help the victims. For instance, they would ask the victims questions in the presence of the bar owners and suspected traffickers, and the IPTF officers within the STOP program would sometimes be found to have been clients of the bars themselves (Simm 2013, 93; HRW 2002, 29). The victims later described being too afraid to speak to the officers due to the friendly relationships they held with the bar owners (HRW 2002, 18). At the same time, the officers

responded with denial and cover-ups when confronted with questions externally, showing how performative the immediate response was (Simm 2013, 94). These attempts to be perceived as acting in defence of the victims appear more like empty actions for the sake of institutional stability, hence the insufficient and detrimental response to the exploitation.

Unfortunately, even after the whistle-blowers revealed the truth behind DynCorp and the UN's involvement in the scandal, nobody was held accountable due to an ambiguity in legal jurisdiction. The Dayton Accords, the formal peace treaty ending the Bosnian War, granted privileges and immunity to international personnel. This included inviolability and "absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction" (UN 1995, 117). This immunity was, of course, not intended to shield parties in human trafficking but effectively replaced the criminal jurisdiction, which would usually have been Bosnian. While the IPTF had the immunity of UN officials, it ought to instead be subject to the jurisdiction of the origin state, in DynCorp's case, the US. However, when the US military investigated, they did not prosecute due to insufficient extraterritorial legislation and a lack of army interest; at the time, there was no law at the federal level to allow US courts the jurisdiction to hear cases on crimes that were committed outside the country (Simm 2013, 181; HRW 2002, 47-48). On the other hand, Bosnia did not prosecute either due to the understanding that the international personnel were immune because of the Dayton Accords. In effect, this ambiguity left holes in the legal jurisdiction of where and by whom these crimes ought to be tried, eventually leading to a lack of accountability (HRW 2002, 25-26). While the UN Secretary-General at the time, Kofi Annan, could have waived this case of UN personnel's immunity, he did not, preventing them from being prosecuted under Bosnian law. Consequently, the harshest punishment received was merely removal from the scene and repatriation to the sending country (HRW 2002, 37; 60; Simm 2013, 181). Furthermore, even after these allegations were made, DynCorp continued receiving US and UK government contracts, showing how little retribution they received despite their actions (Simm 2013, 106). Conversely, as late as September 2001, the victims were being prosecuted for taking part in prostitution, document fraud, or illegal residence in Bosnia and Herzegovina; the director of the STOP program stated that "the prosecutors don't want to talk about trafficking, they only want to talk about prostitution" (HRW 2002, 19).

The UN's involvement in this scheme is all the more shocking in light of its status and well-known ideals of helping, not harming, vulnerable people in post-conflict zones. For victims who had already endured a civil war, to be faced with the seemingly trustworthy 'Blue Helmets' of the UN should bring a sense of relief that help is on the way. Instead, the same uniformed soldiers who visited the bars and used them for sexual pleasure at night came to their rescue during the day. This not only left these communities with a deep sense of confusion and trauma on top of what they had already experienced but also deeply undermined their trust in law enforcement. One of the key tenets of the functionality of the police force is a sense of trust from its citizens, which affects the legitimacy of the police's actions and their ultimate effectiveness (Coning and Peter 2019, 193). When one of the key aims of a peacebuilding operation is to reinstate the rule of law, this is a difficult hindrance to encounter and overcome. Other actors were indeed involved, such as national police forces and non-UN-affiliated civil society organizations (CSOs), as well as other international organizations like NATO via the IPTF. However, what makes the UN unique in this case is the combination of its ubiquity and perceived moral authority. International organizations like NATO may have a comparable level of recognizability to the UN, but they do not have the same reputation for stepping into post-conflict zones and providing humanitarian aid. Smaller CSOs may be recognized in a local context as having the moral authority to help people, but they are not subject to the same scrutiny on such a large international scale and may, therefore, not be held to a universally high standard. Therefore, the combination of the UN's international recognition and perceived moral authority causes it to be faced with strong and widespread outrage. This is also in direct opposition with DynCorp: as a private military company, it has no perceived moral authority since it is not expected to act according to humanitarian principles, and its name is not widely recognized. Therefore, the consequences it faced in terms of public outrage were arguably less emotionally charged and less widespread.

Few policy changes were implemented at the UN level immediately after this event. However, after news broke out about sexual exploitation by UN humanitarian workers in West Africa and Haiti in 2003, the UN quickly adopted a Zero-Tolerance Policy (ZTP) against sexual exploitation and abuse by its peacekeepers (Annan 2003). This policy forbids the exchange of money, food, other goods, and assistance for sex in mission areas, prohibits sexual contact between peacekeepers and children, and "strongly discourages" sexual relations between UN personnel and locals (Jennings 2019, 30). At a bare minimum, it is clear that the response to sexual exploitation in UN missions has become more serious in the form of clear and official denouncement and condemnation. That said, the ZTP has not improved accountability nor reduced the number of allegations in practice (Smith 2017, 408). While it may indeed be a worthy aspiration, it lacks the precision needed to be useful in practice, and the lack of a precise definition of what is considered 'exploitation' and 'agency' allows for ambiguity that can be abused by perpetrators to avoid being charged. Additionally, many of these claims depend on victims coming forward and reporting their experiences - it is rare that whistle-blowers come forward with evidence like Bolkovac, who was dismissed from her role in Bosnia after revealing the exploitation. In a situation where underreporting is already rife, the dismissal of an evidence-laden whistle-blower combined with an ambiguous ZTP makes tangible change even less likely. This lack of effectiveness opens the UN up to further criticism about how genuine its response is and whether the ZTP is more consistent with lip service and temporarily silencing criticism reactively rather than making a genuine step toward human

rights and gender equity within its programs.

The ZTP also embodies some of the weaknesses of the UN bureaucracy and its tendency toward depoliticization. In the process of categorizing sexual exploitation and abuse into a neat acronym (SEA) and designating "SEA focal points," this bureaucratization works to provide technical responses to problems that are much more complex and political than they are treated. While technical solutions are valuable, they cannot work alone to fix a systemic issue (Louis and Maertens 2021, 28). A similar criticism may apply to the notion of simply adding more women to the UN task force when embarking on peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. A recommendation that has often been given is that the involvement of more female peacekeepers will dilute male chauvinistic tendencies and make female victims feel more comfortable in peacekeeper presence (Narang et al. 2021, 173). More training has also been implemented in some teams, such as Norway's specialized police team in the UN peace mission in Haiti, which has investigated sexual and gender-based violence since 2010 (Coning and Peter 2019, 197). While there is some merit to these recommendations, and they are a valid and necessary measure in reducing gender disparity both on the peacekeepers' side and on the victims' side, they are too simplistic on their own and do not reach far enough (Simić 2010, 196). This problem is too deep-rooted at this point to be alleviated by the simple addition of more women and more training; it is a straightforward measure on a policy level to introduce gender quotas on missions, and it is easy for the UN bureaucracy to implement and present it as a step forward, but it is one of the simplest measures possible and arguably the bare minimum.

It would be unreasonable to expect the bare minimum to enact fundamental change in the organization without some additional systemic shifts. Unfortunately, attempts at the quick fixes mentioned before come alongside a tendency to belittle the issue at hand, ignoring the larger modifications that need to be made. In 2010, a movie was released inspired by Bolkovac's story and the case of sex trafficking in Bosnia. The film renewed attention toward the topic to such an extent that Ban Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary-General at the time, staged a special screening and pledged action. However, it emerged that senior officials in the UN, likely to save face, tried to downplay the contents of the film, which had already diminished the violence for the sake of the screen audience (Vulliamy, 2012). This unwillingness to overcome institutional shame by enacting firm policies, such as introducing justice systems that overshadow immunity in such cases, casts further doubt on the UN as an institution that cares for those in need over perpetrators of human rights violations.

The UN failed to prevent this human trafficking from taking place and additionally did not hold the perpetrators accountable. This failure of accountability was largely due to ambiguity of jurisdiction, which would not have been the case had the actors not had the international immunity that allowed their impunity. The victims of exploitation and abuse must be assured that those who commit crimes against them are held to at least national jurisdiction, if not international (Cazala and Costa 2018, 3). Another measure which ought to be implemented is a more precise mandate surrounding organized crime in regions where peace missions are taking place. Almost 75 percent of UN peace operations take place in regions that are strongly affected by organized crime groups, though the UN Security Council only began to consider the threats they pose to peace missions in 2010 (Coning and Peter 2019, 171). Currently, only a minority of peace operations have explicit mandates regarding organized crime groups. This is another change that the UN could implement that is relatively straightforward compared to a systemic change, such as increased waiving of peacekeepers' immunity in cases of sexual abuse.

Unfortunately, this case of sexual exploitation at the hands of UN-affiliated personnel in Bosnia was neither the first nor the last of its kind, and therefore, many of the lessons learned from it remain applicable both to subsequent cases in the past and any future operations. In 2002, there was a child sexual abuse scandal among aid workers in West Africa (Alexander and Stoddard 2021). In 2007, more children were found to have been sexually abused by peacekeepers in Haiti, despite the adoption of Conduct and Discipline Units and the ZTP (Associated Press 2015). Further, of the 134 peacekeepers found in the report, none of them faced criminal charges, and 114 were sent home (ibid). Despite some institutional reforms and the introduction of the ZTP, the root behavioural drivers and culture surrounding peacekeepers have not substantially changed, and this is only exacerbated by the insufficient reporting mechanisms for victims to share their experiences and receive help. The victims in missions like those in Haiti and West Africa distrust the confidentiality of the reporting mechanisms and also fear using them, often using the phrase "we are chased away" in reference to their attempts at reporting the abuse (Davey et al. 2010). While the location may change, and the people on the missions may change, the fundamental structure of the UN peacekeeping missions remains the same, and lack of trust in law enforcement is an issue that haunts each operation.

The UN also faces a staffing issue that causes them to have to reach out increasingly to private military companies like DynCorp; there has been a lack of specialists and resources despite increasing demand for such actors in on-the-ground peacekeeping since the 1990s (Østensen 2011, 19). This problem is extremely complex, and solutions are not within the scope of this paper; however, it is safe to say that with the increased need for and use of private military companies, there must be more stringent regulations in order to hold them and their employees accountable for their actions. In Bosnia's case, the fault was not squarely on the shoulders of DynCorp, especially since private militaries were not necessarily involved in other cases of sexual exploitation on peace missions. Nonetheless, this is a measure that must be taken in order to protect the integrity of the UN peacekeeping missions.

The UN Peace Mission in Bosnia had some successes, such as the implementation of the Dayton Accords, a feat that has since kept general peace in the region and allowed the development of political institutions in Bosnia

and Herzegovina. This includes the reform or creation of ministries such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (Cretu 2015, 1). These ministries have helped the country on its path to becoming part of the European Union; though they were not members at the time of publication, they were recognized as candidates for membership in December 2022 (DG NEAR 2023). That said, Bosnia and Herzegovina is still a country that – along with others in the former Yugoslavia – struggles with government corruption, public mistrust in its political institutions, and indeed human trafficking (Cretu 2015, 3). With that in mind, the UN Peace Mission in Bosnia not only perpetuated sexual exploitation and trafficking but also helped implement an imperfect peace process that maintains many of the region's pre-existing issues.

In sum, this paper argues that the UN failed in its peace mission to Bosnia (UNMIBH,) playing an actively detrimental role in the victims' experience of sexual exploitation and human trafficking and an insufficient role in holding accountable those who were at fault. The immediate response was more beneficial for the UN's public image than the victims, and the ZTP that was later implemented made insufficient changes in the prevalence of abuse. The immunity invoked, and the lack of prosecution of the criminals set an unfortunate precedent for the cases in West Africa, Haiti, and Central Africa, where more women and children were abused at the hands of UN peacemakers and humanitarian workers. This paper recommends implementing mechanisms to remove UN immunity from those who have committed such violent acts, such that they face consequences more serious than merely being sent home. Other recommendations include expanded understanding and training regarding organized crime presence in post-conflict zones, more precisely defined measures regarding the accountability of private military companies, and an improved reporting mechanism for victims of sex crimes on peacekeeping missions. While this problem is certainly deep-rooted, tangible change must be made and experienced by those who depend on the UN.

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Ruination of Sacred Space in Hawaii: Mauna Kea and the Thirty Meter Telescope

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Edited by Susie Strachan and Lily Mason

ABSTRACT

The planned construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope on Mauna Kea in Hawaii reflects the island's long and historical struggle with colonialism, particularly within the astronomy industry. This paper seeks to investigate the relationship between colonialism and Indigenous space in Hawaii by framing Mauna Kea as a site of colonial ruination. Rather than mere defunct "memorialized monuments", Ann Stoler defines ruination as the physical and psychological debris left over from periods of colonization and how they seep into the present social and political present of those subject to colonialism. Manifested through the discourse, ideology, and violence behind the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope, this paper posits that Mauna Kea is an example of an active site of ruination of Indigenous space as a result of Hawaii's past with colonialism and empire.

Introduction

Situated atop Mauna Kea, a mountain sacred to the Indigenous peoples of Hawaii, are several telescopes and observatories funded and constructed by nations and astronomy organizations from around the world. Mauna Kea's largest and most controversial addition to date has been the Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT), supported by countries such as the United States, Canada, India, Japan, and China, and academic institutions such as the University of Toronto (Maile 2021, 98; 108). While Mauna Kea may be a prime location for a telescope, it means much more than that to Native Hawaiians. To them, it is a fundamentally sacred mountain related to the gods Earth Mother and Sky Mother, and thus, in line with a worldview that understands the relationship between people and the planet as reciprocal, they are responsible for Mauna Kea's care (Maile 2019, 320). Their relationship to Mauna Kea isn't possessive but genealogical, as all Native Hawaiians were created by Earth and Sky Mothers and hence are all related (Maile 2021, 97). While supporters of the TMT may reduce this relationship to religion, for Native Hawaiians, it's a political order that their lives revolve around (Maile 2015). In their attempts to silence Native opposition, astronomers, intellectuals, and the government of the State of Hawaii have employed settler colonial methods of dispossession, violence, and the attractiveness of discovery and modernity to justify their exploitation of Native space and land. I argue that Mauna Kea, a mountain sacred to Native Hawaiians, is a site that has been ruined by the ongoing entanglements of settler colonialism and its principles of capitalist extraction. I investigate the construction of the Thirty Meter Telescope as a case study in which I identify how ruination is employed through aspects of extraction, settler modernity, and violence.

Colonialism and Extraction

In her book Imperial Debris: On Ruins and Ruination, Ann Stoler explores the purpose and impact of colonial ruins. Upon seeing the word ruin, one may think of sites such as the Parthenon, the Pyramids of Giza, or the Colosseum – all "enchanted, desolate places…[that] provide a favoured image of a vanished past…thrown into aesthetic relief by nature" (Stoler 2013, 9). However, from a colonial framework, ruins are the physical and psychological debris leftover from the damage and destruction of imperial forces (Stoler 2013, 9). Rather than serve as "memorialized monumental" relics, colonial ruination is about "what people are left with" (Stoler 2013, 9). These ruins have not only disrupted physical space, but livelihoods, health, and structures, resulting in the social ruination of people's lives" (Stoler 2013, 10).

To look at a site of ruination, such as Mauna Kea, is to investigate how the consequences of empire are assumed and leave debris within the present (Stoler 2013, 11). Ruination is a deliberate project to which one is subject, and as a result, "lays waste to certain people's relations, and things that accumulate in specific places" (Stoler 2013, 11). While sites of ruin may be thought of as defunct, stationary physical environments, Mauna Kea is an active site of ruination that reflects colonial projects of the past and through which Indigenous peoples' social and political ruination is seen.

To understand the ruinous nature of the TMT, its capitalistic elements must be made clear. The TMT is funded by nations across the globe and, most importantly, with settler-colonial dollars. American and Canadian capital, for one, has been accumulated through the historical and ongoing dispossession of North American Indigenous peoples and together fund the conquest and further dispossession of Native Hawaiian sacred land (Maile 2021, 106). The State of Hawaii also has an economic interest in these projects, as it supports their tourism economy. Large sectors of the tourism industry in Hawaii are based on tours of astronomy structures on Mauna Kea (96). Already, ruination has come into play. According to Stoler, "ruined ecologies are the profit of some and the ruination of others" (Stoler 2013, 14). Ruining Mauna Kea by littering her with observatories and telescopes has provided entertainment for tourists and revenue for the government, while for Native Hawaiians, it has meant the physical and spiritual destruction of their sacred mountain.

There is an obvious economic interest in the TMT from global players and industries. Given this, colonialism and capitalism are grounded in the extraction of the Native's land (Szeman 2017, 434). To function, capitalist societies need physical inputs that require extraction — whether it's coal, gold, land, etc. (443). It's through this process of extraction that "value is generated through capitalism" (444). To add to the previous list of physical inputs, I will include space. In the case of the TMT on Mauna Kea, astronomers are extracting space from Native land to use not for mining or real estate but for space to place their telescope on to realize its scientific and economic value. By doing so, astronomers invade sacred Indigenous space and minimize Mauna Kea to a "scientific commodity" rather than acknowledging its spiritual and political significance to Natives (Maile 2019, 331). In order to possess this space, astronomers and government actors such as the State of Hawaii must once again dispossess Native Hawaiians of their land (Szeman 2017, 444). The extraction of space on Mauna Kea is also ruinous in an environmental sense. It is projected that the TMT would release approximately 120-130 cubic feet of solid waste every week, which is to be stored in a five thousand-gallon tank underground in the mountain (Malie 2019, 331). Extraction from the environment comes with its prices, and the construction of the TMT seems to create an ironic and vicious cycle: one of the justifications for the telescope is that it will allow science to discover habitable exoplanets for humans to live on, as the conditions on Earth worsen due to climate change driven by the extraction of oil and coal for profit (Maile 2021, 100). Meanwhile, the TMT will contribute to the declining condition of the environment through its colonial disregard for the state of the Earth (as long as it will bring it profit and power) (Szemann 2017, 440). Mauna Kea is being ruined by the colonial state's extraction of space and hence profit from Indigenous land, which will cause detrimental environmental harm and further deny Indigenous peoples' agency and will.

Language of Colonization

Mauna Kea will also be ruined by the TMT through settler notions of modernity and discovery. The use of Mauna Kea as the location for the telescope has been colonialist from the very beginning. The so-called "first person to discover" the mountain, Dutch-American Gerard Kuiper, found it to be an exceptional space for observing the night sky, thus igniting the astronomy industry's possessive grip on Mauna Kea (Maile 2021, 106). The very language used when discussing Kuiper is coined by colonial white men who rationalize their claim on Indigenous land by dismissing Indigenous peoples' existence and proclaiming themselves as the supposed "discoverers." The use of this language alone undermines Native Hawaiian's sovereignty and their right to the land.

The language surrounding Mauna Kea and the telescopes that the astronomy industry forces upon it are also telling that the motivations for building the TMT are colonialist, rooted in the same logic and history as the colonization of the Hawaiian Islands by the United States. The TMT is supposed to bring our knowledge of science and outer space to "new frontiers" (Maile 2019, 331). This motivation behind the construction of the TMT strongly echoes the rationale of Euro-American colonialists whose desire for discovery worked in tandem with the forcible removal of Indigenous peoples from their land (ibid). Ironically, this idea was published in Fredrick Jackson Turner's Frontier Thesis, which was released in the same year that the Hawaiian Kingdom was conquered by the United States (ibid). The urge to discover is also tied to modernity or modernizing science. J.B. Zirker, an astronomer who played a significant role in the use of Mauna Kea as a site for scientific telescopes, described them as "the grandest monuments of our technical civilization" (Maile 2021, 107). Associating telescopes with greatness because of the knowledge they can produce and their contribution to the progress of civilization is not only used to rationalize their construction but also works in opposition to Native Hawaiians, who are associated with the backward, ancient, and antiquated Stone Ages and whose resistance to the appropriation of their land is thus reframed as a rejection of modern science (110). Because Native opposition is grounded in spiritual belief rather than empirically tested science, it is often cast aside as meaningless voodoo religion. Native worldviews are considered inferior to science, and their cause is thereby rendered invalid (Maile 2015).

At the same time, Hawaiians' "ancientness" is also used against them in a different way. In attempts to garner Native support for the TMT, astronomers have released statements in which they present a certain narrative to appeal to traditional Native Hawaiian culture. Alongside images of Hawaii's last kings, a pamphlet from the Keck Observatory on Mauna Kea claims that "after all, the ancient Hawaiians were among the first great astronomers, using the stars to guide them along the islands" (Swanner 2017, 306-7). This appropriation of Indigenous culture is typical of colonialists. To them, the Natives and their culture are an exotic, mystical thing. Here, the Keck Observatory is using it to draw an attractive picture of Native Hawaiians being "on their side," asserting that the observatory is continuing the astronomy tradition of ancient Hawaiians. Using Mauna Kea in this narrative is not only exceptional in terms of space but also culture: where else is better to build an astronomy observatory/telescope than on a mountain belonging to the world's first astronomers? This changing view of modernity versus antiquity – at times superior to ancient Indigenous sanctity of Mauna Kea, at others an equal justification for the TMT – signifies the power colonialists have to alter settler-colonial ideas of modern versus ancient and superior versus inferior to rationalize their ruination of Indigenous land. Mauna Kea continues to be ruined by the ghosts of colonialism that landed on the island in 1893 and haunt it through extractive and dispossessive astronomy projects.

That said, the telescopes and observatories that litter Mauna Kea are not there because of pamphlets depicting friendly relations and admiration for Native Hawaiians. They are there because the settler-colonial State of Hawaii has consistently, for over 100 years, and unapologetically employed violence against its Indigenous population. Before delving into the violent foundations upon which the State of Hawaii was built, it must be understood that the main language of the colonialists is just that – violence. They speak it when they dominate, dispossess, and eliminate, and the supremacy they gain from this is further established with violence (Fanon, 8). State-sanctioned violence is required by colonialists to survey and control the Native: "...the proximity and frequent, direct intervention by the police and the military ensure the colonized are kept under close scrutiny and are contained by rifle butts and napalm" (Fanon 1963, 8). The first act of ruin employed on the grounds of Hawaii was in 1893, when the Hawaiian Islands were seized from its Kingdom and people by the United States (Maile 2021, 105). In 1898, it was officially annexed by the United States, who erected the State of Hawaii on stolen lands. Mauna Kea and the island(s) it sits on have been ruined not only by such historical acts of violence but also that of the contemporary.

Along with framing anti-colonial Indigenous advocates as antiquated, harmful settler-colonial-made stereotypes frame opposing Natives as inherently violent. In 2014-5, there was significant opposition from Native Hawaiians when the construction of the TMT began on Mauna Kea. Leaders and activists blocked the main road to the mountain in the act of protecting their sacred land from any further ruination. However, this resistance did not bode well with the State of Hawaii, and the Governor, David Ige, triggered a state of emergency in response (Maile 2019b, 334). His rationale for doing so was that the Native protestors harassed visitors and tourists, created a hostile environment, and were overall "an imminent peril to the public health or natural resources" (ibid). As a result, several protestors were arrested for reoccupying Mauna Kea (ibid). The State's claims were unsubstantiated. No Native was harassing anyone. No Native was a threat to the environment. These imagined threats of violence claimed by colonialists to be presented by the Native are often used as weapons to feed into settler stereotypes of Native peoples' tendency for violence and are thus used to rationalize actual material violence perpetrated

by the government – especially to make way for settler-colonial projects of extraction or profit (ibid).

Conclusion

Using such imagined and violent settler narratives legitimizes state-sanctioned police brutality and violence against the Natives in the pursuit of securing capital – or, in this case, space – for the astronomy industry's development of observatories and telescopes (Maile 2019b, 335). By identifying a constant line from the overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian Kingdom to today's defence of the building of the TMT, we can see that this violent history has defined and set a precedent for the current use of violence against Native Hawaiians which has "yield[ed] new damages and renewed disparities" upon their community (Stoler 2013, 7). In line with Stoler's argument, "ruin" is a violent verb – it is happening now as a result of the past. The sacred Mauna Kea has been ruined by settler colonialism for over a century. A trifecta of settler nations, the astronomy industry, and supporting academic institutions have been bankrolling the project of extracting space from Indigenous land for the use of scientific observatories and telescopes. Superseding Indigenous claims to the land, its sacredness, and environmental concerns, such projects have gone ahead in the colonial name of modernity and discovery. State-sanctioned violence props up these justifications by casting Natives as violent threats to the rest of the State at large. Mauna Kea continues to be haunted by the ruination of its land by colonial forces in 1893. Colonial violence and detrimental narratives about Native Hawaiians continue to be felt today by its population and the mountain.

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Different Words, Same Results: The Perils of Populism in Ecuador and Brazil in the 21st Century

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Edited by Gaya Karalasingam and Romeo Hor

ABSTRACT

In 2007, Ecuadorians elected Rafael Correa, a left-wing leader who based much of his platform on calls for decolonial reform and the indigenous cosmology of buen vivir. Representing the opposite side of the political spectrum, Brazilians elected right-wing politician Jair Bolsonaro, whose platform included social conservative and anti-environmental rhetoric. Both leaders can be understood as populists, which refers to the phenomena whereby leaders build a multi-class coalition via a personalistic party, have charismatic personalities, and have a redistributive agenda within the existing social bounds. Populism is an ineffective mechanism to address the demands of civil society, which is ultimately detrimental to democracy, as highlighted by the case studies of Ecuador and Brazil. This paper focuses on the impact of populism on one aspect of democracy, the dispersal of power and the limitation of domination by one person or a small group.

Introduction

Populism as a political mechanism and concept has been a recurring phenomenon in Latin America. From Perón in Argentina in the early to mid-twentieth century to more contemporary leaders such as ex-President Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, populism has permeated the political dynamics of many Latin American countries (Mendonça and Caetano 2021, 212). Despite its frequent reappearances, populism has taken on various forms and rhetoric to accompany its rise in both the political right and left. Two Latin American countries that have recently featured populist leaders include Ecuador and Brazil, with presidents Rafael Correa from 2007 to 2017 and Jair Bolsonaro from 2018 to 2022 (Daly 2019, 2; Becker 2013, 46). With Correa representing the left side of the political spectrum and Bolsonaro the right, both countries experienced remarkably similar outcomes under their respective leadership: reliance on status quo policy and extractivism; that is, intensified natural resource extraction typically for economic gain (Bernal 2021, 11). Through a comparison of the two case studies of Ecuador and Brazil, this paper argues that the context-specific rhetoric of populism that brings leaders into power, in practice, is ineffective at realizing the demands of civil society to the detriment of democracy.

"Populism" can be defined as the top-down phenomenon of the rise of a leader built on a multi-class coalition with a personalistic party, a charismatic personality, and a redistributive agenda within the parameters of existing societal structures (Cameron 2022). While the application of the term 'populist' to describe leaders is often contested, several academics have described both Jair Bolsonaro and Rafael Correa as fitting under this term (Daly 2019, 2; Becker 2013, 46; Posner 2022, 798-802). "Civil society" refers to the largely autonomous, voluntary, and organized social life held together through shared rules or the mass population base that supports populist leaders (Isbester 2010, 16). Their demands will be understood as the rhetorical promises and platforms that they vote for, which often reflect the majoritarian opinion. Finally, "democracy" will be described as "a system that disperses power through its institutions and procedures so that the domination of one person, group, or interests can be kept to a minimum"; while this definition may not encompass all aspects of the term, for the purposes of this paper, the focus on the limitation of domination will allow a clearer impact analysis than attempting to evaluate all components (Isbester 2010, 2).

Ecuador and Correa

Background

Ecuador is home to a substantial Indigenous population that comprises approximately 40% of the total population (Becker 2011, 48). As a result, Indigenous interests and voices have had substantial impacts on the political discourse of the country, with the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAEI), a well-organized group of fourteen nationalities having an impressive presence in the political sphere (ibid). Following neoliberal reforms that dramatically increased inequality in the early 2000s, new calls emerged to recognize Indigenous rights, decolonization, and redistributive policy (50). This political climate is critical to understanding the context of the rise of Rafael Correa – a lower-middle class, trained economist – who served as Minister for the Economy before making his presidential bid in 2006 (Becker 2013, 46).

Populist rhetoric: appeals to decolonization and Buen vivir

Correa can be understood as a populist leader due to his personality cult in the party of Alianza País (AP), the redistributive agenda of the Citizens' Revolution, buen vivir, and his charisma (Posner 2022, 798-802). As a leader, Correa and his party headed the Citizens' Revolution, a political, social, and economic movement based on 21st-century socialism; the movement emphasized the concept of buen vivir: an Indigenous cosmology that embraces differences among and between humans and non-humans, with an emphasis on complementarity, reciprocity, relationality, and humans' relationship with nature (Bernal 2021, 16; Merino 2016, 272-273). These concepts and ideas featured heavily in Correa's campaign for the presidency, the Citizens' Revolution, which was the culmination of a long history of social and popular movements from the 1990s primarily led by Indigenous activists, despite him not being an active promoter of Indigenous rights (Becker 2011, 50; Becker 2013, 50). Correa, an academic, investigated new means for development beyond extractivist reliance; much of his platform featured calls for more participatory democracy (Becker 2013, 46; Forero 2021, 229).

However, Correa's electoral base was far from uniform. It was mainly composed of disorganized urban lower classes that featured some support from smaller groups, such as the Federación Ecuadoriana de Indios, rather than the larger, organized labour and social movements (Becker 2013, 50-51). Inherent to the project of populism, Correa's campaign created the 'popular,' working-class and urban middle class versus the 'elite' coalitions (Becker 2011, 51). Leaders of CONAEI criticized Correa for benefiting from being grouped with other Latin American leaders such as Chávez or Morales, who have been seen as allies for their community without being an active promoter of Indigenous rights (Becker 2013, 50). However, the coalition of smaller Indigenous groups supporting Correa undermined the message of CONAEI to speak for all Indigenous groups, which facilitated substantial support for him in the 2007 elections (ibid, 52). Regardless of Correa's personal ideological leanings, diving into leftist, decolonial politics proved strategic. Moreover, given the significant Indigenous population of the country, this strategy was evidently politically expedient.

Rhetoric in practice

In 2008, Correa and the new administration had the Constitutional Assembly re-write the constitution, which featured promising principles of buen vivir, including the recognition of the rights of nature, the coexistence of differing ethnic groups, popular power, and food sovereignty, among other progressive policies (Benalcázar and Ullán de la Rosa 2021, 165). Additionally, the country released the Plan Nacional de Buen Vivir 2013-2017, which called

for, among other items, popular participation, social welfare, reduced reliance on extraction, and social inclusion (Posner 2022, 809). After just five years under Correa's watch and policy development, Ecuador experienced a significant drop in poverty rates, an impressive 8 percent growth rate, and heavy investment in infrastructure, including roads and schools, by 2012 (Becker 2013, 43).

However, despite the early success and rhetorical platform promising constitutional commitments, Correa and his administration's actions did not reflect the values in these texts, specifically upholding Indigenous rights. Even with incorporating buen vivir in the 2008 Constitution, which recognizes the rights of nature and Indigenous autonomy, the rights of Indigenous groups and land defenders have continued to be marginalized. Ecuador continued to rely on a rentier, extractivist economy under Correa; for example, between 1990 and 2000, 413 billion barrels of oil were assessed in the Yasuní National Park, which is highly bio-diverse and home to five Indigenous groups (Forero 2021, 234). There was a proposal from Indigenous and environmental groups to leave this oil untapped in exchange for international compensation (ibid). When Correa abandoned the plan in 2013 in favour of extraction, mass protests with Indigenous and non-Indigenous activists erupted, invoking the rights of Yasuní as a political entity stipulated by the 2008 Constitution in response to the state backtracking on its commitment (Bernal 2021, 23). Correa's unilateral action that sidestepped the demands of Indigenous activists runs contrary to the democratic goal of power distribution to minimize domination and consolidation of power by one leader.

The aggressive, extractivist strategy that Correa pursued accompanied a regime of violence against Indigenous leaders and activists. The government pressed charges against the Indigenous governor Guadalupe Llori, for example, and an extensive list of other leaders also faced charges or suppression (Bernal 2021, 19-20). As well, there was suppression against the Shuar Indigenous groups resisting the El Mirador mining project and violent repression of a march in Quito in 2015 (ibid). The CONAIE leadership criticized Correa's policies for maintaining the status quo regarding extractivism, after his first couple of years in office (Becker 2013, 44). Additionally, the shifting rhetoric of support for extractivism highlights these changes as not just a struggle over implementation due to limited institutional or political will or some other exogenous factor but an overt policy reversal from the initial support for buen vivir and the rights of nature.

Impacts on democracy

Ultimately, the shortcomings in the promise of buen vivir and Correa's rhetoric have troubling consequences for democracy. The rights and inclusion of Indigenous communities have been marginalized despite the rhetorical promises, suggesting voters are electing ideas that never materialize into tangible outcomes. This type of governance erodes faith in electoral politics and rhetorical commitment to decolonization; in the same vein, a progressive constitution masks the continued marginalization of Indigenous communities. The Yasuní National Park protests of 2013 highlight this mismatch of rhetoric and actions with negative implications for democracy. In response to the social unrest, the government arbitrarily issued Decree 16 to shut down Fundación Pachamama, the main environmental and Indigenous group protesting the extraction efforts (Posner 2022, 808). This decree closed popular sector avenues of expression, limiting the ability of free speech and civil society's capacity to challenge the state's decisions. No community councils or empowerment of grassroots organizations occurred under Correa, further highlighting the shortcomings of the Citizens' Revolution for popular inclusion (Becker 2011, 51). Thus, despite promises for more participatory democracy and decolonization that elevated Correa into the presidency, the actualization of these commitments did not occur, suggesting the limitations of populism to achieve political ends for civil society. Both civil society's loss of faith in elections and progressive reform, as evident by the widespread protests expressing dissatisfaction with the system and the consolidation of interests, are detrimental to the goal of limiting domination, a key feature of democracy.

Brazil and Bolsonaro

Background

Brazil's Indigenous population makes up a significantly smaller portion of the electoral base than in Ecuador, at less than 1 percent, with about half of the population considered white and the other half mixed-race (Cameron 2022). Brazil remains the world's largest Catholic nation, with Evangelicals in particular, having a three-fold rise in the last three decades and now accounting for almost a third of the population (Encarnación 2018). This large Evangelical community supported the rise of far-right politician Jair Bolsonaro, who was elected as president in 2018 (Garcia 2019, 64). Bolsonaro comes from Rio de Janeiro and served a controversial stint as a military officer in the Brazilian army between 1977 and 1988 which was followed by an introduction to politics through his role as a council member in Rio de Janeiro and then as a Federal Deputy to the Federal Chamber (Azevedo and Robertson 2022, 157).

Populist rhetoric: appeals to social conservatism and anti-environmentalism

Like Correa, Bolsonaro can also be understood as a populist leader. He co-opted the Social Liberal Party as a personal vehicle for power, created a division of social conservatism and political elites as the "people" pitted against minorities and progressive elites, and has debatable charisma, or at the very least, attempts to present himself as one of the "people" (Daly 2019, 19; Azevedo and Robertson 2022, 160; Mendonça and Caetano 2021, 221). Several scholars have expanded to classify Bolsonaro as an authoritarian populist, citing his anti-democratic tendencies and rhetoric (Daly 2019, 19; Azevedo and Robertson 2022, 160; Mendonça and Caetano 2021, 221). In his campaign for the presidency during the 2018 election, Bolsonaro attracted a wide coalition of supporters, which is an important condition for populist leaders. Such groups included the wealthy private sector, the military, rural landowners opposed to land reforms, the Evangeli-

cals and deeply religious communities (Garcia 2019, 64).

Unlike Correa, Bolsonaro is an extreme right-wing politician with most of his political rhetoric concerning anti-environmentalism, security, and strong socially conservative values regarding sexuality and gender identities. For example, Bolsonaro has expressed provocative statements such as that he "would be incapable of loving a homosexual son" (Hunter and Power 2019, 76). An analysis of Bolsonaro's campaign speeches and platform content found that much of his anti-environmental rhetoric that appealed to agribusiness was in the name of economic growth and development (Mendes Motta and Hauber 2022, 10). An analysis of his Instagram content during his campaign found that his self-portrayal attempted to make him seem ordinary, or one of the "people," with photos of him eating breakfast or wearing the national soccer jersey (Mendonça and Caetano 2021, 223). These strategic attempts to relate to the ordinary person while building exceptionalism through images with the symbolic power of guns or top leaders, combined with espousals of social conservatism and appeals to security interests, highlighted Bolsonaro's successful campaign rhetoric and tactics to develop multi-class support (Mendonça and Caetano 2021, 227).

Bolsonaro's rhetoric captured different electoral support. His focus on security affairs and military background attracted upper- and middle-class groups, and his anti-environmental stance drew in rural agri-business to develop the multi-class coalition that characterizes populist leaders (Azevedo and Robertson 2022, 157). Beyond class lines, the social conservatism and rejection of LGBTQ+ rights appealed to the deeply religious popular base, which crosses class lines (Garcia 2019, 64). These appeals proved successful, with Bolsonaro winning over 70% of the Pentecostal Christian community and heavy majorities in the economically advanced northern regions (Hunter and Power 2019, 77). The differing rhetoric between Correa and Bolsonaro, while in part reflecting different personal ideologies, appealed to the demographic contexts where they were both running for office, which can help explain their respective successes in electoral victories.

Rhetoric in practice

Bolsonaro went to great lengths to satisfy sectoral interests at the expense of wider national interests. Bolsonaro's appeals to anti-environmentalism can certainly be argued to have been actualized under his watch; significant budget cuts were made to the supervision of the Amazon, environmental regulations were dismantled, and land use reform measures were implemented that targeted Indigenous lands to be turned into development areas by moving management from the National Indian Foundation to the Ministry of Agriculture, a pro-agribusiness unit (Milhorance 2022, 759). In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro kept the country open in favour of economic growth to maintain support from the business sector rather than implementing public health measures (Cameron 2022). However, Bolsonaro's handling of the crisis has been viewed as catastrophic; his denial of the seriousness has led to some of the highest casualty rates globally and alienated public health officials (International Crisis Group 2022, 10). Despite the electoral incentive to direct policy benefits to the upper and middle classes, one of Bolsonaro's most popular policies most directly supported the poorer sectors in Brazil. For example, his pandemic relief measure called Auxílio Emergencial, which was a copy of the cash transfer program initiated under former left-wing president Lula da Silva called Bolsa Familia, was one of his most popular policies during his tenure (International Crisis Group 2022, 11). This program benefited and was popular among poorer sectors, which were not the initial target demographic in Bolsonaro's campaign nor in his voter base in 2018 (Hunter and Power 2019, 77).

Additionally, a large focus of Bolsonaro's campaign was on anti-corruption. He emphasized the issue in response to Operation Car Wash, a major political corruption scandal implicating leaders of the Workers' Party, such as former president Lula da Silva and then President Dilma Rousseff (Azevedo and Robertson 2022, 156). Bolsonaro presented himself as anti-establishment, anti-corruption, and anti-politics, that is, a break from the past regimes or an outsider (Rocha 2021, 130). While he has not faced the same corruption charges that da Silva has, he has nonetheless a questionable track record. Rather than being a refreshing, honest alternative, Bolsonaro has questioned the legitimacy of the 2018 election results and called for closures of the Supreme Court and Congress. This suggests that rather than being anti-political, he is anti-democratic (International Crisis Group 2022, 10). These antics have alienated many centrist or moderate voters who once initially supported his candidacy as an alternative to the corruption of the previous administration (International Crisis Group 2022, 10).

While the full extent of the impacts of Bolsonaro's policies and time in office remains to be evaluated, given his presidency is only ending with the October 2022 election, his failure to win re-election, to some extent, supports the idea that his message of anti-corruption and anti-politics fell flat with the electoral base that supported him in 2018. The same middle-class popular sectors that initially supported him have been alienated by his anti-democratic actions and policies and, thus, returned to the same party that they once so adamantly desired to punish (Hunter and Power 2019, 80; International Crisis Group 2022, 11).

Impacts on democracy

Democracy is impeded by this type of political maneuvering; using populist rhetoric to win elections required drawing on and manipulating the demographic base of Brazil and, in practice, has looked like a hodgepodge of policies aimed at pacifying and shoring up support rather than fulfilling the rhetorical claims. While some of Bolsonaro's promises may have been realized, particularly rollbacks on environmental regulations, he has also continued to rely on past policies like Bolsa Familia to guide his administration. This outcome bears a resemblance to Ecuador under Correa: both Bolsonaro and Correa made promises in their campaigns by drawing on their specific contexts to win presidential elections, and both failed to fulfill many of the commitments they made; they also relied

on extractivist economic strategies and immediate needs to determine their policies (Bernal 2021, 11; Milhornace 2022, 759).

The demands of civil society were then not met by this populist approach, which facilitated ascents to power but created little social transformation. For democracy, governance and power are held by the small group of elected officials rather than the active civil society making its demands heard through elections. Particularly in the case of Bolsonaro, his actions that have been evaluated as anti-democratic are bad for democracy through the weakening of institutions and continual questioning of democratic processes and values (International Crisis Group 2022, 11). The consequences of this populist approach are troubling for democracy; civil society is manipulated by populist rhetoric, crafted to appeal to their needs yet failing to address these challenges and calls to action, and it concentrates power on the top officials.

Conclusion

Correa and Bolsonaro used populist mechanisms by drawing on the context of their electoral bases to appeal to their interests. For Correa, the significant Indigenous population lent itself to decolonial rhetoric, whereas the strong Evangelical base in Brazil gravitated to Bolsonaro's conservative social values. In office, however, neither leader actualized these goals; Correa continued to marginalize Indigenous communities, and Bolsonaro took an anti-democratic, rather than anti-corruption, turn. Thus, despite differing rhetoric that reflected the context of their respective countries, Bolsonaro and Correa demonstrate how populist discourse and tendencies serve as a mechanism to win elections rather than to create the social change being called for from the civil society base. Both resulted in a reliance on status quo policies, particularly concerning economic development and extractivism, which featured prominent strategies for both countries (Bernal 2021, 11; Milhorance 2022, 759). The shortcomings of the discourse are thus detrimental to democracy as they have not only led to conditions of social violence, exclusion, and marginalization in Ecuador and polarization through anti-democratic actions and rhetoric in Brazil but also eroded faith in democratic processes and systems to actualize the needs and demands reflected in what got populist leaders elected. Power and determination of policy are concentrated in the small, elected group of populist leaders rather than in the hands of the majority whose electoral voices are not being heard nor recognized in actions which run contrary to the goals and values of democracy.

This research is limited in its extrapolation capabilities; each case of populism and populist leader is context-specific. Therefore, their ability to enact policy will be limited or benefit from their own circumstances, which may facilitate different outcomes. Furthermore, the academic research on Bolsonaro's effectiveness to actualize policy is limited due to the recency of his tenure. However, this research is still important in demonstrating how differing rhetoric from opposite sides of the political spectrum ultimately leads to the same outcome: a reliance on status quo policy and little substantive change for the groups that contributed to their political rise. This analysis helps unpack how populism functions as a political mechanism to achieve power and less so as a vehicle for social or radical change. The effect is a concentration of power in the populist leaders' hands, removing agency from the electoral base of civil society and thereby weakening democracy.

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Grave New World: The Foreseeable Resurgence of Proxy Warfare in Africa

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Edited by Myriam Tounekti and Will Hicks

ABSTRACT

The shift to multipolarity has China and Russia rising to compete against the American hegemonic world order that has dominated the international scene since the end of the Cold War. However, given this competition, Africa has re-emerged as a theatre in which these tensions are unfolding. China, Russia and America are returning to the predatory relationships they engaged in during the Cold War, with African states becoming allies or environments for extraction and exploitation. Economic interest is central to these relationships. These hegemons are building corridors to promote their economic stability through access to lucrative resources and weapons deals, with politically unstable, conflict-ridden and resource-rich African states most susceptible to this fleecing. This paper applies a Marxist geopolitical lens to explain this phenomenon and why alternative theories, namely Neorealism, fail to fully appreciate the internal and multifaceted reasonings for these dynamics.

Introduction

This article investigates which African countries are more vulnerable to proxy wars spurred by China, Russia and the United States contesting one another for dominance in the shifting multipolar international environment. This paper argues that African resource-rich countries and fragile states engaged in armed conflicts will be especially susceptible to this foreign interference, as these superpowers are driven by ongoing competition to secure access to lucrative natural resources and weapons deals. Therefore, a Marxist analysis best explores this predatory relationship and how engagement may likely unfold. These global hegemons are driven by economic concerns to exploit peripheral countries in Africa, thus enriching their markets. As such, proxy warfare and strategic investments are increasingly attractive tactics leveraged to secure spheres of influence. As an independent theatre for these conflicts, Africa is becoming an environment critical to heightening these hegemons' economic competitiveness.

A Neorealist perspective would posit that China, Russia, and the United States' fundamental distrust of one another is the impetus for this increasing competition for alliances in African states. Neorealism contends that as states become more powerful in the international environment, such as Russia and China's ascendency against American unipolarity, they are interested in absorbing weaker states into their orbit to reap the resources and investment opportunities needed to improve their relative positions (De Maio 2014, 38). Therefore, a desire for power maximization drives these states to aggressively seek out African partners to usurp one another's international sphere of influence. This would also explain why weaker states in Africa align themselves with more powerful actors to promote their improvement (Dunne and Schmidt 2020, 113). However, this lens fails to appreciate the domestic and economic causality that motivates these relationships. So, while important for understanding behaviour on the international stage, it is an incomplete theoretical tool.

This article outlines the attractiveness of proxy warfare for competing hegemons. It covers Cold War proxy engagements, primarily by the United States and the former Soviet Union, and how the African theatre reflected their foreign policy agenda. Thereafter, a breakdown of each country's interests and their current engagements will be explored to display the hegemonic-oriented thread between these relationships.

Proxy Conflicts in Africa

During the Cold War

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union (USSR) engaged in proxy wars to exert their regional influence and undermine the enemy while gaining access to coveted resources. Proxy wars are conflicts where less powerful countries or non-governmental groups are supported by larger powers which reflect their respective interests (De Maio 2014, 38). This allows larger countries to engage in indirect conflict through these representatives, such as puppet regimes or rebel groups, without overt warfare between the two. Accordingly, proxy war has various advantages. First, the existential threat of nuclear conflict, as both the United States and USSR were nuclear powers, disincentivized direct war. Proxy war allowed the superpowers to confront one another without risking global annihilation (Bar-Siman-Tov 1984, 263).

Furthermore, indirect engagement allows for plausible deniability. Therefore, any warfare atrocities or human rights abuses would not tarnish their global prestige to the same degree as they would have had they officially participated in the conflict. Moreover, this enables the superpowers to contest global hegemony by working to alter the outcome of regional conflicts to their benefit (Tafotie and Idahosa 2016, 451). By accumulating control across numerous regions globally, the United States and the Soviet Union aggregated spheres of influence to help tip the global balance of power in their favour. As a result, American and Soviet policymakers could enjoy the fruits of an additional ally and further enhance their interests if they won the proxy war without an obvious military defeat should they lose (De Maio 2014, 38).

Accordingly, the primary mechanism driving these Cold War proxy conflicts appeared to be fear of the rival's ideology: American liberal-democratic capitalism against Soviet authoritarian communism. This intrinsic distrust between the hegemons led to a competition for their own perceived survival. This is where the Neorealist lens becomes an attractive explanatory tool. During Africa's main decolonization period, the majority of African nations joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 47). The movement intended for its countries to avoid dominance by foreign superpowers and assert their new-found independence. In practice, however, many African nations were sucked into the American or Soviet orbit. The United States, though initially unreceptive to the potential of African decolonization for their gain, quickly pivoted when it became apparent that emancipated nations provided potential allies to the Soviet Union (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 48). The USSR's anti-imperialist agenda and robust support for anti-Western independence leaders in Africa flamed American fears of the Soviets expanding their power by allying with these new international players. As such, any relative gains for each power were a loss for their rival.

As a case study, the Angolan civil war characterizes Russo-American proxy interference effectively. The Marxist-Leninist Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, a dominant liberation party in the conflict, received $63 million between 1964 and 1975 from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 69). In addition, Cuban troops, acting as Soviet expeditionary forces, also trained and armed this group to rival their colonial oppressors and then consolidate political power after their independence (Yeisley 2011, 80). Fearful of a communist government being installed in Luanda, the United States channelled limited financial support to the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), a pro-American militant coalition, in its engagement (Thaler 2012, 57). Interestingly, as American support waned, China filled this vacuum to exercise its interests (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 69-70). Determined to prevent America from reorienting to a policy of isolationism during the 1970s, China supported the FNLA and later

the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola to maintain Cold War balances of power (Hess 2014, 24). The more preoccupied America and the Soviet Union were with contesting one another, the fewer resources available for the USSR to threaten the weakened state of China (21). Moreover, this also presented China as a legitimate alternative for developing countries to align themselves against the binary of American or Soviet alliances.

This is a textbook example of African nations acting as an arena for superpower conflicts to play out. Engagement with Angola highlights a pattern of China, Russia and the United States meddling in African affairs to release the tension between them and advance their interests. Accordingly, this dynamic has continued into the current shifting multipolar era. Despite this recurring development, the Neorealist argument cannot fully explain the multifaceted nature of proxy conflicts between hegemonic powers. Threaded from Cold War politics into the modern context, Neorealism fails to account for how domestic politics and non-state actors shape foreign relations. To demonstrate, Russia's Putin administration has concretely reoriented away from ideological aims to install communist regimes in proxy countries, instead launching foreign intervention campaigns to bolster their economic competitiveness (Matusevich 2019, 25). In tandem, the United States' Trump administration's goal of containment against threats to their economic primacy and China's interest in maintaining their status as a globalized economic player is the underlying mechanisms fuelling modern trends of intervention in Africa (Tafotie and Idahosa 2016, 452; Edoho 2011, 107).

Neorealism also fails to appreciate how non-state actors are powerful players in modern Sino-Russo-American confrontations. Most countries in Africa are mono-economies: their export income relies almost exclusively on one or few industries, such as crude petroleum in Angola, coffee in Rwanda, cocoa in Côte d'Ivoire or copper in Zambia (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 83). The resources these countries possess tend to be extremely lucrative. Nevertheless, its monopolization of industry makes their economies highly susceptible to volatility on the global market and intervention from wealthier countries also seeking to reap the benefits (Edoho 2011, 113). As such, leaders in many African countries ally with foreign corporations to stabilize the extraction and distribution of their resources (Schmidt and Mwaba 2019). This trend demands attention to economic factors and internal politics to be explained, which Neorealism ignores as it solely focuses on global interactions at the international level.

Furthermore, the security of profits and economic growth is the foundation of these relationships, not the fear other states pose to one's survival. Therefore, while useful, Neorealism is not a wholly fulfilling exploratory tool. The strong vertical hierarchy between hegemonic countries as the exploitative 'core' of the world order extracting wealth from 'peripheral' African countries to enrich themselves perpetuates a parasitic relationship where these countries become largely dependent on their stronger counterparts (Ahmad 2022). Appropriately, a Marxist explanation better incorporates the central actors and underlying cause of China, Russia and the United States' intervention in Africa today.

China's Economic Expansion

China's economic output is reliant on nonrenewable energy sources to power its production industries. As a result, the ability to compete for global primacy against the United States is yoked to open access to a sustainable oil supply (Yeisley 2011, 83). Although Africa only possesses about 9% of proven oil reserves globally, experts cite that the continent likely has significant untapped reserves (Edoho 2011, 114). Africa's arguable political stability compared to other oil-rich nations in the Middle East and its willingness to engage with China makes it a highly attractive source of energy. The roots of China's investments in the African continent stem from Cold War relations. Although directly involved to some degree during its peak, such as the aforementioned Angolan Civil War, as American and Soviet tensions wound down, China filled the vacuum of foreign intervention via investments and 'no string attached' aid projects (Edoho 2011, 108). The Chinese state and its corporations explicitly prefer to build relationships with resource-rich African countries over those without a prominent resource industry to extract wealth from Africa's most profitable sectors.

Considering this, oil is the primary, although not exclusive, field of Chinese investment (Edoho 2011, 115). After the American oil tycoon Chevron abandoned oil fracking projects in Sudan in 1984, the Sudanese government invited the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) to oversee oil extraction projects (Tafotie and Idahosa 2016, 453-54). This relationship led to the explosion of oil-based investment relationships between African states and China. Partnering with three of the continent's top oil producers, between 2000 and 2013, China invested $10 billion in Sudan, $12 billion in Angola and $9 billion in Nigeria (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 328). This has fostered an asymmetrical relationship between China as a rising superpower and these nations, where China's economic interests have been cultivated. Yet, the aid projects it has supplied to these countries in exchange do not allow them to develop effectively. In practice, it keeps them dependent on Chinese markets (Edoho 2011, 108).

However, strong Sino-African trade relationships undermine the United States' potential to fasten these resource-rich countries to their market. This obviously creates tension, prompting the funding of proxy wars. The Second Sudanese Civil War eloquently displays this. To weaken the power of the Sudanese regime in Khartoum that allied with China in the early 2000s, the United States funded rebel groups of the South Sudanese separatist movement, training and arming troops in the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (Tafotie and Idahosa 2016, 454). This strategy echoes their Cold War tendency to meddle in foreign conflicts for personal interests. Nevertheless, China has maintained a firm grasp of Sudan's oil industry, importing up to 65 to 80% of daily production (Tafotie and Idahosa 2016, 454). By creating heavy debt burdens for African governments, China can leverage this power to place political pressure on leaders to align with its foreign

policy agenda (Madeira 2020, 4). This presents an additional threat to American and Russian pursuits in the region. Even so, China has disregarded the politics, human rights abuses, and environmental degradation its investment brings to its partnered countries solely in pursuit of economic dominance. Therefore, resource-rich countries are most susceptible to foreign meddling as the global superpowers continue to fight for primacy.

Russia's Economic Stimulation

Similarly, Russia's foreign relations in Africa also centre around economic ascendency. Russia, in the same vein as China and the United States, views Africa as a "new frontier of political and economic opportunity" (Schmidt 2018, 47). However, Russia is advancing their economic interests to maintain pace with the other superpowers, as it is unfeasible for them to surpass either the Chinese or American markets to become the world's leading economy. Instead, Russia is strengthening its neglected ties with Africa to compensate for its tightening economy. The 2014 Annexation of Crimea, coupled with the increasingly devastating invasion of Ukraine in 2022, has incurred the wrath of international markets, launching a series of sanctions against Russia (Fox 2021, 2; Kusa 2022, 9). In addition, the stiffening of global markets, capital flight and decrease in foreign investments in recent years has also tightened the Russian economy, heightening economic pressure on the nation (Azizi 2019, 92). While Moscow also has ties in the oil and mineral industries in Africa, particularly in Angola and South Africa, their primary mechanism of influence on the continent is arms deals (Matusevich 2019, 36).

By selling weapons to African states, Russia has the dual benefit of compensating for restricted income given their current geopolitical circumstances and incorporating fragile states into their orbit of influence (Azizi 2019, 96-97). This has been the main vein of Russia's strategy in the new shifting multipolar era. In North Africa during the Arab Spring, the 2011 fall of Gaddafi's regime in Libya dissolved a $4 billion arms deal Russia was sowing with Tripoli (Azizi 2019, 97). Given the heavy investment Russia had already placed in the country through various infrastructure projects, amounting to approximately tens of billions of dollars by this point, Russia pivoted its support to Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar's armed forces (Azizi 2019, 96-97; Uniacke 2022). Hafter's alliance maintained their influence in the region while perpetuating the current conflicts Libya is embroiled in.

Moreover, Russia makes up just under 30% of weapons exports in sub-Saharan Africa and has secured significant arms deals with Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda since 2010 (Whitaker and Clark 2018, 345). There is the trend that many of these countries suffer from weak political stability, corrupt government and lax constraints on government power (World Justice Project 2022). Accordingly, Russia's interference exhibits that weak states render their nations disproportionately susceptible to foreign intervention. As a result, Russia, China and the United States remain Africa's largest weapons suppliers, with Russian exporters dominating the scene (Neethling 2020, 10). The hegemon accounts for a staggering 80% of Algeria's weapons imports and has tied numerous other countries to itself through this method of trade (Azizi 2019, 90). Naturally, this incentivizes Russia to foster animosities within the continent to maintain this lucrative market. Some of these conflicts threaten American and Chinese economic interests, which may evolve into proxy warfare to maintain their regional influence and dominance in their respective industries. Furthermore, Russia's current isolation on the world stage is prompting the power to strengthen ties with their allied states in Africa (Schifrin 2022). Although Russia does not have the economic capabilities to viably compete with China and the United States in terms of economic supremacy, the sale of arms allows it to nurture its economic strength in an effort to maintain its relative competitiveness as a global power.

The United States' Fight to Maintain Unipolarity

Comparatively, the United States is uniquely situated against the other superpowers as it possesses an unparalleled decades-long history of investment in Africa and the economic might to invest in numerous industries rivalling the other powers. The Obama administration's view of China as "both an adversary, but also a potential partner" has been overridden by the Trump presidency's position that the other hegemon's investments are a threat to American economic primacy (Sachs 2019, 33, 37). As such, the United States' policy development has been largely reactive to counter Chinese and Russian initiatives while simultaneously protecting their interests on the continent through a policy of containment (Carr 2020).

In the same vein as China and Russia, the United States is deeply entwined with natural resource industries and arms deals in African nations. Notably, access to cobalt mines is a hotbed of power struggle between the United States and China. Africa possesses an estimated 53% of known cobalt reserves in the world, with 3.6 million tons solely in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), making the country the host of over half of global supplies (Edoho 2011, 113; Niarchos 2021). Cobalt is an integral material necessary for making battery components in electric vehicles. Considering this, China Molybdenum Company Limited bought out American mining giant Freeport-McMoRan in late 2020, acquiring possession of numerous cobalt sites across the DRC (Searcey et al. 2021). This new acquisition has tied American automakers, including Ford, General Motors and Tesla, to Chinese-owned mines, not only increasing China's influence in the region but also linking American companies to their global competitor (Searcey et al. 2021). Despite efforts to develop away from this extractive material to discourage reliance on Chinese industries, cobalt is still the primary resource for these batteries in many American-made vehicles (Niarchos 2021).

The Biden administration has warned against Chinese corporations' dominance in the industry, depicted as detrimental to American interests (Searcey et al. 2021). However, China maintains its ambitious goal to dominate Africa's mining and metal market (Eno and Eno 2014, 28). Given the United States' strong

incentive to repossess access to cobalt mines, this tension may encourage some leveraging of their military influence and support for outlaw rebels in the region to regain dominance in the industry. As Eno and Eno contend, should the United States continue to be pushed out of mineral markets in African nations, an escalation to proxy armed conflicts "will be irrevocable" (2014, 28). Given America's lengthy reputation of intervening in foreign affairs for its gain, this avenue is not unforeseeable. Therefore, the United States' economic interests will likely manifest into war by proxy should their access to resources continue to be curtailed.

Conclusion

The shifting multipolar order of Sino-Russo-American tensions leeches into African nations to play out these rivalries. However, given that economic enterprise is a key factor in the maintenance and exercise of power in the modern era, a Marxist lens best explains the motivations behind ensuing proxy wars on the continent. Therefore, weak African nations endowed with natural resources are disproportionately susceptible to this form of foreign interference. In turn, this tips the regional balance of power towards these superpowers. This orientation to soft power tactics could easily devolve into more concrete forms of confrontation (Neethling 2020, 15). China, Russia, and the United States' lacklustre concern for human rights abuses or the predatory nature of their dynamic with African countries exhibits that evolution to armed conflict is not inconceivable (De Maio 2014, 37). Eager to expand their sphere of influence through economic dominance and capture as many resources into their camp without direct military involvement, proxy warfare appears to be an inevitability.

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Lessons from Montréal: Creating MNC Support for Environmental Regulations

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Edited by Sophia Khiavi and Zach Brousseau

ABSTRACT

The 1986 Montréal Protocol was an unprecedented success in the United Nations campaign to tackle climate change. The Protocol was the first piece of UN legislation to achieve universal ratification and successfully stopped the deterioration of the ozone layer. This paper analyzes how two key factors - consumer action and a narrow legislative focus - allowed for the Protocol to successfully regulate multi- national corporations at a global level. Further, the paper discusses the failures of the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Accords when considering the capacity in which the protocols regulate corporations and induce significant environmental change, and last, provides recommendations for future UN climate negotiators.

Introduction

In 1974, a landmark scientific study linked Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), a chemical predominantly used in aerosols - but also air-conditioning and refrigeration, among other industries - to ozone layer depletion (Falkner 2005). Twelve years later, negotiations began on what would become the first treaty in the history of the United Nations to achieve universal ratification, being signed by all member and observer countries (EPA 2020). Several factors contributed to the success of the Montréal Protocol; however, none were more powerful than the following two: the narrow scope of the Protocol and the power of the consumer. These two factors propelled a series of events and reactions that resulted in a wave of legislation which forced multinational corporations (MNCs) to adapt to international environmental regulation. Through a years-long process of negotiations, the international community created a multilateral framework that neatly and expeditiously regulated the global production, marketing, and sale of chemicals that directly contributed to ozone layer deterioration. Since the implementation of the Protocol, no other agreement has come close to the same multilateral consensus nor the same level of MNC regulation.

By analyzing the Montréal Protocol as a case study, this paper identifies the key factors that dictate the effectiveness of international environmental regulation and argues that incentives alone cannot generate MNC support for international environmental regulations; rather, MNCs must be pressured into accepting regulation. Furthermore, this paper will evaluate other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Accords, based on their ability to regulate MNCs and will then provide a series of suggestions that UN negotiators should utilize in future efforts to create real, impactful environmental change.

Key Factor: The Power of the Consumer

The consumer response to CFCs can be broken down into two clear distinctions: the American consumer response and the European consumer response, or rather, lack thereof. American consumers had such instant reactions to the revelation that CFCs were harmful to the environment that, by 1975, some chemical producers needed to reduce their CFC production by 40% due to a lack of demand (Greenhouse 1975). By 1977, US demand for aerosol products such as hair spray, the primary carriers of CFCs, in the United States had fallen 66% from pre-1974 highs (Benedick 1991). US media played a significant role in emphasizing the issue: ozone deterioration received prominent coverage in prominent magazines such as Times and Sports Illustrated; news media closely followed the ozone story and the implications it would have on the planet and human health. Environmental activists played a significant role in sounding the alarm by publishing studies, holding press conferences, funding research, and even suing the US EPA to compel stronger CFC regulations (ibid). This strong consumer response resulted in an equally powerful legislative response: in 1977, Oregon became the first state to ban aerosols that used CFCs, while 13 other states had introduced legislation to ban, restrict, or research the effects of CFCs. By 1978, the US implemented a sweeping federal ban on all aerosol products that used CFCs, becoming the first country in the world to do so, followed by Canada and Norway (EPA 2016). In short, American consumers were keenly aware of the specific threat that CFCs posed and used their knowledge to avoid CFC products, as well as to lobby domestic legislators into regulating CFCs.

Meanwhile, preoccupied with environmental threats of acid rain, chemical spills, and the fallout of the Chernobyl incident, the ozone issue held less importance in the European consumer's mind. Aerosol sales declined in the 1970s; however, they held up formidably compared to the significant fall of US sales. Lack of activism within the European scientific and environmentalist communities was the main reason for the dampened consumer response to CFCs. While NASA led the charge in researching ozone depletion in the US, Europe had no comparable centralized organization, meaning that most scientific research on the issue came from America. Furthermore, activist efforts in the US were so strong that government officials encouraged American environmental groups to motivate their European equivalents, who had little to no influence on European consumers at the time (Benedick 1991). In line with the weak consumer reaction, the legislatures of the European Community (EC), the economic precursor organization to the European Union, did little to counteract CFCs. In 1980, after years of contentious debate, the EC decided on a mandated 30% cut of aerosol use from 1976 levels. This decision was widely criticized for two reasons: firstly, scholars characterized the move as a mere effort to react to American pressure;8 secondly, aerosol use had already fallen 28% from 1976 levels, indicating that the 30% target was largely identified because it would be easy for European industry to achieve (Jachtenfuchs 1990; Benedick 1991).

The stark differences in legislative response to the ozone issue between the US and Europe can be attributed directly to the power of the consumer. Because of the strong public outcry in the US, anti-CFC legislation was quickly introduced to state and federal legislation. Public outcry took the form of boycotts, as demonstrated in the case of the NGO-led "Stratospheric Defense Initiative," which took aim at CFCs in food packaging and successfully pressured McDonalds into cutting CFCs out from all packaging. In contrast, the lack of response by consumers in the EC resulted in a respective lack of legislative response. Richard Benedick, the chief Montréal Protocol negotiator on behalf of the American government, writes in his Ozone Diplomacy, "educating and mobilizing public opinion are essential to generate pressure on hesitant governments and private companies" (Benedick 1991). In short, a strong US consumer response to CFCs created an equally powerful legislative response and, eventually, led to the US becoming the main proponent of the strong regulations that the Montréal Protocol created. In contrast, the weak EC consumer response led to weak regulation of CFCs and eventually led to the EC being a laggard in CFC legislation compared to the US.

Key Factor: Narrow Focus

Negotiators of the Montréal Protocol un-

derstood that this singular piece of legislation would not wholly combat climate change; rather, they believed it was one effective solution that would, as a whole, lessen the effects of climate change. Pushed through the UN with the US as its main proponent, the Montréal Protocol specifically targeted CFC chemicals, which were manufactured by a handful of chemicals manufacturers, such as Du Pont, French Atochem, and British Imperial Chemicals (Benedick 1991). These chemicals were easily identifiable in consumer products, meaning that consumers could recognize and boycott products that contained CFCs, as previously discussed.

In contrast to the narrow scope used to identify and expose culprits at the Montréal Protocol, both the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Accords attempt to broadly tackle climate change through a variety of unspecific goals, such as general greenhouse gas emissions targets that allow each state sole input on how to reach those goals (Falkner 2005). That is, both Kyoto and Paris have little to no guidance on what specific industries or companies should be focused on in order to reach the agreements' climate goals.

This broad-scope approach results in less pressure on specific industries, companies, and other significant emitters which would otherwise be targeted as stakeholders that must reduce their emissions. This creates two significant issues that did not hamper Montréal: first, by not identifying specific industries as key emitters, consumers cannot enact the same level of boycotts and reaction that spotlighted the CFC industry as a key emitter (EPA 2020). Secondly, having to accommodate so many possible emitters so many governmental, environmental, industry, or other stakeholders, Kyoto and Paris are beset by broad, unactionable language. This broad language inevitably leads to inter-state disputes, disagreements, and, eventually, a loss of support. This is the case of the Kyoto Protocol, which to this day is not ratified by China nor the US, two major emitters that Kyoto should be targeting for the implementation of its goals (NOAA 2023).

The Industry Reaction

While the CFC industry was estimated to be worth US$3 billion in 1986 (approximately US$8 billion in 2023), chemical industries on each side of the Atlantic held differing beliefs on the need for international regulation. Although no industry player truly supported or sought regulation by any means, DuPont and other US companies were overwhelmed with the strong public and legislative support for CFC regulation and, thus, were eventually more open to it than their European counterparts. DuPont, the largest CFC producer in the world at the time, declared in 1975 that restrictions on CFCs "would cause tremendous economic dislocation" and began to research ozone depletion while launching strong lobbying efforts against CFC regulation (Schuyler 2003; Greenhouse 1975). Meanwhile, EC companies began their campaigns against regulation, successfully lobbying the EC Commission to be sympathetic to arguments that controls on aerosols and other CFC-using products would impose significant hardships on the industry. European CFC-producing MNCs argued that, due to existing overcapacities and the supposedly large capital requirements that would be required to overhaul the existing chemical process, tens of thousands of jobs would be jeopardized if the EC had enacted a CFC ban similar to those enacted in the U.S (Benedick 1991).

US companies became more open to regulation when several states began enacting their own CFC regulation legislation. DuPont and other companies recognized that implementing uniform, federal-level regulations would be less costly and complicated than having to navigate a patchwork of state legislation. Meanwhile, with light consumer pressure on legislatures, European CFC producers did not have to face a similar situation. This follows the theory that MNCs are financially incentivized to operate within and support national or supranational regulatory domains when faced with having to navigate the patchwork of domestic regulation (Levy and Prakash 2002). As the evidence against CFCs mounted, American companies grew more aware of the inevitability that international regulation was coming: on the eve of the Montréal Protocol negotiations, 500 US companies, including DuPont, released a statement that multilaterally recognized the environmental threats that CFCs posed, and for the first time, indicated support for ending the use of CFCs (Benedick 1991). This was a significant shift in industry stance – not only did it mark a transatlantic divide between US and EC industries, but it also marked, for the first time, MNCs recognizing that environmental regulation in some form was not only inevitable but necessary (ibid).

Once again, the power of the consumer response, enabled by the narrow focus of the Protocol, is seen to have played a crucial role in forcing MNCs to accept regulation. The strong US consumer and legislative response pressured US MNCs into accepting legislation, while EC MNCs, facing little to no domestic pressures, remained unilaterally anti-regulation.

The Incentive Argument

To incentivize MNCs, the Montréal Protocol created the Multilateral Fund, which offered to fund CFC-divestment projects in developing countries. This has created projects like the UNDP-brokered partnership among the governments of Japan, Indonesia, and the Japanese CFC industry (UNDP 2012). However, incentives were never intended to be the main lever for creating change.

In comparison, Kyoto and Paris have created significantly more enticing investment opportunities for states and MNCs than Montréal: Kyoto pioneered the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the "first global, environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind, providing a standardized emissions offset instrument, CERs" (UNFCCC 2023). In short, this mechanism provides ways for industrialized countries to invest in greenhouse gas emissions reduction projects in developing countries and use these investments to count towards the industrialized country's emission targets. Paris further developed CDMs by expanding on international carbon markets and providing a framework to develop carbon markets in developing countries (Leva and Vaughan 2021). The results of the CDM initiative have been mas-

sive: as of September 2021, the total capital investment by CDM projects was US$162 Billion; in comparison, the lifetime size of Montréal's Multilateral Fund totalled just $4.4 billion in 2023 (Lo and Cong 2022; Multilateral Fund 2023). While the CDM market is thriving and generating profits for MNCs, only 7 of the 32 countries that make up 80% of global emissions are on target to meet their Paris Accord goals as of 2018. In other words, incentives alone, no matter how impressive on paper, have not been able to create meaningful emissions changes when there is no significant regulatory pressure. Thus, Montréal's regulatory approach must be considered a more effective alternative.

Scholars have pointed to other reasons why Kyoto and Paris have not been effective: most importantly, the lack of ability that the UN has to enforce its agreements and the "free-rider" problem (Barrett 2003). Considering the lack of progress made by Kyoto and Paris to meet meaningful emissions targets and the lack of industry-specific language, it is argued that they have not effectively created MNC participation or regulation compared to the Montréal Protocol.

Lessons for Future Negotiations

As thoroughly discussed, Montréal was able to force MNCs into cooperation by utilizing strong public pressure, which in turn spurred strong legislative pressure. Paris and Kyoto both seek to solve climate change by setting emissions targets, decided by each state, without any focus on individual industries, companies, or other major emissions creators. This broad-stroke practice has failed to generate significant results in the fight against climate change, so future negotiation tactics must change. In having evaluated the success of the Montréal Protocol, states must recognize that regulating MNCs by focusing on specific industries is necessary in order to create effective multilateral agreements. Thus, to conclude this paper, recommendations for future MNC regulation will be detailed by recognizing the successes of Montréal and the failures of Kyoto and Paris.

1. Consumers must play an active role in pressuring MNCs.

Corporations have not shown an ability to proactively change harmful, profitable practices. Thus, consumers must actively pressure MNCs with concerted efforts to harm corporate profits and reputations. As seen with the events leading up to the Montréal Protocol, real changes in consumer preferences will lead to legislative change, whether it be on a domestic or international level. Governments must play an active role in educating their citizens on the drastic effects climate change will have on the world. A UNESCO study found that only 53% of national curricula in the world have a reference to climate change; 40% of US teachers who educate about climate change do so inaccurately (UNESCO 2012).

2. Climate Change cannot, and will not, be solved by one treaty.

The aspirations of Kyoto Paris are admirable and mighty, yet they lack pragmatism and realism. Instead of focusing on creating general climate targets, such as the 1.5-degree temperature increase target set in the Paris Accords, future treaties must regulate industries individually and, therefore, the MNCs that operate within them. This systematic approach will ensure that each industry is regulated with nuance and careful consideration. Furthermore, industries must be treated in accordance with their emissions production: concentrating on the most important energy-using industries, such as transportation and heating, would be the most pragmatic and efficient way of tackling the largely energy-intensive issue that greenhouse gas emissions are (Benedick 1991).

3. Investment is crucial.

By no means does this paper seek to discredit the importance of investment and incentives in the transition to more sustainable practices. In fact, investment partially enabled the successes of the Montréal Protocol: the technology available at the time of the Montréal Protocol could not substitute the chemicals industry's widespread use of CFCs (Benedick 1991). In anticipation of this, the Protocol encouraged investment. It provided funds for MNCs to develop better technology to ease the transition away from CFCs, a strategy that will successfully close the hole in the ozone layer this century.

Furthermore, the CDM markets that Kyoto created and Paris furthered are ingenious and crucial in encouraging more sustainable practices. The climate crisis will not be solved without investment in technology; however, solely focusing on investment will not meaningfully change industry practices.

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Conclusion

The Montréal Protocol is the only instance where the international community came together to successfully regulate multinational corporations for environmental purposes. The Protocol was not successful because of its ability to incentivize MNCs; rather, it was successful because of the overwhelming support for regulation, which forced MNCs to seek new market opportunities and profitable alternatives in line with changing consumer priorities. The Protocol came about because it focused on a specific issue within the broader scope of climate change, allowing consumers to boycott specific products and motivate their domestic governments to act on the direct threat of CFCs rather than climate change as a whole. MNCs from those targeted industries were then forced to recognize consumer and legislative pressure for regulation, and ultimately, transition to more sustainable practices.

Neither the Kyoto Protocol nor the Paris Accords were able to achieve results similar to those in Montréal because of one main factor: they sought to solve a massive issue with too few strokes of the pen, which diminishes the ability of consumers to press specific industries and causes general inefficiencies in the negotiating process (Benedick 1991). Negotiators of future climate agreements must recognize why Montréal worked and choose to focus their efforts industry by industry, problem by problem, making it clear that the international community will eventually regulate all industries that contribute to climate change. MNCs have not shown the propensity, nor the willingness, to proactively change unsustainable business

practices without consumer or legislative pressure. Yet, the Montréal Protocol has shown the propensity for a multinational climate agreement to force tremendous change, even on this most unmoving party, the MNC.

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