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Volume XIII: Issue I Flux: International Relations Review

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Flux operates out of Montréal, located on the traditional territory of the Kanien'keha:ka, a place which has long served as a site of meeting and exchange amongst nations. The Kanien'ke-ha:ka are the keepers of the Eastern Door of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. In writing about political science and international relations we strive to incorporate diverse voices and bear in mind the forces, including (neo) colonialism, which have shaped the way we understand international relations. We encourage all readers to inform themselves on and actively resist, in the diverse forms that resistance can take, (neo) colonialism in Canada and abroad.

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FOREWORD

Welcome to the first issue of Flux: International Relations Review Volume 13! The largest issue Flux has ever produced, it was only made possible by the incredible dedication of our writers, editors, reviewers, designers and support staff.

Volume XIII, Issue I presents ten original articles written by undergraduates from universities across North America. The articles cover a wide range of topics within Flux's broad global affairs theme, and stem from a variety of academic disciplines: political science, international relations, history, international development studies, and art history. First, Caroline Smutny evaluates modern policing and 'pacification' programs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in "Death and Democracy in a Divided City: Structural Racism and Police 'Pacification' in 21st century Rio de Janeiro". Then, Kiran Basra explores what factors cause peacekeeping operations on the African continent to succeed or fail in "The Role of External Assistance and Neutral Leadership in Successful African Union Peacekeeping Initiatives: An Investigation of Burundi and Somalia". From there, Natalie Pennisi takes us back to Italy in the fallout of WWI, examining how the 1919 Fiume Crisis birthed a new political resentment which evolved into Benito Mussolini's fascism in "On the Road to Italian Fascism: The Fiume Affair and Global Politics". Next, David Mickelson argues that the 1973 Arab-Israeli War allowed America to develop dual patronage over both Israel and Egypt amid waning Soviet influence in the Middle East in "Neutral Swaggering: American Involvement in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War". After that, Riyana Karim-Hajiani examines the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention without the unanimous approval of the UN Security Council, as seen in NATO's 1999 Kosovo intervention, in "Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics". Our first Ivy League contributor, Columbia undergraduate Matthew Ruppert surveys grassroots resistance to militarization through street art in Baghdad, Rio de Janeiro, and Minneapolis in "Artistic Resistance: A Comparative Perspective of Protest Art in Highly Militarized Societies". Our first French-language article, Thibault Jacquemont examine le pivot potentiel du Japon du pacifisme d'après-guerre à la remilitarisation en "Nouvelle dynamique militaire du Japon et conséquences sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est". Next, Benjamin Clark covers how post-WWII East Asian states—China, the Koreas, and Japan—used revisionist history to redefine national identity in "Revisionist Historiography as a Tool for State-Building in 20th Century East Asia". Then, Wilson Symons highlights how the Non-Aligned powers of the 1955 Bandung Conference used their coalition as an instrument of anti-colonialism in "The 'Third World's' Anticolonial Worldmaking Project". Finally, Jessica Wang helps us digest the issues covered in this Issue with her search for an 'Archimedian point' (a common truth) in international relations theory in "International Relations' Theoretical Cycles: The Search for an Archimedean Point".

This issue reflects our ambition to expand Flux's outreach to new disciplines, new universities, new languages, and new media—check out the first-ever Flux Podcast at: https://anchor.fm/flux-international-.

I would like to thank our editors and writers for their commitment to producing the best version of their craft. Special thanks also go to our talented graphic designers and our layout editor, Wendy Lin, who worked tirelessly to put this project together.

Still a relatively young journal, I am proud to say that the efforts of the Flux team this Fall 2022 semester have resulted in significant growth and interest in the journal. I look forward to continuing this venture with you as we now turn to Issue II. Thank you for reading and enjoy!

Best,
Graydon Davidson
Editor-in-Chief of Flux: International Relations Review 2022-2023.

Death & Democracy in a Divided City: Structural Racism & Police 'Pacification' in 21st Century Rio de Janeiro

Caroline Smutny, McGill University

Edited by Justin Weir and Tito Almeida

ABSTRACT

Beginning in 2008, the government of Rio de Janeiro introduced Pacifying Police Units (Unidades de Policia Pacificadora, or 'UPPs') in dozens of the city's favelas, the disproportionately non-white slums that house Rio's most impoverished residents. This policy of state intervention was meant to bring lasting peace, social development, and rule of law to communities long plagued by state neglect, social exclusion, and high rates of drug-related violence and police brutality. This paper evaluates Rio's pacification program from a post-colonial perspective, concluding that UPPs not only failed to meet their progressive objectives but upheld entrenched dynamics of structural violence inherited from Brazil's early foundations as a slave colony. By tracing Brazilian authorities' long history of repressing the 'insurgent' racial 'other' under the guise of 'pacification,' this paper argues that UPPs represent the recovery of an internal colonization model used to consolidate state control over territories and populations for purposes of capital growth. This analysis has significant implications for our understanding of racism and inequality in Brazil: the structural and normative legacies of Portuguese settler-colonialism remain embedded in Brazil's supposedly race-neutral democracy, where security forces still criminalize the Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous lower-class in order to promote a neoliberal capitalist agenda.

Introduction

Once the largest slave colony in the Americas, Brazil today remains home to the largest Afro-descendant population in the Western hemisphere. Given its seemingly smooth trajectory from slave society to proud multi-racial nation, Brazil was traditionally characterized as a positive model of post-racial citizenship in Brazilian and North American scholarship. The Brazilian state is viewed as having transcended the race-based stratification, prejudice, and violence that has long plagued its Northern counterpart, the United States (Telles 2006). The popularity of this narrative in Brazil masks a far more complicated reality of insidious structural violence, preventing a much-needed societal reckoning over the country's long hidden race problem. Since the early 20th century, the paradox of Brazilian race relations has been the harmonious image of "racial democracy" superimposed over a stark reality of social apartheid (Telles 2006, 24). The myth of racial inclusivity has been so successfully internalized in the Brazilian psyche that highly visible racial disparities remain politically invisible even in a formally democratic context, preserving deep-seated patterns of racialized violence that continue to shape the modern state's public security policy (Telles 2006). Two hundred years after decolonization and around forty years after democratization, the basic dimensions of the colonial power matrix endure in 21st-century Brazil. A nation initially built on the imperial exploitation of Indigenous and African slave labour has matured into a neoliberal police state that continues to marginalize and brutalize its predominantly Afro-descendant underclass to serve elite capital interests.

In few places are these dynamics more salient than in the 'divided city' of Rio de Janeiro, a patchwork of extreme intersectional inequality where police brutality is a function of racial and socioeconomic status. Afro-Brazilians are almost three times more likely to be killed by Rio's notoriously deadly Military Police, and the overwhelming majority of criminal and police violence is confined to the hundreds of Black-majority *favelas*, low-income shantytowns, woven into the fabric of the "formal city" (Poets 2015, 184). These historical asymmetries hardened over the past four decades in the context of the 'War on Drugs,' a US-led international campaign to combat the growing illegal drug trade through counter-insurgency tactics. Rio's emergence as a major site of narcotics trafficking in the 1980s transformed the city's slums into battlegrounds between hyper-militarized state and non-state actors, with devastating consequences for the inhabitants of these neighborhoods (Larkins, 2015). To cope with this escalating security crisis, the state's introduction of UPPs — *Unidades de Policia Pacificadora*, or Pacifying Police Units — was promoted as a radical break from past police practice. First implemented in 2008, then widely deployed in scores of *favelas* prior to Rio's hosting of two major global sporting events (the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics), UPPs aimed to expel drug traffickers, establish a permanent community-oriented police presence, and bring rule of law and social development to the city's most marginalized spaces and residents (Poets 2015).

This paper argues that contrary to the paci-

fication program's inclusionary objectives and the high expectations it generated, UPPs merely gave new logic to old security models, legitimizing the violent control of post-colonial 'others' in order to promote the neoliberal order rather than protect and integrate its most vulnerable citizens. The perpetuation of racialized police governance has significant implications for our understanding of how colonial legacies shape the parameters of democratic citizenship in Brazil, where the descendants of those subjugated by the colonial order remain otherized and victimized by the modern state despite their formal inclusion under the law.

Racial Violence in Colonial Brazil

Many Brazilian scholars have attempted to align Brazil's colonial past with the sanitized portrait of "racial harmony" central to the nation's modern self-image. In truth, however, its centuries-long colonial period was rife with the genocide, oppression, and enslavement of Indigenous peoples and millions of imported Africans (Telles 2006; Langfur 2018). From when the Portuguese first landed on Brazilian shores in 1500, slavery was at the heart of the colonial enterprise. The colonial order was designed to maximize resource extraction and capital accumulation for imperial enrichment, and racialized violence was integral to consolidating Portuguese territorial sovereignty and securing access to a cheap, submissive labour force (Telles 2006; Neocleous 2013). Brazil's economic ascendance was built on the backs of the enslaved: Portuguese settlers' rabid consumption of slave labour fed the colony's massive export economy, anchored in labour-intensive sugar cultivation. The grim calculus of cost-effective production meant that slave turnover was incredibly high on Brazilian plantations; it was common practice to work slaves to death and replace them with cheap new arrivals, accounting for Brazil's intake of almost half of the approximately twelve million slaves brought to the 'New World' over 350 years (Langfur 2018).

Population control was a perpetual concern in a context where dark-skinned slaves quickly outnumbered white elites. The constant specter of rebellion encouraged authorities to treat the entire under-class as a potential security threat, and this "securitization" of racial identity and poverty would become — and remain — central to the stability of the Brazilian regime. The foundations of Brazil's modern security apparatus and rule of law were shaped by the early orientation of these institutions to protect European-descendant elites and contain the insurgent racial 'other' (Darke & Khan 2021). Achillé Mbembe's concept of "necropolitical" governance best captures this framework of colonial rule, which hinged on the state's ability to deploy racism in order to sustain and reproduce an economic system based on extreme exploitation (Mbembe 2019, 82). Mbembe defines "necropower" as the sovereign capacity to dictate which groups are worthy of state protection and which are designated as killable (Mbembe 2019, 78). The sociopolitical order normalizes the disposability of targeted populations by 'otherizing' them in the cultural imaginary, and subjecting them to dehumanizing living conditions indicative of their 'exceptional' status. Where terror, deprivation, and confine-

ment become routine for whole classes of people deemed enemies of the state, "nobody bears even the slightest feelings of responsibility or justice toward this sort of life or, rather, death" (Mbembe 2019, 38). Dominance over Brazil's massive slave population was maintained through a culture of normalized death, institutionalized violence, chronic vulnerability, and the repression of kinship communities (Larkins 2015). In Rio, the first formal police force — the Royal Guard — was established in 1809 with the primary aim of policing the city's majority Black population and preventing a slave uprising, and historical records register no arrests of any whites for the first several decades of its existence (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

'Pacification' was central to the logic of colonial necropolitics and was prominent in the administrative, political, and security vocabulary of colonial authorities (Oliveira 2014). The term first emerged to justify the brutal treatment of Indigenous populations resisting Portuguese invasion, and the concept reflected the Catholic Church's central role in defining the parameters governing the permissible use of force (Langfur 2018). Jesuit missionary zeal, racial prejudices, and imperial ambitions together created a powerful rationale for colonization, recasting the Portuguese advance as a divinely ordained 'civilizing mission' (Oliveira 2014). Reimagined as pacification, the slaughter and enslavement necessary for empire-building became righteous and edifying, and the circular reasoning of the 'civilizing' imperative made its 'mission' never-ending. Because poor material conditions and ethnocultural differences were considered evidence of Indigenous and

African depravity, and because the nature of subjugation preserved these markers of inferiority, the endless need to 'pacify' translated into a self-sustaining policy of mass social control (Oliveira 2014). Over generations, this paternalistic process combined straightforward brute force with religious-based social engineering, in a strategy geared to neutralize internal threats and build a secure foundation for capital accumulation. Portuguese colonizers developed a race-based "coercive pedagogy" that sanctioned white violence as a tool used to teach "morally weak" non-whites to submit to the colonial order, justifying the elimination and policing of "savage" populations viewed as an integral workforce but inherently unruly and suspect (Langfur 2018).

Beginning with the submission of the Tupinambá tribe in the 1550s, "pacification" campaigns were the primary mode of conquest (Oliveira 2014, 131). In a pattern reproduced across the frontier, colonizers invaded and occupied Indigenous settlements, then 'domesticated' the inhabitants through a 'constructive' process of violent repression, political-economic penetration, and Catholic cultural "tutelage" (Oliveira 2014, 128). The establishment of militarized "guardianship" and economic development was framed in progressive terms (Oliveira 2014, 130), but these 'pacifying' practices were designed to permanently appropriate Indigenous land, monopolize colonial markets, and subordinate native populations. Surviving Indigenous peoples were often simply relocated to more peripheral Catholic missions, where colonists requisitioned their labour (Oliveira 2014). Pacification policies

became more maintenance-oriented over time, but the sporadic rise of Indigenous and African insurgent communities kept the external colonization paradigm alive through the 19th century. Invoking notions of 'just war' and 'law and order,' imperial authorities treated African and Indigenous people who resisted or undermined Portuguese control as threats to "peace and civil conformity," justifying the "defensive" repression of these communities (Darke & Khan 2021, 728).

From Slavery to the War on Drugs: Independence, Modernization, and Democratization

Brazil never faced a revolutionary restructuring of the social status quo. Neither Brazilian independence in 1822, nor the abolition of slavery in 1888 fundamentally transformed the socioeconomic and racial structure of the Portuguese colonial system, oriented around the pillars of large landholding, a racialized labour hierarchy, and global capitalism (Darke & Khan 2021; Telles 2006). Decolonization was a smooth process of rearticulating colonial power dynamics on new grounds, and the gradual transition from slavery was an elite-sanctioned development based more on the shifting economic landscape than grassroots pressure. Neither involved the violent rupture of the racial hierarchy or a reconfiguration of the existing aristocratic order, and the state implemented no policies to promote the self-sufficiency or integration of former slaves post-abolition (Darke & Khan 2021; Telles 2006). Instead, Brazil's transition to modernity represented a hardening of colonial power structures, led by elites who

recognized that "something needs to change so that everything can remain exactly as it is" (Darke & Khan 2021, 726). Formal slavery was replaced with serf-like economic dependence and criminalization, generating a new basis for Brazil's asymmetric power relations and the selective repression of Indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, and mixed-race populations (Darke & Khan 2021). This social architecture was solidified by national elites who eventually embraced Brazil's long history of miscegenation, accepting legal racial equality and abandoning explicit "whitening" policies (Telles 2006, 28). By proactively eliminating formal racial barriers and rhetorically promoting a multiracial nationalism, the Brazilian state left the colonial racial hierarchy intact while denying the salience of race in social relations or structural inequalities (Telles 2006).

Favelas are a particularly powerful manifestation of the intersectional inequalities inherited from the colonial period. In staggered phases of modernization and urbanization spanning from the late 19th through the 20th century, streams of Afro-Brazilian former slaves and their descendants moved from the rural countryside to industrial city-centers. With few opportunities for upward mobility, these migrant flows led to the mushrooming of squatter settlements on urban peripheries, excluded from basic public services including access to water and sanitation systems (Telles 2006; Poets 2015). Relegated to the lowest rungs on the social and occupational ladder, *favela* residents constitute a substantial informal workforce in the cities they occupy, providing cheap labour for the urban elite while their own humanity is degraded by

the vulnerabilities endemic to extreme poverty, including substandard infrastructure; poor healthcare, nutrition, and education; and high rates of crime (Larkins 2015). Like the nation itself, the physical landscape of modern Rio reflects a society divided along parallel axes of racial identity and socioeconomic status. The affluent majority-white districts of the city exist side-by-side with clusters of majority-Black *favelas* — neighbourhoods viewed since their inception as hindrances to modern urban development and sources of crime, social decay, and recurring public security crises (Salem & Bertelsen 2020; Larkins 2015).

The solution to Rio's "*favela* problem" has traditionally been seen as removal rather than development (Larkins 2015, 7). In the 1940s, populist housing resettlement programs set a precedent of expulsion that paved the way for aggressive *favela* eradication campaigns under Brazil's military regime in the 1960s-1970s (Larkins 2015). *Favelas* can be considered post-colonial formations, representing the enduring symbolic and material divide between "savage" non-white spaces and "civilized" European-descendant spaces (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 86). The state's systematic neglect of these communities perpetuates the poor living conditions, lawlessness, and socio-spatial exclusion of the so-called "dangerous classes," creating a self-fulfilling security crisis that reproduces the necropolitical dynamics of colonial governance (Poets 2015, 184). The precariousness of life at the fringes of society breeds the very social problems that justify the continued marginalization and repressive control of these populations, who are valued as labour pools but otherwise considered burdensome and problematic. In an echo of colonial strategies of population management, the state maintains its free-market economic order by demonizing and policing the victims of extreme inequality — *favela* poverty upholds patterns and perceptions of non-white criminality, which in turn legitimize the police state's targeting of the urban poor in the name of preserving public order (Poets 2015).

The securitization of Rio's *favelas* only became more pronounced following Brazil's transition back to democracy after three decades of military dictatorship, a process which began in the mid-1970s and solidified in 1985. During the military regime, "pacification [was] the dominant concept for targeting so-called "subversives" through counter-insurgency policing" (Müller 2018, 224), and the nation's hyper-militarized police institutions survived the elite-led democratic opening. In Rio in particular, the authoritarian police tactics honed to root out political enemies during the Cold War were superimposed onto the new war against organized crime (Müller 2018). As the democratic state aligned itself with the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1980s, economic austerity policies worsened urban inequalities. Professional drug trafficking organizations embedded themselves in Rio's extensive network of hillside slums, the density of which increased dramatically as the number of residents ballooned to almost a quarter of the city's population (Poets 2015; Larkins 2015). The arrival of the 'War on Drugs' gave new logic to the discursive construction of *favelas* as "enemy territory," and the state's militarized response drew on a long

history of counter-insurgent practices dating back to the colonization of Brazil's hinterlands (Larkins 2015, 9; Poets 2015). Through the turn of the century, *favelas* became open warzones between armed 'narco-state' actors and Rio's Military Police. Consequently, young, Black males were the main victims of soaring rates of urban violence and homicide (Muller 2018; Oliveira 2014).

While estimates suggest that only one to three percent of the roughly 1.5 million who inhabit the city's *favelas* are involved in organized crime, *favelados* remain collectively stigmatized by the state and public alike. The derogatory, colloquial term *favelado* ('slum-dweller') embodies the deep prejudices attached to the criminality of the *favelas* and their residents in the public imagination. Widespread calls for hardline security policies are demonstrative of the enduring cultural tendency to associate poverty with moral deficiency and disciplinary violence with public order (Larkins 2015). The popularity of '*linha dura*' ('hardline') discourses has long justified the extreme lethality of the elite patrol unit formed to combat narco-traffickers, Batalhão de Operações Policais Especiais (BOPE). A direct descendant of the death squads deployed during the dictatorship, BOPE has openly "retained the right to destroy the enemy without risking punishment," and the unit's blatantly inhumane tactics give clear expression to the democratic state's capacity to kill particular groups at its discretion (Larkins 2015, 62). Over roughly three decades, periodic BOPE incursions into trafficker territory failed to dislodge the criminal gangs, and the deadly cycle of irregular warfare only reified the

favelas' status "as the natural dwelling place of violent enemies of state and society" (Larkins 2015, 9).

From *Linha Dura* to Pacification

By the early 2000s, the internationalization of Rio and nationwide democratic advances — notably, the rise of the leftist Worker's Party and election of President Lula de Silva — encouraged a re-evaluation of the iron-fisted approach to managing the *favela* crisis. Political and international momentum favored the development of a more humanitarian "community policing" model, oriented to improve state-society relations and promote a socially inclusive, globally-oriented image of Brazilian modernity consistent with a democratic, world-class city (Müller 2018; Dias Felix & Hilgers 2020). Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were conceptualized as a new public security paradigm at the nexus of "proximity policing" and social development (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 88). Security objectives were to be combined with long-awaited infrastructural projects and provision of public services, all in collaboration with locals. The goal was to liberate Rio's *favelas* from drug traffickers and install a permanent, resident-friendly police presence, followed by the integration of *favela* territories and inhabitants into the city's formal economy and society (Poets 2015). In what appeared to be a repudiation of urban militarism and police impunity, Rio's officials presented the UPP program as a policy oriented to promote "hope and citizenship, (…) symboliz[ing] all the appreciation we have for human life" (Müller 2018, 222). For both domestic and international observers, this

policy marked the promising arrival of democratic security governance, heralding "a new culture of more peaceful policing methods" with the potential to become a "model for the region and the world" (Müller 2018, 222). The state launched the flagship UPP in December of 2008 in the *favela* of *Santa Marta* and institutionalized the program in 2011. Following a handful of publicized successes, UPPs were widely implemented directly prior to Rio's hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics (Saborio 2013). By early 2014, 38 UPPs with 9,543 pacification officers had been installed throughout Rio's *favelas*, reaching ~160 'pacified' communities (Muller 2018).

In practice, the pacification program has been far less of a paradigm-shift than implied. The process of rolling out a UPP begins with a military-esque invasion of BOPE forces to "cleanse" the territory of drug traffickers, after which an official UPP unit takes over community patrolling (Larkins 2015, 68). Contrary to its stated objectives, *favela* pacification has primarily consisted of endless military occupation, never developing into the communitarian, development-oriented public security model that was envisioned. Because the program operates *within* the logic of the 'War on Drugs' rather than challenging it, it draws on the same stigmatized representations of *favela* residents that requires their permanent management or elimination (Poets 2015). With all *favelados* considered potential criminals, UPP officers have prioritized reimposing state authority over "enemy" areas through blanket repression, retaining the same warlike mindset and count-er-insurgency tactics that characterized past police practices (Poets 2015, 185). The revival of 'pacification' as an explicit administrative concept is telling: the UPP program operated as a conquest mission reframed to suit modern sensibilities, consisting of the deployment of state units to seize and tame 'insurgent' non-white territories in the name of preserving liberal democracy (Müller 2018; Oliveira 2014; Salem & Bertelsen 2020). UPPs ultimately reproduce the same security discourse that criminalizes poverty and excludes underclass spaces from the boundaries of normative rule of law (Poets 2015). Within these "zones of indistinction," collateral damage and mass suspension of civil rights are legitimate tactics appropriately calibrated to defend the moral national community against a depraved enemy (Poets 2015, 185). While most UPPs succeeded in temporarily reducing rates of violent crime and homicide, UPP occupation merely constituted a new form of necropolitical governance. "Pacified" *favelas* exist as islands of military authoritarianism in the middle of democratic Rio, where inhabitants live under surveillance in a perpetual "state of exception" (Poets 2015, 189), and order is maintained through routine repression and terror (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

The dynamics of UPP occupation have directly mirrored aspects of the settler-colonial 'civilizing' process, particularly in the combination of violent repression and pseudo-benevolent cultural re-education (Oliveira 2014; Salem & Bertelsen 2020). Just like colonial "guardianship," UPPs have primarily been oriented to promote social control and conformity rather than social welfare and integration

(Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 94). The community development objectives originally meant to accompany the permanent state police presence have been almost entirely absent from the pacification process. The UPP Social, the parallel program responsible for the infrastructural development and public services component of the policy, never fully materialized. As a result, "no significant policies in healthcare, education, or concerning basic needs have followed the implementation of the UPP" (Saborio 2013, 139). Instead, UPP officers have been the main mediators of limited public service provision, turning welfare into an instrument of security policy coercively wielded to "conquer" communities (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 93). Considering their primary goal of maintaining 'peace' and 'public order,' the UPPs' quasi-social role encourages officers to engage in arbitrary cultural policing and ideological surveillance, often animated by their own chauvinistic religious moralism and the assumed immorality of *favela* culture (Salem & Bertelsen 2020; Oliveira 2014). UPP agents have commonly understood their duties to include the "domestication" of residents and defense of traditional hierarchies, turning "uncivilized" *favelados* into "*cidadãos de bem*", 'good citizens', by enforcing a state-sanctioned culture based on respect for authority, Christian conservatism, and heteropatriarchal normativity (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 98). This has often resulted in the repression of 'subversive' Afro-Brazilian cultural expressions and *favela* sociality, neutralizing the organizational capacity of otherwise marginalized citizens. With residents lacking meaningful political outlets, UPP scrutiny cripples the communal solidarity needed for grassroots resistance against police abuse or eviction orders. While unpacified *favelas* have been sites of passionate collective protest when targeted for removal, their pacified counterparts have largely surrendered quietly when facing eviction (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

At root, the pacification experiment has largely served the demands of elite-oriented capitalist growth. UPPs were primarily devised to promote an image of Rio as safe and attractive for foreign investment, as part of a larger entrepreneurial globalization strategy which was jeopardized by the city's high-profile '*favela* problem' (Saborio 2013; Poets 2015). The policy was only developed following the approval of Rio's bids to host two consecutive "mega-events," with the significant international scrutiny and promotional potential that these showcasing opportunities entailed (Saborio 2013, 133). The needs of local communities were at best secondary considerations subordinated to the interests of domestic and foreign capital. Revealingly, *favelas* selected for pacification did not correlate with levels of crime but with proximity to high-profile, wealthy districts ripe for real estate speculation and foreign traffic (Saborio 2013). While some centrally located *favelas* were simply bulldozed for event construction and peripheral neighborhoods were ignored completely, the communities that came under UPP control formed an "urban security belt" surrounding the venues where the World Cup and Olympic Games were held (Saborio 2013, 133). The commercial component of the pacification program was evident in the exploitative marketing of success stories: pac-

ified *favelas* like *Rocinha* were superficially "beautified" and promoted as tourist attractions, commodifying urban poverty for foreign consumption while meaningful improvements in public welfare and service provision were neglected (Larkins 2015, 17). UPP successes have often amounted to militarized gentrification, enabling capital expansion by submission and dispossession. The securitization of *favelas* legitimizes the repression, exploitation, or outright removal of the "inconvenient populations" that inhabit them (Müller 2018, 238). The initial 'shock of peace' sets the stage for a subsequent 'shock of order' — the pacification of a community is followed by market penetration of the *favela* space, seen in the arrival of private service providers and the gradual encroachment of land by property developers (Larkins 2015, 151). This supposed 'integration' of a *favela* into the surrounding city simply entails the latter overtaking the former, in a "formalization" process that reproduces the neoliberal order in zones previously beyond its reach (Poets 2015, 191). Inevitably, this final stage of pacification intolerably increases costs of living for most indigent residents, forcing them to relocate to more peripheral *favelas* and achieving the total recapture of coveted land (Saborio 2013; Poets 2015).

Conclusion: Disjunctive Citizenship in Democratic Brazil

Despite being widely hailed as a progressive innovation in Brazilian policing, UPPs reflected more continuity than change (Dias Felix & Hilgers, 2020). In practice, Rio's pacification program was less oriented towards the social inclusion and democratic empowerment of *favela* residents than towards their coerced submission to a neoliberal state order that confines them to conditions of permanent marginality and insecurity. There are striking parallels between patterns of dehumanization and subjugation of non-white 'savages' in Brazil's colonial past and the otherization and criminalization of their descendants in the present: even under an entirely different political and legal regime, Brazilian society remains dichotomized between 'true Brazilians' deemed worthy of full protections and post-colonial 'others' considered socially expendable at best and threatening at worst (Oliveira 2014; Poets 2015).

The colonial dimensions of the UPP program demonstrate the insidiousness of embedded social norms and power dynamics even in a reform-minded democratic context, a fact which questions the true extent of Brazilian democratization. While Brazil's official history of republican democracy has been one of universal formal membership in the nation-state, Brazilian citizenship remains highly exclusionary in practice. Full citizenship status — and the rights that it entails — operates as an ascriptive category, exercised as the privilege of particular social groups. Disjunctive citizenship is the consequence of disjunctive democratization: formal political liberalization alone will not deliver substantive democratic equality if citizens remain unprotected, devalued, and disenfranchised in the civil sphere (Holston & Caldeira 1998). As a concept, UPPs represented an opportunity for meaningful progressive change, setting a precedent for a community-oriented public security policy that acknowledged the

importance of social services and redefined the role of the police as one of democratic law enforcement rather than arbitrary authority enforcement. In practice, however, they merely demonstrated the tension between democratizing forces and reactionary affirmation of traditional hierarchies, which leaves society stuck in a state of half-baked democracy and stunted reform.

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The Role of External Assistance and Neutral Leadership in Successful African Union Peacekeeping Initiatives: An Investigation of Burundi and Somalia

Kiran Basra, McGill University

Edited by Sophia Khiavi and Gaya Karalasingam

ABSTRACT

Peacekeeping initiatives on the African continent are an important tool in de-escalating conflict and providing humanitarian aid. Despite their utility, some regional peacekeeping initiatives are more effective than others, raising the question: what factors cause an African Union peacekeeping mission to succeed or fail? This paper answers this question by exploring the African Union's Mission in Burundi (AMIB) and in Somalia (AMISOM). In comparing both missions, I find that neutral leadership and an influx of external resources are crucial to ensuring a successful peacekeeping mission in the African Union.

Introduction

Since its creation in 2002, the African Union (AU) has engaged in several peacekeeping missions on the continent with the hope of restoring peace. Despite this goal, African peacekeeping initiatives have not always succeeded in controlling violence. This has raised the question: what factors cause an AU peacekeeping mission to succeed or fail? Considering this question is crucial to illuminate which factors are necessary to include in future initiatives and ensure that the African Union can become more conducive to restoring peace in the region.

To answer this question, it is important to examine two of the AU's most significant peacekeeping initiatives, Burundi and Somalia, which have yielded significantly different outcomes. This paper will argue that the AU's mission in Burundi was successful due to an influx of external resources and South Africa's leadership. Comparatively, the AU's mission in Somalia was unsuccessful due to a severe lack of resources and the biased leadership of Ethiopia. Therefore, neutral African leadership and a sufficient supply of resources are imperative to a successful AU peacekeeping initiative.

This paper will open by exploring the African Union's mission in Burundi (AMIB) and why it was considered a success. It will then argue that the financial and administrative assistance AMIB received from the external states and organizations, in combination with the leadership of Nelson Mandela's South Africa, were key to its success. Next, the paper will evaluate the African Union's mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to demonstrate why it was considered a failure. Then, it will explore how

the lack of financial aid and military troops, coupled with the biased leadership of Ethiopia which advanced its own political agenda under the guise of AMISOM, hindered the mission's success. Finally, the paper will conclude by arguing that a neutral African leader and an adequate supply of resources are crucial for the success of AU peacekeeping initiatives.

Burundi: How South Africa and External Support Allowed AMIB to Succeed

The Burundian Civil War of 1993 to 2005 was rooted in the unequal distribution of state power between the Hutus, who comprise 85% of the population, and the Tutsis, who constitute 14% (Vandeginste 2009). Despite being a significant minority, the Tutsis controlled major institutions in Burundi such as the military and the judiciary. This power imbalance aggravated many Hutus who were weary that state institutions controlled by Tutsis would ignore their interests. In 1993, Melchior Ndadaye became Burundi's first democratically elected Hutu president. Shortly after, Tutsi-extremist army officers launched a coup, assassinating Ndadaye and triggering the outbreak of civil war. Within a year, over 300,000 Burundians died due to violence between the two ethnic groups ("Burundi Profile - Timeline" 2018). By 1996, Tutsi leader Pierre Buyoya staged a coup to seize power, which was viewed unfavourably by Hutus, who saw Buyoya's rule as illegitimate. Despite growing hostility, Buyoya signed the Arusha Accords in 1998, which mandated a country-wide ceasefire. This ceasefire provided the basis for the African Union's deployment of their first peacekeeping mission, the African

Union's mission to Burundi (AMIB), on April 2nd, 2003 (Badmus 2017). AMIB stayed in Burundi for just over a year, concluding its mission on June 1, 2004, with a swift transition of responsibilities to the UN following their leave.

Results

In order to evaluate the success of the AU's peacekeeping mission in Burundi, it is crucial to assess whether the mission fulfilled its mandates. The mandates of AMIB were to "1) oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, 2) support disarmament and demobilisation initiatives and advise on reintegration of combatants, 3) strive towards ensuring favourable conditions for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping mission; and 4) contribute to political and economic stability in Burundi" (Svensson 2008). In addressing the first mandate, AMIB was successful in implementing ceasefire agreements in the Arusha Accords under Chapter III Article 25, which called for the "permanent ceasefire and cessation of hostilities" in Burundi (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 69). This ceasefire agreement was negotiated by the leader of AMIB, South African president, Nelson Mandela. In response to the second mandate, AMIB was able to disarm 228 combatants and find suitable DC areas and Pre-Disarmament Assembly Areas (Badmus 2017). In addressing the third mandate, 95% of Burundi was relatively stable when AMIB ended its mission (Agoagye 2004). As a result, AMIB was able to stabilise Burundi to such an extent that the UN could deploy its own mission (ONUB) in 2004 following AMIB's departure. In completing the

fourth mandate, AMIB was able to politically stabilise the country by providing security for leaders returning from exile which assisted in the subsequent formation of a National Government (Svensson 2008). Furthermore, AMIB was able to complete these mandates in just one year, its efficiency proving a further testament to its success. Due to the efficient completion of AMIB's four mandates, the African Union's peacekeeping initiative in Burundi was ultimately a success.

Causes

Two major factors led to AMIB's success in Burundi. The first was the external assistance, which the mission received from states and organizations. AMIB received significant assistance from the UN including administrative, logistical and technical support, headquarters administration and access to public information (Badmus 2017). AMIB also frequently consulted with international agencies like the EU, UNICEF and the World Bank, specifically with regard to the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programme and in implementing the ceasefire agreement tasks (Badmus 2017). In addition to administrative assistance, AMIB was also given significant financial donations by external donors. This included UN organizations which provided $6 million, the EU and the World Bank, which each gave $33 million, and the US which provided $6 million (Cocodia 2017). The resource and financial support given to AMIB was crucial to the mission's success due to the initiative being severely underfunded by the African Union. Despite the mission having a budget of

$110 million, AMIB was initially only given funds of $60 million which could not afford to implement the initiative's mandates. By the time AMIB concluded its mission, however, the budget had grown to $134 million, an amount that the initiative could not have fulfilled without its external backing.

The second major factor which contributed to AMIB's success was the leadership of South Africa. Under South Africa's direction, AMIB was able to set forth a clear agenda for the mission to follow under the leadership of President Nelson Mandela. Mandela took over as the facilitator for the Arusha Accords in 1999, which negotiated terms for a ceasefire and opened the door for the AU's peacekeeping mission. Once AMIB entered, "South Africa took the initiative of creating a platform facilitating [Burundi's] democratic transformation" (Cocodia 2017). In addition to Mandela's leadership, South Africa was the largest supplier of troops for AMIB. The nation contributed 1,500 troops throughout the mission including the South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD), which was responsible for protecting politicians returning to the country in order to ensure that the peace process was maintained (Svensson 2008). South Africa's leadership in AMIB was therefore invaluable to the mission's success, because it directed the initiative under a clear strategy through the mentorship of Mandela, while South Africa's commitment to providing valuable resources in military assistance filled AMIB's deficiency gaps.

Somalia: How Ethiopia's Biased Leadership and a Lack of Resources Hurt AMISOM

The Somali Civil War began in 1991, following the overthrow of dictator Siad Barre. His assassination in 1991 created a power vacuum, triggering armed conflict between clan-based warlords fighting for control over the country (Düsterhöft et al. 2013). This conflict led to the collapse of customary law and a power struggle between clans, which precipitated the arrival of the first UN Peacekeeping Mission UNOSOM in 1992 (Cocodia 2017). During its mission, the UN experienced extensive backlash from Somali citizens who opposed Western intervention and killed multiple peacekeeping soldiers. As a result, UN peacekeeping missions withdrew in 1995 and have since looked to the African Union to restore peace in Somalia. The African Union deployed its own peacekeeping mission called AMISOM to Somalia in 2007 and has remained in the country for the past 14 years, despite limited change in the perpetuation of violence.

Results

AMISOM was mandated to pursue three objectives: "1) Enable the gradual transition of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces, 2) Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and 3) Assist the Somali security forces in the stabilization, reconciliation and peace-building of Somalia ("AMISOM Mandate" 2000). Despite efforts by AMISOM to address the first mandate, AMISOM concluded that there was an "inability of Somali security forces to take over from AMISOM", due to the fragmented nature of Somalia's government

and security forces (Williams et al. 2018). In regards to the second mandate, the threat of al-Shabaab has actually increased, not reduced, as "AMISOM has found it very difficult to sustain effective offensive operations against al-Shabaab" (Williams et al. 2018). The mission was therefore unable to limit the group's influence over Somalia because al-Shabaab continues to pose a deadly threat to the country by infiltrating institutions and conducting regular attacks against Somali citizens and AU forces. AMISOM has also failed to complete the third mandate as they have yet to achieve stabilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding in Somalia because the civil war has not yet ended, and violence continues to wreak havoc today as it did thirty years ago, when the conflict first began. In fact, stabilization was obstructed because the AU and the Federal Government could not agree on a shared stabilization plan as the two organizations had different visions of what stabilization looked like for Somalia (Lotze 2016). Thus, not only was AMISOM unsuccessful in completing any of its mandates, the mission has not changed the status of the conflict in the country, demonstrating its ultimate failure.

Causes

Several factors contributed to AMISOM's failure to achieve peace in Somalia. The first contributing factor was the biased leadership imposed by Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia is positioned beside Somalia, the country wanted to ensure that the power vacuum opened by the Somali Civil War would produce a pro-Ethiopian government to solidify its hegemony in the Horn of Africa. To do so, Ethiopia took leadership within AMISOM to direct the mission's strategy in accordance with its own biased political agenda. Specifically, Ethiopia advanced their political agenda by "picking winners in the competition to create the new regional administrations and [. . .] acting as the power behind the throne of the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia]" (Williams et al. 2018). By using AMISOM as a vehicle to camouflage their intentions, Ethiopia succeeded in directly shaping the AU's position on how to implement peace in Somalia. However, Ethiopia's nefarious intentions were not oblivious to all. Many African states saw their influence in AMISOM as a deterrence to participate, so they were unwilling to contribute military resources to an initiative that was viewed as "little more than a politically symbolic appendage to provide Ethiopian troops with a greater degree of international legitimacy" (Williams 2009).

The second factor that played a large role in AMISOM's failure was the mission's severe lack of resources: specifically a shortage of military capacity and monetary aid. After assessing the level of violence in Somalia, AMISOM was expected to deploy 8,000 troops in order to successfully complete its mandate. Despite this estimate, the African Union struggled to secure just over half of that number (Williams 2009). As a result, the African Union's low military capacity was not able to adequately counter the threat of al-Shabaab and clan-based warlords who possessed strong armed capability and superior knowledge of the land. Besides a shortage of troops, AMISOM also struggled with a severe lack of funding. Limited financial capital

created uncertainty on important questions like the number of peacekeepers being deployed, the duration of the mission, the intensity of operations and the equipment being used. In addition, many external donors withdrew their financial support as the mission went on. The European Union, one of AMISOM's three key donors, cut funding by 20% in 2016. As a result, "the Ugandan and Burundian troops were deployed into Somalia without funding" causing the presidents to withdraw their troops as they refused to sacrifice wages (Cocodia 2017). This left AMISOM with a smaller budget and fewer troops, severely hindering the mission from effectively challenging violence in Somalia and completing its mandates.

Main Takeaways for a Successful Mission

The cases of Burundi and Somalia have revealed two key factors which are necessary for a successful peacekeeping initiative in Africa: a neutral regional leader and a sufficient supply of resources. Firstly, missions deployed by the African Union must be led by a neutral African actor. The clear leadership of Nelson Mandela assisted in the efficient completion of AMIB's mandates because it prevented a shared coalition of competing interests from pulling the mission in different directions, which would waste time and resources. Neutral leadership is crucial, as demonstrated by Mandela, who was viewed by Burundis as unbiased compared to his predecessor Nyerere, who was accused of displaying bias for Hutus (Cocodia 2017). This neutral leadership was imperative to AMIB's success because "being neutral in the exercise of its mandate gave credibility to the mission

and aided stability" (Cocodia 2017). A lack of neutral leadership, as exemplified by Ethiopia in AMISOM, deters other regional actors from cooperating, weakening the mission as a collective force and limiting its resources. In addition, the perception of a biased leader deters local acceptance of a mission, as demonstrated by the Somalis' hesitance to accept AMISOM knowing that it was guided by their neighbour who sought regional influence. Without local acceptance, peacekeeping missions will struggle to implement objectives, as demonstrated in 1993 by a backlash against UN peacekeeping troops in Somalia. This leader must also be African, whether they represent a state or an independent African institution, in order to reflect the decolonial process of the continent and to gain acceptance from citizens of the weak state. Therefore, AU peacekeeping initiatives must appoint a neutral regional leader in order to ensure their success.

While appointing a neutral leader is imperative, many scholars argue it is extremely difficult, as explained by the theory of realism. According to realism, "international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate" in a self-help system (Grieco 1988). When cooperation does occur, it is shallow and short-lived because the constraints of anarchy remind states that they cannot rely on other countries for their own survival. Therefore, many realists argue that regional peacekeeping missions are doomed because they require cooperation which is unlikely. Moreover, since power is relative, a state can only become more powerful if another country becomes weaker. Thus, peace-

keeping missions offer strategic opportunities for regional actors to exploit the initiative in order to advance their own political interests and ensure their power, as exemplified in the case of Ethiopia which tried to install a pro-Ethiopian government in Somalia. Since countries like Ethiopia must value their own power over restoring peace to another country due to the self-help system of anarchy, realists argue that it is unlikely regional actors will cooperate, but when they do it will often be to take over the mission for their own benefit.

While this argument is persuasive, it fails to account for cases like South Africa, which willingly led AMIB despite living 2,500 miles away from Burundi. Moreover, peacekeeping missions can offer several inherent benefits for participating countries. Firstly, decreasing conflict in the region and restoring peace ensures that violence will not spill over to their country or raise tensions with similar ethnic or linguistic groups within their state. Moreover, mitigating violence in the region decreases the chances that refugees will flee their homeland and spread to their country. Finally, participating in missions fosters a positive reputation for involved countries and increases their likelihood of being trusted on the international stage, leading to alliances, and inclusion in treaties like valuable trade agreements.

Despite the benefits of cooperation, nations with biased leadership like Ethiopia threaten AU peacekeeping missions, so the African Union must be wary of the power that states can hold disproportionality in the mission. The AU can do this by reflecting on how missions can be used as a tool to enforce regional hegemony in the area, and assessing the motives of lead nations and their expected benefits. By being more critical of the roles of state actors in each mission, the African Union can ensure it selects neutral regional leaders to guide peacekeeping initiatives.

Secondly, in order to be successful, AU missions must be accompanied by external support and UN assistance. Currently, the African Union is at a severe disadvantage because the institution is heavily underfunded. Over 40% of member states do not pay yearly contributions to the institution which has made the African Union "heavily dependent on donor funding to run its programs and operations" ("Sustainable Financing" 2021). As a result, the African Union does not possess enough resources to accurately achieve the mandates it sets in its missions. In the case of Burundi, despite the mission's severe underfunding by the AU, it received significant external funding and resources which allowed it to finance tasks in order to achieve its objectives. Despite also being initially underfunded, AMISOM did not receive the same level of external support that AMIB did, and external actors withdrew resources and financial aid as the mission persisted. By depleting the mission's military and financial capability, AMISOM was unable to fund the tasks needed to complete to achieve its mandates. Therefore, AU missions must be sufficiently funded and the institution must set realistic mandates according to the budget. It is crucial to note that relying on external support should only be a temporary solution, as the ultimate goal is to create an institution that is self-sustainable. However, until the Afri-

can Union has enough money to fund its own missions, the organization is dependent on the contribution of external actors. Forming strong ties with other organizations like the EU, UN, and World Bank is thus crucial to maintaining financing in future missions.

Strengthening the African Union is imperative to the restoration of peace on the continent. Unlike the AU, other peacekeeping institutions like the UN or external intervening actors like the US and UK generate an inherent distrust from the African population due to their colonial legacies. This has been demonstrated by the backlash UN peacekeepers and US soldiers faced in Somalia in 1993 when citizens shot down their helicopters, killing 18 American soldiers and 2 UN soldiers, and dragged their bodies through the city ("Black Hawk Down" 2017). Therefore, the AU possesses the unique capability to intervene without the burden of institutional imperialism like other peacekeeping institutions. Thus, strengthening its financial and military capacity is essential to anti-imperialist peacekeeping missions on the continent.

Conclusion

A comparison of the African Union's peacekeeping missions in Burundi and Somalia reveals how two similar missions can reap drastically different outcomes. In the case of Burundi, the clear leadership of South Africa, coupled with assistance from external states and organizations, enabled the success of AMIB. In comparison, the nefarious leadership of Ethiopia combined with a significant lack of military resources and financial aid severely hindered the success of AMISOM in Somalia.

The difference in outcomes between AMIB and AMISOM highlights two crucial factors that are imperative to the success of peacekeeping missions from the African Union. First, the neutral leadership of an African state ensures that the mission is led in a clear direction with the central purpose of restoring peace. Second, having sufficient resources like troops and monetary aid is necessary for the peacekeeping initiative to fund the tasks necessary to complete the mission. If the African Union can ensure that both factors are involved in all future peacekeeping missions, the organization possesses a higher chance of achieving success and restoring peace in the region.

This evaluation is important because the African Union is one of the only regional organizations on the continent that is capable of restoring peace without the entrenched colonial and imperialist legacies that plague other actors like formal colonial regimes or institutions that have perpetuated colonial legacies, like the United Nations. Therefore, the duty of restoring peace in Africa is uniquely designated to the African Union. Through the implementation of these two key factors of success, the African Union can strengthen their peacekeeping missions in order to increase its ability to mitigate conflict and prevent future violence from erupting on the continent.

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On the Road to Italian Fascism: The Fiume Affair and Global Politics

Natalie Pennisi, McGill University

Edited by Emily Matuska and Susie Strachan

ABSTRACT

Despite its relative obscurity beyond the realm of Italian history, the Fiume Crisis (1919-1920) is a critical juncture for the study of modern European history, international affairs, and the genesis of fascism in Italy. Following the conclusion of WWI, Italians felt betrayed by their Entente allies who did not deliver Italy the territorial expansion they promised. Gabriele D'Annunzion described this as a "mutilated victory" and seized upon the geopolitical instability following WWI by capturing the Croatian city of Fiume to deliver Italy some of the land it was promised. Although his reign in Fiume only lasted fifteen months, his actions inspired the likes of Benito Mussolini to use unilateral force to claim power in 1922. Thus, beyond representing a critical episode in fascism's history, Fiume is arguably the birthplace of Italian fascism.

Introduction

In many ways, World War I marked a watershed in Italian history, as it was Italy's first major war since its unification nearly half a century prior in 1871 when different states on the Italian Peninsula consolidated into one Italian state. However, despite Italy contributing a high proportion of soldiers, having a mortality rate higher than its alliance members, and fighting on a critical front against Austria-Hungary, Italy's contributions to WWI are often treated as a matter of secondary importance in the broader historiography of the period (Gibelli 2010, 464-465). Italy's allies also viewed Italy's wartime contributions as marginal because it did not directly fight their main enemy, Germany, supposedly making Italy undeserving of the territories it had been promised during the 1915 Treaty of London, which laid out the conditions for Italy joining the Entente and abandoning neutrality (Sullivan 1983). Many Italian nationalists took this view as a great offense and declared *vittoria mutilata* – that their victory had been tainted and mutilated by their allies failing to fulfill the terms on which Italy agreed to join the war and abandon its neutrality. Some of these same nationalists even decided to take matters into their own hands, and seized the Croatian port city of Fiume (now called Rijeka) – a city that was at least sixty percent ethnically Italian (US Department of State 1918, 443). By taking unilateral action and undermining Fiume's right to self-determination on a global stage, the Italian nationalists created a geopolitical crisis that paved the way for other authoritarians to enact imperialist regimes.

In this paper, I will examine how, as the boldest and most blatant display of unilateral authoritarianism in Italian history up until that point, the Fiume Crisis was a turning point in twentieth century Italian political history. I will start by providing the diplomatic and political context that compelled Italy to enter WWI as well as define Italy's expectations for what it would receive territorially as a victor of the war. I will then establish a direct connection between Italy's expectations from the Treaty of London and its feeling of betrayal over its meager territorial gains from the Treaty of Versailles – the treaty that concluded WWI. I will go on to describe exactly what the Fiume Crisis was, how the international community reacted to it, and what the event meant to Italians. Lastly, I will argue that the Fiume Crisis established the foundation upon which Benito Mussolini later built his Fascist doctrine and eventual seizure of power.

Methodology

The existing body of literature concerning the Fiume Crisis primarily focuses on the general course of events and the flamboyant personality of Gabriele D'Annunzio – the famous Italian poet and ardent nationalist who led Italy's seizure of Fiume. I attempt to rectify this by discussing the political and diplomatic discourse surrounding the period. Moreover, while many historians connect the affair to Mussolini's March on Rome and fascism's success in Italy, they fail to situate the seizure of Fiume within a larger chain of events that includes Italy's entrance into WWI against the wishes of the Italian masses. Because there are many different angles one could use to study the Fiume

Crisis, in this paper I prioritized examining the event through a political lens because many of the diplomatic deliberations and criticisms of the event were recorded in English. Thus, documents such as treaties, official statements, and other miscellaneous governmental documents comprise the bulk of my documentary corpus.

A Mutilated Victory Will Mobilize the Masses

The Fiume Affair stands as the culmination of Italy's historic mistrust of other nations, its irredentist and imperial desires, and its sense of frustration and betrayal over its allies' failure to deliver the promises outlined by the Treaty of London. Prior to WWI, Italy had an extensive history of foreign domination and mistrust, with the peninsula frequently passing between its more powerful neighbours and always remaining under foreign control (Marcuzzi 2018, 101). After its unification which ended its period of geographic fragmentation, Italy entered into an alliance with its historic enemy, Austria-Hungary, to ensure its territorial integrity to the north and the east. The alliance constituted an attempt to choose "the stronger side," viewing any ally as a "potential future opponent" as well (101). This paranoid view of national security resulted in "a solid Italian mistrust of everyone," as Italian politicians remained split on which allies would prove the most politically expedient (101).

Italy maintained this paranoid mindset into the beginning of WWI, initially deciding to remain neutral and assess the different alliance networks that were embroiled in the conflict despite its existing ties to Germany and Austria.

However, eventually both the Entente – which included France, Britain, and Russia – and the Triple Alliance – which included Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire – approached Italy to entice it to join their side, and on April 26th, 1915, Italy agreed to join the Entente instead of its German and Austro-Hungarian allies. In doing so, Italy chose to prioritize its relationship with Great Britain who it relied on for imported raw materials rather than its allies to its north (Marcuzzi 2018, 103).

Italy's motivations for joining the war went beyond national security, with the promise of Italian irredentism and imperialism outlined in the Treaty of London also playing a major role. Irredentism greatly shaped nineteenth and twentieth century Italian nationalism, and the idea of a union of "unredeemed" lands with their Italian mother country became a major rallying cry for the Italian unification and its entrance into WWI (Hechter 2001, 84). The Treaty of London addressed Italian irredentist interests by promising Italy permission to annex territories with high concentrations of ethnic Italians, such as Trieste and Trentino and advanced Italy's imperial ambitions by promising it territories that would prove strategically advantageous for expanding its fledgling empire, such as the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea (The Treaty of London 1915, 1). The treaty also promised Italy a fair portion of any additional territorial conquests that may occur during the war in places like Africa and Anatolia (The Treaty of London 1915, 2). By acquiring "unredeemed" territories thought to be Italian at heart as well as new territories, Italy aimed to ensure its domination of the Med-

iterranean and Adriatic regions and become a considerable European power.

Due to these political aspirations, Italy accepted the terms of the Treaty of London and threw itself into the war effort, effectively opening an additional front against Austria-Hungary and accumulating significant death tolls. Italy lost approximately 680,000 men to the conflict, a mortality rate steeper than its British ally's (Gibelli 2010, 464). However, once the negotiations for the end of the war began, Italy found itself betrayed by its allies who did not ensure that it received the territories they promised. One of the major causes behind this development was US President Woodrow Wilson's formidable opposition to the Treaty of London, which he argued was invalid because of its secrecy (Wilson 1919, 761).

Gabriele D'Annunzio, Italy's most famous poet and flamboyant right wing nationalist, condemned Italy's WWI allies and in 1918 declared "vittoria nostra, non sarai mutilata" – translating roughly to "we will not let our victory be mutilated" (Sullivan 1983). D'Annunzio's statement would greatly shape Italy's perception of the war by asserting that his nation had not received compensation for the heavy price they paid during the war. His proclamation had two obvious consequences: it created a national mythos of betrayal and victimhood, and foreshadowed his eventual attempt to correct this betrayal by seizing what he believed rightfully belonged to his country – the city of Fiume.

Face of the Fiume Affair

Italian frustrations over the Treaty of Versailles and their mutilated victory culminated in September 1919 when D'Annunzio and his "legion" of volunteers, most of whom were disgruntled veterans and right-wing nationalists, seized the Croatian city of Fiume (Wilcox 2018). One of the most effective ways to understand D'Annunzio's reign of Fiume is by analyzing the 1920 Charter of the Regency of Carnaro, the new constitution that separated Fiume and made it its own state. This founding document entailed a strange melding of ideologies, with the charter's sixty-five articles touching upon topics ranging from state-sponsored music, re-establishing Roman traditions, and "the culture of the Adriatic race" (O'Sullivan 1983, 202). In many ways, the charter proposed some progressive ideals, such as governmental accountability through the recall of elected officials, the constitutionally-enshrined right to petition their government, and "the Great National Council" which was set to meet every seven years "in a special conference to consider constitutional reforms" (198). D'Annunzio also incorporated elements of syndicalism, with his own, artistic twist, by creating a system of ten guilds for his citizens largely on the basis of their occupation. One of these guilds encompassed no specific trade and D'Annunzio described this guild as "reserved for the mysterious forces of progress and adventure" (197). With this provision, D'Annunzio created an elite class in Fiumian society reserved for intellectuals, artists, and the Übermensch, reflecting his devotion to Nietzsche and ancient Romans (Wilcox 2018).

Retrospectives on Fiume and D'Annunzio have since described his rule in greater detail, shedding light on how his blended constitution

affected the lives of Fiumians. Unsurprisingly, D'Annunzio often used violent methods to ensure the creation of his artistic utopia, with his paramilitary troops, who many viewed as the first iteration of Mussolini's Black Shirts, forcing their political enemies to consume castor oil, "a noxious laxative" (Burton 2019). The government also expelled ethnic Croats from the state, likely to establish the dominance of the "Adriatic race" and Italian culture. D'Annunzio noted "for any race of noble origin, culture is the best of all weapons" (O'Sullivan 1983).

D'Annunzio's assertion that Fiume belonged as a part of Italy actually had ample evidence to support it. Firstly, Fiume passionately asserted that it wanted to join with Italy, which Fiumians viewed as their "Mother Country" (US Department of State 1918, 443). It viewed itself as closely tied to the peninsula through their shared Roman heritage, with a Fiume representative stating, "the Wolf which nursed Romulus and Remus gave life also to our Fiume, now reborn to liberty… I repeat our oath: *Fiume shall be Italian*" (US Department of State 1918, 443-444). Moreover, the city had a long history connecting it more to Italy than to Croatia except for a nineteen-year period when Fiumians were "subjected forcibly against their will to Croatian domination" (US Department of State 1918, 444). Fiume had previously engaged in a violent revolt starting October 30th, 1919 against the Croatians who annexed them following the demise of Austria-Hungary (US Department of State 1918, 444).

External Reactions to the Fiume Crisis

Much to his disappointment, D'Annunzio's time in Fiume ended in 1920 after Italy invaded the country and deposed his government. A lot of what contributed to the demise of D'Annunzio's reign in Fiume in 1920 was the external pressure – mainly from the United States – to end the Fiume Crisis. US President Wilson greatly influenced international law during his tenure as the commander in chief, meaning that he substantially shaped the discourse surrounding the Fiume Crisis and Italy's perceived misbehaviour. Wilson's flagship policy was his Fourteen Points – which were released nearly a year before the war's conclusion – in which he outlined his vision for the post-war new world order, founded on the basis of self-determination, limitation of imperialism, and, optimistically, world peace. He asserted in the preamble of the document that "the program of the world's peace, therefore, is our program" (Wilson 1918, 1). In addition, Wilson explicitly addressed Italy's fate, dedicating an entire point to the issue of Italian imperial ambitions. Point IX stated that "a readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality," reflecting Wilson's desire to create countries around a distinct ethnic core (Wilson 1918, 1).

Considering that Wilson had already viewed Italy's borders as an area ripe for conflict, it came as no surprise when he leapt to action to condemn D'Annunzio's exploits in Fiume. The United States – who entered the war nearly two years after their Italian allies – refused to recognize the Treaty of London, which Wilson decried as a "private" understanding between

imperial France, Britain, Russia, and Italy. He viewed the agreement as unfair considering that many states had joined the Entente since the signing of the treaty with no knowledge whatsoever of its existence (Wilson 1919, 761). Thus, Wilson believed that the Treaty of London provided Italy with no legal authority to seize Fiume.

After explaining why the Treaty of London was an illegitimate agreement, Wilson elaborated on why Italy's seizure of Fiume was unjust within the context of his conception of right and wrong. Firstly, Wilson viewed D'Annunzio's seizure as foreign tyranny. Wilson contended that placing the area under Italian rule would mean subjecting the region to foreign domination because he wrongfully believed the area to be predominately ethnically Croatian (Wilson 1919, 762). He went on to highlight that Fiume's port was critical to the commerce of the area, meaning that surrendering it to Italy would greatly harm the economy of that coastal region. Lastly, he believed that Italy no longer needed Fiume and the miscellaneous islands scattered throughout the Adriatic because it was no longer defending its extensive shoreline against Austrian naval attacks (762). However, according to Wilson's "Fourteen Points" and prioritization of self-determination, it made sense for Fiume to join Italy. The metropolitan area of the port city had an extremely high concentration of people who considered Italy their "Mother Country" (US Department of State 1918, 443). Thus, a "readjustment of the frontiers of Italy" in accordance with "clearly recognizable lines of nationality" would include the core of Fiume, but not the suburbs,

because estimates describe the population being up to eighty percent Italian in the center of Fiume (446). Moreover, correspondence between Wilson's secretary of state and the American ambassador to Italy describes the city as "Italian by blood, language, character and sentiment" (US Department of State 1918, 443). The ambassador goes on to add that the "vast majority of the inhabitants of Fiume… protest against being sacrificed without reason to what they claim now can be considered… Jugo-Slav imperialism." This quote reflects how the people of Fiume resented the growing Slavic imperialism resulting in the creation of Yugoslavia and preferred to become part of Italy (US Department of State 1918, 443). While Wilson's doctrine of self-determination and resistance to imperialism were very progressive views for any mainstream politician to have during this era, it bears mentioning that he applied these principles unevenly. He used his doctrine to condemn the Italians who stood lower within the European gradation of powers, but scarcely challenged the mighty British Empire who was far more guilty of the "crime" of imperialism.

Wilson's frustration with the secret nature of the Treaty of London placed France and Britain, the original signatories of the treaty, in a very awkward situation. Neither country wanted to anger Italy, they "were content to let Wilson bear the burden of the Italian quarrel, while they endeavoured to remain on good terms with both him and the Italians (Albrecht-Carrie 1966, 113). Both countries decided to remain out of the conflict, lacking any explicit policy about the fulfillment of the Treaty of London unlike their Italian and American allies, and not

wanting Italy to become competition by gaining territorial power (Albrecht-Carrie 1966, 113). While international reactions to the Fiume Crisis ranged from apathetic to apoplectic, Woodrow Wilson's indignant, albeit hypocritical, opinion ultimately affected the situation the most.

D'Annunzio and Mussolini

Many of the hallmarks of Italian fascism were present in D'Annunzio's political exploits, such as his extreme nationalism, promotion of conservative political values, and his willingness to use violence to achieve his political ends. D'Annunzio's entire political life was defined by extreme ethnic nationalism. He pushed Italy to enter WWI to win glory and then invaded Fiume to correct his country's humiliation. In Fiume, he emphasized the greatness of his Roman ethnicity by highlighting the great cultural accomplishments of Rome – ranging from antiquity, to the Renaissance, to his own personal contributions. He also asserted that Italian identity and greatness was based on blood. He tied Italy's fate to being "the long-awaited inheritor to the great Roman Empire." Croats, unlike Italians, were not descended from Romans, and thus had no place in his new state, leading D'Annuzio to force ethnic Croats out of Fiume in order to create a homogenous state for Italians. He also maintained socially conservative views for much of his life, famously explaining that civilization had become "feminized and soft" which would not be accepted in his utopia; instead, he wanted men to become "fierce warriors once more" (Burton 2019).

Many aspects of D'Annunzio's political re-gime reappeared several years later following Mussolini's ascent to power, but that does not mean that D'Annunzio was welcomed with open arms into the fascist inner circle. Instead, fascists attempted to distance themselves from the flamboyant D'Annunzio. Upon Mussolini's rise to power, his biographer and lover, Marghertia Sarfatti, condescendingly referring to D'Annunzio's actions in Fiume as "marvellous exploits, all of them, marked by fire and daring and originality, but also… in the nature of mere episodes" (Safartti 1925, 6). Her attitude reflected how fascists viewed D'Annunzio's actions in Fiume as aspirational, but also of marginal importance. D'Annunzio himself recognized his influence on Mussolini's regime and wrote to Mussolini several weeks after his march on Rome in order to understand and challenge their schism. He wrote, "Is it not true that the best of the movement called 'fascist' was engendered by my spirit? Did I not announce today's national uprising forty years ago… So how can I be your enemy? And how can you be mine?" (D'Annuznio, 253).

One explanation for the questions D'Annunzio posed so emphatically could be that his exploits in Fiume, his charisma, and his noble Roman lineage made him a threat to Mussolini's claim to power. In the same way that Mussolini was able to woo thousands of Italians to the fascist cause with his impassioned speeches, D'Annunzio also created a potent cult of personality: "It was D'Annunzio's canny ability to transform politics into an aesthetic – even religious – experience that proved most prescient to Mussolini's rise. His narratives of bygone eras of glory, of virility expressed

through violence, whipped an alienated and fractious populace into frenzy. His blithe disregard for truth allowed him to create… his own reality" (Burton 2019). D'Annunzio's ability to persuade the masses likely made him one of Mussolini's most dangerous rivals, so in order to secure his base, Mussolini had to relegate the very man who inspired and enabled his movement to the sidelines.

Consequences & What Fiume Means

The Italian imperialist fiasco in Fiume is representative of two larger trends prevalent in this region of the Mediterranean – the emergence of fascism and the geopolitical instability in the region caused by the post-WWI collapse of empires. The Fiume Crisis is an important juncture for studying the genesis of Italian fascism because it fits into the larger pattern of authoritarianism that became popular during this era. While many historians identify Fiume as the "birthplace" of fascism and directly tie D'Annunzio's actions to Mussolini's March on Rome, there is strong evidence that ties Fiume to Italy's entrance into WWI as well (Gumbrecht 1996, 256). The majority of the Italian populace in 1915 preferred neutrality to intervention in the Great War, but nationalists like D'Annunzio persuaded the government with their countless demonstrations that their opinions reflected that of the public. Historians have written that by going against the general will, Italy's entrance into WWI "confirmed the notion that determined elites could overcome the passive majority," a common characteristic of authoritarian governments (De Grand 2006, 609). D'Annunzio perpetuated this trend by circumventing democratic institutions and taking matters into his own hands to establish the Regency of Carnaro. This kind of approach and mindset culminated with Mussolini's March on Rome which showed a similar flagrant disregard for the will of the people. However, Fiume's place in the genesis of fascism should not be understated; D'Annunzio and his regime formulated much of the imagery and tactics that Mussolini harnessed in order to seize control of the Italian government.

The Fiume Affair also highlights the volatility that the Balkan region experienced due to its multiculturalism and the collapse of empires in Europe and the Middle East, epitomizing why the "Adriatic Question" remained a sticking point in European diplomacy. The Adriatic Question refers to the diplomatic uncertainty of the division of the northern Balkans following the demise of Austria-Hungary. Before WWI, much of the northeastern Balkan peninsula was included in the highly entrenched government of Austria-Hungary; when the Dual Monarchy dissolved, the Entente had to grapple with which groups to prioritize and how to resolve Italy and Yugoslavia's competing claims ("The Adriatic Question 1919," 3). D'Annunzio's seizure highlighted the moral hazard of attempting to establish an ethno-state in the region due to the different ethnic groups living in close proximity to each other. In order to establish a truly Italian state, his government deported many Croats from their homes. Similar population exchanges occurred between the southern Balkan states and Anatolia in the wake of the Ottoman Empire's demise, resulting in extensive bloodshed and heartache as ethnic minori-

ties were expelled from their homes (Gingeras 2009, 2). The population exchanges that occurred during the WWI era showed how the fall of an empire affects the lives of its ethnic minorities. Because of the Adriatic Question and D'Annunzio's authoritarian actions, the Fiume Affair stands at an interesting juncture in WWI history, embodying both the chronic instability caused by the fall of a multiethnic empire as well as the emergence of fascism – an ideology that would define the global political arena for years to come.

Conclusion

Italy is viewed by many historians as a minor player in WWI, but although it did not deal the fatal blow to Germany or Austria Hungary, its participation in the war is still of great importance to twentieth century European history because of how the war's outcome resulted in the genesis of fascism. Initially, Italy aspired to remain a neutral state, but when the Entente approached it with terms that would allow it to claim unredeemed lands, control the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and gain more colonial territories, it decided to abandon its neutrality and throw itself into the conflict. However after WWI ended, it became increasingly clear to Italians that they would not get the terms the Entente promised despite their contribution to its victory, enraging many Italian nationalists who claimed their victory was mutilated. Gabriele D'Annunzio – Italy's famous poet with a penchant for political theatrics – looked eastwards to the port city of Fiume and decided to claim some of the unredeemed lands for his home country, forming the Regency of Carnaro

in 1919 and ushering in the diplomatic crisis known as the Fiume Affair.

During his reign in Fiume, D'Annunzio crafted a strange state which combined various progressive ideals with syndicalism and ethno-nationalism, ruling in a way that many historians now label as proto-fascist. Despite claiming to have created an artist's utopia, D'Annunzio relied heavily on deportations of local Croats, political violence, and a cult of personality to remain in power. However, Carnaro only stood for fifteen months before being toppled by the Italian Government in an attempt to establish good relations with Yugoslavia.

Likely the harshest critic of the Fiume Affair was Woodrow Wilson who condemned it as foreign rule that undermined Fiumian's right to self-determination – even though the vast majority of Fiumians actually preferred joining Italy. The Fiume Affair received mixed reactions from Italy itself, with the ultra-right simultaneously attempting to harness D'Annunzio's momentum and distance themselves from him, and the liberals holding responsibility for the demise of D'Annunzio's dream. While D'Annunzio's time in Fiume was short-lived, it is a critical juncture in Italian and European history that embodied both the geopolitical instability created from collapsed empires and the birth of fascism.

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Neutral Swaggering: American Involvement in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War

David Mickelson, McGill University

Edited by Sophia Khiavi and Madalena Monteiro

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that America's involvement in the October War (1973 Arab-Israeli conflict) was a dual venture to both entrench diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel, as well as to develop relationships with two potential American patrons. The article examines the unique political context of the 1970s to explain how political patronage with Egypt and Israel was made possible not only by the Soviet Union's waning regional influence, but also by the Presidency of Anwar Sadat, Henry Kissinger's unique rhetorical techniques as American Secretary of State,and Europe's reduced patronage of the region. It finds that by using swaggering, or the threatened use of force, the US was able to cement economic and diplomatic control of the region, further its regional goals, such as trade partnerships with Saudi Arabia, and improve diplomatic relations with NATO allies.

Introduction

America's involvement in the October War can be understood as the moment in which the US-Israeli defence partnership took its present-day form. This conception of the war, however, ignores the American gains made in the Arab world during and after the conflict, especially the US' partnership with Egypt. This paper will argue that through a combination of aid, swaggering and a perceived neutrality, the US was able to build on favourable environmental factors to cement its political, strategic and economic relationship with Israel and establish another with Egypt. These allyships successfully advanced the US' main regional goals and asserted it as the Middle East's most influential superpower. This essay will begin by offering an overarching background on America's relationship with Israel and its regional goals. It will then delve into the environmental factors that encouraged the establishment of a secondary regional ally and the elements which made Egypt an excellent candidate for that role. Finally, it will analyse the extent of America's involvement in the conflict, as well as the consequences of its wartime actions on both the US' objectives and regional partnerships.

Background

The US and Israel did not always share the bond which they do today. Guilt, humanitarian impulses and an idolization of the US constitution by Zionist leaders encouraged Americans to aid in the resettlement of Jews after the Holocaust (Lewis 1999, 365). A failure to accommodate Jewish refugees during the Holocaust, as well as a comparatively late condemnation of Hitler, were both stains on America's growing reputation as the leader of the "free world." This was accentuated by the robust, domestic presence of Jews, which put pressure on the US to aid in the reconstruction of Jewish civil society. The resettlement of Jews into Palestine was attractive and seemingly reasonable to the US administration for two reasons. First, the United States was fearful that domestic institutions would be overrun by refugees. Second, the United States was relatively ignorant regarding the region's pre-existing Arab presence (Ibid). Throughout Israel's nascency, America served as a diplomatic force for the entire region by attempting to improve relations between the Jewish State and its Arab neighbours while simultaneously condemning any overreaches of force, most notably in 1956 during the Suez Canal crisis. (Ibid, 365-366). This moment saw the United States encourage France, Britain and Israel, all of whom were trying to capture the recently nationalized Suez Canal, to remove their forces from Egypt in order to maintain peace with the latter's patron Russia. This led to a relationship with Israel that, while diplomatically salient, was cold and distant (Ibid, 366). However, as American-Israeli relations gradually improved during the 1960s, a period which saw increased arms sales and diplomatic support in the United Nations, American foreign policy transitioned towards vocal support for the Jewish state, entrenching the United States' position as Israel's main supporter (Ibid, 365).

Between 1967 and 1973, the primary strategy of American foreign policy in the region was peace-seeking (Ibid, 365). This differs from peacekeeping, which implies the pre-existence

of conflict which the peacekeeping nation attempts to mitigate; peace-seeking instead lends itself to the overall removal of violent conflict. Initially, the US pursued diplomacy through channels endorsed by the United Nations, seeking multilateral arrangements in which France and the UK were asked to carry the "spear of peace" (Burns 1985, 367). After 1970 however, the US took a more unilateral approach to stability, deferring minimally to the United Nations Security Council during this time (Ibid). "Black September," or the Jordanian Civil War, was a pivotal moment in American foreign policy in the Middle East, as it showed that at any time, regimes which seemed secure might be vulnerable to insurgencies. Israel and America's strategic partnership grew stronger after 1970, as the Black September crisis prompted President Richard Nixon to fill the arms vacuum created by France after Israeli actions in the 1967 war to ensure the presence of a strategic partner in the Middle East (Lewis 1999, 355). Despite this emerging defensive partnership, it would be incorrect to interpret America's relationship with Israel before and during the October War through a realist prism evaluating hawkish US foreign policy. Instead, it should be perceived as one in which diplomatic relations held primacy.

At this stage, it is necessary to define America's two primary foreign policy goals in the Middle East prior to the October War. First was the establishment and maintenance of a strong relationship with Saudi Arabia (Lewis 1999, 366). This partnership was sought after due to Saudi Arabia's massive oil reserves, access to which was vital to ensure that America could maintain its economic advantage over the Soviet Union. As such, the US sought a partnership with a state in the Middle East that could advocate for the West in its attempts to secure and maintain an optimised trade deal with the Saudis, especially during times of conflict (Ibid). The United States' second goal was to avoid causing complications with NATO allies (Ibid), who served as vital economic and defensive partners against the Soviet Union. The colonial histories of these NATO states had created essential relationships with countries in the region, who were often also the enemies of Israel (Ibid). This was especially true in the case of France, whose reliance on regional oil exports and trade with Egypt and Syria, at the time Israel's two most vocal enemies, was worth 100 million euros more than its relationship with Israel (Sus 1974, 66). As such, actions which caused outcry from these nations would in turn affect American-French relations. Thus, when establishing a relationship with and endorsing actions undertaken by Israel, the US had to consider the repercussions of infringing on its allies' strategic goals.

Beyond these foreign policy goals, "control" over the Middle East was crucial in the larger Cold War context. This was due to the region's geographic position, whereby its proximity to the Soviet Union, coupled with the Western influence on its governmental institutions and borders, positioned the Middle East as a battleground in the expansion of spheres of influence. For the Soviet Union, control over the Middle East would mean an ostensibly socialist hegemony over the Asian continent. This would prove to be a huge economic boon, and

served as proof of concept for socialism. The United States, on the other hand, beyond the vital importance of the region's oil in maintaining industrial competitiveness, realized the strategic benefits of military allyship in the Middle East (Wilson Center). These benefits were both tangible and intangible; having a military presence in the region's backyard would prove unnerving and destabilize the Soviet Union (Ibid). As such, there were huge military benefits to be gained from becoming the region's primary patron.

The primary way that the United States went about enforcing these foreign policy goals was through *swaggering*. Although Art (1980, 5) notes that swaggering is difficult to pin down analytically, it can be understood as the threatened use of deterrent, compellent or defensive force, without the actual use of violence. Swaggering usually takes the form of demonstrations which showcase the military potential of a given state, such as published weapons stockpiles or military demonstrations involving new technologies. In the case of the October War, swaggering took the form of the threatened use of nuclear weapons. This was especially pertinent for American foreign policy in the buildup to the October War, as the SALT 1 Accord in 1972 determined that the strategic nuclear superiority of the United States over the Soviet Union had ended (Ibid, 4). Up to this point, Nixon's foreign policy had relied on the US' nuclear stockpile to deter conflict in the rest of the world, and as such, a form of swaggering would have to be used to account for the nuclear threat associated with provoking Soviet patrons.

A partnership with Israel would provide many advantages to the United States, notably the acquisition of a loyal ally in a contested region. However, America could not rely exclusively on Israel to fulfil its regional goals. This was due to the animosity between the Jewish state and its neighbours, who viewed Israel as a continuing regional settler-colonialism. Israel's primarily Eastern-European population ran contrary to the pan-Arab movement sweeping the region at the time, which endorsed a unified Arab identity throughout the Middle East. This animosity was further compounded by repeated wars between Arab states and Israel which the latter would most frequently win, thereby creating a dynamic of Israeli invincibility and Arab weakness (Ashley 2012). To ensure that its regional goals could be achieved, the US required a second regional ally to provide it with legitimacy and advocate on its behalf to other Arab nations.

A Changing Environment

The Middle East's changing political and economic environment during the early 1970s increased the likelihood of the US becoming the region's dominant international influence. First, the loss of Western European control over the Middle East provided the opportunity for America to make strategic and economic gains. The states with the most dramatic losses of influence were France and the UK, whose Sykes-Picot agreement was intended to grant them regional supremacy through control over Arab colonies. Until the 1960s, France had exercised direct, colonial control over North Africa to maintain its presence as a global power (Mulayim 2017). However, in the wake of

bloody revolts in important colonies and an overall loss of economic power after World War Two, France withdrew from the region and elected to maintain a regional presence through diplomacy and shared culture, citing its colonial influence on governmental and civic structures as a reason to maintain close economic and political ties (Ibid). France's strategy of indirect control also worsened relations with Israel due to their reduced need for intelligence collected by the Mossad regarding insurgencies in their colonies (Lewis 1999, 366). This indirect control took the form of liberalisation, wherein the French government hoped to exert control over the Middle East through trade monopolies from companies based in France. However, this push for deregulated, export-oriented economies opened the door for America to flex its economic muscles and make partnerships of its own, gaining monopolies over raw materials the French wished to control. Britain, meanwhile, saw its once vast empire dramatically constrict. This caused a vacuum in global power, and control over crucial assets such as the Suez Canal were ceded to local elites. The loss of territory, especially territory so significant for global trade, provided an incentive for America to replace the British empire as the region's most significant Western economic influence, thereby guaranteeing the US access to essential trade routes. Much like in the French case, America was able to capitalize on the lack of experience among local elites who agreed to operate under a neoliberal framework, thereby allowing American corporations to exert influence in sectors the United Kingdom used to control directly.

Significant geopolitical developments, particularly the loss of Soviet influence and the larger context of the Cold War, also provided the US with an opportunity to make strategic gains. The Soviet Union's primary goal in the Middle East was the neutralisation of US strategic advantages in Eurasia through the establishment of naval and air bases around the region (Ashley 2012). The Soviets accomplished this by selling weapons and co-opting anti-Israel sentiment to further their own political desires and undermine potential deals between the US and Middle Eastern nations. However, this strategy was highly limiting, as the Soviets failed to exert dominance in strategically important countries like Turkey and Iraq. Moreover, Ashley (2012) notes the conditional nature of these partnerships, stating, "Bereft of any substantial ideological attraction, the provision of arms and aid in exchange for influence was the sole method of enticing Arab clients to the Soviet standard". This clientelistic relationship was strained further with the Moscow Summit of 1972, which encouraged a foreign policy of détente. This further weakened ties between the Soviet Union and its Arab clients through the USSR's immediate calls for ceasefires during periods of hostility (Ibid). The clientelistic nature of the Soviet Union's relationships with Arab states which were oriented primarily around defence, ran contrary to Sadat's crucial foreign policy goal of minimizing Israel's military superiority. This discredited the Kremlin as a forceful protector in the eyes of Arab leaders (Suri 2008). As such, Russia became a far less attractive patron in the eyes of hawkish Arab States.

These factors combined to create an environment which primed the Middle East for American influence. Within the context of the Cold War, superpower patronage was essential to maintain standing among regional rivals. As such, the changing nature of Soviet foreign policy presented the US with a chance to further enhance its global sphere of influence.

Importance of a Partnership with Egypt

This favourable environment would be impossible to capitalise on without a secondary regional ally which held a stronger position in the Middle East than Israel. Enter Egypt, whose influential regional presence, economic decline and changing politics under President Anwar Sadat made the nation an excellent candidate for a foreign partnership with the United States.

Egypt's position as the political leader of the Arab World originated under former President Gamal Nasser, whose unifying pan-Arab rhetoric and decolonization of the Suez Canal earned the leader admiration throughout the Levant. After Nasser's death, Egypt continued to exert substantial cultural influence over its regional allies (Walker 1997, 148). This made the country an alluring associate, as even though a partnership with the West would likely reduce its political influence, Egypt held enough cultural capital that a treaty between itself and the Israelis could pave a path towards regional stability.

An American-Egyptian partnership also made economic sense. From an American perspective, Egypt had a highly productive agricultural system that could result in the US benefiting from foreign resource extraction (Weinbaum 1983, 640). Additionally, influence over the Suez Canal's functioning would serve not only American economic interests, easing the transport of oil from its partners in the Gulf, but also producing benefits for NATO allies, such as a continued Western presence in Egypt and a de-nationalized Suez Canal. By reabsorbing a country with a longstanding tradition of European control into its sphere of influence (Korany 1984, 50), the US would improve its relationship with its NATO allies.

From an Egyptian perspective, an economic partner as powerful as the US was attractive. After Nasser's failed attempts to create robust nationalised industries, a weak Egyptian economy required urgent investment. This was only expedited by the need to repair damage sustained during the October War, which would incur further costs for the state (Weinbaum 1983, 640). Sadat viewed liberalisation and considerable investment in infrastructure as essential to kickstart the Egyptian economy (Ibid). He viewed American aid as a crucial step to this goal's fulfilment, as Soviet promises of an equitable and efficient economy had been proved unfeasible through the constant underperformance attached to their patronage.

Finally, the changing face of Egyptian power increased the likelihood of a productive partnership between the two nations. Nasser saw the US as an amalgamation of imperialist and Zionist ideologies that pulled the string behind Israel's aggression and military dominance (Ibid). Sadat, Nasser's successor, held the United States in a far more favourable light.

First, Sadat did not hold the Soviet Union in the same esteem as his predecessor. This was largely due to failures in Egyptian foreign pol-

icy for which he felt the Soviet Union was responsible. These failures included the Soviets' delivery of poor intelligence in the build up to Egypt's 1967 war with Israel and their failure to endorse his hawkish disposition leading up to the October War in 1973. Sadat viewed the partnership more as a necessity to defeat Israel through the supply of qualitatively superior weapons than as one of friendship (Burns 1985, 175). This relationship worsened in 1971 after Sadat discovered a Soviet-backed plot to overthrow him (Ibid). Thus, in 1971, beneath the guise of cooperating with the Soviets, the groundwork for a closer Egyptian-American partnership began construction (Ibid). Repeated demonstrations by the Egyptian military were noticed by Kissinger, who correctly identified this swaggering as bombast designed to attract America's attention (Ibid, 176). Thus, Egypt was the ideal candidate to become America's Arab-liaison in the Middle East through economic, cultural, and political perspectives.

Second was his ideology regarding the Palestinian peace process. One of the core issues with Soviet-Arab relations was the perceived lack of leverage that the Soviet Union held over Israel (Ashley 2012). America's relationship with Israel demonstrated to Sadat that the US could induce concessions and provide equitable negotiations, thereby establishing the United States as a more strategically advantageous ally than the Soviet Union (Suri 2008).

Third was Sadat's personal opinion of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Sadat viewed Kissinger as a magician capable of building a new image of America in the Middle East due to Kissinger's other successful peace negotiations, such as with Mao in China (Suri 2008). He also respected the way in which the Jewish Kissinger utilized the antisemetic tropes through which he was depicted by leaders in the Arab World to elevate himself to near-mythic status as the leader of both American and Jewish foreign policy, thus making him the ultimate Zionist (Ibid).

Sadat additionally held an ideology regarding the Palestinian peace process. While Nasser believed that the eradication of Israel was the only way to help Palestinians, Sadat saw peace with Israel as a potential route toward securing Palestinian rights. Palestinian advocacy was a popular holdover from Nasser's Arab Nationalism, and failure to include their plight in policy would prove highly unpopular domestically. One of the core issues with Soviet-Arab relations was the perceived lack of leverage that the Soviet Union held over Israel (Ashley 2012). America's relationship with Israel demonstrated to Sadat that the US could induce concessions and provide equitable negotiations, thereby establishing the United States as a more strategically advantageous ally than the Soviet Union (Suri 2008).

Finally, the audience costs of negotiations between America and Egypt would enhance the negative consequences of failure on both sides. From an Egyptian perspective, if talks were public and failed, the already struggling Egyptian economy would lose crucial foreign aid from Arab and Soviet allies (Suri 2008). Meanwhile, public, unprompted negotiations with Egypt would damage the US' growing friendship with Israel. Outside of reversing the gradual progression of bi-national ties, the

loss of Israel's allyship would result in negative consequences for the US. Through a realist paradigm, it could produce another nuclear enemy, as Israel was assumed to have nuclear weapons by the 1970s and peace with Egypt could signal hostility to the Jewish state (Ibid). This would negatively affect the United States' ability to mitigate the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, a major diplomatic goal at the time (Ibid), as without a superpower ally, Israel would feel the need to maintain its material advantage. The year 1973 marked the end of the Vietnam War, which, through a constructivist paradigm, saw America's global psyche drastically affected through the communist usurpation of a "Westernised" state. The loss of another friend would weaken the Western sphere of influence and embolden the Soviets' ideological push (Ibid). The incorporation of Israel into a Soviet sphere would prove especially detrimental to American foreign policy, especially given the trust between the Knesset and Washington, as well as it's self proclaimed organisational strength, which required less involvement as compared to other developing nations. Israel's self-reliance was illustrated by its stable governing structure, which had existed as a de jure state during the Yishuv[1], and military power, which at the time seemed to require less investment than other, less-equipped nations (Lewis 1999, 367). The October War provided an opportunity for both nations to engage without fear of consequence, thus establishing

a relationship under the guise of ceasefire negotiations.

Involvement

America's strategy during the October War thus had to strike a balance between neutrality, so as to not feed into negative perceptions about its activities in the Arab world, and support for Israel, so as to not lose its main regional client. The United States also had to demonstrate a legitimate threat within the pacifist constraints of détente which was accomplished through swaggering. Neutrality was the official position taken by Nixon, who hoped that the belligerents would beat upon one another for a short period of time, leading to their eventual docility (Suri 2008). This neutrality included delayed aid shipments to Israel (Ibid), despite calls from Kissinger to immediately provide the Israelis with missiles and bomb racks (Burr 2003, art.18). This was neutrality in name only, as despite communicating with Cairo regarding peace terms (Ibid, art.20), the United States provided Israel with 11,000 tonnes of military supplies and loudly endorsed it on the international stage (Ibid, art.49). However, American posturing was sufficient to maximise bipartisan diplomatic influence, as Arab leaders turned to the US for peace after the tides of war turned in Israel's favour (Ashley 2012). Thus, despite failing to maintain the "low profile" desired by Nixon (Suri 2008), US involvement was appreciated in both Arab and Israeli circles.

Additionally, the US effectively utilised swaggering to peacefully demonstrate military superiority over the Soviet Union without becoming directly involved in the conflict. Amer-

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1 This was the pre-existing Jewish state which existed under Mandatory Palestine and consisted of informal structures or organize immigration and allocate funds.

ica's swaggering served as a reminder that it possessed, and was apparently ready to use, nuclear weapons. This strategy was pursued by setting the US' military stance to DEFCON 3, an increase in force readiness above that during peacetime (FAS 2022), justified in this case by pressure from the Soviet Union to de-escalate. In the context of the Cold War, this was a level of aggression that could quickly devolve into the use of nuclear force. Thus, the declaration of DEFCON 3 served a dual purpose for the US. First, it provided an offensive benefit, which to Israel solidified the notion that the US would defend it in military situations to the best of its strategic ability, as demonstrated by the Americans' willingness to enter a state of military preparedness in defense of their new ally (Ashley 2012). Meanwhile the Arab States were impressed by the United States' proclivity towards force (Ibid). The declaration also served a defensive purpose, as Kissinger claimed that the action was taken in opposition to the unilateral introduction of troops by any great power in the Middle East, painting Americans as peace-seekers on the world stage (Suri 2008). This declaration also undercut Soviet military influence, as America's defensive stance implied an offensive position by the Soviets and their deployment of troops; thus, the failure to produce any meaningful shift in the Middle East's balance of power further discredited the Kremlin and made the Soviet Union look weak (Ibid).

An important thing to note about America's involvement in the conflict is that it seemed to contradict its two primary interests in the region. In terms of maintaining relationships with NATO allies, Kissinger accused European countries of being "jackals" for their opposition to Israel, while America's relationship with Saudi Arabia was impacted by the 1973 oil embargo, in which the withholding of oil shipments from the Saudi's to America caused huge levels of inflation and greatly reduced production efficiency (Burr 2003, art.63). America's actions drew complaints from European nations, many of whom suffered the consequences of the oil embargo but lacked the economic and military resources to intervene directly (Sus 1974, 65). Thus criticisms of Israel were all the states could muster, with domestic populations taking the side of Israel, and the British population strongly opposing the calls for its destruction (Ibid, 70). In the wake of the Algerian civil war, anti-Arab demonstrations in France forced their government to either vocally endorse either Israel or neutrality (Ibid). Thus, NATO allies begrudgingly accepted American military intervention, despite their condemnations of Israel, under the condition that the US' actions lifted the oil embargo. The US believed that by supplying aid to Israel during the conflict, Egypt would be convinced to limit its advancements and disengage, correctly identifying that oil shipments would resume in the absence of active conflict (Burns 1985, 179). In addition, the US predicted that supplying aid would accelerate the conflict's conclusion and improve the equitability of any ceasefire arrangement (Ibid) A rapid conclusion to the conflict would also disincentivize further conflict-related embargoes, as the economic costs from a lack of oil exports would far outweigh the benefits of minimal Israeli concessions among OPEC nations.

. Thus, neither NATO relationships nor America's economic relationship would be worsened through involvement in the conflict.

Results

American foreign policy during the October War was successful, solidifying relationships with Egypt and Israel, while also establishing America as the Middle East's preeminent superpower. America's newfounded relationship with Egypt led to peace between Egypt and Israel, resulting in the former's re-acquisition of the Sinai desert and diplomatic channels between Cairo and Jerusalem. This relationship would also create benefits outside of peace, with Egypt becoming the second-largest recipient of US foreign aid (Weinbaum 1983, 5) and America using its new Arab ally to negotiate deals with Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War (Walker 1997, 150). Thus, the US, in its pursuit of regional involvement, successfully fulfilled its objective to create a second regional ally capable of advocating on its behalf to other Arab states.

America's mediation between Israel and Egypt was also a major diplomatic win for the former, fulfilling Israeli Prime Minister Ben Gurion's vision of a hegemonic power establishing peace between his country and its Arab neighbours (Lewis 1999, 365). American-Israeli relations also saw economic and military improvements after the conflict. The end of the October War marked the beginning of written American military assurances to Israel (Ibid, 367), with Kissinger stating further that the US would support Israeli military ventures *in extremis* (Lewis 1999, 367). In terms of eco-

nomic aid, after 1973, US yearly aid to Israel increased from 122 million USD a year to an average of 2.4 billion, passing the cumulative total which America provided to all Arab states. This underpinned the unbreakable bond between Israel and America which exists today, thus demonstrating the effectiveness of America's fulfillment of its goal of establishing and maintaining a relationship with Israel.

Finally, America's handling of the conflict allowed it to exert regional control while undermining Soviet foreign policy. Diplomatically, the peace negotiated between Israel and Egypt established America as a powerful arbitrator. As noted by Kissinger, "Everyone knows in the Middle East that if they want peace they have to go through us" (Suri 2008). The threat of nukes allowed the US to establish strategic control over the region by deterring Soviet encroachment and demonstrating superior military quality. The Soviet Union's failure to get directly involved incurred audience costs among its Arab allies, who had predicted a 75% chance of the Soviet Union's direct involvement (Scherer 1978, 3) and were frustrated by repeated failures to assist Arabs in recapturing the territory lost in 1967 (Ibid, 7), thus opening the door to clientelistic partnerships with the United States. It must be noted that a partnership which hinged on the threat of nuclear warfare to establish regional control would not have been sufficient for Arab states to view the US as a legitimate strategic partner. One of their core criticisms of the Soviet Union was what they perceived to be a blustering nature, which tended to exaggerate Soviet military capabilities. However, when observed in combination with

Israel's military success, the characterization of America as the region's greatest military presence was legitimised. Thus, the US could exert regional control and protect its other economic interests in the area.

In conclusion, when viewing America's involvement in the October War through the lens of a nation attempting to consolidate relationships with Egypt and Israel, establish regional control, and protect relationships with Saudi Arabia and NATO allies, the combination of purported arms shipments, swaggering and neutrality proved to be a successful military strategy.

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Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics

Riyana Karim-Hajiani, McGill University

Edited by Stevan Vujicic and Zach Brousseau

ABSTRACT

This essay aims to address the question of whether there is sufficient state practice to justify humanitarian intervention in the absence of a United Nations Security Council mandate, as required by international law. In the first portion, this essay presents the concept of humanitarian intervention, mapping its origins with reference to the views of Hugo Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Alberico Gentili until the emergence of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations. In the second portion, this essay deals with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) military intervention in 1999. Pointing to Kosovo, this essay concludes that there is sufficient state practice to justify the practice of humanitarian intervention in world politics since state practice sets a precedent for customary norms of international law.

Introduction

To what extent does international law allow for the use of force for unauthorized humanitarian intervention[1] and is there sufficient state practice to justify the assertion that a right to humanitarian intervention exists? Humanitarian intervention without United Nations (UN) Security Council authorization generates enormous debate regarding its legality and legitimacy in world politics. While unauthorized humanitarian intervention clearly contradicts *de jure*[2] black letter law under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, humanitarian concerns continues to be cited by states as a *de facto*[3] legitimate reason for using force. The UN Charter, ratified in 1945, is the "overriding public law of international society" (as cited in Fassbender 2009, 77). Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, states must refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against other states (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945, 3). This paper examines the conflict between the rules of international law and the legitimacy of state practice of humanitarian intervention, when the Security Council fails to

authorize action in the face of human suffering and rights abuses. I support the 'illegal but legitimate' line of reasoning as advanced by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) 1999 intervention in Kosovo; recognizing that because the law is not necessarily just, circumstances may allow for non-compliance with the law. I argue that despite the UN Charter Article 2(4) outlawing the use of force against sovereign states without Security Council approval, unauthorized humanitarian intervention is legitimate to the extent that it is consistent with a set of practices which are internationally recognized as legitimate, notwithstanding its consistency with written law that is enforced by judicial bodies. That states are justified in their use of force for humanitarian purposes because state practice sets a precedent for customary norms of international law, trumping treaty law[4] like Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. In combination with the political and moral norms of the international community, unauthorized intervention for humanitarian purposes in contemporary world politics is supported.

The Roots of Humanitarian Intervention

The present debate about unauthorized humanitarian intervention cannot be fully grasped without discussing the pre-UN Charter context on the use of force which contemporary international law is based upon. The study of humanitarian intervention is traced back to classical scholars of international law such as Grotius, Vattel, and Gentili (Rytter 2001, 125).

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1 Unauthorized humanitarian intervention refers to the use of force by a state or group of states or an international organization against another state, aimed at preventing or ending massive violations of the fundamental human right of individuals other than its own citizens ('strangers') or of international humanitarian law, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied and without the authorization of the UN's Security Council.

2 De jure describes a set of practices recognized by law as a matter of right or fact.

3 De facto describes a set of practices that is not recognized by law but is accepted as legitimate.

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4 Treaty law refers to written agreements of international law between consenting states and which has been ratified.

These legal theorists believed that a "war to rescue an oppressed people and to punish injustice was a just war" (Rytter 2001, 125). Vattel regards the independent sovereign state as an actor in international relations to which a 'law of nations' applies (Glanville 2013, 19). In this context, Vattel suggests a society of independent states to which European nations are members and to which this "law of nations" applies (Glanville 2013, 18). Consequently, European states are duty-bound to one another, requiring member states to respect positive law in addition to natural law. Positive law[5] obliges states to tolerate other states' behaviour so long as it does not infringe on the liberty and independence of others within the society, "no matter how 'illegal and condemnable' the offending state's actions" (Glanville 2013, 19). However, Vattel asserts that there is a right to intervene to rescue the oppressed that is based on a natural law of morality and justice. These views contradict the eighteenth-century principles of sovereignty and non-intervention, and illustrate the tension between the rule of non-intervention and the need to protect people from tyranny (Glanville 2013, 20). In this context humanitarian intervention appeared as a fully-fledged doctrine during the nineteenth century (Heraclides 2015, 23-25). Humanitarian intervention in the nineteenth century is understood as interference in another state's affairs despite the norms of non-intervention and sovereignty, "for

the purpose of vindicating the law of nations against outrage," or in the interests of humanity (Heraclides 2015, 24). For example, Britain, France, and Russia cited a 'humanitarian duty' to stop Turkish massacres of Greeks as the basis for their intervention in the Greek War of Independence (1827-1830) (Heraclides 2015, 24). However, this general acceptance of 'just war' shifted in the twentieth century, as principles of non-intervention hardened alongside the establishment of legal doctrines, including the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact (which attempted to prohibit the use of force in international relations) and the ratification of the UN Charter (the consequences of which are discussed below). Nevertheless, the desire to protect human rights in the international community did not fade. We now see the evolution of humanitarianism from a general duty against tyranny to an operation outside of the rules of black letter law which preserve sovereignty and non-intervention principles.

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter

In a classical interpretation of the UN Charter, Article 2(4) codifies the rule of non-force in public international law. However, there are two legal exceptions to the prohibition of force, one of which is found in Articles 39, 42, and 44. These articles grant the Security Council the power to authorize force in response to a threat to peace and security in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945). The application of Articles 39, 42, and 44 under Chapter VII in combination with Article 2(4), transfers a

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5 Positive law (otherwise called "Man's Law") refers to a set of rules which have been established by an authorized legislature in a political community made up of individuals and which does not claim to be derived from a natural set of principles.

state's previously held right to use force to the Security Council. Thus, Security Council-sanctioned intervention is unambiguously legal, provided it conforms to the Council's authority over "threats to international peace and security" (outlined under Chapter VII and Article 39) (Hurd 2011, 296). Otherwise, Article 2(4) clearly does not permit the use of force without a Security Council mandate. Accordingly, the Security Council is the sole UN organ with the authority to legalize the use of force.

This interpretation of Article 2(4) has been repeatedly upheld by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), exemplified by the Court's rejection of the United States's (US) 1986 application for humanitarian intervention in Nicaragua (International Court of Justice 1986). The Court stated that "while the United States might form its own appraisal of the situation as to respect for human rights in Nicaragua, the use of force could not be the appropriate method to monitor or ensure such respect," rendering the actions of the US in violation of international law because they occurred without permission from the Security Council (International Court of Justice 1986, 124; Rytter 2001, 133). Thus, unauthorized humanitarian intervention is not allowed according to the UN Charter's plain text.

However, this interpretation ignores other relevant considerations, such as the political and moral dimensions of law not considered in Article 2(4). Indeed, there are moral situations "in which the unilateral use of force to overthrow injustice begins to seem less wrong than to turn aside" and comply with the rules of law (Brenfors and Petersen 2001, 454). Further, since contemporary international relations

have been redefined by globalization, situations involving human rights violations are no longer categorized as the domestic affairs of a state. Rather, upholding human rights is a global concern, which suggests that Article 2(4) cannot be seen as the absolute legal rule with which we judge state practice.

State Practice and
Customary International Law

What qualifies as legitimate must be understood in the context of state practice, as when a "norm has been repeated in practice in the international community, so to be generally accepted, it becomes part of [customary] international law as a general principle" (Brenfors and Petersen 2001, 485). On this view, state practice trumps the treaty law that the UN Charter is based upon because it has the power to modify the legal rules against the use of force. However, in accordance with international legal theory, state practice must be accompanied by a subjective acceptance by the international community (formally called "*opinio juris*") in order to gain the status of customary rule (Wheeler 2001, 148-149). From a classical legal interpretation of the post-UN Charter period, *opinio juris* of unauthorized humanitarian intervention does not exist because the rule of non-force has been repeatedly upheld by various resolutions and declarations pertaining to non-intervention and sovereignty such as in the 1987 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations (Wheeler 2001, 149). I do not deny that these promotions of non-force show that *opinio juris* rejects the

right of unauthorized humanitarian intervention in the immediate post-UN Charter period. However, since the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, 'new interventionism' emerges wherein violations of Article 2(4) are no longer condemned by the Security Council and the broader international community as they previously were. Instead, intervention is largely endorsed by the international community (Brenfors and Petersen 2001, 486). This trend provides evidence of *opinio juris* that was previously absent from international law prior to the 1990s and which contradicts preceding resolutions and declarations of non-intervention and sovereignty as cited by the classical legalist view. Bearing this in mind, contemporary state practice must be viewed as setting new precedents of customary norms which alter the legally binding character of non-force under Article 2(4) and are supported by *opinio juris*.

NATO's 1999 Intervention in Kosovo

As stated, state practice in the post-Cold War period has established new customary norms in international law which support the legitimacy of unauthorized humanitarian intervention, irrespective of Article 2(4) (Morkyte 2011, 129). NATO's unauthorized humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1999 sets this precedent. In 1998, the Serbian military under the direction of President Milošević sent forces into the region, then a part of Serbia, in response to Kosovar insurgents. The government campaign ultimately proved to be an effort to ethnically cleanse the region of its majority Albanian Muslim population (Scharf 2013, 160).

The UN Security Council determined that the Serbian government was violating the human rights of the Kosovo-Albanian Muslims, which constituted a threat to international peace and security, so they called for the cessation of violence in three resolutions (Wheeler 2001, 145). However, the Security Council did not authorize the use of force because Russia threatened to veto any such attempt, because the country wanted to avoid setting a precedent for intervention in post-Soviet states (Scharf 2013, 160; Wheeler 2001, 145). Acting without authorization, NATO launched a series of aerial bombing attacks ("Operation Allied Force") (Scharf 2013, 161). NATO insisted that there was a legal justification for their use of force, reasoning that the Security Council determined that there was a threat to peace and security but failed to act (Scharf 2013, 162-164). Opposing actors argued that because no definite authorization had been extended, NATO had breached international law. Indeed, the NATO intervention was illegal, insofar as black-letter law prohibits the use of force outside the UN Charter's exceptions. Nevertheless, NATO successfully convinced the international community that their actions were consistent with the spirit of international law, irrespective of Article 2(4) (Wheeler 2001, 147). NATO's action was endorsed by the European Union, the Organization of Islamic States, and the Organization of American States with little public dispute over the necessity of the action to prevent more human suffering and rights violations – applying a political and moral perspective rather than one of *de jure* law (Scharf 2013, 165).

In response, Russia proposed that NATO's

action be condemned by the Security Council like previous instances of unauthorized intervention, but their plea was rejected (Brenfors and Petersen 2001, 496). Instead, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, which "put in place the foundations for the international civil and security presence in Kosovo that accompanied the end of hostilities," and can be interpreted as providing an after-the-fact authorization (Scharf 2013, 165). Therefore, I argue that Resolution 1244 provided *opinio juris* confirming the status of customary law. This is best illustrated by the International Commission on Kosovo's statement: "The Commission acknowledges that NATO's military intervention was illegal, though legitimate" (Zajadlo 2005, 36). From this point of view, NATO's Kosovo intervention was a turning point for customary international law.

Concluding Remarks

Throughout this essay, I have considered the legality of humanitarian intervention in the absence of the Security Council's approval as required by the UN Charter's Articles 39, 42, and 44 and in violation of Article 2(4)'s rule of non-intervention. Using NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, I have supported an 'illegal but legitimate' line of reasoning that allows for the conclusion that irrespective of Article 2(4), states are justified in their use of force for unauthorized humanitarian purposes. This is because state practice since the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union gives precedent for the development of customary norms of international law which characterizes contemporary international relations. Regarding Article 2(4),

despite illegality according to black-letter law, unauthorized humanitarian intervention is a legitimate state practice.

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Artistic Resistance:
A Comparative Perspective of Protest Art in Militarized Cities

Matthew Ruppert, Columbia University

Edited by Emily Matuska and Anna Hayes

ABSTRACT

With the rise of militarization, governments around the world are subjecting cities and their citizens to increasing levels of securitization and violence. These policies limit inhabitants' ability to use and control the urban spaces that they call home, a prominent theme in Lefebvre's right to the city, leading many inhabitants to push back. This paper considers the role of public art in the conflict over state encroachment, using case studies of Baghdad after the US invasion in 2003, Rio de Janeiro before and during the 2014 FIFA World Cup, and Minneapolis during the 2020 Black Lives Matter protests. In each of these cases, art plays a critical role in marking the city space with the grievances of the inhabitants and calls for social reform, reasserting the inhabitants' right to city space.

Introduction

Moments of urban restructuring, often initiated by state action, create the opportunity to dramatically alter the use of a city. In a modern context, after a large event that disrupts normalcy, the state will push for increased control and securitization by employing tactics of militarization, while the people will demand more personal autonomy. This struggle demonstrates Henri Lefebvre's conception of the 'right to the city.' Lefebvre argues that residents implicitly assert that "the city belongs to those who inhabit it;" thus, increasing the 'use value' of space must be given priority over the whims of a powerful state or increasing the 'market value' (Purcell 2014, 149; Lefebvre 1996, 167). This struggle between a domineering state and its inhabitants over public space is a global phenomenon. In 2003, the United States' invasion of Iraq changed Baghdad's understanding of public space and free movement, causing ripple effects that continue to this day. Similarly, in Rio de Janeiro, statewide cleansing and redevelopment in preparation for the 2014 World Cup also drastically altered the environment of the city. Moreover, in 2020 the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis sparked protests over power, policing, and the use of space. In this paper, I analyze these three case studies to explore militarism's encroachment on the inhabitants' right to the city, and the inhabitants' use of art to reclaim these rights. I argue that militarization employs violence to secure city space while art realigns that space with the sentiments of social movements, expressing grievances and making demands for the residents to have control over their city.

Militarized Encroachment on Space

Current theories of urban security demand state control, relying on and supporting increased levels of militarization. Militarization, in its urban context, is defined by Yaseen Raad (2017, 136) as "an *excessive deployment of security measures* to the point where it affects the everyday life of city dwellers" for the purpose of protecting the interests of powerful stakeholders. States support increased militarization by considering war to be everywhere and everyone to be a threat. Thus, these states "automatically translate difference into othering, othering into targeting, and targeting into violence," which significantly limits the inhabitants' right to the city as defined by Lefebvre (Graham 2009, 399-400). Not only are locals not seen as the rightful controllers of space, they are treated like hostile invaders. The state causes "everyday spaces, sites and infrastructures of cities—along with their civilian populations" to be threats, bringing "military ideas of the prosecution of, and preparation for, warfare into the heart of everyday urban life" (Graham 2009, 388). In the push for state control to 'secure' the city against threats, war is spread across urban space, targeting civilians and their space.

Violent militarization is used to claim space for activities deemed secure and appropriate by the state, using space to re-entrench state power and suppress social mobilization. When a city is militarized, the available "public space shrinks," reducing city-dwellers' access to areas where they may spend time collectively (Raad 2017, 135-136). Physical space has an important role in fostering social connections

and political movements, especially for those traditionally excluded from power (Purcell 2014, 149; Pyla 2013, 5). Thus, by the militarized state disrupting public space, the state undermines the ability of residents to form the bonds and connections necessary for collective action, thereby insulating the state from popular demands (Raad 2017, 137). More precisely, this occurs through "the extension of military ideas of tracking, identification and targeting into the quotidian spaces and circulations of everyday life" (Graham 2009, 385). Techniques of militarization that invade and occupy public space prevent inhabitants from generating social connections, engaging in collective action, and otherwise using the spaces as they wish. Other scholars have expanded on Lefebvre's conception of the 'right to the city,' asserting that the "right to the city is seen not just as a right to appropriation, participation, and difference but even more broadly as a *right to space,* the right to inhabit space" (Soja 2010, 108). Militarism, and the violent exclusion that it causes, violates the inhabitants right to space by suppressing residents' ability to use and benefit from the domain of their city. This militarization manifests itself in violence against the city's residents, as seen across Baghdad, Rio de Janeiro, and Minneapolis.

Militarization in Baghdad, Rio, and Minneapolis

Across the three cases, increasing militarism has impeded on citizens' right to the city. The 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq brought devastation, uncertainty, and terror to Baghdad. During the invasion, the city was a crucial site of conflict and in the occupation that followed, Baghdad became the focus of American military strategy and served as the main hub for their army. The U.S. military during its occupation from 2003 to 2011—and the subsequent governments they installed—implemented physical changes to secure the city. Perhaps most noticeably, the U.S. built walls, checkpoints, and barbed wire fences to segment the city and place it under permanent siege (Mehta 2013, 56). On Abu Nuwas Street, for example, the US used blockades ostensibly to protect the Westerners and regime officials staying in the hotels along the street. The United States' forces also restricted access to the riverbank next to the street in order to protect the Green Zone, an American military base, which sat across the river (Raad 2017, 141-142). These measures eliminated any remnants of the citizens' free access to the city. It also eliminated the nightlife that Abu Nuwas Street had previously been known for, depriving them of their traditional space for leisure and entertainment. In total, 44 walls and 50 fixed checkpoints, along with many other blockades, were erected across Baghdad during the U.S. occupation (Mehta 2013, 58). These barriers control the movement of the inhabitants, cutting off Baghdadis' access to their city under the guise of security. Iraqis were forced "to submit to a system of law enforcement that dehumanizes them as objects of war" as they were deemed to be security threats and subjected to arrests and violence for merely walking in their city (59). This militarization psychologically "unhom[es]" Baghdadis—creating an unwelcoming environment for locals (62). Both physical-

ly and psychologically, militarization caused by the US occupation of Baghdad has denied Baghdad's inhabitants control over their city space.

In Rio, destructive practices and special-access zones were similarly used to modify the city in preparation for the 2014 FIFA World Cup. The state and World Cup organizers' main priority was to portray an image of a safe, clean, and revitalized city to the world (Kassens-Noor and Ladd 2019, 52). Most of the planners of the city's redevelopment—politicians, city officials, investors, sponsors, and internationally based event organizers—were not, nor were they representative of, the inhabitants of Rio. Since, according to Lefebvre's theory, "it is the everyday experience of inhabiting the city that entitles one to a right to the city," this method of redevelopment calls into question the organizers' respect for the right to the city (Purcell 2014, 142, 150). Furthermore, this redevelopment plan mirrors militaristic ideology by labeling all residents as threats. In fact, the state used violence to move over 19,000 families, oftentimes by marking entire neighborhoods for destruction (Kassens-Noor and Ladd 2019, 53). This large-scale relocation undermines the right of the inhabitants of Rio to control and use their space. The effects were magnified for the homeless or poor because they are more easily cast as the 'other' by the powerful controllers of the state and made unwelcome in the city. During and before the World Cup, the police relied on consistent violence against homeless populations, including physical beatings and even burning homeless people's belongings in the streets, to remove them from tourist-heavy

areas (Kassens-Noor and Ladd 2019, 57). Additionally, the redevelopment efforts created new 'special access zones' for World Cup guests that city inhabitants, especially the homeless, were excluded from. The state instrumentalized bright lights, random searches, and arbitrary arrests to remove the homeless from these areas (Kassens-Noor and Ladd 2019, 53). Therefore, in the name of making visitors, sponsors, and players more welcome, violent acts were key in making the Rio locals unwelcome and powerless in their city

In the summer of 2020, militarization increased in Minneapolis, where the police behaved like an occupying military force in their city as the inhabitants' claim to space was wholly ignored and violently seized from them. Following the murder of George Floyd by an officer of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), Minneapolis—along with much of the United States—erupted into demonstrations over justice, policing, and structural racism. The MPD responded with escalatory violence. The police arrived at the protest grounds in Minneapolis in full riot gear and armored vehicles. They tear gassed crowds, shot rubber bullets, threw flash-bang grenades into crowds, conducted mass arrests, and used stun guns on people (Lee, Jarvie, and Hennessy-Fiske 2020). The state also employed violent police action to deny residents access to space. Violent suppression of residents' access to streets and parks also occurred because the state believed these areas could be forums for political action. Even though the protests were sparked by a system of violent, racist policing practices resulting in murder of George Floyd, agents of the state still

employed militaristic policing practices to secure property at the expense of public's rights to protest on their streets.

The Power of Art in Militarized Urban Contexts

Art as Reflecting Mass Politics

Art can be a political act that both reflects and influences popular sentiment. Protest art, defined in its broadest sense, includes graffiti, songs, murals and slogans. It has a unique ability to capture the subjective voices and experiences of participants in social movements, even in moments of political violence (Jonsson 2021, 514). Under the conditions of high militarization, art can recognize that spaces are modifiable, making them "targets for social and political action seeking justice and democratic human rights" and working to increase "their positive and/or decreas[e] their negative effects on our lives" (Soja 2010, 104). In 2019, the Sadoon Tunnel in Baghdad, a few blocks from Abu Nuwas Street, became a focal point of public art during anti-government protests that were violently repressed. During the occupation of Baghdad, the US built walls to permanently divide Baghdad along sectarian lines and established a government structure that did the same (Mehta 2013, 60). Protestors demanded an end to these divisions, in addition to the elimination of corruption. They also advocated for better social services, and independence from US and Iranian intervention (Bencks 2019). One specific target of the protests was the police presence, as demonstrated in a Sadoon Tunnel mural by Sinan Hussein showing a police officer in full riot gear standing with their back to the viewer. The riot shield the officer is holding shows the reflection of a clown face—revealing the officer to be a clown (Appendix Figure 1). This mural satirizes how laughable the police's claims to provide security were to the people of Baghdad. Rather than increasing safety, the police inflicted violence on Baghdadis. In a separate painting, the image of a tear gas canister is shown lodged in a bloody face next to the words "they killed my dream," showcasing the violent effects of the police's militarized response. Another mural, depicting a child painting a bright sun rising above a country house onto a fully armored officer's shield, casts the state as oblivious to inhabitants' needs and shows how militarization corrupts the innocence of children. In Baghdad, the artists capture and resist the political violence waged by the state by plastering the prominent walls of the Sadoon Tunnel with their pain and frustration. The artists were able to use and transform "aesthetic forms, discourses, and tactics produced by social movements and contribute to these movements' aesthetic repertoires and archives" (Léon 2018, 353-354). In comparison to art, other ways of communicating social change, such as history, political science, and journalism, are limited in their ability to portray the freedom and common emotion of a social movement (Jonsson 2021, 515). Protest art is less hampered because it is unmediated by state and media organizations; thus, artistic representations can more accurately demonstrate the demands and emotions of a social movement. In the case of Baghdad, the grief, anger, despair, and hope of the protestors was captured in the many murals lining the tunnel.

Moreover, art displayed publicly has the power to showcase demands of social movements by making them visible to the general populace. Public display in art means "artistic production can be immanent to the politics of social movements and…can exercise agency in shaping their meaning and direction" (Léon 2018, 372). In the context of state violence and militarism, art can play a crucial role in ensuring people can see, recognize, and condemn this violence in all its forms by providing alternatives to state narratives that would otherwise gloss over the violence and diminish their role in it (354). For instance, in the wake of the release of information about American officers torturing Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison, a Salaheddin al-Sallat painted a mural depicting this torture. In the mural, a hooded prisoner attached to electrical wires stands on one side of the mural while a hooded and cloaked Statue of Liberty figure stands on the other side. In the mural, the Statue of Liberty's hand that traditionally holds the tourch is instead poised to touch controls that will send electricity coursing through the prisoner. By implicating the US in the perpetuation of violence against Iraqis, the mural serves to condemn and acknowledge the role of influential foreign actors in this violence. This mural speaks to the pain inflicted on the inhabitants of Baghdad, reflecting popular anti-US sentiments and reminding viewers of who is responsible for such heinous acts of violence. Social activist murals do not necessarily contain an explicit demand or call to action, but each uses the public nature of the mural to push back against state power and its false narratives. The murals identify the culprit of vio-

lence and oppression even when the powerful would rather ignore it, expressing "the anguish of an aggressed nation that nevertheless exposes its resistance through the resilience of the creative spirit" (Mehta 2013, 57).

Urban art also operates by marking the quotidian spaces of the city with messages and demands, indicating how "political violence is structurally inherent to the city's present social and spatial order," and not just in well-known locations (Léon 2018, 363). Even before the 2019 protest movement in Baghdad, one artist drew regime attention after painting murals in regular places across the city focusing on the violence faced by children. In one mural, a child is depicted with his hands on the back of his head next to the words "don't shoot me" written in English. This mural conveys the terror caused by the militarization of everyday life in Baghdad, and it demands a different method of security. Another mural showed four children, three of which were holding guns, next to the words "What do you want to become?" followed by an array of question marks. This mural asserts that the future of Baghdadi children is at risk due to widespread militaristic violence. The question "What do you want to become?" written on the wall in the mural seems to be directed at the children in the mural, but the question also asks adult viewers what kind of space, city, country, they want their children to grow up in. This demonstrates how routine the violence in Baghdad has become and it ensures that artistic resistance becomes enmeshed in everyday life.

In Rio de Janeiro, residents utilized art to demonstrate that the World Cup investment and

militaristic street clearing designed to showcase security and cleanliness to the world was undertaken by the state without regard to the inhabitants of the city. The focus of Rio de Janeiro's leaders on improving the city's appearance often manifested itself in the destruction of favelas, or working-class neighborhoods at Rio's periphery, and the removal of homeless people (Kassens-Noor and Ladd 2019, 52). In one mural, a child wearing a Brazilian soccer uniform cries next to a soccer ball with a skull on it. On the other side of the child are depictions of a home and a family crossed out with blood and written at the top of the mural is "They will destroy our community for the World Cup" (Appendix Figure 2). This mural addresses the plight of children, calling attention to the destructive spatial practices of the World Cup preparations. In this mural, there is no separating the game of soccer from the violence and destruction occurring, thus co-opting the imagery of the World Cup to bring awareness to Rio's struggles and their causes. Another mural turns a soccer ball into a bulldozer, tearing through an entire neighborhood to make way for a red carpet. This mural intimates that soccer and its glitzy stars have taken priority over the inhabitants of Rio de Janeiro, and that leaders of the World Cup are to blame for the violence. Another mural of the Brazilian flag with the word "Sold" written on it dripping red paint, reinforces the plight of the community subjected to changes made to benefit those with capital investments. This mural suggests that while Rio's residents were fighting to save their homes and spaces for themselves, the state and international investors tried to eliminate their presence to make room for the World Cup and its attractions. This is why "the right to the city is understood to be a struggle to augment the rights of urban inhabitants against the property rights of owners'' (Purcell 2014, 142). Inhabitants need control of the city for themselves, rather than relinquishing it to the highest bidder. This, however, is made more difficult by state interventions focused on security rather than social support.

In Rio de Janeiro police violence not only directly aided the foreign capital holders but, perhaps more insidiously, also diverted resources away from the public inhabitants. Another mural depicts the World Cup mascot firing a rifle next to a demand for "education not repression," making it clear that protestors see the priorities of the state as misplaced. Stencil paintings on the street reading "less jails, more schools, demilitarization, less weapons, more health" next to a chalk outline of a body reinforces this point. In these murals, there is clear linkage between the militarization of the city, which brings harm in and of itself, and the decline in social services, which lead to protestors using the street space to demand better treatment of Rio's inhabitants. The murals denounce the state's guise of security and cleanliness to rationalize militarization. Put bluntly by another mural, the demands of the people were simple: "FIFA Go Home". The street art of Rio demanded that the city be controlled by and for its inhabitants rather than the destructive forces of the state. By marking the city, protest artists subverted the state's obsession with outward appearance by making the art and its accompanying social grievances and demands inter-

Art as Demanding the Right to the City

In the context of city space, public art marks the space, asserting the people's right to use the area away from the militaristic state's incursions. In broader terms, art can be used to protect the right to the city. Art can be used to modify the meaning of prominent buildings, walls, and spaces, often subverting the state or official narrative of domination (Edelman 1996, 75). The Turkish Restaurant building, located just above Sadoon Tunnel became a symbol of the protest movement in Baghdad (Reuters Baghdad 2019). In Sadoon Tunnel, side by side murals demand "Iraq for Iraqi people" and showcase the Turkish Restaurant building draped with an Iraqi flag and filled with triumphant people. The message of this mural is clear: rejecting control of Iraq by foreign powers or an unrepresentative government. By marking this building as belonging to and representing the Iraqi people, the mural of the Turkish Restaurant building showcased what could be. Another mural depicting the Turkish Restaurant building shows a motorized rickshaw, an unofficial symbol of the protest movement, circling the Turkish Restaurant with an Iraqi flag trailing behind. Sitting just below where the building actually stood, these murals create a hopeful interpretation of the building as a new home for the Iraqi people and a place for celebration without the interference of the state. This building is claimed on behalf of the protestors, who wish to push militarization out of all of Baghdad so they can claim the city space for the inhabitants.

In Minneapolis in 2020, police desperately wanted to maintain the status quo against demands for changes in social structure and art was used to claim space free from state control. In an increasingly militarized city, violence and surveillance were key aspects of the MPD's attempt to enforce 'public order' and 'security.' In response, residents used physical barriers and symbolic markers to claim the intersection where George Floyd was murdered as an autonomous, de-militarized zone for people to mourn and protest, naming the space George Floyd Square (Bella 2021). Within this square, the site of Floyd's death had been marked with the painted silhouette of a figure. In addition, at the time of the protests, the square was transformed into a multi-functional community space; food was sold or given away, a first aid clinic was established, and protestors gathered in large numbers. In contrast to Lake Street eight blocks away where most of the violence occurred and protestors clashed nightly with the police, George Floyd Square was clearly marked as a place claimed by and for the inhabitants. Hung up in the square was a black sign saying "Reclaim a Sense of Space," with a drawing of a flower that had "healing" and "community" written on the leaves. Hence, George Floyd Square was demarcated as a place of community for the residents and protestors, away from the violent encroachments of the police. At the entrance, a graffitied traffic sign was modified to read "No cops" and "Residents Only". Although there was no significant physical barrier to entry on foot, these artworks work on a psychological level to bar the space for some and grant access for others.

As Raad states, this distinction "is about how someone enters a space even if not physically barred from it and is conditioned by feelings of receptivity, welcome and/or comfort or by the lack of these feelings" (2017, 137).

In George Floyd Square, the reversal of traditional power politics of space was facilitated through art. The marginalized and their allies were welcomed with "Black Lives Matter" plastered everywhere and food, and flowers covering numerous memorials. Meanwhile, the military mechanisms of the state were barred by combative signs and defund the police sentiments. Emphasizing this reversal, concrete barricades placed by the state were painted in bright colors with words like "power," "peace," "get free," and "stop the violence". When the permanent police barricades around the George Floyd Square blocking vehicle traffic were removed, people replaced them with tables, a wine-rack, and other household items. These items indicated that the police were no longer allowed to impose or remove segmentation on the street because the people were in charge of the space. Art made this separation between inhabitants—users of the space—and the police—agents of the state—explicit. Painted in bright block letters on the street were the words "Know Justice, No Street" and on the bus stop "No Justice, No Streets". Since the protestors have taken the space from the state, this demand announces the requirements protestors placed on the state in order to relinquish the space. One of the most prominent messages in the square was written on the gas station canopy and read: "Where There's **People** there's **Power**" . This statement is bigger than just

George Floyd Square. The writing looks over all of the square, reminding the world that everyday people have the ability to control space and impact the political realm as they see fit.

Quotidian art advocates for inhabitants to enjoy their full right to the city, by marking and controlling the daily and mundane urban spaces; this, however, does not always have to use the exact same tactics or achieve the same goals. In Rio and Baghdad, the art focused more on attracting attention about violations of spatial rights, both from inside the city and from abroad than the art in George Floyd square did. This is likely because Sadoon Tunnel in Baghdad was already prominent before the murals and Rio was hosting an incredibly prominent international event. This desire to attract attention in Baghdad and Rio resulted in the creation of large murals as opposed to the artwork of signs and smaller graffiti in Minneapolis. While all three represented and influenced the protest movements they were a part of, the intended scale of audience was potentially different. Instead of focusing on attracting attention from the city and abroad, the art of George Floyd Square placed a greater emphasis on claiming space and marking its boundaries. By associating space, both quotidian and famous, with the symbols, images, and messages of a social movement, art has the power to make the spaces in each of these three cities work for the citizens who live there.

Conclusion
As the state militarizes space—enclosing it, dividing it, securitizing it—and wages violence on its inhabitants, political art gains importance

as a method to fight state control. Public art becomes a potent tool for social movements to express their grievances and demands, make statements, and then claim space. In Baghdad, the divisionary blast walls of a foreign occupier were co-opted as a canvas for protest and a central tunnel displayed the demands and hopes of a budding protest movement. In Rio, where livelihoods were targeted for destruction, residents used art to demand the prioritization of their needs. In Minneapolis, a space where the presence of racialized policing cost George Floyd his life and where the MPD continued to seek control, George Floyd Square was transformed by art into a community centre where the state held little power. In all these places, systemic harm and state control was challenged by art that subverted hierarchies and undermined militarism. Whereas militarism uses fear to justify state encroachment on the right to the city, art relies on hope and captures inhabitants' support to defend this right.

Appendix

Figure 1. A police officer in riot gear is reflected in their shield as a clown. Sinan Hussein. Located in Sadoon Tunnel, Baghdad, Iraq. Photographed by Alex MacDonald.


Figure 2. A crying child wears the Brazilian National Team Uniform. To his right a soccer ball with a skull in it. To his left a symbol for home and family are crossed off in blood. The words above read "They will destroy our community for the World Cup." Meteo Mangueira. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Photographed and translated by Voice Project.

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
Nouvelle dynamique militaire du Japon et conséquences sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est

Thibault Jacquemont, Université de Montréal

Edited by Sophia Khiavi and Zach Broussard

RÉSUMÉ

Depuis maintenant une dizaine d'années, le Japon se tourne vers une nouvelle dynamique militaire, à l'encontre de la tradition pacifiste que la péninsule nippone semblait respecter depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Quelles pourraient alors être les conséquences de la nouvelle dynamique militaire japonaise sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est ? Cet article tente ainsi de proposer une réponse structurée, s'appuyant sur les communications officielles des États de la région en termes militaires et diplomatiques, ainsi que sur les analyses avancées par certains auteurs et organismes universitaires et académiques pertinents. L'argument principal du présent écrit est d'affirmer que le Japon tente d'assurer un rééquilibrage des puissances en Asie de l'Est, notamment vis-à-vis de son voisin chinois. Pour ce faire, le Japon s'appuie sur trois piliers principaux : un renforcement de ses capacités militaires par augmentation progressive de son budget de défense, une réassurance de son alliance avec les États-Unis pour s'assurer un avantage à court et moyen terme face à la montée de la Chine et une diversification de ses partenariats stratégiques dans la région pour développer son autonomie stratégique en Asie de l'Est à plus long terme.

Introduction

Héritier d'une dynamique pacifiste au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le Japon se tourne de plus en plus vers une logique de contournement de l'Article 9 de sa constitution, stipulant qu'« il ne sera jamais maintenu de forces terrestres, navales et aériennes, ou autre potentiel de guerre » sur le territoire nippon. Le Japon a ainsi observé une augmentation continue de ses dépenses militaires depuis 2012, avec un tournant important en 2021, le parti Libéral Démocrate s'engageant à faire passer le budget militaire annuel du Japon à 2% de son Produit Intérieur Brut (PIB), soit presque le double du budget actuel (Forbes 2021). Ses forces armées figurent ainsi aujourd'hui au nombre de celles qui sont les mieux équipées au monde (CIA World Factbook 2022). Allié majeur des États-Unis dans une région où les risques d'escalade s'intensifient, le Japon constitue alors un acteur important des dynamiques sécuritaires en Asie de l'Est. Il se voit ainsi impliqué directement dans les « situations de zone grise » comme aux îles Senkaku/Diaoyu, et indirectement dans les tensions autour du Taïwan. Il s'agira alors de répondre à la question suivante: quelles seront les conséquences de la nouvelle dynamique militaire japonaise sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est ? Nous émettons l'hypothèse que la stratégie militaire de plus en plus affirmée du Japon mènera à terme à une pacification de la région, les acteurs locaux ayant davantage intérêt à conserver un *statu quo* qu'à entrer dans un conflit armé en raison d'un phénomène de rééquilibrage des puissances. Pour vérifier la validité de cette hypothèse, il s'agira tout d'abord d'analyser l'évolution de la stratégie militaire du Japon au cours des dernières années et ses conséquences observées sur la stabilité régionale, puis les nouvelles orientations de la stratégie militaire nippone et leurs conséquences prévisibles sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est.

Historique antimilitariste de l'après-guerre et rôle des menaces extérieures dans la normalisation de la défense nippone

Au-delà de la constitution pacifiste du Japon, certains principes politiques, fondés ou non sur cette constitution, ont été définis au cours de l'histoire nippone récente. Ils sont alors révisables à la discrétion du gouvernement (Gustafsson 2020, 512). Par exemple, en 1954, le principe de non-usage de la légitime défense collective a été décrété, puis en 1967, trois principes non-nucléaires ont été définis et en 1976, le budget de défense a été limité à 1% de son PIB. Toutefois, l'évolution des menaces extérieures a été vectrice de normalisation de cette défense nippone. On peut ainsi affirmer que « tout au long de son histoire moderne, le schéma récurrent de la géopolitique japonaise a consisté à adapter le système politique du Japon pour répondre aux conditions de l'environnement international » (Pyle 2018, 75). En s'adaptant au contexte international, le Japon tente ainsi de trouver et défendre sa sécurité nationale et sa capacité de projection militaire dans la région pour la défense de son territoire et d'agentivité plus importante dans la région est-asiatique. Dans l'après guerre-froide, les menaces régionales ont en effet été instrumentalisées pour justifier un renforcement des capacités militaires de la péninsule dans le cadre de l'alliance avec les États-Unis. Par exemple,

la menace Nord coréenne, illustrée par la crise nucléaire de 1993-1994, a justifié le développement d'un système multicouche de défense anti-missile. La menace chinoise, illustrée par la modernisation rapide de l'Armée populaire de libération et l'opacité de la stratégie militaire de la Chine (Cabinet du premier ministre 2010), justifient un renforcement de l'Alliance nippo-américaine. Celle-ci marquée par l'alignement du Japon sur son allié avec un engagement en faveur de la résolution des différends autour de Taïwan (Office of Secretary of Défense 2010). Plus récemment, le Japon a exprimé de vives inquiétudes face aux mouvements de la garde côtière chinoise aux alentours des îles Senkaku, dénonçant des tentatives unilatérales de changer le *statu quo* par la coercition (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 3). Ainsi, en 2020, les activités de gardes-côtes chinois dans cette zone ont été menées pendant 333 jours par un total de 1161 navires (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 3). La Chine y applique en effet la technique dite du « Salami » , consistant à mener des actions militaires prévisibles et répétées dans une zone, pour éviter toute réaction massive tout en légitimant progressivement une influence sur le territoire revendiqué (Couveinhes 2018, 666). La Chine tente ainsi de banaliser la présence quasi-permanente de ses gardes-côtes tout en exerçant des droits de police maritime dans l'objectif d'entériner une prise de contrôle *de facto* (Patalano 2020). On assiste également à la militarisation de ces garde-côtes, placés depuis 2018 sous la direction de la Commission militaire centrale et autorisés depuis février 2021 à faire feu sur des bâtiments militaires de pays

étrangers (NHK World Japan 2021). De plus, le Japon continue à dénoncer le manque de transparence de la politique de défense chinoise (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 17) et s'inquiète de l'importante croissance du budget militaire de son voisin, atteignant au moins 250 Mds\$ par an, soit cinq fois le budget japonais (IRIS 2021).

Ensuite, le Japon a exprimé, dans son livre blanc, de vives inquiétudes face au développement d'armes nucléaires tactiques et de capacités nucléaires de la Corée du Nord (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 4). Ainsi, les défilés d'octobre 2020 et de janvier 2021 présentaient entre autres un nouveau missile balistique de classe ICBM et un nouveau missile à lancement sous-marin (SLBM). De plus, la Corée du Nord a rompu, le 24 mars 2022, le moratoire qu'elle respectait depuis 2017, en lançant un missile balistique intercontinental (ICBM) arrivé en zone maritime économique exclusive du Japon (Le Journal de Montréal 2022).

D'autre part, le Japon dénonce une tendance à l'augmentation de l'activité des forces armées et nucléaires russes à proximité de son territoire. En décembre 2020, le ministère russe de la Défense a en effet annoncé le déploiement complet du système de missiles sol-air S-300V4 dans les îles Kunashiri et Etorofu, revendiquées par les deux parties. Ce même mois, des bombardiers russes Tu-95 ainsi que des bombardiers chinois H-6 ont également effectué des vols conjoints, de la mer du Japon à la mer de Chine orientale et à l'océan Pacifique (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 20). Enfin, le 14 avril 2022, la flotte russe du Pacifique a testé des missiles Kalibr dans la mer

du Japon durant des opérations conjointes nippo-américaines dans la zone (Le Monde 2022).

Ainsi, ces menaces extérieures et la manière dont elles sont considérées ont justifié, et justifient encore aujourd'hui, une normalisation de la défense nippone. Bien que toujours assez éloignée des forces militaires « classiques » de nombreux autres États, la défense japonaise tend à se développer de plus en plus vers une logique d'autonomie stratégique et de réalisation de son principe de défense collective. La tradition pacifiste japonaise après la Seconde Guerre mondiale et sa militarisation récente, lente et dissimulée, permettent toutefois à la péninsule de ne pas nourrir une course à l'armement avec ses voisins, et de conserver des rapports diplomatiques avec les principaux acteurs régionaux.

Bilan des dépenses et des objectifs militaires du Japon

Déjà caractérisées par leur perfectionnement technologique, les forces armées japonaises disposaient en 2010 du cinquième budget mondial, équivalent au budget allemand, avec des capacités humaines de 230.000 hommes, très peu face aux 1.6 millions de soldats chinois et au million d'hommes nord-coréens (IISS 2010). Leur point fort était maritime, avec 149 bâtiments, 16 sous-marins, un tonnage équivalent à la marine française, avec une expertise de grande qualité en déminage sous-marin et en lutte anti-sous-marine (IISS 2010). Limité depuis 1976 au seuil de 1% du PIB, le budget de défense s'est envolé avec la croissance d'après guerre du Japon, puis est entré dans une phase de réduction continue à partir de 2002 (Pajon

2011, 129). Les nouvelles orientations de défense (New Defense Program Guidelines) publiées le 17 décembre 2010 marquent la fin de la posture militaire héritée de la guerre froide, avec l'annonce de la mise en place de forces plus mobiles, dissuasives, aptes à intervenir dans le cadre d'opérations internationales (Pajon 2011, 130). Dans cette logique, la Stratégie de Sécurité Nationale (NSS), élaborée en décembre 2013, précise que le Japon cherche à assurer sa propre sécurité, ainsi que la paix et la stabilité de la région dans une approche de « contribution proactive à la paix » (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 23). Le Ministère de la Défense a ainsi annoncé qu'il allait solliciter un budget additionnel record de 773,8 Mds de yens japonais pour l'exercice 2021/2022 (Le Figaro 2021), augmentation justifiée par l'ensemble des menaces extérieures décrites précédemment. Ce budget additionnel doit couvrir les frais d'achat de missiles d'interception, de 12 avions de chasse F-35, d'hélicoptères et de torpilles sous-marines (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 24). Plus largement, les forces armées japonaises comptent, en 2022, 309.000 hommes en activité. Ainsi, d'après la formule GFP, la puissance militaire actuelle du Japon serait comparable à celle de la France, de la Corée du Sud ou encore de l'Inde.

Concernant la question des îles Senkaku, des centaines d'hommes ont été déployés sur les îles Ryukyu voisines avec des batteries de missiles antinavires et de missiles sol-air de type 3 à portée intermédiaire (Asia Maritime Transparence Initiative 2020). Ces nouvelles capacités visent à dissuader la Chine de maintenir des gardes-côtes ou d'autres bâtiments au

large des îles Senkaku et, indirectement, à rassurer les États-Unis (Akita 2021, 3). Au sujet de Taïwan, le Japon adopte une approche d'affirmation de son implication régionale croissante (IRIS 2021), réaffirmant ainsi l'importance de « stabiliser la situation autour de Taïwan pour la sécurité du Japon et la stabilité de la communauté internationale » (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 23). Le 27 août 2021, les représentants de l'État nippon se sont ainsi rendus à Taïwan pour renforcer la coopération militaire avec les États-Unis (IRIS 2021), s'engageant également à organiser des exercices en commun avec les gardes-côtes Taïwanais. Cet événement illustre la dynamique multilatérale de la péninsule et sa logique d'avancées militaires prudentes dans une logique de limitation d'une militarisation régionale globale. Le vice-premier ministre japonais a également déclaré qu'une invasion chinoise de Taïwan serait un acte grave qui menacerait l'existence même de l'État japonais (IRIS 2021). Enfin, pour outrepasser les limitations constitutionnelles empêchant les gardes-côtes japonais de réaliser toute intervention à l'étranger, le parti libéral démocrate a jugé que ceux-ci ne dépendaient pas du ministère de la Défense mais du Ministère de la Police (IRIS 2021).

Bilan de la stratégie diplomatique du Japon: Alliances et partenariats stratégiques

Face aux menaces extérieures grandissantes, le Japon mène une stratégie de contrepoids, faisant la promotion d'une coopération de sécurité régionale, mêlant partenariats stratégiques, approche inclusive, partenaires européens et minilatéralisme au sein du dialogue stratégique quadrilatéral avec les États-Unis, l'Inde et l'Australie (Pajon 2021, 18). L'objectif du Japon est ainsi de décourager l'aventurisme chinois dans la lignée de la stratégie pour un Indo-Pacifique libre et ouvert, comme annoncée par le Premier ministre Abe Shinzo en 2016 (Pajon 2019). Il s'agit également de façonner un ordre régional basé sur des normes contraignantes pour Pékin, s'appuyant sur un récit alternatif au projet chinois des Nouvelles routes de la soie. Avec les États-Unis, il s'agit pour le Japon de renforcer l'alliance préexistante qui lui offre un avantage stratégique face aux menaces extérieures. Les deux acteurs réalisent ainsi des exercices interarmes conjoints pour renforcer leur coordination en cas de scénarios de crises autour des îles Senkaku. Le gouvernement Suga a ainsi obtenu la réassurance par l'administration Biden que les îles Senkaku se trouvaient sous protection du traité de sécurité bilatéral (Pajon 2019). De plus, les deux pays ont réaffirmé que l'alliance nippo-américaine continuerait de constituer « la pierre angulaire de la paix, de la sécurité et de la prospérité dans la région indo-pacifique » (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 1). Toutefois, face au constat du déclin relatif des États-Unis dans la région, le Japon tente de gagner en autonomie en renforçant ses propres capacités, comme décrit précédemment, mais aussi en diversifiant ses partenaires. Cette nouvelle dynamique nippone ne réjouit pas le partenaire américain, qui voit naître de multiples organisations internationales et coopérations informelles indépendantes de son giron diplomatique. On assiste ainsi du côté américain à une stratégie d'incarnation de l'acteur central, seul en capacité de

rivaliser avec le géant chinois. On assiste ainsi progressivement à l'avènement d'un discours de bipolarisation chino-américain à la Maison Blanche, et à l'emploi de manœuvres diplomatiques symboliquement fortes, telles que la visite de Nancy Pelosi à Taïwan en 2022.

Ainsi, des liens étroits ont été progressivement tissés et renforcés avec d'autres acteurs de la région, notamment l'Australie, l'Inde et la Corée du Sud, ainsi qu'avec des pays du Sud-Est asiatique dans une logique de protection des routes maritimes rejoignant le Japon par le Sud (Pajon 2011, 138). Le Japon coopère également activement avec d'autres acteurs partageant sa vision d'un Indo-Pacifique libre et ouvert (FOIP), notamment des pays européens tels que le Royaume-Uni, la France et l'Allemagne, ainsi que la Nouvelle-Zélande et le Canada (Ministère de la Défense du Japon 2021, 2).

Ces différentes alliances et partenariats stratégiques illustrent ainsi l'entrecroisement des enjeux sécuritaires et économiques dans les logiques stratégiques du Japon. Le tournant militariste du Japon, engagé à partir du début des années 2010 et renforcé en 2021, avec l'annonce d'un doublement de son budget de défense, joue ainsi un rôle clé dans la détermination des perspectives à venir pour la Sécurité en Asie de l'Est.

Perspectives à venir pour la Sécurité en Asie de l'Est

Certaines voix ont dénoncé une tendance inquiétante pour l'équilibre régional après l'annonce du doublement à venir du budget de la défense du Japon (AFP 2021). Cette augmentation mettrait en effet le pays au même niveau que le chiffre exigé des membres de l'OTAN selon le parti libéral démocrate. Pour certains, cette nouvelle dynamique militariste du Japon pourrait accélérer la course aux armements dans la région (IRIS 2021). Il s'agira alors de vérifier cette hypothèse et plus, de déterminer les conséquences de la nouvelle dynamique de défense du Japon sur le sécurité en Asie de l'Est. Cela se fera par l'analyse de l'avenir de l'alliance nippo-américaine, puis par l'étude de l'influence à venir des partenariats stratégiques du Japon, et enfin par la détermination des perspectives à venir de la position relative de la Chine en Asie de l'Est et ses conséquences sur la sécurité dans la région.

Implications à venir des États-Unis dans la région et conséquences sur l'alliance nippo-américaine et sur la sécurité en Asie de l'Est

Au début de la présidence Trump, l'ancien chef d'état major des forces d'auto-défense terrestres du Japon, Ryoichi Oriki, a affirmé que le japon devait abandonner l'idée d'un soutien indéfectible des États-Unis, le Japon devant, selon lui, se préparer à voir les Américains s'éloigner de la péninsule nippone (Seisaku Shinkutanku 2017, 17). Cette nouvelle affirmation a été défendue par l'ancien ambassadeur Shinichi Kitaoka, disant craindre que la défense américaine de l'ordre international libéral et du système de marché libre ne change de forme, incitant le Japon à réfléchir aux modalités de ce changement et aux solutions de politique étrangère et de sécurité à adopter en conséquence (Institute for International Policy Studies 2017, 3). Face à ce constat, le Japon semble ainsi diri-

ger l'avenir de sa stratégie de défense vers une double logique de renforcement de son alliance avec les États-Unis d'une part et, d'autre part, de développement de son autonomie stratégique, de ses capacités militaires, et de ses partenariats dans la région. La péninsule nippone estime en effet que cette alliance américaine reste indispensable pour assurer sa propre défense et la stabilité en Asie de l'Est, notamment à court et moyen terme (Samuels et Wallace 2018, 707). La relation « vainqueur-vaincu » d'après-guerre est toutefois révolue, elle a laissé place à une réelle alliance entre deux acteurs clés de la sécurité dans la région. Les deux alliés font aujourd'hui face à une rupture de l'équilibre des puissances engendrée par la montée rapide de la Chine, il s'agit alors pour le Japon d'assurer un renforcement de sa relation bilatérale privilégiée avec les États-Unis pour assurer un rééquilibrage des puissances et ainsi augmenter le coût de toute agression militaire de la part de la République Populaire de Chine. Dans l'hypothèse où la dynamique militariste du Japon se poursuit à un rythme élevé et que les États-Unis maintiennent à court et moyen termes leur engagement sécuritaire dans la région, cette stratégie devrait aider le Japon à maintenir la sécurité dans la région. Plus précisément, le renforcement annoncé de l'alliance nippo-américaine devrait avoir certaines implications dans des situations de crise actuelles en Asie de l'Est. Ainsi, alors que les tensions autour de Taïwan atteignent un nouveau pic, Tokyo a été pressé par Washington de clarifier son soutien à Taipei, notamment à travers le *Taiwan Relations Act* (Mizorogi et Kato 2021). De plus, la déclaration conjointe ayant suivi la rencontre Biden-Suga, la première déclaration nippo-américaine mentionnant Taïwan depuis 1969, a envoyé un signal politique fort à l'égard de la chine concernant l'avenir de la sécurité dans la zone Taïwanaise et, plus largement, dans la région Est-Asiatique (Pajon 2021, 23). Cette déclaration conjointe reflète également une concession japonaise à son allié américain, mais laisse présager une implication bilatérale forte pour assurer l'avenir de la stabilité sécuritaire régionale.

Ainsi, malgré une perte de puissance relative des États-Unis en Asie de l'Est, le renforcement de l'alliance nippo-américaine à court et moyen terme devrait assurer une domination militaire des deux acteurs dans l'optique d'une stabilisation sécuritaire dans la région. À plus long terme, le Japon devrait toutefois s'orienter vers une politique étrangère plus indépendante du giron américain (Pyle 2018, 78), illustrée par une multiplication des alliances et partenariats stratégiques avec les acteurs en présence partageant la vision d'une région Indo-Pacifique libre et ouverte.

Rôle des partenariats stratégiques et implications sur la Sécurité future de l'Asie de l'Est

En établissant de nouveaux partenariats stratégiques et en renforçant ceux déjà existants, le Japon espère consolider sa flexibilité stratégique, voire atteindre une autonomie stratégique (Samuels et Wallace 2018, 708). Dans cette logique, le « losange » du Quad constitué avec les États Unis, l'Inde et l'Australie et axé sur la zone Indo-Pacifique constitue en quelque sorte une réponse à la vision chinoise

du « One Belt, One Road », une stratégie de développement mondiale d'infrastructures par la Chine, et des initiatives parfois agressives qui l'accompagnent, avec entre autres la stratégie du collier de perle. Cette stratégie militaire chinoise consiste à mettre en place différents points d'appui le long de la route maritime vers le Moyen-Orient, par souci de sécurisation et de contrôle commercial notamment. Le cas d'endettement du Sri Lanka pour la construction d'un port international dont les rennes sont aux mains de la Chine est un exemple parlant de la logique expansionniste économiquement et commercialement du géant chinois. Le successeur de Shinzo Abe, Yoshihide Suga, a appuyé la montée en puissance du Quad, illustrée par la rencontre en personne, durant la pandémie, des ministres des affaires étrangères des quatre pays en octobre 2020, envoyant ainsi un signal politique fort pour l'avenir du Quad et l'importance de son implication dans les perspectives sécuritaires de la région (Johnson et Sugiyama 2020, 28). Le Quad se caractérise par une convergence des intérêts de ses membres, avec une interopérabilité qui amène à penser que ce partenariat sera amené à durer. Il a pour principal intérêt de matérialiser le risque d'actions lourdes et concrètes en cas de perturbation de l'ordre sécuritaire établi dans la région (Lee 2016, 2). Au Quad s'ajoute d'autres partenariats renforcés influençant l'avenir de la région Est-Asiatique, notamment le partenariat bilatérale avec l'Australie, marqué par la signature d'un accord d'accès réciproque en novembre 2020, ou encore le partenariat avec certains pays européens, illustré par des exercices navals conjoints avec la France en décembre 2020

(Vavasseur 2020) et un dialogue bilatérale avec les ministères de la Défense et des Affaires Étrangères de l'Allemagne en avril 2021.

La qualité de ces partenariats, qui les différencie par ailleurs des alliances, est l'absence d'engagement de défense réciproque entre les parties. Cela assure une grande flexibilité et limite l'envoi d'un message trop agressif face à la Chine (Pajon 2019), limitant ainsi la montée des tensions. Ces partenariats permettent également au Japon d'obtenir davantage de poids dans la balance des puissance pour défendre ses propres intérêts, notamment concernant l'avenir des îles Senkaku (Levante 2021). L'objectif japonais est ainsi d'assurer la stabilité de la région Est Asiatique par une stratégie de *balancing* (Levante 2021), c'est-à-dire en tentant de rééquilibrer son pouvoir économique, diplomatique et militaire avec son voisin chinois. Toutefois, la structure multipolaire de l'ordre international rend difficile la définition par les puissances de « lignes claires et fixes entre alliés et adversaires » (Waltz 1979), comme l'illustre le double jeu de l'Inde qui noue des partenariats stratégiques face aux velléités chinoises mais tire profit de la puissance économique de son voisin (Ministry of External Affairs of India 2016). Les partenariats forgés par le Japon sont toutefois motivés par l'objectif de sécurité et non de puissance, cette réalité de conflit d'intérêt de certains de ses partenaires ne constitue alors pas un réel obstacle à la stabilisation de l'équilibre des pouvoirs dans la région Est-Asiatique. Le Japon lui-même conserve un comportement souvent ambigu dans ses relations avec les différents acteurs régionaux, par exemple, ses relations avec les

Philippines (Pajon 2021, 56).

Une Chine en constant renforcement relatif face au Japon et implications pour la sécurité en Asie de l'Est

Bien que la menace chinoise reste potentielle dans la région, le déclin relatif des États Unis et de ses partenaires permet de plus en plus à la Chine d'imposer ses revendications dans la région Est-Asiatique. Ainsi, son ascendant grandissant en termes de puissance dans la région lui permet de maintenir une autonomie face à la force que d'autres acteurs exercent en Asie de l'Est (Waltz 1979, 177). De plus, bien que le Japon adopte une stratégie de *balancing* qui semble adaptée à la situation actuelle de la région, elle doit être renforcée face à une Chine qui conserve un avantage certain et une plus importante marge de manoeuvre en cas de conflit (Levante 2021). Toutefois, si les autorités chinoises en arrivaient à entrer en conflit direct avec le Japon et ses alliés ou partenaires, de lourdes conséquences diplomatiques et économiques seraient observées. En effet, malgré de nombreuses tensions entre la Chine et le Japon, comme présenté précédemment, les deux États restent des partenaires importants l'un pour l'autre. Ainsi, en 2007, la Chine était devenue le deuxième partenaire commercial du Japon derrière les États-Unis et, en 2002, le Japon était devenu le premier fournisseur commercial de la Chine, ainsi que son premier client en 2009 (Pelletier 2013, 101). De plus, le Japon constitue pour la Chine un important investisseur étranger. Dans cette optique, malgré des tensions constantes dans la région entre les deux puissances, la probabilité d'un conflit armé entre les deux pays reste faible (Delamotte 2010, 297). Les autorités japonaises s'inquiètent toutefois du tournant idéologique qu'emprunte la relation conflictuelle entre les États-Unis et la Chine (Akita 2021, 3) et de l'augmentation progressive des tensions bilatérales entre les deux pays. Malgré la faible probabilité d'une attaque directe de la Chine sur le Japon ou inversement, une militarisation des tensions sino-américaines pourrait à terme amener le Japon à s'engager dans un conflit armé par mécanisme d'alliance.

Plus précisément, cette évolution de la puissance relative de la Chine dans la région Est Asiatique devrait avoir différentes implications dans l'avenir des îles Senkaku. Ainsi, malgré le fait qu'une grande majorité des Japonais souhaite tout sauf sacrifier leur sécurité et leur qualité de vie au profit de nouveaux conflits de conquête ou de prestige (Couveinhes 2018, 673), la Chine semble suivre depuis plusieurs années une dynamique de plus en plus claire d'extension de son influence en Asie de l'Est, illustrée par ses activités agressives autour des îles Senkaku. Sa méthode du « salami » et le flou qui entoure sa stratégie militaire autour du cas des îles Senkaku/ Diaoyu rendent incertain l'avenir sécuritaire dans cette zone. Je soutiens qu'il semble toutefois que le scénario le plus probable concernant ces îles ne soit pas un conflit armé mais la poursuite d'un jeu d'influence progressive des deux pays sur les territoires revendiqués.

Concernant Taïwan, la détermination des perspectives à venir de la situation sécuritaire semble plus complexe. En effet, une approche stratégique et rationnelle nous amènerait sans

doute à affirmer qu'une invasion de Taïwan par la Chine continentale serait très peu probable, au regard de l'équilibre actuel des puissances qui rendrait le coût de la guerre extrêmement élevé pour tous les acteurs de la région. Toutefois, cette affirmation serait sans doute naïve et adopterait une approche ne considérant pas assez la dimension culturelle et historique de la politique menée par le parti communiste chinois sur le cas de Taïwan. Ainsi, même s'il semble évident qu'une invasion de Taïwan par la Chine continentale soit un grand risque pris par la Chine tant sur le plan militaire que diplomatique et économique, il est difficile de faire des prédictions sur les perspectives politiques de Xi Jinping. Le développement des capacités de « défense collective » du Japon, accompagné d'une clarification et d'un renforcement des alliances et partenariats stratégiques en jeu, semblent alors assurer un rééquilibrage des puissances et augmente le « coût de la guerre » pour la Chine, mais cette stratégie de *balancing* menée par le Japon et ses alliés semble pour le moment insuffisant pour assurer une paix e.g. tout à fait certain dans les régions Est-Asiatique et Indo-Pacifique.

Conclusion

Pour conclure, le Japon a entamé, au début des années 2010, une trajectoire de défense plus assumée, marquée par un tournant important en 2021 avec l'annonce d'un budget à venir équivalent à au moins 2% de son PIB annuel. Cette nouvelle stratégie de défense est celle d'un État en position de faiblesse qui tente de rétablir un équilibre des puissances en Asie de l'Est dans un système de « self-help » ou d'« auto-assistance » (Waltz 1979, 177). Ainsi, trois principaux piliers caractérisent la nouvelle stratégie de défense du Japon : un renforcement de ses capacités militaires par augmentation progressive de son budget de défense, une réassurance de son alliance avec les États-Unis pour s'assurer un avantage à court et moyen terme face à la montée de la Chine, et une diversification de ses partenariats stratégiques dans la région pour développer son autonomie stratégique en Asie de l'Est à plus long terme. La particularité du pacifisme de la Constitution japonaise ainsi que l'approche nuancée du développement des capacités de défense collective du Japon permettent à la péninsule nippone d'assurer un rééquilibrage des puissances dans la région Est-Asiatique sans alimenter de réelle course à l'armement (Delamotte 2010, 297). Cette stratégie d'augmentation du coût de la guerre, similaire dans son essence à l'approche adoptée par l'Union Européenne face à la Russie autour de la situation en Ukraine, semble pour le moment assurer la stabilité sécuritaire de la région Est-Asiatique et ainsi assurer la défense du modèle d'Indo-Pacifique libre et ouvert. Cependant, le Japon reste un État en position de faiblesse relative dans la région, notamment face aux deux grandes puissances que sont les États- Unis et la Chine, dont les tensions semblent progressivement s'accentuer. L'avenir de la paix dans la région, favorisé par la nouvelle stratégie de défense nippone, semble ainsi dépendre en grande partie de l'évolution de cette relation bilatérale.

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Revisionist Historiography as a Tool for State-Building in 20th Century East Asia

Benjamin Clark, McGill University

Edited by Justin Weir and Elena Lee

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the use of historical revisionism by post-WWII East Asian governments as a tool for state-building. I begin by summarizing how both WWII and the postcolonial legacy of Imperial Japan left many states in East Asia weakened — in need of new national narratives to bolster their legitimacy. Next, I analyze the historiographical trends of China, the Koreas, and Japan, demonstrating how revisionism was a pervasive trend. Finally, I examine case studies of state censorship and organized violence across the region which occurred in response to the methodological threats to revisionist narratives. This paper finds that historiographical revisionism played a key role in East Asian state-building, enhancing state legitimacy by supporting post-war national narratives. Revisionist trends in East Asia are one example of how states can weaponize history — altering collective memory and identity through nationalist lenses, in pursuit of greater legitimacy.

Introduction

Following the Second World War, emerging states in East Asia struggled to rebuild their nations amidst political disarray. A legacy of colonialism by Europe and Imperial Japan, a lengthy Civil War in China, and the partitioning of the Korean peninsula had severely damaged — if not destroyed — the national identities of East Asia. After WWII, if the surviving polities were to succeed in rebuilding their states, they had to redefine such identities. However, history did not always conform to the new ideologies and images that these emerging polities were attempting to develop. Instead, be it the colonial remorse of Japan, the impact of that legacy in both Korea and China, or even the very cultural traditions at the core of these societies, history served as an obstacle to these new narratives because it maintained a connection to their previous collective identities, despite attempts to reshape them. Therefore, these new polities needed to reconstruct national narratives by reshaping their very histories — and historiographies[1] — through explicitly nationalist lenses as a vital tool for post-war, post-colonial nation-building in twentieth-century East Asia.

Post-WWII Nation-Building

The end of the Second World War was a pivotal turning point in East Asian nation-building, especially following Japanese colonial rule. Imperial Japan had colonized much of the Pacific even before the war. This was the result of both a need for resources to fuel its rapid industri-

[1] Historiographies refers to the ways in which history is studied, written and interpreted.

al expansion, as well as a desire to acquire the same imperial prestige its European counterparts had long enjoyed (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 46). By 1910, the Japanese had already conquered Korea, and subsequently launched an invasion of Manchuria (Northeastern China) in 1932 (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 46).

When war broke out several years later, colonial efforts increased both in scale and severity. In Korea, there was a systematic effort to eliminate Korean identity. This was exemplified by the destruction of much of the Gyeongbokgung Palace, which had been the political and cultural center of Korea for the past five centuries, and the mandated use of the Japanese language (Korean Cultural Heritage Administration 2007). In China, the Japanese faced resistance both from the incumbent Republic and Mao's revolutionaries, leading to brutal attempts to quell resistance such as the Massacre of Nanjing in 1937 — in which the Japanese all but razed the city and its population (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 46).

However, it was not just Japanese colonialism that spurred national identity crises in East Asia, but influence from Western powers as well. In China, since the Opium Wars of the nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty was forced to offer considerable concessions to European powers, dividing China into 'spheres of influence' for exclusive economic exploitation. This eventually prompted the overthrow of the monarchy in 1911 by the government of Chiang Kai-shek (Dorrill 1969, 36). However, by the 1930's, many viewed the republican government led by the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) as equally willing to compromise

Chinese sovereignty to garner Western support, prompting the communist revolution headed by Mao Tse-Tung (Brugger 1986, 643). In turn, supporters of the Kuomingtang's republican government viewed the revolutionaries as being compromised by the influence of the USSR. Even though the movement was only loosely connected to the Soviets, this resulted in a general sentiment in China — by all parties — of perpetual subjugation by foreign powers, an attitude that Japanese influence would only catalyze (Huaiyin 2010, 350).

Though Japan was a colonial power, or indeed because of it, they too faced an identity crisis by the end of World War II. Facing the carnage of the Tokyo firebombing and atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the once-proud empire was devastated physically and psychologically. Surrender terms such as Emperor Hirohito's public rejection of his divine mandate, the forced disarmament of the Japanese military, and indefinite occupation by allied forces compounded this (Japanese Constitution 1947, Article 4; 9). As a nation, Japan was both humiliated and humbled by the war, shattering its national identity after losing 'Great Power' status.

Foreign interference in Korea was perhaps more intrusive than either China or Japan. Following the war, the peninsula was forcibly partitioned as a direct result of foreign interests, and by 1950 this led to the outbreak of the Korean War as a proxy conflict between the West and China (with the U.S.S.R.) (Sato 1990, 98). After decades of Japanese rule, partition, and now war, Korean national identity was literally fragmented in two. Following this legacy of humiliation, decimation, and fragmentation, the surviving polities in East Asia were now faced with two tasks: rebuilding their national identities and gaining legitimacy for their new states.

The Emergence of Revisionism

One of the most potent ways that East Asian states accomplished these tasks was by establishing a new national narrative — often done through historical revisionism: the reinterpretation of historical events to engrain modern narratives into collective memory.

Exceptionalism is one example of revisionist methods, focusing on instances of historical pride and accomplishment, and then crediting them to the new ideology of the state. A clear example of exceptionalist revisionism in East Asia is the historiography surrounding the Shin Ganhoe in Korea, a political front aimed at liberating the peninsula from Japanese rule (Wells 2001, 183). The Shin Ganhoe attempted to accomplish this by combining both the nationalist-oriented rhetoric of the South with the more socialist-oriented rhetoric of the North, creating a unified force with the primary goal of freeing Korea (Wells 2001, 183). After the peninsula was partitioned, the organization was therefore lauded by the North and the South as integral to liberation and a demonstration of Korean exceptionalism, with each side crediting such to their unique national narratives (Wells 2001, 183).

In the North, socialist historiography portrayed the front as a force fighting primarily for class liberation amidst the economic oppression of the Japanese (Wells 2001, 187). In the South, however, nationalist historiography instead

portrays the front's liberation movement as being ethnically centered, reasserting Korea as a unified people amidst the cultural oppression of the Japanese (Ibid). In actuality, the Shin Ganhoe advocated for both these things — but far less fiercely than each narrative would lead one to believe (Wells 2001, 189). However, because colonial trauma was so integral to the collective memories of all Koreans, both sides were able to capitalize on the liberation efforts of the Shin Ganhoe. This was done by first inflating their successes, and then retroactively projecting modern nationalist narratives as being driving forces in those successes. The effects portrayed both the organization — and their ideology by proxy — as exceptional for state-building.

China also used postcolonial rhetoric to its advantage as a base for its national narrative. The use of postcolonial rhetoric is best shown through *The Quotations* from Mao Tse-Tung, a de-facto manifesto for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that came to be synonymized with their new national identity. The text quickly invokes anticolonial rhetoric, claiming that the enemies of the Revolution are "all those in league with Imperialism," linking its ideology inextricably with the liberation struggle (Zedong 1976). Mao extends this reasoning — stating that if the Revolution is the enemy of the colonizers, counter-revolutionaries are therefore Imperial sympathizers (Zedong 1976). Through this linkage, Mao legitimizes the Revolutionary cause by equating it with the colonial struggle, while simultaneously delegitimizing the competing national narrative of "paper tiger" reactionaries (Zedong 1976).

In conjunction with postcolonialism — and

in many ways through it — Marxism quickly became the basis of mid-twentieth-century Chinese historiography. Mao's writings explicitly established material-based interpretations as the only legitimate historiographical theory, dismissing all others as "historical idealism" (Zedong 1976). This is best reflected in the work of Fan Wenlan, a prominent 20th century Chinese historian who often used a Marxist lens for revisionist purposes. Wenlan gave particular emphasis to the significance of past rebellions in China, doing so through a postcolonial and/or Marxist interpretation (Huaiyin 2009, 271). For example, in his analysis of the Opium Wars, Wenlan focused on the triumphant resistance to foreign subjugation, as well as the theft of Chinese resources by colonial powers (Huaiyin 2009, 275). Elsewhere, Wenlan praised the leader of the 1850 Taiping Rebellion, Hong Xiuquan, as an exemplar of Revolutionary values, claiming that his views on wealth distribution and class relations reflected "utopian communist ideals" (Huaiyin 2009, 276). In both instances, Wenlan's use of postcolonial and Marxist theory, as well as his exceptionalist portrayal of Hong Xiuquan and resistance during the Opium Wars, helped legitimize the nascent state by reinterpreting history through a Revolutionary narrative.

Dueling Narratives

The Kuomintang Nationalists, however, held a counter-historical narrative more suited to their competing vision of a Chinese state: the Modernization narrative. Jiang Tingfu was one of the earliest and most notable practitioners of Modernist theory in this Chinese

historiography. Where Fan Wenlan applauded the socialist undertones of resistance during the Opium Wars, Tingfu interpreted the rebels as being "ignorant and apathetic" opportunists, with some corrupt to the point of aiding in the plundering of Guangzhou (Huaiyin 2009, 276). Similarly, unlike Wenlan's praise of Hong Xiuquan, Jiang Tingfu saw his Taiping Rebellion as hollow populism, unwilling and unable to follow through on progressive social ideals (Ibid). Tingfu frequently criticized Wenlan for deliberately framing these struggles not only as anticolonial but against "the oppression of the Manchus;" a direct reflection of Revolutionary narratives that sought to scapegoat the Northeastern ethnic minority group who posed a threat to their vision of a unified national identity (Huaiyin 2009, 282). In all such instances, Jiang Tingfu presents a counter-historiographical theory of Modernization: one that focuses on progressive reform and Revolutionary corruption, both vital in the efforts to present an alternative national narrative by the Kuomintang.

This Modernization narrative, and historiographical scholars like Jiang Tingfu, were consequently suppressed and discredited by the CCP. By the 1980s, however, after the disastrous Cultural Revolution and efforts such as 'The Great Leap Forward,' Marxist-oriented reforms had led to massive forced famines and economic isolationism (Brugger 1986, 646). As a result, the Revolutionary narrative was no longer sustainable. Once the Kuomintang was effectively exiled to Taiwan and no longer a political threat, the Modernist ideology became a viable replacement. The failures of Revolutionary rhetoric and policy prompted the CCP to shift focus from agrarianism towards industrialism; now that it reflected the national vision of the CCP, the Modernization narrative was readily adopted (Huaiyin 2010, 348).

This historiographical paradigm shift in China, therefore, represents a double-revisionism of sorts: previous Marxist-Revolutionary interpretations were reinterpreted through Modernism. Following this shift, China underwent transformative economic and technological advancement. Modernist theory and scholars such as Jiang Tingfu, once shunned by the mainland, were embraced as the new orthodoxy while Marxist theory was simultaneously phased out as a legitimate historiographical tool (Huaiyin 2010, 348). In both cases, historiographical practices were used to alter collective memory, reshaping national identities to the benefit of the state — first through a Revolutionary lens, and later through a Modernist one.

In Japan, the rebuilding of national identity was not supported by victorious postcolonial rhetoric, but instead undermined by it. For one, Japan did not triumph over foreign interference — after the war, they were fully at the whims of the allied forces, and forced to surrender their right to an independent military (The Japanese Constitution 1947, Article 9). This cognitive dissonance from both submission to foreign powers and the shame of colonial atrocities resulted in a national narrative of victimization — something that revisionist historiography would bolster (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 46).

Japanese historian Hayashi Fusao's 1964 book *The Great East Asian War as a Just War* is an excellent example of this narrative.

As the title suggests, the text seeks to justify the actions of Japan in World War II. For example, it claims that the conflict was merely the inevitable outcome of defiant Japanese modernization in the face of Western imperial ambitions (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 48). Furthermore, Fusao claims that Japan annexed Korea and Manchuria not as acts of aggression, but as a defensive measure for all parties: the invasion was justified because the West would have taken their place if they had not acted (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 48). This interpretation portrays Japanese imperialism as both unavoidable and self-defensive, serving as "a catalyst for Asian national liberation" (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 47). Thus, Japanese historiography reinterpreted its legacy to directly reflect the new state's narrative of victimhood and benevolence following WWII.

Threats to New Narratives

Although revisionist theories are a powerful way to support a state's national narrative, certain historiographical methods can threaten these attempts. For example, prioritizing material evidence in historiography can undermine the legitimacy of revisionist narratives. Methodologies found in environmental and material historiography make revisionism significantly more difficult, as they provide objective, physical evidence. The immutability and irrefutability of such sources makes them resilient to attempts at revision, compromising the validity of a nationalist interpretation.

Oral testimony is another such method. Although not as easily verifiable, oral accounts of direct witnesses can directly contradict a nationalist historical narrative. A key example is the testimony of various *Ianfu* in modern Japanese historiography. These 'comfort women' were military sex slaves for the imperial forces of Japan who have been able to provide detailed, eye-witness accounts of various colonial atrocities including mass rape, mass murder, and cultural genocide (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 51). The testimony of these Ianfu not only discredits claims of colonial benevolence, but also contradicts nationalist historians like Hayashi Fusao's denial of their very existence (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 51).

Political elites in East Asia were not idle in the face of these threats, however. Historical erasure is a particularly pernicious form of revisionism, as it does not just reinterpret events but seeks instead to erase them altogether. Erasure, therefore, became a key tool used to destroy material and oral sources.

One of the most blatant attempts at erasure in East Asia is the Cultural Revolution in China. After Chairman Mao declared non-Revolutionary histories as illegitimate, the CCP underwent a deliberate attempt to destroy what Mao called 'the four olds:' the traditional ideology, culture, habits, and customs of China (Zedong 1976, Ch. 1). To fully replace the collective identity with a Revolutionary one, Mao's Red Guard systematically destroyed cultural sites, a plethora of historical documents as well as the suppression of dissidents (Brugger 1986, 646). Those who clung to their past identities — be it protecting historical material, retaining unsanctioned mementos, or teaching alternative histories — were arrested, beaten, and executed (Brugger 1986, 646). This resulted in the death

of hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of anyone who did not fully conform to the new narrative (Brugger 1986, 646). The Cultural Revolution, therefore, managed the threat of material, textual and oral histories posed by destroying physical evidence and silencing dissident voices.

Modern Revisionism

Even in modern East Asia, there are attempts at erasure. In China, for example, rigorous censorship has replaced large-scale cultural destruction. Even if certain records or material evidence survived physical destruction, the use of such evidence is severely restricted in modern Chinese historiography if it undermines national unity. Additionally, such materials are heavily regulated because of the state's control of archives, and its censorship capabilities regarding academia.

One such example would be the discourse surrounding the Fukien Rebellion of 1933, a communist insurgency that ended in resounding defeat and the defection of its leaders to the Kuomintang (Dorrill 1969, 43). The speed and totality of this defeat represent a particularly embarrassing incident for early communist efforts, and so modern Chinese historiography has attempted to disassociate the group from the wider Revolution to erase a glaring failure of Revolutionary rhetoric (Dorrill 1969, 45).

Beyond academic censorship, oral testimonies are silenced just as effectively through similar censorship but also grave criminal penalties for contradicting the national narrative, which may be seen as critical of the government and therefore a subversive act. Meanwhile in Japan, although there are no active attempts at silencing oral voices, a consequence of their imperial legacy in Korea and Manchuria is that very little oral testimony remains after systematic mass killings. The absence of these erased voices was therefore used for many years in revisionist historiography as proof that colonial atrocities were either exaggerated or invented by Western adversaries (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 47). Furthermore, what little evidence remained, such as with the Ianfu, was discredited or denied (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić 2000, 50). And so, throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, East Asia historiographies not only engaged in revisionism but specifically erasure through material destruction, the suppression of oral testimony, and censorship of academia to preserve the nationalist narrative of the state.

Conclusion

Postcolonial historiographies of East Asian states often reinterpreted events to rebuild national identities. History was reinterpreted by projecting modern national narratives onto past events, actions, and institutions, with such narratives legitimized by invoking colonial struggles and emphasizing historical exceptionalism. These narratives were accomplished largely by preferencing certain methods and theories in their historiographies that were better suited to these identities, while simultaneously suppressing historical methods that contradicted them. Because of these historical and historiographical manipulations, new state narratives would sometimes reject dissident lenses altogether, either choosing to deny — or outright

erase — historical events from collective memory. In short, the promotion of nationalist historiography was both a product and a tool for state-building in East Asia after WWII, altering collective memory by reshaping it through reinterpretative theories, thereby allowing emerging polities to remake national identities. As we have seen throughout East Asia, the alteration of history can serve as a potent tool for nation-building. In shaping collective memory, states can shape collective identity to support whichever narrative is most conducive to their interests.

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The 'Third World's' Anticolonial Worldmaking Project

Wilson Symons, McGill University

Edited by Stevan Vujicic and Eren Togan

ABSTRACT

While the term "Third World" is a problematic anachronism due to its derogatory connotations, it is used throughout this essay to bring to life a concept envisioned by Vijay Prashad – the Third World Project. In the middle of the twentieth century, newly independent Third World nations displayed an unprecedented degree of agency and unity as they undertook an anticolonial worldmaking project. I will discuss how the creation of the Third World bloc empowered their anticolonial agenda, namely through the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). This geopolitical alliance became a formidable force within the international political arena and would blunt a new phenomenon, neocolonialism, as these nations partook in South–South economic, cultural, and defensive cooperation. Lastly, this essay will touch on the transformation of the UN into an institutional vehicle for political independence and economic reform.

Introduction

In a 1952 publication of *L'Observateur*, a French anticolonial weekly paper, Alfred Sauvy coined the term "Third World'' to describe underdeveloped nations outside of the Cold War blocs known as the First and Second Worlds (Sauvy 1952, 81). Although Sauvy stressed that the power struggle between Western capitalist nations and Eastern Communist nations threatened the countries outside of this bipolar divide, he ended the article on an optimistic note, remarking that "after all, this Third World, ignored, exploited, despised like the Third Estate, also wants to be something" (Sauvy 1952, 83). As history unfolded, Sauvy foreshadowed the revolutionary spirit of the Third World, as these nations undertook a worldmaking project against colonialism, racism, and nuclearism. While all three of these elements were foundational pillars of the Third World Project, this essay will focus on the advancement of anticolonialism. Fused together by their struggles for independence, nations of the Third World crafted their own history and project, as they united together against colonialism in all of its manifestations. By establishing a Third World geopolitical bloc through the 1955 Bandung Conference and the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, these countries delegitimized colonial governments' rule and established political weight and power within the international political arena (Wagner 2012, 275-277). This unprecedented geopolitical alliance blunted neocolonialism, as it strengthened defensive, economic, and cultural cooperation within the Global South. By joining the United Nations (UN), the Third World further undermined colonialism, utilizing this intergovernmental organization as an institutional vehicle for political independence and global economic reform. This was facilitated through the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 and the adoption of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) in 1974 (Fajardo 2022, 204-206).

The 1955 Bandung Conference

The Third World geopolitical bloc was created when twenty-nine African and Asian nations gathered to collectively denounce colonialism at the Bandung Conference in 1955 (Wagner 2012, 276). This first major Afro-Asian conference inaugurated the Third World Project. Despite the apparent divisions based on borders, political alignments, and social differences, the twenty-nine nations were "united by a common detestation of colonialism in whatever form it appear[ed]," as Sukarno, Indonesia's first president, declared in his opening speech at the conference (Sukarno 1955). Even though they represented 54 per cent of the world's population, these countries recognized that their efforts to dismantle the West's colonial empires must be a united, not isolated effort (Nawrocki 2022). In the conference's Final Communiqué, the Bandung twenty-nine harmoniously denounced colonialism and pledged their support for the political self-determination of dependent Third World nations (Kahin 1956, 84-85). This conference and Communiqué, a political manifesto of sorts, delegitimized colonial government's rule, as it united the Third World as a geopolitical power bloc against Europe's colonial em-

pires. This unprecedented alliance profoundly transformed the calculus of international politics. While colonial empires were condemned, liberation movements were empowered. This is particularly evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where in 1960 alone, seventeen nations achieved independence (Meriwether 1960, 181). The Third World's efforts to dismantle colonialism were no longer disjointed, but rather united under the geopolitical alliance established at Bandung, signaling that colonial governments were no longer uncontested on the world stage.

A Bulwark Against Neocolonialism

In addition to empowering their voice within international political discourse, this geopolitical bloc served as a bulwark against neocolonialism. In July of 1956, Yugoslavia entered the Third World bloc, as the new "Big Three" – Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia – convened on the island of Birjuni, Yugoslavia to form a nonsuperpower alliance. This meeting affirmed their commitment to the Bandung principles and laid the foundations for the creation of the NAM (Životić and Jovan Čavoški 2016, 85). This newborn tripartite alliance debuted on the world stage when Gamal Abdel Nasser, the president of Egypt, nationalized the Suez Canal – a prized Anglo-French possession – in July 1956 (Prashad 2017, 100). After Britain and France, alongside Israel, invaded Egypt to reclaim this key component of their colonial empire, Yugoslavia and India quickly pledged support for their new ally. Jewaharlal Nehru and Josip Tito adamantly denounced this invasion at the UN as a neocolonial effort to prolong the economic exploitation of Egypt (Životić and Čavoški 2016, 88). The Suez Crisis highlighted the effective bulwark established against neocolonialism, with the Third World bloc acting as a multilateral support system. The bulwark also included military support once Cuba joined the Third World bloc, as this small Latin American nation provided massive amounts of arms and troops to the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), an anticolonial guerrilla force in Angola (Gleijeses 2002, 160).

Economic and Cultural Cooperation

Neocolonialism was suppressed through the cultural and economic cooperation that this alliance of Third World nations cultivated. Rather than opening with a condemnation of colonialism, Bandung's Final Communiqué called for economic cooperation, commencing the "long-standing call for South–South cooperation" (Wagner 2012, 276). The Bandung twenty-nine committed to partake in transnational technical assistance, joint ventures, primary commodity trade agreements, trade fairs, and the exchange of information and ideas of mutual interest (Kahin 1956, 76-78). While neocolonialism was largely an economic phenomenon, it also had cultural dimensions, as the West transformed its cultural suppression of the Third World after colonial governments were uprooted in the post-war era. The First World's mainstream scholarly and media discourse was the principal vehicle of this cultural suppression, as it perpetuated derogatory cultural notions of decolonized nations. For instance, Paul Ehrilich's 1968 publication of *The Population Bomb* argued that overpopulation,

rather than colonialism, was the primary cause of hunger in the Global South, homogenizing the Third World population as savages, ahistorical, profligate, and worthless (Prashad 2017, 8). However, the Third World bloc blunted this neocolonial cultural suppression, as these newly independent nations participated in cultural cooperation. The Bandung Conference enriched and empowered the national cultures of the Third World, as the participating nations agreed to engage in the "acquisition of knowledge of each other's country" and "mutual cultural exchanges" (Kahin 1956, 80).

The Non-Aligned Movement and Armed Liberation

The creation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961 further strengthened the Third World geopolitical bloc, not just as an adjunct to the First or Second Worlds, but as a formalized intergovernmental organization against colonialism and the Cold War conflict. As the two rival camps struggled for possession of the Third World during the Cold War, leaders Tito (Yugoslavia), Nasser (Egypt), Nehru (India), Sukarno (Indonesia), and Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) offered an alternative to this bipolar world. The leaders hosted twenty-one nations from Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America at a summit in Belgrade in 1961, marking the beginning of this historic movement (Prashad 2017, 100). While these countries did not act conjointly on all issues, the NAM strengthened their geopolitical unity and power, propelling their unified rejection of colonialism into international political discourse. While the NAM advocated for peaceful co-existence, it did not

display complete neutrality given its support for armed liberation movements on the African continent. For example, in 1964, the NAM offered "every type of support to the freedom fighters" part of the MPLA, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) – three liberation movements that took up arms against Portuguese colonial regimes in their respective nations (Prashad 2017, 103). In the eyes of these non-aligned nations, the armed struggle against colonialism was not a violation of peaceful co-existence, but rather a necessity for it. The second NAM Conference in Cairo in 1964 reaffirmed this ethos, as they deemed wars of national liberation to be the colonized world's principal vehicle to fulfill their "natural aspirations" (Prashad 2017, 110). The 1966 Tricontinental Conference in Havana would further empower armed militancy across the Third World, particularly in Vietnam, as the 513 delegates from the 83 groups in attendance pledged solidarity to the Vietnamese people following presentations by Nguyen Van Tien of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and Tran Danh Tuyen of the government of North Vietnam (Prashad 2017, 108). The creation of the NAM cemented the Third World as a formidable force within international politics, and thus delegitimized colonial rule throughout the Global South, as their politically empowered advocations for armed liberation experienced a phase of oratorical inflation.

Disrupting the UN's Status-Quo

While the UN was founded in 1945 to pro-

mote human rights, world peace, and social progress, its membership demographic and political agenda in the immediate post-war years suggested otherwise. The internal pressure from the few founding Third World members to extend membership, coupled with the Bandung Communiqué's demand for universal membership, contributed to the democratization of this intergovernmental organization. Throughout the 1950s and into the 1970s, newly independent Third World nations were welcomed into the UN. In fact, by 1970, membership reached 127, a stark contrast from the initial 51 founding members in 1945.[1] Newly independent nations' acceptances into the UN legitimized their independence on a global scale, signalling that a large portion of the international community believed that the West's colonial empires were coming to an end. Moreover, the Third World further destabilized colonial governments by utilizing the UN as a platform to broadcast and denounce previously hidden colonial atrocities to the world. This denunciation of the First World's remaining colonies reached its apogee in international political discourse three years after the Belgrade summit in 1961, as the G-77 – a group of seventy-seven nations – was established to act as the unified mouthpiece of the Third World's anticolonial agenda at the UN (Wagner 2012, 278). While the UN admitted a large number of Third World countries and became a platform for anticolonialism, it remained largely apolitical on decolonization in terms of the resolutions it adopted, as the majority of the members of the Security Council – a governing body with veto power over the General Assembly – were dedicated to keeping their colonial empires intact (Prashad 2017, 102). Nevertheless, Third World member nations increasingly leveraged their growing representation and voting privileges in the General Assembly, eventually transforming the UN into an institutional instrument for political independence and justice. For instance, the General Assembly passed the landmark Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960 and established a subsequent Special Committee on Decolonization to monitor this declaration's imposition.[2] By leveraging their growing representation within the UN, the Third World carved out a greater space for their anticolonial sentiment within the international political arena and transformed this organization's political agenda.

Economic Agency Within The UN

This newly established amalgamation of nations within the UN would also serve as the Third World's principal defensive mechanism against neocolonialism, as this bloc would "be the bulwark against dollar imperialism and offer an_alternative model for development," as remarked by Prashad (Prashad 2017, 41). The bloc leveraged their weight within the UN, paving the way for the establishment of the UNC-

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1 United Nations, "Growth in United Nations membership," Accessed April 15, 2022. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-un-membership

2 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV), "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," Adopted December 14, 1960. https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/declaration-granting-independence-colonial-countries-and-peoples

TAD in 1964 and the subsequent UN adoption of the NIEO in 1974. The conference and resolution were the economic arms of the Third World Project, as they were catalysts in driving global economic reform amidst the West's neocolonial economic exploitation of Third World countries. As the first secretary general of the UNCTAD, Raúl Prebisch – an Argentinian economist – drew the Third World into the discussion for their own development, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs – Western-dominated economic institutions and agreements – tried to keep them out (Prashad 2017, 70). In the eyes of many scholars, the adoption of the NIEO in 1974 was the high point of the Third World Project, as it legitimized the Third World's efforts to transform an unbalanced global system of trade and the division of labor between the raw-material producing nations of the Global South and the industrialized nations of the North (Fajardo 2022, 205).

Conclusion

Freed from the shackles of formal political colonialism, Third World nations undertook an ambitious anticolonial worldmaking project that delegitimized colonial governments and suppressed neocolonialism. The creation of a Third World geopolitical power bloc through the Bandung Conference and the establishment of the NAM transformed the calculus of international politics, as colonial governments became the targets of politically empowered denunciations in international political discourse. This newly established bloc also served as a bulwark against neocolonialism, fostering defensive, economic, and cultural cooperation amongst its Third World members. By joining the UN, these newly independent nations transformed its political agenda and utilized it as a platform to propel condemnations of the remaining colonial governments onto the world stage. They also leveraged their growing membership to reconstruct this organization into an institutional vehicle against neocolonialism's economic exploitation of the Global South, namely through the creation of the UNCTAD and NIEO. This anticolonial worldmaking project highlighted the agency and capabilities of the Third World. Contrary to many claims at the forefront of First World scholarly discourse, the Third World was not a mere follower of and adjunct to the Global North, but was rather a leader in its own right.

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International Relations' Theoretical Cycles: The Search for an Archimedean Point

Jessica Wang, University of British Columbia

Edited by Justin Weir and Tito Almeida

ABSTRACT

The study of international relations (IR) is characterized by several key theoretical debates. Each marks an attempt to search for a new Archimedean point — an objective ground that can act as a common framework for the entire scholarly community. IR's Archimedean point has consistently shifted over time, in reactionary cycles. This article examines the relationship between the neo-neo debate (neorealism and neoliberalism) and critical theory, while evoking Caspar David Friedrich's painting, "Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog" as a visual representation. It argues that the consistently reactive cycle of international relations theories is perpetuated by the search for an Archimedean point in a 'disenchanted' world. This article is structured in three main sections; it will begin with an introduction of IR theory, particularly the neo-neo debate. It will subsequently discuss the neo-neo synthesis — where the two schools of thought converge at an Archimedean point. Finally, it will dissect the rise of critical theory in response to the synthesis.

International Relations (IR) theorists recognize that the development of the field is characterized by several pivotal debates. Each marks an attempt to search for a new Archimedean point — an objective ground that can act as a common framework for the entire scholarly community. An Archimedean point can be understood as a conventional wisdom, unassuming truth, or common

ABSTRACT (continued)

fundamentals that a field agrees on. Throughout the development of IR, its Archimedean point has shifted from utopian aspirations to pessimistic reality, from historical interpretation to positivist scientism, from consistent framework to fragmentation.

Examining the relationship between the neorealism-neoliberalism debate (hereafter referred to as the neo-neo debate) and critical theory, this article argues that the consistently reactive cycle of international relations theories is caused and perpetuated by the constant search for an Archimedean point in a disenchanted world. 'Disenchantment' is a term popularized by German sociologist Max Weber to describe 'rationalized', 'modernized', and 'secularized' post-Enlightenment societies (Chua 2016). Disenchantment refers to the abandonment of religion and the adoption of scientism and humanism — Weber posits that our modern society represents a disenchanted world.

Critical theory in IR emphasizes that an acceptance of the existing Archimedean point reinforces a global liberal-capitalist status quo which marginalizes other states, and is unable to bring meaningful change. Critical theory, therefore, seeks to diversify theoretical grounds and advance IR thinking in a manner that can support the liberation of marginalized groups. While critical theory's diverse Archimedean points have led to disciplinary fragmentation, postmodernist views have eliminated the possibility of Archimedean points altogether — arguing that conventional wisdom is merely an artificial displacement and simulation. In the concluding section, piecing together all the theoretical shifts from neo-neos to postmodernism, I will demonstrate that IR's search for Archimedean points is a result of the disenchantment of the social sciences.

This article is structured in three main sections. It will begin with an introduction of IR theory, particularly the neo-neo debate. It will subsequently discuss the neo-neo synthesis — where the two schools of thought converge at an Archimedean point. Finally, it will dissect the rise of critical theory in response to the synthesis.

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An Introduction to IR Theory

IR theory's origin lies in the classical realist school of thought, which posits that states seek to maximize power above all other goals (Baylis and Smith 2001, 95). Realists posit that states are insecure, competitive, and self-interested — constantly in conflict with each other as a means of accumulating increased wealth and power. Liberalism emerged in the 20th century as a challenge to realist views. It rejects the notion that all political activity is governed by states' desires to increase their power. Instead, it emphasizes the role of domestic politics in determining international policy, and focuses on the benefits attainable from cooperation between states — such as international trade, military deterrence, and the spread of democracy. Together, realism and liberalism are considered the traditionalist IR theories.

Neorealism and neoliberalism emerged from a behaviourist critique to traditionalist theories. Behaviourism argues that traditionalist theories are too dependent on historical interpretive approaches — that is, they were advanced solely by the analysis of past events. Instead, behaviourist scholars sought to apply the research methods of the natural sciences to IR, emphasizing observation, empirical testing, causality, and falsification. Neorealists theorized that inter-state relations are chaotic because states have no guarantee of security in an anarchic global system. The term 'anarchic' refers to the fact that there is no global sovereign state to govern the activities of individual governments — instead, the global political system resembles a country devoid of a government at all. In essence, states engage in conflict as a means of achieving security, rather than as an attempt to accumulate power. Neoliberal scholars also recognize the anarchic nature of the international system, but they argue that global cooperation between states is possible through international institutions. In their view, global cooperation is sustainable and will ultimately lead to improved economic integration, reduction of state-state conflict, and the remedying of global issues, such as climate change (Keohane et al. 2011, 1). Neoliberalism in IR is separate from neoliberalism as a political philosophy, despite regrettably sharing the same name.

The Neo-Neo Debate

The first venue of debate between neorealism and neoliberalism is the understanding of the extent to which cooperation between countries is possible. Neorealism emerged as an evolution out of the realist school through Kenneth Waltz's seminal work, *Theory of International Politics*. Neorealism adopts a more 'scientific' approach while retaining realist assumptions about power and conflict (Pfefferle 2016). Through focusing on the anarchic systemic structure, Waltz adopts a deductive approach and reorients realism. Rather than using state motivations to explain behaviour, Waltz focuses on the security-stripping anarchic structure of the global system which all states are subject to (Pfefferle 2016). The rational assumption and structural emphasis resemble methodologies of natural sciences. Waltz conceptualizes the international system as "a structure of constraints to which no [state] is immune" (Hoffman 1987, 70). All states' primary concern under such a system is security;

therefore, they will never consider cooperation unless security is assured — which is nearly impossible. Thus, it is a self-reproducing anarchic structure, which fosters competition and makes cooperation unlikely.

In contrast, the neoliberal view argues that state cooperation is, to a certain extent, possible through international institutions. They disagree with the neorealist claim that the anarchic system is self-reinforcing. Instead, neoliberal scholars argue that states reside in an interdependent world, where they "will seek efficiency in managing collective problems presented by international anarchy" (Kay 2006, 62). Therefore, neoliberalism is rooted in economic theories; it argues that economic interdependence will lead to political integration, creating interest alignment between states, and cooperation on these shared interests in international institutions (Baylis and Smith 2001, 213). Therefore, by seeking international institutions to establish cooperation in areas of mutual interest, Neoliberal scholars believe that states can alleviate the issues that emerge from anarchy (Lamy 2001, 132). For instance, the European Union is a community of states founded on principles of economic integration which then gradually evolved into political integration. In short, neoliberals have a different perception of the role of international regimes as compared to neorealists. While neoliberal scholars believe that international institutions can facilitate cooperation amid the anarchy of the international system, neorealists maintain that such constraints cannot be mitigated at all.

Another key disagreement between the neo-neos lies in understanding states' patterns of behaviour. For neoliberals, states are "egoistic value maximizers" who operate on principles of absolute gains (Baldwin 1993, 9). Specifically, they only seek to maximize personal interests and are indifferent about other states' gains (Baldwin 1993, 9). They are willing to cooperate — but only as long as they will benefit from it. On the other hand, neorealists argue that state competition is dictated by relative gains — that is, states judge their position in the global system only in comparison to other states. Therefore, states' willingness to cooperate depends on "how well their competitors do" (Hasenclever et al. 2006, 84). In other words, a state is less likely to cooperate if the other party is expected to gain more from it.

Overall, neoliberalism and neorealism share a similar assumption regarding the anarchic nature of the international system but have different interpretations about how states act within it. The neo-neos diverge on the potential for cooperation, the effectiveness of international institutions, and the states' behaviour amid anarchy.

Converging Archimedean Point: Neo-Neo Synthesis

The neo-neo synthesis critique was pioneered by Danish political scientist Ole Waever. He states that traditional schools of thought, such as realism and liberalism, all embarked from different ontological, methodological, and epistemological grounds. They focus on different actors, and have separate conceptions of reality. Meanwhile, neorealism emerged in response to behaviourist critiques, and liberalist views of interdependence. It is a relaunch

of realism, tailored to dodging these critiques by incorporating a more scientific approach (Waever 2009, 162; Paioletti 2011). Waever observes that liberalism followed a similar trajectory by narrowing its focus to the impact of domestic politics and institutions on state cooperation. As a 'neo-evolution' of the original theory, neoliberalist scholars claim that increased interdependence will lead to a decline in states' sovereignty and militarization, while state networking will facilitate foreign policies and cultural exchange. Neoliberalism accepts the assumption of anarchic structure and seeks testable hypotheses to counter neorealism on state cooperation (Waever 2009, 163). Therefore, both theories ameliorate their predecessors by incorporating scientism. Both consider the anarchic international system to be the independent variable conditioning the behaviour of the dependent variable — the states (Paioletti 2011). In short, they are ultimately grounded in the same structural assumptions and scientific approach.

Recognizing this convergence, many scholars argue that the neo-neo debate offers no practical advancements to the field of IR, because the two sides share a very similar foundation. Each theory employs scientific methods to garner legitimacy, while anything outside of such a framework is deemed meaningless. The practice of studying IR in the same manner as natural sciences is already questionable, not to mention its operationalization as a method to privilege the concerns of dominating powers and exclude other states. In a sense, they are reinforcing the system created by dominating powers. Waever writes that "both [schools of

thought] underwent a self-limiting redefinition towards an anti-metaphysical, theoretical minimalism" (2009). In other words, by passively taking the fundamental assumptions as intrinsic conditions of the system, they only maintain different interpretations about superficial aspects of IR such as institutions, economic interdependence, and the military (Pfefferle 2016). Establishing themselves on the same Archimedean point, they fall into a trivial spiral of debate, failing to advance the field of IR.

The Rise of Critical Theory

IR critical theory is the most notable critique of the neo-neos' epistemological practices. It seeks to transform the existing capitalist-oriented international system to advance values of equality and social justice in global politics. Canadian political scientist Robert Cox challenges the rationalists to expand their vision beyond independent state and power struggles because it reinforces domination and coercion. Rather than conforming to the rationalist pursuit for one unchanging absolute truth, Cox writes that "theory is always for someone and for some purpose" (1981, 128). In other words — theories of the world system are constructed by powerful actors to serve hegemonic purposes. They use IR theory to create narratives that acquire them legitimacy, resulting in entitlement and privilege. In response to the neo-neo synthesis, critical theorists argue that passively accepting the anarchic system as an unchanging fact generates constraints. Any new theoretical thoughts beyond this assumption are deemed illegitimate and will be excluded in the IR theoretical debate. Therefore, the neo-neos

are limited in explaining change, and do not adequately tackle new challenges.

Nancy Fraser states that contemporary political struggle consists of two aspects: recognition and redistribution. Recognition refers to the aspiration for "freedom and justice connected to gender, sexuality, race, and national recognition" (Ferreira 2018). Therefore, in response to the synthesis, critical theory seeks to include marginalized voices. Critical theory pursues liberation and equality through empowering the powerless. It seeks to overcome injustice in the global order by questioning the fundamental claims about its structure. As a result, diverging from the positivist approach, many new Archimedean points such as gender analysis and class analysis have prevailed. Critical theory has shifted IR theory from an Archimedean point to dispersed and fragmented grounds.

Critical theory marks the transition from the also connects to the postmodernist trend. Postmodernists "seek to deconstruct the traditional international relations framework by uncovering the assumptions and artificial construction of political identities" (Constantinou 1994, 22). Specifically, postmodernists seek to and call the "language, concepts, methods, and history" of the field into question (Der Derian 1988, 189). It is difficult to develop a summary of postmodernist theories given their complexity and variety. However, we should highlight Der Derian's notion of the 'crisis of modernity', where "the legitimacy of tradition suffers on several counts, the unifying belief in progress fragments, and conventional wisdom becomes one of many competing rituals of power used

to discipline [international] society" (Derian 1988, 189). In other words, while critical theorists stress that there should never be a single Archimedean point, the postmodernists argue that we may never have had a real Archimedean point at all. Despite critical theory's effort to diversify the field, its fragmentation led postmodernists to recognize that our theoretical grounds have always been changing, depending on the time and context. Extending on the critical theorist view of domination and legitimacy, postmodernists argue that Archimedean points are merely displaced reality composed by symbols and signs. In other words, an illusion produced by a dominating power to discipline international society. Therefore, the postmodernists seek to "undermine the fundamental tenets of the traditional, state centric international theories, leaving a theoretical vacuum in their wake" (Pickard, 2012). Indeed, the field moved from critical theorists' multiple Archimedean points to having no core foundations at all. The postmodernist view eliminates the possibility of universal grounds.

Figure 1. "Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog" by by Caspar David Friedrich.

Piecing it All Together: Searching for an Archimedean Point in a Disenchanted World

The reactive cycle of IR debates is perpetuated by the constant search for an Archimedean point. It started from utopian aspirations to pessimistic reality, then from historical interpretation to positivist scientism, from consistent framework to fragmentation. Nonetheless, after a period of searching and testing, the scholarship finally synthesized its epistemological common ground.

On a broader perspective, the searchfor an Archimedean point in IR scholarship is a product of disenchantment. As Enlightenment scholarship eliminated religious influence, social science studies needed new epistemological grounds for scholars to achieve consensus on. Specifically, the Enlightenment has eroded religious beliefs — we now put faith in science and seek to explain the world in rational terms (Chua 2016). Nietzsche wrote that "God is dead" (Hendricks 2022) because we eliminated the possibility of His existence through the Enlightenment's rationalization of human life. IR's search for a theoretical lever can be visualized by Caspar David Friedrich's painting "Wanderer Above the Sea of Fog" (Figure 1). The painting illustrates a man, standing alone on a peak, feeling lost in a sea of fog. The man persists to arrive here because of his desire to elevate himself from the limited and subjective perspective found on the ground. He aspires for a clear and complete glimpse of the world from the above and beyond: an objective view. His longing and searching are perpetuated by a curious need to 'know', and the need for truth. Instead, he becomes increasingly lost, discovering a sea of fog. Just as the desire for an epistemological lever perpetuated IR theorists to move from one peak to another — from idea to reality, from interpretations to observations, from consistency to fragmentation — each debate marks a more elevated peak than the last one. As we stand on the assumed highest ground of scientism and empirical rationality, we are lost in theoretical fragmentation — like being lost in a sea of fog. In summary, IR's reactive cycle of debates is perpetuated by the constant search for an Archimedean point in a disenchanted world.

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