Flux operates out of Montreal, located on the traditional territory of the Kanien’keh:ka, a place which has long served as a site of meeting and exchange amongst nations. The Kanien’keh:ka are the keepers of the Eastern Door of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy. In writing about political science and international relations we strive to incorporate diverse voices and bear in mind the forces, including (neo) colonialism, which have shaped the way we understand international relations. We encourage all readers to inform themselves on and actively resist, in the diverse forms that resistance can take, (neo) colonialism in Canada and abroad.
I am honoured to have overseen the team that made the eleventh edition of Flux: International Relations Review possible. For this issue, our team of authors, editors, reviewers, and designers have produced exceptional work in particularly challenging circumstances.

The eleventh edition of Flux consists of seven insightful articles, showcasing some of the best research produced by McGill’s undergraduate students. This volume covers a breadth of international relations issues and topics from the appropriation of homosocial, homoerotic, and feminized behavior within militaries, to the West Bank Barrier’s development, to environmental activism in the digital age.

This journal would not be possible without the help of all the dedicated reviewers and designers who contributed to its development as well as the teams of editors and authors who worked tirelessly amid a global pandemic to prepare, polish, and elevate these academic pieces.

I would like to especially thank our managing editor, Emma Frattasio, for her inspired vision and continued support. I want to thank our team of graphic designers—Olivia Yu, Anika Ouy, and Bri Nadeau—for their hard work and for bringing to life their creative vision for this issue. I would also like to thank Jennifer Innes, our library liaison, for consistently providing resources and advice throughout this cycle as well as IRSAM and its members for their continued support. Finally, I want to thank you, our readers, for continuing to motivate us in furthering our project; your readership fuels our motivation to publish a new issue each semester. I hope you find this issue as insightful as I did and that it inspires you to further your exploration of international relations literature in the future.

Best,

Maëna Raoux
Editor-in-Chief, Flux: International Relations Review
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Brotherhood in Tension: The Militarized Appropriation of Homosocialism and Homoeroticism

Juliette Croce
Edited by Shira Garbis and Olivia Gumbel

ABSTRACT - The military is an institution that relies on norms of masculinity allegedly to sustain social cohesion between units and its identity as a “brotherhood.” This reliance subordinates femininity within the military culture and ostracizes the feminized individuals who serve. Simultaneously and paradoxically, militaries integrate homosocial, homoerotic, and feminized behaviors within their practices, traditions, and norms. This article looks at how this appropriation manifests, particularly in the German Armed Forces, locating various feminized practices adopted by military units over the past century and the adverse consequences of this appropriation. In analyzing these behaviors, I argue that this appropriation at the heart of military identity perpetuates heterosexual, hypermasculine norms that the institution idealizes by reinforcing gendered and heteronormative boundaries. In turn, I contend that this further marginalizes feminized individuals in militarized settings, particularly gay men.
The military has been portrayed as a brotherhood long before national armies came to stand as they are now. The idea that unit cohesion strengthens this brotherhood has remained strongly present and deemed crucial within preparation for combat. The identity of the brotherhood rests upon norms of traditionalized masculinity—strength, an unemotional nature, fearlessness, to name a few—and simultaneously casts those who deviate as incompatible with the military, on the basis that these individuals would disrupt this important social cohesion. However, while arguing the incompatibility of feminized individuals such as gay or queer men in the military, the military itself engages in behaviour that is homosocial, homoerotic, or otherwise feminized. Unlike if these behaviours were practiced by those feminized, the brotherhood enacting them is accepted and the acts themselves are appropriated into the masculine identity of the military. In this research paper, I argue that this appropriation of homosocialism, homoeroticism, and feminized behaviours key to military identity perpetuates the heterosexual, masculine norms the institutionalized by reinforcing heteronormative boundaries and further marginalizing individuals who serve, particularly gay men. I look specifically at Germany’s military forces from World War I to the present, a history that serves as an exemplary case of this appropriation in a variety of its forms. I chose the military as an institution where masculinities are set—by a larger social and cultural context—and where they are repeatedly confronted and repeatedly denied. Thus, the military is a site of struggle over the construction of masculinities, including gender and sexuality. The masculinities of the military have been fundamental in the construction and perpetuation of dominant social and cultural norms of masculinity. The military has been portrayed as a masculine institution, the embodiment of both traditional and radical conceptions of masculinity. The military is often conceived as an enterprise with an identity reliant on the maintenance of a “macho” man image or the “illusion of masculine invincibility,” which has remained the case for Germany up until recently (Bianco 1996, 53). Soldiering has been consistently perceived as a manly job, requiring its personnel to have and propagate socially constructed norms of masculinity, including physical strength, the capacity for tolerating bodily and psychological pain or torment, and the ability to remain stoic and rational through all situations. In this sense, military masculinities are set upon “wider social assumptions about what it is to “be a man,” and the affirmation of these ideas in institutional practices and wider cultural processes” (Basham 2013, 103). Furthermore, because the military is itself a national institution, these soldierly behaviours are often justified through the idea of serving the nation. For example, Jason Crouthamel (2014) points out that in the German military, during World War I, masculinized characteristics such as aggression and bravery were enhanced and transcribed as aggression towards enemies, and bravery for the sake of the nation (47). The military is thus a locale where dominant ideas of masculinity flourish and are constantly reinforced in direct opposition to behaviours, actions, and identities deemed “feminine.” In militarized settings, femininity is “coded as an arbitrary, fictional construction which represents weakness, subordination, dependency, and disloyalty” and is hence rejected because of its un-masculinity (Belkin 2012, 26). Often, as is the case of German armed forces in World War II with regards to British soldiers, enemies were targeted as effeminate and weak, thereby building up the soldiers’ identities as distinctively and contrastingly masculine, heroic, and strong (Kühne 2002, 236). In the case of Germany, masculinity is seen as a representation of what Jennifer Maruska (2010) distinguishes as hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity (236). This hypermasculinity is an image various militaries create to maintain their idealized identity and is put into practice via exclusionary policies that are based upon and further emphasize the dominant masculine and subordinate feminine dichotomy. Thus, the military embraces stoic men because they are “strong enough” to protect the nation, while simultaneously rejecting those feminized. The patriarchal ideas behind these exclusionary policies are thus revealed; gay men—actively constructed and stereotyped as feminine—are placed in a subordinate position linked to womanhood and marginalized along with the alleged hindered military capabilities that come with this positioning (Briamont 1997). This rejection has been seen in many states’ policies that have explicitly banned homosexuals from serving openly, including in the US until the 2010 repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and in Great Britain until 2000 (UK Ministry of Defense 2000; US Congress, House 2010). These changes are tied with the demand and shift towards political moral obligations of equality and civil rights (Polcher et al. 2014, 19). Military acceptance tends to occur in the wake of such shifts and acts as “one of the last bastions of masculinity and homophobia” (Bleiker 2017). Germany presents itself similarly, with regulations first allowing homosexual soldiers to serve openly in 2000 and granting legal protection from discrimination in 2006 (Douglas 2020). German armed forces began permitting homosexuals to serve in 1969 (US Government Accountability Office 1993, 6). However, bans on homosexual relations were placed until the 1990s, targeting those who exhibited homosexual
orientation or engaged in homosexual behaviours (Fleckenstein 1993, 9). Prior to that, there were several trials of soldiers arrested for homosexuality under Paragraph 175—Germany’s legal prohibition of sodomy. It was argued that they were disrupting military order and that they “may lead to the isolation of certain groups or the formation thereon, to jealousy and mutual distrust” (Crouthamel 2014, 125; Fleckenstein 1993, 9). Until 1987, homosexual or gender-fluid forces could have their security clearances withdrawn because they were thought of as vulnerable to compromise by foreign intelligence agents (US Government Accountability Office 1993, 36). This was the case for Germany’s Gunter Kiessling, a third-ranking general and a deputy NATO commander who was dismissed in 1984 by Manfred Womer—then the Minister of Defense—on unproven charges that he was homosexual and posed a security risk (Fleckenstein 1993, 4). In this way, homosexuals in the military and their perceived failed masculinities compromised not only the identity of the institution but also the missions themselves.

The most common argument for the marginalization of feminized individuals from and within militaries, stresses social coherence and team morale; it is argued that these individuals endanger these ideals and hence impair military efficiency (Bianco 1996, 60; MacCoun 1996, 158). Though this is not based on empirical grounds, institutions like the German Ministry of Defense have used this as further “evidence” that homosexuality endangers others regardless of whether or not homosexual individuals have the capacity for combat (Fleckenstein 1993, 9). More precisely, the “male bonding which unit cohesion depends upon will be impossible with gay men present” because many heterosexual men argue they feel vulnerable or “preyed upon,” and hence cannot do their job (Cohn 1998, 135). In turn, as exclusionary policies explicitly contend, overall combat effectiveness is compromised. This sustains the hegemonic masculinity of the military by placing the feminine other as a threat to military effectiveness and blaming them for “hetero-male shortcomings” (Gilder 2019, 161). This blame was seen on a large-scale post World War I and during the rise of the Nazis, where a stab-in-the-back myth arose, contending that the German loss was the fault of those who fragmented unit cohesion—specifically homosexuals (Kühne 2002, 237).

However, the emphasis on social cohesion reveals that while the individual who participates in behaviours deemed homosexual, homoerotic, or feminine is vilified, the male bonding at the unit level, which may be just as homosexual or homoerotic, is embraced. Carol Cohn (1996) points out that, though homosexual individuals in the military are marginalized because they are allegedly denying the “inferiority of their sexuality and identity and that they are incompatible with military service,” these behaviours that strengthen brotherhood ties are appropriated as positive and encouraged for better combat effectiveness (139). In the next section, I look closer at these unit behaviours within German militarized settings to gain a clearer understanding of what this means for both the military’s hypermasculine identity and the feminized individuals within these units.

The German Military

Germany’s armed forces have a long history of these masculinized identities and simultaneous acts of homosocialism, homoeroticism, and feminized behaviours. Though in recent years there have been efforts to re-establish the ideals of solidity that are explicitly less masculinized, homosexual marginalization still occurs (German Bundestag 19th Electoral Term 2019, 64). In this section, I look closer at the foundations of such marginalization in several practices found within the German military: entrenched homosocial and homoerotic ideals of comradeship, various aspects of military training, and hazing and initiation rituals that have occurred over the past century. This will serve as a basis for my argument that these components have consequences that further support militarized masculinities, despite the elements of femininity involved within these practices.

During the World Wars, the German armed forces were faced with the horrors of trench warfare and extreme destructive power. The soldiers were nonetheless sent to the front idealized as the warrior male, the bearer of the nation’s security and martial masculinity. For German men, “war was seen as a testing ground for manliness” and showed true individual sacrifice for the sake of the nation (Crouthamel 2014, 53). Key to the German military experience was the emphasis the army placed on glorified unit solidarity, in this case, described as comradeship. Going beyond the fundamental pillar of being a man” (Kühne 2002, 233). This was seen in a variety of homosocial and homoerotic behaviours that soldiers not only experimented with but embraced in attempts to cope with the emotional toll of being at the front. The “most prominent” example lies in the use of cross-dressing and the newspaper headlines of World War I. On the front page of newspapers, feminine characteristics such as compassion and sensitivity were highlighted to provide comfort in the violent and stressful environment, often writing on homosexual bonds that mimicked husband-wife intimacy (Crouthamel 2014, 117). Cartoons such as “washing day” featured playful depictions of men doing their laundry, joking “sarcastically that they had become “women” as a result of life at the front” (114). Cross-dressing entertainment, often for comedic or theatrical purposes, was a common act of temporary relief from war stress that was tolerated by military authorities. Despite these acts being considered harmless, authorities and doctors made sure to maintain “boundaries between what they perceived as threatening or benign to the military society,” the former including “transvestite behaviours” and those that could lead towards temptation of same-sex love (111).

That same comfort granted by these practices was provided in the form of “sanctioned homoerotic behaviour that could include physical affection even involving close physical friendship, between otherwise heterosexual men” (Crouthamel 2014, 231). This, combined with a willingness to show fear and pain to comrades during combat, is an example of the military being understood as a site for the construction of abstracted masculinities, where the conventional femininities of comradeship disrupt the masculine characteristics of the military man. Comradeship was thus an “escape” from the real-life violence faced, but also the socially pressured masculine norms these men were forced to follow. However, and quite paradoxically, the integral feminine nature of comradeship—itself homosocial and homoerotic in kind—was based on a sense of community that arose from symbolic and practiced subordination of the feminine other, including homosexuals. For example, in the German military and social initiation processes of World War II—similar to the modern-day experiences described below—the male recruits were bodily degraded in various ways and objectified as such, something traditionally experienced solely by women in the home (Kühne 2002, 235-236).

However, it went further than this, as “the femininity expressed in comradeships became the fundamental pillar of being a man” (Kühne 2002, 244). This fundamental pillar represented an evident double standard; while there was an acceptance of homosocial behaviour and a tolerance of homoerotic relations, they were only accepted as long as homosexual identity was not involved to ensure that homosexual individuals did not “threaten the wider patterns of good order and discipline” (Morgan 1994, 168). Furthermore, a fine line was drawn between homoeroticism as a sentiment that could strengthen unit bonds—such as sexual horseplay in the military barracks of
explicitly gendered and homophobic insults used to teach young soldiers “to deny, indeed to obliterate, the “other” within the psyche”, to extreme physical brutalization (Whitworth 2008, 113). However, while military training relies upon building up norms of militarized masculinity in the reconstruction of their de-individualized soldiers, it does so “premised on a simultaneous renunciation and embrace of the unmasculine” (Belkin 2012, 33). Thus, this is a prominent example of a dissonance in which the feminized individual engaging in these homoerotic and homosocial behaviours would be disrupting the cohesion, but the heterosexual, dominant man doing so is preserving it.

Besides these ideals of comradeship, the German military has become more and more progressive over the course of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first century regarding the explicit exclusion of gay men—including barring discrimination and bullying from a legal standpoint. However, the homosexual individual has remained targeted and opposed in the modern German military, including being “treated like outsiders by their comrades” (Blesker 2017). Thus, these more tolerant views in no way entail that the argument against the compatibility of homosexuality and the military as a masculine institution has faded out. I argue that this is because, despite a distancing from the intensity of ideas of comradeship, dominant masculinities engaging in feminized behaviour remain considerable and present elsewhere in German society, particularly in military training and ritualized hazing practices.

Behaviour coded as feminine begins early on in training when the personnel are stripped of their individualistic identity and controlled in a way that replaces this individuality with a complete commitment to and dependence on the masculinized institution (Whitworth 2008, 111). For example, this is seen in acts of military assimilation during initiation processes of German youth movements wherein teaching “boys how to become a man, to think, feel and behave like other men, to adopt and internalize manly social qualities,” they are forced to “learn male conformity and male solidarity” (Kühne 2002, 242). For example, in the case of the assimilation rites described above, there were sometimes homoerotic practices included, with acts of torture and humiliation as key components (78). These acts are indicative of the German military acting as an institution that allows heterosexual “experimentation” via homoerotic behaviour; this behaviour is coded as innocent at the expense of the marginalization of the acknowledged homosexuals. This homoeroticism is further seen in various hazing experiences and rituals of humiliation involving the body and sexual acts, including conducting “climbing exercises in the nude before their fellow soldiers” and forced “sexually motivated medical exercises” while being recorded (Gebauer 2017; The Local 2010). These rituals allow for heterosexual men to participate in homoerotic behaviour without being labelled as gay or having their masculinity undermined. This is especially so when one considers that these acts occur amongst simultaneous ritualized attempts of proving masculinity—such as being forced to eat animal liver or being punched in the stomach multiple times (The Local 2010). At the same time, this provides further reasoning for the exclusion or disassociation of homosexuals from the military as it is the ostracizing of genuine homosexuals that makes the military a space for these homoerotic practices to be embraced (Cohn 1998, 142).

There is a similar appropriation seen within military drilling and maintenance, which demands strict characteristics of femininity, ranging from obedience to authority and attention to dress, to participation in activities such as “cleanliness, tidiness, and domesticity, more commonly associated with the feminine” (Basham 2013, 105; Hooper 2001, 47). In using these at the key site of the person’s transformation, the military is engaging these aspects of femininity as controlled and rational. In this way, the masculinized space of the military appropriates these feminized behaviours “when carried out within the parameters of military efficiency and operational effectiveness” (Basham 2013, 106). Without the conformity of these feminized norms in the production of the male warrior, the contradiction these unmasculine behaviours pose to the military identity would be revealed. Together with the sanctioned homoerotic and homosocial behaviour described above, this behaviour showcases an underlying current of appropriation that not only sustains military identity but further disassociates it with feminized individuals.

**Consequences**

It is this disassociation that is a key consequence of this appropriation. Using the analysis above, I demonstrate that the appropriation furthers military masculinity and its pitfalls. In this section, I will analyze the consequences that this appropriation has on both those who appropriate these behaviours—those with “dominant” masculinities—and those who are being appropriated from—subordinate, “failed” masculinities—as well as how this plays out in the military’s perception of its hypermasculinity. In demanding the appropriation of various feminized behaviours described above and these individuals embracing homosocial practices to feel included in their unit, the “military has fragmented service members’ identities and generated a series of confusing double-binds that intensify their desire to become masculine while making it impossible to live up to that standard” (Belkin 2012, 40). In a similar vein, if military men engage with these homosocial and homosexual desires in an attempt to substitute forms of intimacy, they experience a form of patriarchal confusion, thought of as the difficulty of sustaining “the naturalness of dichotomy between “masculinity” and “femininity”” (Enloe 2007, 81). Heterosexual attempts at living up to or reifying their confirmation to these hypermasculinized, militarized standards are aimed at proving their masculinity at the expense of the exclusion and denigration of subordinate masculinities, such as homosexual men. In having this mutilated sense of masculine self, heterosexual men in the military seek to reinforce their masculinity through this transgression of the soldier as threatening, as seen in the post-World War I stab-in-the-back myth and contemporary exclusionary tactics. This threat, in being integrated into the everyday military unit experience, would turn the warrior male into someone in “the female subject position—being the object of the gaze, being desired, being powerless before the gaze, instead of being the gazer” (Cohn 1998, 144). Furthermore, this locates the patriarchal reasoning behind this threat, in that it is gender—being gazed on as a woman—rather than sexuality that is at stake, supported by the sanctioned homoerotism and homosocialism described above. This reveals that the appropriation of these behaviours actually serves to sustain the patriarchy, while the practices that cause this in and of themselves seemingly oppose it. Furthermore, the military’s appropriation of homosocial, homoerotic, and feminized behaviours causes those insecure about their masculinity to reposition the homosocial as threatening once again. This explains how even after bans on homosexuals in the German military were lifted, discriminatory and homophobic practices persist in the form of underground practices such as virtual glass ceiling policies, jokes at the expense of gay service members, and ostracization by fellow troops after coming out (Hemicker 2014). In this way, forms of homoeroticism and homosocialism in the military maintain the heterosexual power in the institution by forming boundaries between heterosexuals—who do not have the fear of being labeled as gay in participating in these behaviours—and homosexuals as a threatening “other.” Because homosexuals are excluded from participation in the unit and these homoerotic practices due to their “sinister nature,” their subordinate positioning is further secured and the desires of heterosexual
men who engage in these practices are prioritized (Basham 2013, 109). Thus, "homoeroticism and the "embrace of the unmasculine" is just as much a part of the performance of heterosexual masculinity as homophobia and sexism can be" (107).

Feminized others incorporated into the military thus illuminate the fragility of its hegemonic masculinity; not only does the integration "undermine ideals about the naturalness of masculinity and militarism," but it also reveals how the feminine aspects of the institution itself are appropriated (Bulmer 2013, 139). This also serves as an explanation for why these behaviours are appropriated in the first place: they further the military’s masculine identity that would otherwise be compromised if the behaviour remained unacknowledged. It is these appropriated elements within the cohesive combat units that sustain the military’s identity as hypermasculine, doing so by using them to further the dichotomous and hierarchical norms of the heterosexual and the feminized male in the ways described above. Showcased by the German armed forces as a masculinized institution, the military continues its affirmation of the wider social ideas of what it is to "be a man" at the expense of the men who don’t conform to these same ideas.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have discussed how homosexual men—as representing a subordinate class of "feminized masculinities"—have historically been isolated within armed forces because of the hypermasculine nature of military institutions. By closely analyzing the German military’s homosocial, homoerotic, and otherwise feminized practices, I have demonstrated how these behaviours were appropriated from the individuals in the military who have been, and continue to be, placed in a position of "other." This position of inferiority and general exclusion allows for the innocence of these behaviours amongst heterosexual military men to be sustained as integral to the masculine identity of the institution, specifically in Germany. In doing so, I showed that this appropriation perpetuates the heterosexual, hypermasculine idealized self the military purports to be, and as such, further marginalizes the gay men who serve in the armed forces. Furthermore, reflecting on the last century, I located this appropriation in the centrality of military masculine culture, persisting despite shifts in time and societal norms. Contrary to what I propose, some may argue that if the military is an environment where men can express femtimization of behaviour remain in militaries like Germany’s, but there has not yet been an attempt at addressing the appropriated feminized behaviours I analyzed. Inclusionary policies have to go further than just targeting conspicuous discrimination and seek to address homosocial and homoerotic practices that run alongside them that marginalize gay men. In doing so, wider ideas of military identity can emerge, and the association of the military with masculinity can become more open to reconstruction.

References


The Impact of Trumpian Trade on Canadian Agriculture: Evidence from Commodity Analyses

Victoria Flaherty
Edited by Felipe Aas and Juliette Mennicken

ABSTRACT - It is generally understood that Canada’s close trading relationship with the United States helps power its export-dependent economy. This understanding was challenged in the wake of the US-China trade war that began in 2018. The trade war, which created opportunities for countries to fill the void left by American products in the Chinese market, was a chance for Canada to sink its teeth into China’s need for agricultural commodities. By examining Canada’s trading relationship with China during the trade war at a commodity level across five different products, this paper ascertains the factors that determined why Canadian lobster fishers jumped for joy while canola farmers floundered. This examination exposes how Canada-China tensions arose because Canada’s extradition with the US severely depressed its ability to sell certain agricultural goods to China.
The Canadian economy is characterized by its reliance on export commodities, and, as a result, by its reliance on solid trading relationships with countries that have large consumer bases—countries like the United States (US) and China. In fact, these countries are Canada’s top two trading partners, accounting for 79.3 percent of its exports (World Bank 2019). Thus, when China and the US, the two largest economic powers, initiated a quaking trade war in 2018, disruption ensued (Kalsie and Arora 2019, 1). In the trade war’s wake, not only did the US and China get hurt economically, but further, other countries’ economies fell victim to the fault lines created (Library of Congress 2019; UNCTAD 2019). However, a significant space opened in the Chinese market as the sale of US products to Chinese consumers became deeply depressed (Swanson and Rappeport 2020). The attractiveness of this newly available space in the Chinese market to third party nations cannot be overstated in light of China’s massive population and buying power. Thus, this paper will examine how the trade war cracked open opportunities for Canada’s export-oriented agricultural economy to rev up its exportation to China by taking the reins from the US, following tariffs that made US agricultural goods unattractive for Chinese consumers. The scale of this void is illustrated by a spokesperson for the American Farm Bureau, who stated that “[A]merican] farmers have lost the vast majority of what was once a $24 billion market in China” (Hass and Denmark 2020).

It is clear that opportunities for export growth are distributed asymmetrically within a given country and, further, within a given sector. The scope of this assessment is confined to the agriculture sector due to the size of the void that opened in the market amidst China’s decisions to raise tariffs on US agricultural imports. Therefore, one must examine the impacts of the US-China trade war on Canadian agricultural trade with China by examining specific commodities. Through this examination, it becomes clear that the success of Canadian agricultural products’ penetration into the Chinese market has been impacted primarily by comparative advantages, commodity pricing, and a diplomatic spot between Canada and China that resulted due to a US-China trade treaty. By parameterizing my analysis to the commodity-level within the agricultural sector, it becomes apparent that agriculture, one of Canada’s key industries, has been diversely impacted by this trade war. The agricultural sector was chosen for examination due to the unique character of the tariffs placed on the US by China and the strength of the Canadian agricultural sector. Thus, the trade war that came about as a result of Trumpian trade policies may have theoretically provided ample opportunity for Canadian exports to penetrate the Chinese market (Hubert et al 2019). However, Canadian agricultural products have had varied degrees of success in their attempts to penetrate the Chinese market, which may not have been the case absent of China-Canada tensions. In the case of commodities that were not affected by these tensions, namely lobster and wheat, Canadian goods were successful in penetrating the Chinese market. This paper will explore why other commodities, such as pork, canola, and soybeans, floundered and failed to fill the void left by American goods in the Chinese market.

### Tweets, Tariffs, Tech: The Historic and Situational Context of US-China Relations

The US and China have a complex history of political engagements and trading activity, which began in a diplomatic sense when the US formally recognized China in 1979 (Kalsie and Arora 2019, 3-4). Since then, China has proven to be a hungry competitor and an attention-commanding producer, with its gross domestic product (GDP) growing, on average, by 9.6 per cent per annum (Zhang 2018, 54). In addition to its economic gravity, China continues to grow substantially in terms of political, cultural, and technological power. Many scholars evaluating systems-level pressures on the international system point to the fact that China’s rising prominence presents a security threat to the US’ power. This is exhibited by the “China Threat” theory, which highlights China’s ballooning power and the inconceivability that China can have a peaceful rise on its way to being a rivalling superpower of the US (Al-Rodhan 2007, 41-44). Although the security elements of the trade war are not as relevant to Canadian agricultural exports as the purely economic conditions, I would be remiss to omit that the US-China trade war is embroiled in a deep history of political power struggles and does not exist in a purely economic vacuum (Kalsie and Arora 2019, 1). In fact, it is important to indicate that many scholars have pointed to the reasoning for US President Donald Trump’s actions during the trade war as being both economic and political; these were economic, due to his perception that the US-China trading relationship has been more beneficial for China. Secondly, the Trump administration wanted to slow China’s rise as a high-powered, high-tech global superpower (Zhang 2018, 56).

While vying for the oval office, Trump was adamant in his platform about his intent to rework American trade policy. He called China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) “one of the greatest thefts in world history” and used powerful rhetoric to mobilize this as an election issue (Rushe 2019). Once inaugurated, the Trump administration began the process of renegotiating trade conditions through tariff adjustments and agreement frameworks across an array of sectors. Trump ascertained that China was manipulating its currency, obstructing market access, and stealing intellectual property. Trump pointed to a figure that stated that the US was running a US$500 billion trade deficit with China, which overestimated the trade deficit by US$165 billion but nonetheless provided him with fodder to seek to correct this deficit. This attempt began in March 2017, when Trump signed two executive orders concerning relations with China (Kalsie and Arora 2019, 7). The first called for tighter tariff enforcement in anti-subsidy and anti-dumping trade cases, while the second ordered a review of the roots of US trade deficits (The White House 2017).

In January 2018, Trump ordered the US to commence an investigation using Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to examine claims of Chinese theft of American intellectual property. Congruently, Trump’s rhetoric became more adversarial towards China, notably when Trump told media sources that he would be willing to impose a “big fine” on China. Beginning in spring 2018, the US and China began a seesaw of imposing tariffs and banning products that saw the two countries placing billions of dollars in tariffs, duties, and bans on the other country. In December 2018, the two countries agreed to a 90-day halt on new tariffs, including Trump’s agreement to delay the scheduled tariff increase until early March, at which point talks were to take place.

Further, China agreed to buy a substantial amount of US agricultural products. These efforts extended the March deadline on tariff increases, which left future increases on an open-ended basis and continued to adhere to his plan to bump tariffs up to 25 per cent throughout the summer of 2019. In June, Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to rekindle trade talks ahead of a meeting scheduled at the Group of 20 summit. At the G20, the two sides agreed to restart trade talks after concessions from both, as Trump agreed to imposing no new tariffs and to an easing of restrictions on Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications company, and China agreed to purchase new US farm products (Kalsie and Arora 2019, 8).

However, in August 2019, US and China representatives underwent two more trade talks with little progress. This led to complaints voiced by Trump that China had failed to keep their promise to buy more US farm products. Trump announced 10 per cent tariffs on US$300 billion worth of Chinese imports, in addition to the 25 per cent already levied on US$250 billion worth of Chinese goods. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce responded to this by halting the purchase of US agricultural products. After the US markets closed, the Treasury said that it had determined that China was manipulating its currency, as the yuan weakened past the key 7 per US dollar level which sent equity markets sharply lower. In September 2019, the US and China had deputies meet, resulting in the cancellation of a planned Chinese visit to US farming regions. Despite attempts to reconcile, American tariffs continued to be applied to approximately US$125 billion worth of Chinese goods, which included popular items such as bluetooth headphones and footwear, and China announced that it would impose additional retaliatory tariffs against US$75 billion worth of
US goods, which put up to 10 per cent extra on top of existing rates. In October 2019, the US banned firms from selling to twenty-eight Chinese companies over alleged human rights violations, which China denounced as an interference in sovereignty (Swanson and Mozur 2019). According to Chinese officials, this soiled the atmosphere surrounding the trade talks. Eventually, in early 2020, the US and China came to an agreement that stipulated loosening levies and buying hundreds of millions of dollars in products from one another. However, the terms of this agreement have not come to fruition, as international relations between the two countries have been significantly impacted by COVID-19 and the 2020 presidential election.

**“Everybody Loses”: the Opening Void in the Chinese Market**

The impact within the US and China has clearly been substantial, with struggling sectors and the need for government aid echoing in both countries (Woo 2018). This has added to the precarious trading situation, as an unclear future in trade has dampened confidence and deterred heavy investment. However, in assessing the consequences of the trade war, looking beyond these two countries at the bigger picture of the entire global market tells a more complex story. At present, there are four major strands of literature that are attempting to assess the ongoing “eye-catching” trade war (Zhang 2018, 54). Most fields of research surrounding this topic are not entirely applicable to this paper’s specific focus, as much of the literature circulating focuses on the trade imbalance, jobs, and efficacy of Trump’s threats. However, a relevant strand exists that analyzes the imbalance, jobs, and efficacy of Trump’s threats. The impact within the US and China has been significantly impacted by COVID-19 and the 2020 presidential election.

The United States and Canada maintain a close relationship which has resulted in the two countries being intertwined economically, militarily, and diplomatically—as shown by the US$1.4 trillion economic relationship between the two continents. They are each other’s largest trading partner and the US serves as Canada’s primary source of foreign direct investment (The Embassy of the United States in Canada n.d.). This relationship is usually lucrative and beneficial for the export-dependent northern nation. However, a relevant strand exists that analyzes the negative impacts of such wars on the international trading system, as the trade war slowed global growth in 2019 to 3.0 per cent (Heeb 2019). This strain, which widely points to the fact that the war violates the WTO’s principles by spurring protectionism, poses risks for the global trading order, helps to frame this topic in international law. While the trade conflict is underway, ebbing moments of opportunity and distress emerge for countries hoping to break into the massive Chinese market (Aljazeera 2019). The economic impact of the war is not being shared equally, as the US remains the least exposed of the world’s 20 largest economies to a drop in exports, in part because of its massive consumer base. Other countries have not been as lucky, as exhibited by the IMF director’s assessment of the trade war as a situation in which “everybody loses” (Shalal and Timmons 2019). In Canada, agriculture was in bad shape in 2018, with millions of dollars in losses (the difference between farm revenues and operating expenses) falling by nearly 21 per cent—one of the largest annual decreases in Canada ever recorded (Edmiston 2019). The trade war, however, offered a glimmer of opportunity for Canadian farmers, as tariffs would imply an exodus of American products from the Chinese market. Thus, a void opened in the huge Chinese market, and many countries hoped to fill that void with their countries’ products. Canadian products that were positioned to fill that gap were concentrated in the agricultural sector due to specific Canadian comparative advantages.

**Commodity Analysis**

**Cross-Nation Crustaceans: Lobster’s Success in the Chinese Market**

Over the past decade, China’s demand for lobster has grown at breakneck speeds, with its imports increasing by 500 per cent from 2009 to 2014 (United Nations 2017, 3). This demand has been largely supplied by American products, with the Maine fishing industry exporting 363 thousand kilograms in 2010 and more than twenty times that amount in 2018 (Whittle 2019). However, following the trade hostilities that resulted in China placing heavy tariffs on US lobsters in July 2018, America exported only one million kilograms of lobster in the first half of 2019, less than a fifth of the amount exported in the previous year. This gave rise to an opportunity for Canadian lobster to fill the demand for Atlantic lobster and to break the “cartel” of Maine lobster in the Chinese market. The US government did, in the form of American exports fell short on sales projections by about US$140 million, Canadian lobster fishers increased their exporting capacity to China by more than US$223 million (Whittle 2019). As a direct result of the trade war, Canada now controls 85 per cent of the Chinese lobster market (Mercer 2019). Thus, Canadian lobster fishers have successfully benefited from this dispute, as Canadian lobster has overtaken the Chinese market with much lower prices than American lobster. Those in the Canadian lobster industry are now focusing on “China, China, China”, narrowing in on newfound opportunities thanks to the dearth of American products in China (Mercer 2019). This focus has proved fruitful, especially in light of the fact that the value of Canadian lobster exports rose by nearly US$9 million when comparing July 2018 to July 2017 (Withers 2019). Significantly, Maine fishers were not beneficiaries of the agriculture package from Washington, which hurt their ability to continue being competitive in China. This commodity analysis demonstrates that the successful penetration of Canadian commodities into the void left by American goods in the Chinese market is most successful when the American domestic response has not included aid for that commodity. Further, the Chinese bans on Canadian goods stemming from the arrest of Wanzhou did not include a ban on lobster, which allowed for lobster to succeed in the Chinese market. After China placed tariffs on American wheat in 2018, its options for high-protein grain were significantly diminished (Robinson 2019). This phenomenon was furthered when Australia,
articles and reports that due to the country's grain industry, further opening a void in the market. Canada successfully seized this large opportunity, exhibited by the fact that Canada's wheat exports to China jumped nearly 200 per cent from January to November 2018 (McMillan 2019). This trend continued, as wheat was not impacted by political action taken by China against Canada following Wanzhou's arrest. This allowed Canadian wheat to continually find a home in the Chinese market, shown by the fact that Canada shipped 1.9 million metric tonnes of wheat to China in the first half of 2019, up 92 per cent from 2018 (Robinson 2019). This continued through 2020, with Canadian wheat outselling its American counterpart in terms of the Chinese market for two quarters of 2020 (McMillan 2020). This followed a Chinese curtailment on buying Australian wheat due to Australia’s criticism of China’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, as neither tariffs nor political decisions inhibited the trade of wheat between Canada and China, Canadian wheat was successful in penetrating the Chinese market where there was an opportunity.

Pig Heads and Pig Headedness: How Pork Fared Amidst the Trade War

Following significant Chinese tariffs on American pork, American pig farmers saw their businesses “dry up” and Chinese consumers needed a new source of pork products (Swanson and Rappeport 2020). As the third largest importer of Canadian pork, China was already a key market for Canadian pork products, but its importance swelled once US pork imports were inhibited preventing an opportunity for Canadian pork producers (Gollom 2019). The China-Canada trade relationship tracked happily along following the tariffs, as Canadian products began penetrating the void left by American counterparts. This is shown by the fact that Canada exported $310 million worth of pork to China in the first four months of 2019 (Statistics Canada 2019). However, this came to a screeching halt in June 2019, when China closed its ports to Canadian pork and beef due to the Chinese authorities allegedly finding banned additives in a Canadian shipment (Gardner and Panetta 2019; Tunney 2019). This ban also came amidst the diplomatic dispute that was a result of the Wanzhou arrest, and it is widely speculated that the arrest was a cause of this ban (Sagan 2019). Canada’s agriculture minister speculated that these shipments and certificates were most likely not Canadian, but being misrepresented as such, as Canadian farmers stopped using the banned additive in question eight years prior in order to penetrate foreign markets more effectively (Gollom 2019). Following China’s blanket ban on Canadian pork imports, Canadian exports were hit hard, particularly those of pig heads. This was a damaging blow to Canadian pork producers because of the specific cultural and highly regionalized culinary uses of pig heads that limit the consumer demand for them (Edmiston 2019). Even so, Canada exported much more pork to China in 2019 than in 2018, selling 22.61 per cent more in 2019 as of October compared to 2018 (Statistics Canada 2019). As diplomatic tensions cooled, China continued to purchase Canadian pork, buying record numbers in the first half of 2020 (McMillan 2020).

Toying with Soy: How Chinese Policy Impacted Soybean Farming in Canada

Canadian soybeans are faring poorly amidst the trade war and diplomatic tensions with Canada and have been largely unable to penetrate the Chinese market. Many Canadian commodities are priced out of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, meaning that when US soybean futures take a hit, Canadian farmers encounter that same hit. This was especially true in the case of soybean trading in 2018 and 2019, as international prices fell from US$10.70 per bushel in 2018 to US$7.80 in May 2019 (Dyck 2019). Absent of a trade war, this may not have been the case, as flooding in the Midwest US should have driven up prices. Thus, in the initial phases of the US-China trade war, Canadian soybean farmers were benefitting significantly, with 2018 seeing an 80 per cent surge in soybean sales to China from Canada. China is the most significant market for soybeans in the world, controlling 60 per cent of the market and purchasing roughly 85 of the 148 million tonnes traded internationally annually, whereas the second-largest buyer, the European Union (EU), purchases fifteen million tonnes (Powell 2019).

Following the trade dispute with China, American farmers were holding one billion bushels of unsold soybeans, triple the normal amount. Poor farming weather, along with American producers being tarifed out of competitiveness on the Chinese market, presented a significant opportunity to Canadian soybean producers. However, several variables meant that Canada was unable to seize a significant enough share of the Chinese market. Firstly, the American government distributed US$28 billion in aid to farmers to ease the pain of the trade wars, which drastically reduced the per-bushel price of American soybeans and allowed the sale of American bushels at aggressively low prices (Nickel 2019). As prices are internationally linked, this allowed America to push into many markets that Canada previously had solid bearings in, such as the EU. Secondly, following the arrest of Wanzhou, the plunge in Canadian soybean exports to China was sharp and swift, with exports becoming negligible. Canadian soybeans continue to struggle to sell for their value into 2020, but slight upticks in pricing and purchasing shows promise for Canadian farmers. Thus, American domestic responses to agricultural difficulty coupled with the diplomatic tensions created by Wanzhou’s arrest have negatively impacted soybean penetration into the Chinese market despite an existing opportunity.

Gold Oil or Fool's Gold: Canadian Canola in China

Canola does not fit perfectly into the examination of Canadian penetration into the Chinese markets where gaps have been created by tariffs because canola is not as important to the American export market as it is to Canada’s. For Canada, there was not much room to grow in terms of the Chinese market, as China was already Canada’s second largest export destination for canola and American canola was not significantly impacted by the trade war (Nickel 2019). With that being said, Canadian canola seed exports to China fell by 22 per cent from 2018 to 2019 as a result of Chinese bans, with farmers planting 9 per cent less in this time period (Nickel 2019). Ottawa responded by increasing coverage available for canola exporters, seeking to reduce trade risks. However, the Canadian response was not enough to keep Canadian canola farmers exporting at normal rates. Canada attempted to turn to Europe to fill the gaps, hoping the biodiesel industry in Europe would pick up the slack (Edmiston 2019; Robinson and Durisin 2019). This might have allowed Canada to bounce back after two Chinese decisions in March 2019 revoked importing licenses for Canadian canola due to “pests” in shipments, an accusation speculated to have been a response to Wangzhou’s arrest (Robinson and Durisin 2019). However, Canada only supplied limited amounts of European demand in the past and struggled to gain access to the market, as Canadian farmers are not certified by the EU (Shahal and Timmons 2019; Robinson and Durisin 2019). Other markets that can absorb some canola importation include Pakistan and Bangladesh, although Canada has been experiencing troubles penetrating those markets to the same degree it used to sell to China.

In the absence of gaining meaningful access to new markets, Canada’s canola exports continued to depend on the hope of the Chinese market. Although canola remains constrained, exports of its seed to China in March 2020 were three times that of February’s and the largest since December 2018 (McMillan 2020). Thus, in the case of canola, this commodity was unsuccessful in exporting to the Chinese market amidst the trade war due to the diplomatic decisions that may relate to the arrest of Wanzhou on American orders. However, in 2020, demand for Canadian canola soared, and China began obtaining the product through third party countries such as the United Arab Emirates (Nickel and Gu 2020). Therefore, although this export product was not trying to fill a gap, it is an important element to examine in understanding how Canadian agriculture is impacted by American trade and diplomatic decisions. Canola demonstrates a clear example of a commodity that was initially harmed by Canada’s relationship with the US, but eventually managed to find its way back to Chinese consumers.
The commodity-level analysis conducted in this paper demonstrates that the opportunities presented to Canadian agriculture were asymmetrically distributed across different product sectors. Moreover, the ability for producers to seize these opportunities was impacted by Canada’s relationship with the US, tariffs levied by China, and global weather patterns. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou was a significant detriment to Canadian economic opportunities in China, as the arrests were likely related to Chinese bans on commodities such as canola and pork. Trade wars in the future between major economies may be beneficial for Canada in the absence of idiosyncratic diplomatic spats akin to the situation with Wanzhou. Even if Canadian products were able to successfully penetrate the Chinese market in consideration of all five of the aforementioned commodities, that is not necessarily necessary for celebration for Canadian agriculture. Farming is based on predictions and educated guesses during planting seasons, in which seeding, ordering, and cultivating is done months in advance with little insight into the unexpected turns that may take place in the international political economy or among global trading relations. This has produced a fair deal of uncertainty in the market and short-term contracts have resulted in “nervousness” on both sides (Dyck 2019). This inhibits the ability of farmers to comfortably invest in their operations and may have drastic impacts on commodity pricing in the future. In theory, the decreased availability of American products for Chinese consumption could have created a larger place for Canadian trade to infiltrate; however, following a series of diplomatic and economic events, Canadian agriculture was only able to take advantage of the Chinese market under very specific conditions. This gave rise to a situation in which Canadian farmers ended up owing a record-high US$106 billion by 2019 (Edmiston 2019). In early 2020, the US and China negotiated a trade agreement that was supposed to result in China buying significant amounts of American agricultural goods (Hiltzik 2020).

The US-China trade war has had significant and asymmetric impacts on the global trading environment. As has been established, political decisions, commodity pricing, and tariff rates are the most important variables to examine in trying to ascertain how a commodity in the Canadian agricultural sector was impacted by the trade war. Through an analysis of Canadian trade, I have shown how these variables account for much of the commodity-level discrepancies in examination of the upshot of the trade war. Despite the potential opportunities created by the US-China trade war, some Canadian products’ ability to seize these opportunities was damaged significantly by the US issuing an extradition request for Chinese executive Meng Wanzhou, which turned China-Canada relations sour and damaged their trading relationship. As the trade war continued to unfurl, the COVID-19 pandemic and Joe Biden’s presidential win derailed possible trade talks between China and the US.

This paper’s exploration of the trade war’s impact on the Canadian agricultural sector raises several questions regarding Chinese market accessibility, Canadian diplomatic relations, and the US’ influence on Canadian trading relationships. These include: What additional variables may emerge that could impact commodity penetration into the Chinese import market? What ways might the Canadian government use domestic policy tools to help farmers stay competitive looking ahead to Biden’s impending presidency? Can the commodity-level analysis approach be applied effectively to other sectors than the agricultural one? These questions may serve as a guide for understanding new possibilities for threats and opportunities for Canadian trade and diplomacy.

References


FLUX: International Relations Review


ABSTRACT - As censorship algorithms for digital communications evolve in China, so do netizens’ evasion techniques. In the last two decades, strategic users have employed the language of satire to slip sensitive content past censors in the form of euphemisms or analogies, with messages ranging from lighthearted frustration to wide scale resistance against repressive government policies. In recent years activists have used spoofs to discuss controversial subjects, including the president, violent arrests by the Domestic Security Department, and even the #MeToo movement. In addition to providing an outlet for criticism and free speech, spoofs can also be a powerful organizational tool for activists in authoritarian societies through their ability to facilitate decentralized, personalized, and flexible connective action. This paper investigates how feminists used spoofs for social mobilization throughout China’s #MeToo movement while evaluating potential frameworks for measuring activists’ success against the media censorship and political repression of a networked authoritarian regime.


Peppa Pig, Winnie the Pooh and river crabs are leading double lives. Their on-screen characters may serve as wholesome role models for children, but in their spare time they make appearances on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) most wanted list; Peppa Pig is actually a “gangster” symbol associated with dangerous fad-chasing, counterfeiting merchandise, and youth counterculture. Winnie the Pooh’s likeness, too, has driven home criticism of President Xi Jinping, and river crabs have grown into a metaphor for the state’s strict censorship program (Qin 2018; Hunt and Wang 2018). The persuasive value of the characters comes not from their original design, but from their use in online spoofing culture—a form of parody which undermines “cultural, social and political agendas” through satirical euphemisms (Gong and Yang 2010). In authoritarian regimes, spoofs can function as subtle analogies for sensitive or unwanted political viewpoints, allowing their manifestations to bypass censors. Parodies are a powerful tool for expressing dissent or criticism, particularly for marginalized groups that are unable to express themselves through mainstream media channels.

On an individual level, satire creates an environment of free speech and allows for emotional catharsis. However, when aided by social media platforms that allow for the quick spread of information, spoofs facilitate decentralized, personalized, and flexible connective action. These tools have ultimately expanded opportunities for digital activism and social resistance by China’s feminists. Spoofs have been an essential force for disseminating information about feminism through Chinese social media platforms—especially during the #MeToo movement, a social campaign founded in the United States with the goal of holding perpetrators of sexual violence accountable and overcoming the stigma surrounding survivors. This paper will begin by contextualizing the censorship environment in which spoofs were first introduced in China, followed by an analysis of spoofs as an evasion technique. The paper will then discuss why the framework of connective action is best suited to explain the success of spoofs in a networked authoritarian society. Finally, using the logic of connective action, it will evaluate how spoofs have bolstered China’s #MeToo movement and analyzed the implications of such parodies for feminist activism.

**Political Context of China’s Censorship and the Rise of Spoofing**

Prior to the economic reforms of the late 1970s, Chinese media were a direct arm of the CCP’s propaganda machine. After 1978, the CCP began to modernize the media industry by giving up its monopoly over journalism. However, the government maintained a watchful eye and news outlets that published controversial content faced closure, while the journalists who wrote for them risked harassment or dismissal from their posts (Tai 2014, 189). As the internet grew more accessible, more people were able to talk and learn about subjects that the authoritarian government had deemed inappropriate for unsupervised discussion. Soon, the internet enabled netizens to mobilize opposition, such as labour protests, human rights activism, calls for democracy, political reform, separationist movements, etc. (Tai 2014, 189). As ordinary netizens became more involved in communication channels, the CCP created a new system of censorship, regulating Chinese servers through agencies such as the State Council Information Office (SCIO) founded in 1990. This “networked authoritarianism” occurs when an authoritarian regime retains control over expression despite perceived social-networking freedoms (MacKinnon 2011, 32-33). Users may feel as if they can speak and be heard on the Internet, but in reality, the regime is monitoring and manipulating digital communications. Thus, there is no guarantee of free speech. Although censorship is run by privately owned companies, they are held liable to government leadership, leading censors to filter content according to the CCP censorship platform. The two main companies carrying out pro-government censorship in China are the live streaming platform, YY and the social media application, WeChat. YY filters content from the client-side, which means that all of the commands for censorship can be found within the application.

YY refers to a master list of terms that must be censored before allowing the client’s device to send a given message. As such, YY’s master list can be reverse engineered in the application and potential trigger words are monitored to allow netizens to figure out what specific terms to avoid using when discussing controversial subjects. YY’s keyword list can be tracked on an hourly basis and the current dataset from Citizen Lab has identified over 20000 keywords. The list relies on both general-side censorship, whereby its algorithm is kept on a remote server, thus preventing its keywords from being reverse engineered. Once a message is sent by a user, it is filtered privately by WeChat’s parent company, Tencent, and censored only if it contains an unwanted keyword combination. Decoding WeChat’s server-side sensors requires more involvement because keywords by themselves may not trigger a censor and may only be flagged when used in conjunction with other keywords. In addition, users are not notified if their message is blocked; the intended receiver just does not see it. Thus, avoiding WeChat censors is challenging for the ordinary netizen because server-side filters are not transparent. Such complex algorithms have prompted evasion techniques to arise and evolve (Crete-Nishihata, et. al. 2020).

Spoofing culture is a slang-based evasion technique that grew alongside the expansion of digital communications. Due to the use of characters in Chinese writing, the language contains many homographs and homophones, which can be used as substitutes for censored words. If users know from experience that a certain character will be filtered by Wechat, they can use a spoof to slip a message past the censor. One of the most famous examples is the “Grass Mud Horse,” which is a spoof that rose to prominence in 2009 as a consequence of a CCP campaign against online pornography. Campaigns against vulgarity are routine in China, and are often used by the CCP as a means of removing unwanted political views from the internet (Wang 2012). At first, “Grass Mud Horse” gained notoriety as a way of using pornographic language without attracting negative attention because its pronunciation (cáo nǐ mā) was a close homophone of the phrase “F*** your Mother” (pronounced cáo nǐ mā). Over time, the euphemism evolved to symbolize defiance against internet censors and was further popularized through toys, cartoons, and songs. Later renditions have depicted the grass mud horse as a challenger of a spoof: the “river crab,” which grew out of the idea of the “harmonious society.” Former President Hu Jintao used the term “harmonization” to refer to CCP censorship of online content that opposed party propaganda. WeChat uses this term sarcastically to criticize the CCP’s attempts to filter the internet, the CCP banned it as well. As a result of the censorship of “harmonization” (pronounced hèxié), netizens turned to its homophone, the river crab (hèxié). Songs, videos and posts depicted the grass mud horse as an alpaca-like creature struggling against an evil river crab, symbolizing the tension between freedom of speech and government censorship (Wang 2012). Sometimes, the censorship apparatus detects spoofs and censors the substituted word. However, spoofs are adaptable and often evolve into further analogies in order to confuse censors. For instance, the phrase “national treasure” (guó bǎo) is a homophone for the “Domestic Security Department” (guó bǎo), which was censored due to prolific criticism of the DSD’s violent suppression of dissidents. In addition to “national treasure,” netizens also use the word “panda,” or even the panda emoji as an analogy for the DSD, because many Chinese people view the panda as a “national treasure.” Homophone spoofs like this are the most common because they are recognizable and easy to link together (King, et. al. 2013, 3). However, spoofs are not always language based. On occasion, they also sprout from memes or niche online communities. One of the spoofs for President Xi Jinping is Winnie the Pooh because of an internet joke from 2013, where a picture of Xi walking alongside President Obama was compared to a similar cartoon image of Winnie the Pooh next to Tigger. As a non-political term, Winnie the Pooh is much more likely to evade censors than the President’s name. In addition to his domestic fame, Winnie the Pooh also gained prominence with international news outlets such as BBC News, The Guardian, and Telegraph. Better
Theoretical Framework

Spoofing is an important anti-censorship technique because it performs as a “personal action frame” – an individualized political orientation based on “personal hopes, lifestyles, and grievances” (Bennet and Segerberg 2012, 743). Personal action frames are a key characteristic of decentralized social campaigns because they do not require ritualized action or packaging in order to spread into new contexts. Instead, they rely on broadly understandable themes that can be adapted by individuals in order to overcome barriers to “established political organizations, ideologies, interests, class, gender, race, or ethnicity” (Bennet and Segerberg 2012, 747).

Decentralized campaigns that rely on individual connections or identities rather than social ones are also known as “collective action,” a type of campaign typically used by activists in authoritarian states. Collective action is often understood through its parallels with collective action, which is the “pursuit of goals by more than one person controlled or spurred by actors other than government officials or their agents” (King, et. al., 2013, 6). The two are best distinguished through the way they interact with networking tools. Collective action campaigns typically have an offline base and technology serves as a tool that helps bolster the existing movement. Conversely, with connective action, technology itself is the primary organizing agent and it is digital communications that bring the campaign into existence. Collective action is often understood through its parallels with collective action, which is the “pursuit of goals by more than one person controlled or spurred by actors other than government officials or their agents” (King, et. al., 2013, 6). The two are best distinguished through the way they interact with networking tools. Collective action campaigns typically have an offline base and technology serves as a tool that helps bolster the existing movement. Conversely, with connective action, technology itself is the primary organizing agent and it is digital communications that bring the campaign into existence. Collective action is often understood through its parallels with collective action, which is the “pursuit of goals by more than one person controlled or spurred by actors other than government officials or their agents” (King, et. al., 2013, 6). The two are best distinguished through the way they interact with networking tools. Collective action campaigns typically have an offline base and technology serves as a tool that helps bolster the existing movement. Conversely, with connective action, technology itself is the primary organizing agent and it is digital communications that bring the campaign into existence.

Collective action is more likely to be detected and cracked down on by authoritarian regimes because its base is centrally organized and founded in collective identity values that are then turned into social campaigns. Collective speech is not only more identifiable but also more threatening to the CCP because it builds “collective action potential” – a destabilizing situation where “a locus of power and control other than the government, influences the behaviours of masses of Chinese people” (King, et. al., 2013, 14). Thus, authoritarian governments will target both unwanted political ideas and movements that have the potential to mobilize they campaign. For example, WeChat’s censors are more concerned with group chats, where users might have an audience of up to 500, than with simple one-on-one conversations (Crente-Nishihata, et. al. 2020). Furthermore, any symbol or topic that facilitates unified social interactions is at risk of being targeted by censors, which is why certain topics that may not seem anti-governmental are targeted. Although Peppa Pig is not explicitly a symbol for dissent, she is a unifying figure for subculture and thus she has collective action potential. In short, activists in authoritarian states need to develop organizational structures that are fragmented in order to avoid being identified as a potential mobilization threat. Connective action is far more appropriate for decentralized mobilization because it encourages social communication on an individual level. Content is spread in the form of seemingly apolitical symbols, which are only politically meaningful to those who actively seek to engage with the information that way. For instance, if a young child shares a picture of Winnie the Pooh to their friends, they are likely discussing the cartoon, not President Xi Jinping. On the other hand, if this picture is shared by someone humorously or sarcastically, then those who recognize the analogy will be able to engage with the other person’s political message. Without openly discussing politics these two users can engage each other’s sense of political awareness without officially stating their own views. Although users may not be engaged in direct conversations with each other, they are interacting with the same material, which ultimately fosters the sustainability and reach of the movement (Zeng, 2020, 185-186). Furthermore, netizens tend to appropriate applications that are used by most citizens, such as WeChat, which reports over one billion monthly users (Crente-Nishihata, et. al. 2020). This not only increases chances of proliferation, but also makes it more difficult for the government to block activists, since a full shut down of something essential, such as business transaction sites or messaging apps, would create a problematic level of criticism and attention (Zuckerman 2013).

Hashtags are an example of effective personal action frames that make digital activism a low-cost and low-risk way for people to get involved in digital activism (Caidi and Zhang, 2019). With hashtags, a user is able to categorize their posts as part of a broader discussion or theme without necessarily linking themselves to a formal organization. In 2016, football player Colin Kaepernick purposely knelt instead of standing during the American national anthem as a form of protest against police brutality and racism. For him, this was a high cost move, as he would later be released from his contract and criticized by many in his field. However, sharing the hashtag that he inspired, #takeaknee, was significantly less risky. Without engaging in protests themselves, users could back Kaepernick and share their own personal statements regarding racism or police violence. Using a hashtag allows an individual to demonstrate support for an idea, or to share their own perspective without committing themselves to it offline. However, just as they can be low risk and low cost, hashtags can also be low reward. Typically, hashtags work best when they are followed up with offline demonstrations, such as the Women’s March in 2018 that followed the rehabilitation of the #MeToo Movement in 2017. Yet, offline movements are not always an option for those in authoritarian states, where demonstrations and protests are forbidden (Zeng 2020, 181). Thus, while hashtags and other forms of connective action may not be high-reward, they are an important tool for activism because they create new avenues for momentum where otherwise there might have been silence. Spoofs perform similarly to hashtags. Like hashtags, spoofs are based in semantics, appeal to subcultures and they carry meanings that are not explicitly verbalized. Since only the underlying message is controversial and not the words themselves, the perceived risk of sharing the message is low. Although digital activists run into trouble with the government for crafting controversial messages, those who share them are significantly less culpable because they can claim to not understand the political meaning of the spoof or to have been participating in the joke as a gag (Larmer 2011). As such, spoofs have found traction as a type of activism that can use the perception of their ability to appeal to counterculture, spoofs are an invaluable tool for minority or human rights activists who are excluded from the dialogues of mainstream media, which strictly adhere to CCP’s censorship policies (Wonneberger 2020). For instance, when Chinese blogger Guo Baofeng was detained by police in July 2009 for reposting a video which accused local Xiamen authorities of covering up a murder and gang rape, an expression based on an internet trend was created to advocate for his release. The phrase, “Guo Baofeng, your mother is calling you home for dinner,” was derived from a then-popular World of Warcraft meme where a user jokingly posted, “Jia Junpeng, your mother is calling you home for dinner.” Larmer (2011). This appealed to the shared experience of most Chinese kids of being called home for dinner after playing outside. Prompted by another activist, netizens made noise by sending postcards with this message to the police station and sharing it online. While it is unconfirmed whether this campaign was the deciding factor in Guo Baofeng’s case, this particular activist was released after only 16 days whereas many others with the exact same charges had been sentenced to multiple years (Larmer 2011). Most notably, neither the blogger who started the spoof, nor the netizens who reshared it faced formal consequences from the CCP.

#Hashtag Feminism and #MeToo in China

Womens’ movements use hashtag activism very successfully because they are able to build personal action frames that bring awareness and engagement to the public. In response to the 2014 Isla Vista shooting, the hashtag #YesAllWomen
illustrated how gender oppression could impact women not only through acts of violence, but also through day-to-day aggressions (Thrift 2014, 1091). This hashtag, along with other feminist tags like #bringbackourgirls, find success because they do more than remember isolated incidents; they highlight how everyday experiences are shared across a group. A recent example of hashtag feminism is the #MeToo trend, which was coined by The New York Times. As Burke in 2006 to educate people about the prevalence of sexual assault and abuse. The term was re-popularized in 2017 when celebrities in Hollywood began sharing their high-profile stories of harassment. This hashtag mobilized social media users to share their own experiences with misogyny, raising awareness and motivating many to consider the effects of gender inequality in their own lives. More shares meant more publicity for the topic and, in turn, to increased discussion (Caidi and Zhang 2019).

Because of the CCP, China’s feminists have had to navigate hashtag activism differently from other women’s movements. Twitter has been banned in mainland China since 2009 and is only sparsely accessible to Virtual Private Network (VPN) users. Thus, communication between international and local feminists is limited. Furthermore, movements with foreign roots are especially hard to introduce in China due to the tension between global and local activism. Attempts to bring in Western ideas are met with government disapproval of the spread of so-called uncritical imitations of Western cultural ideas (Hsiung and Wong 1998). Consequently, contemporary feminist activists resort to creative evasion techniques like spoofing to participate in international feminist campaigns such as #MeToo. When the movement started to spread to China, the hashtag was banned by authorities, leading a user to invent a homophone for the phrase: #nǐmù, which would be translated to “rice bunny,” since “nǐ” means rice and “mù” means bunny. Netizens could share their support for the movement either with the characters for “rice bunny” (米兔), the pinyin (nǐmù), or through emojis ( символ). The emoji is a key tactic because illustrations or drawings are more difficult for automatic censors to detect and require manual filtering. Even more successful were the spoofs that involved other dialects or languages, such as the phrase “俺也一样,” which means “for me, it’s the same” in the Sichuan dialect. Thus, as the #MeToo discussion grew, netizens developed increasingly innovative methods for sharing subversive information. Another spoof that gained traction regarded a high-profile TV personality who was accused of sexual harassment. Due to his ties to the CCP, his name, “Zhi Jūn” was censored. However, netizens ‘camouflaged’ their discussions of him by using the homophone “zhūjūn,” which means “swine bacteria” (Zeng 2020, 184). Eventually, censors caught on to this substitution but netizens had already turned to other means of expression. #MeToo supporters began rotating screenshots of articles with information about sexual predators so that content would remain legible for netizens but undetectable by automated filters. A popular strategy was “caching”, which is the process of restoring sensitive content and concealing it in places that are inaccessible for the CCP’s censors (Zeng 2020, 182). For example, one user managed to permanently save information about a case of sexual harassment from 1998 by caching the survivor’s open letter in a cryptocurrency transaction. Others followed by saving the letter on a personal programming site. GitHub, which the government was unable to tamper with due to its American origins, and unwilling to block due to its use by Chinese IT developers. By diversifying their evasion techniques, activists ensure that the feminist message behind #MeToo withstands CCP crackdowns.

**Analysis**

Activity needs to be organized on a case by case basis; while Twitter may have allowed for socially connected hashtag feminism in America, WeChat’s censorship meant that Chinese feminists needed to organize differently. Where Western movements benefit from themes like stressed collective identity, China’s feminism was reinforced by individuals. In states without networked authoritarianism, feminists do not need to avoid presenting a unified movement because their government is not intolerant to collective action. Feminists in non-authoritarian states are also likely to have access to money, labour, or facilities; in China, these resources are more limited, especially when the government supports their own feminist organization over others. China’s feminist movement has found traction with spoofing culture because spoofs help activists in authoritarian societies avoid the problem of collective action potential by being decentralized, adaptable, and personalized. The differences between the two regime types also impacts how successful movements in one region are in another. Western activists, explicit change or momentum is a marker for social impact, but in authoritarian states it is more important for an idea to endure censorship than to spark dramatic progress. Dramatic change is one-dimensional here; there is no guarantee of permanence and it may be difficult for other movements to recreate. Conversely, when an idea survives censorship, it is a sign of a dynamic and adaptable activist innovation. The Chinese #MeToo movement was not big or immediately impactful and that greatly increased its chances of survival. The #MeToo movement has been bolstered both by local Chinese activists and the international Chinese community, who supplemented their #MeToo tweets with the hashtags #MeTooChina (the Chinese word for “China”) and #China. Within China, #MeToo was supported by a variety of groups and regions, evidenced by the use of diverse dialects. The Chinese diaspora had an instrumental role in keeping the conversation alive. Because they are outside of the scope of CCP influence, diaspora individuals are able to use unencumbered platforms like Facebook. Diaspora #MeToo by overseas Chinese individuals coincided with quiet periods domestically, suggesting that diaspora activity increased directly in response to heightened censorship (Caidi and Zhang 2019). Diaspora members reacted to silenced activists by drawing international attention to #MeToo and feminist mobilization structures in China, as well as the issue of CCP censorship. Furthermore, the overseas Chinese are also able to mobilize in a centralized way without risking a crackdown from above. Diaspora members created platforms such as the website “MeTooChina.org” for those back home to anonymously share stories outside of Chinese servers that would have otherwise
censored them. In addition to functioning as an emotional outlet, this site was used by overseas Chinese to brainstorm potential policy solutions and goals that local activists would otherwise have been unable to discuss (Caidi and Zhang 2019). The diaspora’s uncensored voices and mobility allowed them to supplement Chinese feminists’ connective action with external organizational structures and global recognition. More and more activists are urging those in the diaspora as well as members of the Chinese elite to do a better job fighting for gender equality on behalf of working class women. Despite being more likely to face sexually violent crimes, working class women are less likely to be considered victims or provided support because of their low social capital (Zeng 2019, 78). Netizens and members have played important roles making information on activism widely available and inerasable by the CCP. However, the privilege of having an audience is still far out of reach for many. #Mitu, spoofers, and activists have made serious progress for freedom of expression, but the movement needs persistent attention and participation to stay afloat. In order for marginalized groups to be able to advocate for themselves, they need greater access to anti-censorship tools that can withstand government crackdowns.

Hashtag feminism and spoofs worked well in China because they are decentralized, personalized and flexible, allowing them to be compatible with connective action. Fragmentation allows united political messages to evade CCP censors, while personal action frames facilitate creating and maintaining personal action frames. Because each user can come up with their own method of avoiding censors, evasion techniques are ever changing, making them much harder to track or regulate. In a regime where media censorship is growing more and more sophisticated and political opposition is thoroughly regulated and suppressed, the innovation and resilience demonstrated by feminist netizens is revolutionary in and of itself.

References
ABSTRACT - The development of new digital technologies was predicted to be a boon for environmental activism. Internet and social media platforms were expected to facilitate broad bottom-up change, enabling activists worldwide to communicate and organize more effectively. However, the emergence of digital technologies may not have revolutionized the methods and impacts of activist organizations, especially for the environmental movement, wherein meaningful change has not yet been realized regarding climate change and nature preservation. Given the many challenges activists face, it is essential to understand how collective action can be undertaken with digital media to produce positive consequences for nature and human relations. Moreover, the neoliberal economic context from which digital technologies emerged and grew further accelerates environmental destruction through overproduction and overconsumption. This paper examines the relationship between environmental activism and digital technologies. While the environmental movement may have benefitted from newer organizational and communication tools on the international stage, the neoliberal economic framework in which digital technologies operate fundamentally contradicts the goals of the environmental movement.

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The emergence of the internet and the growth of social media platforms have been considered powerful new tools for social activism movements, facilitating broad bottom-up change. The environmental movement was initially thought to benefit from the arrival and growth of new digital technologies. It was hoped that tools such as online communication and social media platforms would allow environmental activists to organize more effectively. Spreading information to a wide audience of supporters and connecting with like-minded individuals would be easier as geographical and temporal barriers were reduced, and as the need to pass through established news companies was eliminated. However, the emergence of digital technologies did not revolutionize the methods and impacts of activist organizations. This is particularly true for the environmental movement, whose existence to this day demonstrates the continued urgency of the climate crisis. The environmental movement in this paper will refer to organizations whose general focus is the protection of the environment as well as individuals independently taking part in related activism. Environmental protection through the environmental movement may take the form of advocating for a decrease in global temperature rise, increased biodiversity conservation efforts, and climate justice, among other goals. Mainstream media sources will refer to print media (newspapers) and electronic media (television, radio, cable news), while digital media will refer to media communication that emerged with the internet, such as emails, organization websites, and social media platforms. This paper will examine the impacts that the emergence of online communication and social media platforms have had on the methods and the efficacy of the environmental movement in generating meaningful change for environmental protection from individuals, public actors, and the private sector. Given the significant challenges we are facing in terms of climate change and environmental degradation, understanding how collective action can be undertaken within digital media is important to produce the most positive consequences for nature and human relations. The paper will argue that the benefits enabled by digital technologies for the environmental movement, namely more effective organization and communication, are outweighed by the tendency of online activism to be low-risk and lacking real engagement, due to echo chambers and ‘slacktivism’. These costs and benefits of digital technologies for the environmental movement are ultimately overshadowed by the structural problems that come from the neoliberal economic context. These problems contradict the initial goals of equal co-creation and horizontal communication of digital technologies and are fundamentally detrimental to the environmental movement. Firstly, the paper will discuss the benefits of digital technologies for the environmental movement: the loss of geographical and temporal barriers to spread information, reaching wider audiences, and the increased independence of environmental organizations to communicate on their platforms. Secondly, the paper will discuss the negative consequences of digital technologies on environmental activism: mainly, that wider audiences translate into the loss of meaningful engagement and impactful activism. Thirdly, the paper will assess the underlying structural issue, which is the dependence of the environmental movement on the neoliberal elite to succeed. This is evidenced in two ways: first, the problem of established corporate media power means that the environmental movement must create spectacular news so as to fit into top-down media narratives. Digital media coverage, and second, the commodification of nature in the discourse and methods of activism is in contradiction with the preservation of nature itself. Lastly, the paper will conclude that to protect the natural environment, the environmental movement will need to transform the way they currently use digital technologies, to promote strong environmental collective action. By creating what digital technologies were originally hoped to bring: a space of horizontal, bottom-up co-creation where communication is thoughtful and inclusive. Strength, Efficacy, and Independence of Online Environmental Activism

The emergence of digital technologies altered the way environmental activism operates. Traditional campaigning practices were done by lobbying groups, scholars, or scientific organizations in a slow, more effortful manner by organizing protests or unconventional actions and influencing the broader society through books and news media (Elliott 2020). Conversely, digital technologies enabled faster communication between like-minded but geographically far individuals through emails, organizational webpages, and social media platforms. Effective communication is at the heart of any type of activism in order to share information, to raise awareness, as well as to coordinate mobilization and organize actions; in fact, the success of activist activities is dependent on effective communication (Büssing, Thielking, and Menzel 2019, 12). Social media platforms and other forms of online communication are therefore powerful tools for activist movements, allowing organizations to “extend and accelerate the circulation of information, to mobilize resources, raise awareness, facilitate discussion, organize events and gain public attention” (Sobéron 2019, 2). Digital media has allowed the environmental movement to transcend the significant geographical and temporal barriers of traditional activism by disseminating information quickly. This is especially evident in “cross-platform usage”, where information is spread through “horizontal networks interconnected through different platforms” (3). Most large environmental non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace or the World Wildlife Fund, now tend to have an online presence across multiple social media platforms as well as their websites, allowing them to communicate with their supporters directly, instantaneously, and across large geographical spaces. While online communication reduces geographical and temporal distances for the spread of information, digital technologies are also essential spaces for what Geert Lovink calls “tactical media action” (Lester and Hutchins 2009, 581). Lovink is a scholar whose work focuses on the “emancipatory and democratizing potential of new media technologies,” and his idea of “tactical media” is defined as a form of communication which is “participatory,” “dissenting,” and used by groups of people who feel “aggrieved by or excluded from the wider culture” (580, 581). Tactical media is a powerful tool for activists to interrupt established news media with their messages. This tool is reinforced with digital technologies as activists have “expanded [their] reach into the network of the internet, where their messages can be shared across the world in seconds and can potentially gain a lot of traction (581). Using tactical media strategies through digital communication technologies is useful for the environmental movement to attract mainstream media attention. An example of this use of tactical media for environmental purposes can be seen in Neil Smith’s ten-day ‘tree-sit’ in 1998 to protest the construction of a road in a eucalyptus tree forest in Tasmania (586). After ten days in the tree with a computer and internet connection, Smith, who was dubbed “Hector the Forest Protector,” gained significant media coverage through the spread of information to politicians and news companies by email, recounting his situation and the context of the forest (586). Although Smith’s action was not successful in preventing the construction of the road, it is an example of a tactical media strategy, demonstrating the effective use of digital technologies at the beginning of the internet era to gain mainstream media attention and to spread information across a considerably greater geographical area. Digital technologies have thus enabled the environmental movement to engage in tactical media strategies in order to disseminate information and communicate across wide geographical areas very efficiently. As previously discussed, the environmental movement has been able to gain public attention by using “tactical media” strategies or creating original and rapid content that is then given digital coverage by mainstream media sources. The environmental movement has also been able to gain widespread public attention by using digital technologies autonomously, no longer relying on print and electronic media. Instead, environmental organizations can communicate directly with their
With the ability to create one’s self-representation and the ability to share this information quickly, the environmental movement has used digital technologies to reach and mobilize a widespread and large audience of old and new supporters. Social media platforms such as Facebook create “horizontal networks” between users who can share campaigns, ideas, and other information internationally, thus widening the reach of anything published about the environment. Hemmi and Crowther (2013) described, similarly, the “user-friendly and flexible forms of communication” that are permitted on social media platforms, such as videos and events, may appeal to wider audiences more effectively than written content which may be less accessible in mainstream media. The global environmental organization, Greenpeace, argued that petitions and hashtags are several of the tools offered on social media platforms that allow people campaigning on similar issues to connect and are part of wider campaigns which can create “huge societal change” (Abelvik-Lawson 2020). The “worldwide attention” given in the past year to the ‘Fridays for Future’ movement—a worldwide movement of youth striking weekly to protest the inaction on climate change, led by Greta Thunberg—and the widespread use of the hashtag #FridaysForFuture on social media is another demonstration of using digital technologies to reach a large audience and gain widespread news attention (Soberton 2019, 1).

Media attention which reaches a large audience is effective for an environmental movement because it helps to gain new supporters and mobilize old ones. This ultimately fosters change by putting pressure on powerful actors, such as companies or politicians, to change their actions or decisions, by raising awareness, and appealing to a large scope of individuals to make small changes in their daily lives. For example, a video made by Greenpeace in 2014 called “Everything is not Awesome” criticized Lego’s partnership with the oil company Shell and was viewed six million times online (Abelvik-Lawson 2020). The video format is a powerful medium to share information and provoke emotion from an audience, and its presence on social media and Greenpeace’s website made the message spread quickly across the world. This ultimately resulted in Lego ending its “multimillion pound, 50-year relationship with the oil company” due to the pressure of maintaining a positive corporate image (Abelvik-Lawson 2020). Similarly, Hemmi and Crowther (2013) argue that online activism can be thought of as ‘persuasive activism’ or ‘sub-activism’, where online environmental action is effective by being a “persuasive strategy of engagement rather than a confrontational one” (4). One interviewed member of Friends of the Earth Scotland stated that online, small-scale activism is more effective than confrontational offline environmental activism as it is “more approachable and less lecturing”, meaning that “people will listen to us and we’ll be able to influence them a lot more” (4). Involvement in environmental groups through social media contributes to the creation of “ecological citizenship” among individuals, according to Dobson, which is a form of identity that focuses on the “public implications” of one’s actions, especially in terms of one’s ecological footprint (Craig 2019, 167). Therefore, the use of digital technologies by the environmental movement has the power to create positive environmental change by shaping public opinion about companies, politicians, and even one’s self in terms of the environmental impact of their behaviors. The reduction of geographical and temporal barriers, the ability to gain widespread attention without depending on traditional news outlets, and the two-directional nature of communication on digital media technologies have allowed the environmental movement to become more autonomous, participatory, and far-reaching.

Slacktivism and Echo Chambers: Is Online Activism Even Activism?

While the emergence of the internet and growth of digital technologies initially brought hope to activist movements due to their potential to accelerate change, a growing body of literature (see Büscher et al. 2019; Büscher 2016; Hemmi and Crowther 2013) is questioning the power of digital technologies in fostering meaningful activism. Online activism has been described as ‘clicktivism’ or ‘slacktivism’ due to the absence of meaningful engagement and mobilization by online activists, referring to the inability of creating change by simply liking content with a ‘click’ (Büscher 2016, 730). Büscher, Thiellking, and Menzel (2019) sought to examine the relationship between online environmental behavior (‘liking’ content) and more demanding offline behaviors, such as donating money and volunteering, by conducting a quantitative research project about the protection of the Andean bear in Ecuador (4). They found that online campaigns can be a “low-level entry point for environmental action” but only if the individuals in question have the time or money (9). Their conclusions are thus in line with the assumptions of slacktivism: since offline activities such as volunteering or donating money require large amounts of personal resources, they are more closely correlated to each other than to online ‘liking’ (9). Therefore, their results show that digital technologies are only effective in leading to meaningful actions in support of the environmental movement if individuals are already predisposed to do so. Conversely, Greenpeace argues that online environmental support leads to meaningful activism both offline and digitally. The organization cites a Georgetown University study which stated that online activists are “twice as likely to volunteer their time, more than four times as likely to contact political representatives, and five times as likely to recruit others to sign petitions” (Abelvik-Lawson 2020). The stronger emphasis made by Greenpeace on the correlation between online engagement and offline actions may be caused in part by Greenpeace’s role as an environmental organization which uses hashtags, videos, and petitions to generate mobilization, and thus wishes to portray online activism as a strong gateway to meaningful offline action. As a large environmental organization, Greenpeace also may find further use in offline activism by being able to monetize online actions, such as likes or views by their supporters, something which the smaller Ecuadorian organization studied by Büscher, Thiellking, and Menzel probably could not. Nevertheless, it can be expected that
the individuals who ‘like’ environmental content online will be more likely to engage in offline environmental activism than those who do not partake in online liking, but liking online content remains a much easier task (in terms of time, money, and engagement) than offline activities. Therefore, while the environmental movement may have reached a wider audience using digital technologies, it is to conclude whether the audience size has led to an increase in offline activism, as a result of slactivism. Of digital technologies activism discussed literature, is the risk ‘echo chamber’. Echo on the idea that online organizations individuals who are and committed to actions and will thus ‘converting’ others public support for movement 2020, 50). This linked with the idea of social media platforms such as Facebook individuals have a limited and partial audience reach since they may only attain the people who are already seeking out their message. This audience reach is both advantageous and disadvantageous: while it has the disadvantage of spreading the movement’s messages to a smaller number of people, it also has the potential advantage of this smaller group being more passionate and interested, and more likely to engage in subsequent offline activism. Therefore, to effectively foster awareness and attain the vast goal of reversing climate change through broad societal change, the environmental movement must use digital technologies in conjunction with mainstream media, to simultaneously advocate towards a mass audience and direct potential supporters to their unfiltered message online.

The difficulty of digital technologies in generating meaningful engagement has led scholars to question whether online activism can truly be called ‘activism’. Activism is defined as ‘a doctrine or practice that emphasized direct vigorous action especially in support of or opposition to one side of a controversial issue’ (Merriam-Webster 2020). This stereotypical vision of activism which focuses on effortful action is agreed upon by interviewed members of the Friends of the Earth Scotland who described “true” activism as involving high stakes, confrontation, and militancy (Crowther 2013).

In addition to the lack of confrontational militancy, online environmental activity may be more focused on creating one’s digital identity and presenting oneself as environmentally engaged rather than helping to foster meaningful change. Gladwell argues that “the growth of ‘social media activism’ is a way for people to participate and support a cause safely, people who otherwise would be at disproportionate risk of state violence if they took part in more confrontational activist methods. For example, Extinction Rebellion has recognized that their reliance on direct, high stakes militancy, essentially being arrested as a method to protest the lack of environmental policy in the UK, is flawed, as it puts people of color at higher risk of police violence despite partaking in similar activities (Extinction Rebellion 2020).

The traditional model of media coverage that is characteristic of neoliberalism, based on top-down established corporate media deciding what information will receive news attention, has not been fundamentally altered by the growth of digital technologies. The rise of the internet promised more equal access to public attention, allowing individuals to share their content, independent from established electronic and print news Corporations. Activists hoped that this would be a powerful tool to generate change independently, building on each other’s messages, in harmony with the idea of natural diversity evolving through cycles. However, Lester and Hutchins (2009) argue that digital technologies have instead become a tool used by environmental activist organizations primarily to get the attention
of established mainstream news sources (592). The model of media power has remained the same despite the growth of digital technologies: Environmental groups are using the internet in a way that reaffirms the historical and cultural dominance of print and electronic news media, adapting to the agenda and priorities of journalists, as opposed to forging new models of media power embedded within the specific networking capacity of the internet. (Hutchins 2009, 580). The authors argue that there is a “popular assumption” that the established news media hold “a privileged and naturalized role in representing and anchoring ‘reality’” (Lester and Hutchins 2009, 591). This is an issue because environmental campaigns that do not gain news media coverage are believed to be unable to attract broad public support as access to a mass, impartial audience may only be attained through mainstream news coverage. Therefore, environmental organizations use tactical media to “intervene in and influence” the mainstream news outlets (582). Since these major news sources are based on novelty and significant events, the environmental movement must systematically re-strategize to “find alternative access points” into the mainstream news media (583). Some of the tactical tools they use are the coordination of strategic actions combined with “symbolic resonance” (583). The earlier example of ‘Hector the Forest Protector’ demonstrates this combination: the strategic action of Smith sitting in a tree temporarily prevented the logging of the forest and the by-also-being-a-symbolic-image-of-a-single-man-preventing-the-destruction-of-the-forest. Another example of this unchanged model of media power is the Fridays for Future movement. Per popular belief the movement started gaining popular attention as a result of its use of the hashtag #FridaysForFuture on social media; in reality, the movement began to gain considerable traction only after Greta Thunberg’s UN speech in December 2018 (Road 2019). This shows that environmental activists still rely on news coverage from mainstream media sources to receive widespread public attention; even the attention coverage from mainstream media sources to receive UN speech in December 2018 (Road 2019). This considerable traction only after Greta Thunberg’s social media; in reality, the movement began to gain Fridays for Future movement. Per popular belief of this unchanged model of media power is the destruction of the forest. Another example being a symbolic image of a single man preventing forest and it gained national news coverage by also “symbolic resonance” (583). The earlier example coordinators of strategic actions combined with methods of activism, contradicting the narrow world itself. Environmental activism inevitably must create some human representation of nature to impart common understandings of the natural world to others. However, Büscher (2016) argues that the representations of nature present online are almost entirely commodified within the economic model of consumerism and profit-making and this commodification of nature happens in what Büscher calls ‘nature 2.0’ (727). Nature 2.0 is “a nature that is humanly produced” through co-creation, active modification, and production by individuals on social media and other online communication spheres (727, 728). An example of nature commodification is the ecological search engine called Ecosia. By selling user data and creating advertising space, they give the majority of their revenue to “rainforest sustainability programs” (731). Firstly, the representation of the Amazon rainforest as the “lungs of our planet” hides a more complex reality of local gold-diggers and farmers who rely on the forest for their income. This representation of nature is distorted to promote Western consumerism of the search engine and to generate profit (732). Secondly, individual interactions or searches on Ecosia are represented as being positive for conservation efforts. However, in reality, user data ends up fueling the capitalist economy by allowing the search engine to place more advertisements, indirectly encouraging more consumption and destruction of the environment. The commodification of nature in online discourses and activist methods fits within the neoliberal vision which represents competition and profit as ways of “saving nature”. However, the representation of nature through these capitalist forces is “impersonal” and “sliced into small bits that can be trademarked and sold” which goes against the true representation of nature as wild, peaceful, and diverse (736). Therefore, while the emergence of digital technologies spurred hope for the environmental movement to provide a space for bottom-up mobilization for nature preservation, the neoliberal economic context shifted the structural mechanisms of digital technologies. Instead, environmental organizations remained dependent on their messages being expressed through the same elitist model of media power and resorted to nature commodification to succeed at raising public awareness, at the cost of positive and sustainable representations of the environment.

How to Save Digital Environmental Activism and the Planet

In order to promote strong and effective collective action for the environment, digital technologies must find a way to operate within the neoliberal economic structure in a way that fosters horizontal, bottom-up communication and activism, in contrast with the ideals upon which they were originally created. In today’s economic context, nature conservation efforts are increasingly being “subjected to capitalist market dynamics” such as ecotourism or payments for ecosystem services (Büscher 2016, 728). Similarly, environmental organizations compete among one another for the attention of media outlets and potential online conservation supporters, instead of the collective efforts needed to reach environmental goals (733). Büscher argues that part of the problem lies in the “highly marketized environment where ‘social connections’ and ‘doing good’ in the like-economy consist solely of individual actions” (733). The neoliberal market model poses significant challenges for the environmental movement, as previously discussed, and commodifying nature will not solve the environmental crisis. Therefore, it will be essential moving forward to reimagine the way digital technologies are structured economically, to reduce negative business incentives and promote positive nature conservation efforts.

Various scholars have discussed potential alternatives to structure digital technologies in accordance with environmental efforts. Lester and Hutchins (2009) highlight the importance of “sustainable self-representation” reinforced by direct and on-going communication between users, where online users participate in the creation of citizen journalism through “community-driven wikis, blogs, vlogs and video-hosting sites” (591). Investing in such types of participatory communication models would lead to news that is “more likely to be incremental than spectacular”, but this digital collective self-representation fits better with the goals of the environmental movement, “both philosophically and practically” (591, 592). It is essential to create an open digital space where all individuals can contribute to the dissemination of news and mobilization. Büscher (2016) makes similar claims about the importance of horizontal self-representation on social media platforms. He suggests that ‘eco-blogging’ could be a “form of pedagogy to critique established, consumerist online communication” among equal individuals (734). Currently, there are significant efforts made in this direction as news websites such as The Correspondent and Drilled News are reader-funded and collaborative, and are thus able to be ad-free, participatory spaces of journalism. Similarly, independent podcasts funded by listener contributions through Patreon, such as the Critical Frequency podcasts and the Yikes podcast, enable bottom-up discussion on pressing climate issues, free of corporate funding. Environmental problems are increasingly salient; therefore, fostering forms of self-representation and it is desirable to avoid elite news “diluted by the interests of the state, capital and/or corporate media” and to promote sustainable communication and collective action (Lester and Hutchins 2009, 592).

An important aspect of sustainable and ongoing self-representation by the environmental
movement online is about shifting the structural way we relate to each other on these digital technologies, promoting thought-out, expressive communication. The neoliberal economic context with its ever-growing desire for profit has a fundamental impact on how we use digital technologies today. Communication and relationality on these platforms are structured to be commodified and result in the types of engagement such as surface-level ‘likes’ and feeding into echo chambers. It dissuades users from engaging in thought-out, expressive communication, and ultimately goes against the goals of the environmental movement.

Wael Ghonim (2015) argues that real change on social media can be achieved by promoting civility and thoughtfulness in online discussions, and making it socially acceptable to change one’s mind on a subject, rather than the short and sharp opinions given in response to complex issues; he argues that it is important to talk with each other instead of at each other. Similarly, the scholar Zeynep Tufekci (2010) argues that effective social change can be achieved through slow and sustained work and protest, and embracing technology and making it socially acceptable to change one’s mind on a subject, rather than the short and sharp opinions given in response to complex issues; he argues that it is important to talk with each other instead of at each other.

Conclusion

The emergence of digital technologies has impacted the environmental movement by increasing the speed and scope of its messages worldwide. Despite having a theoretically broader reach, the nature of digital technologies’ platforms has meant that audiences reached online are often limited to those already seeking out the environmental movement’s messages, and offline engagement does not necessarily lead to more effortful offline activism. Nevertheless, in many ways, it is difficult to characterize the size and nature of the impact of the growth of digital technologies on the methods of the environment movement. Due to the neoliberal economic context within which social media platforms and other online communication technologies grew, corporate news continues to dominate mainstream media coverage as well as the digital sphere, where digital platform algorithms favor these established news companies to maximize online engagement. The perpetuation of this elitist model of media power within the digital sphere shapes the actions and content of environmental organizations and prevents them from being completely autonomous in the content they generate. Additionally, the representation of nature in neoliberal terms is detrimental to environmental goals as it aims to generate profit from the preservation of nature, when the act of seeking profit can be seen as promoting over-production and over-consumption, beyond nature’s limits. The goals of the environmental movement will be best promoted by fostering the initial hopes of digital technologies: providing an open space for deliberation, creation, and self-representation among individuals. Achieving this space of healthy communication will help to cultivate effective activism and an environmentally sustainable future.

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Political Discourse in the Maghreb: An Analysis of Amazigh Identity in Algeria and Morocco

Peter MacDonald

Edited by Shira Garbis and Isha Shahané

ABSTRACT - The Imazighen (plural of Amazigh) are an indigenous group primarily located in Northern and Western Africa. While Amazigh communities are present across the Maghreb, the role of Amazigh identity in Morocco and Algeria is of particular interest given each country's distinct treatment of ethnic and linguistic minorities. In Algeria, Amazigh identity is not as overtly politicized as in Morocco, wherein Amazigh communities are often at the forefront of public discourses and are often scapegoated as a source of political instability. Compared to Morocco, Algerian Imazighen generally experience higher acceptance levels due to numerous social, political, historical, and geographic factors that underpin the treatment and perceptions of Amazigh identity in Morocco and Algeria today. This article analyzes Algeria and Morocco's respective independence movements, political systems, language laws, and geographic topography to link the contemporary role of Amazigh identity to each national setting's unique history, politics, and geography.
The Amazigh are an ethnic group indigenous to North Africa whose existence predates modern Arab society; though they are sometimes referred to as “Berbers,” this term is rooted in colonial sentiments and has largely been repurposed by Amazigh communities (El Aïssaï 2001, 58). Many Amazigh currently live in dispersed communities across North Africa, primarily in Morocco and Algeria. While both countries have large Amazigh demographics, there exists a sharp difference between each country’s political frameworks and incorporation of Amazigh identity. The Moroccan government has been less accepting of Amazigh communities than Algeria’s, leading Amazigh activists in Morocco to become more politicized. It is worth noting that, for this paper, I define politicization as the degree to which something has been transformed from an objective, nonpartisan entity into a politically charged, often subjective one. Politicization does not take place in a vacuum, and it often reflects myriad socio-political pressures. More specifically, Amazigh communities in Morocco are frequently scapegoated for political instability, making their “role” in contemporary Moroccan society inherently salient, albeit in an ostensibly negative manner. On the other hand, present-day Algerian society is less transgressive in Algeria and why Amazigh communities are increasingly integrated into political discussions. Historical context, geographical differences, varying civil society groups, and differing degrees of language acceptance can explain why Amazigh communities are more politicized in Morocco than Algeria. Moreover, these factors can effectively account for why Amazigh identity is considered less transgressive in Algeria and why Amazigh communities are politically ostracized in Morocco and depicted as counter-establishment agitators.

Firstly, while Algeria’s path to independence was marred by persistent French colonial rule and a bloody civil war, Morocco gained independence through a relatively quick process. Algeria’s lengthy experience under French rule inadvertently resulted in a more unified population, staunchly resistant to imperial sentiments. This difference in history can further account for the contrasting political developments in Algeria and Morocco, respectively. Simultaneously, Algeria has civil society organizations facilitating the protection of Amazigh heritage, and the unyielding Moroccan monarchy quashes many attempts by Imazighen to self-organize (Chatatou 2019). Due to the primacy of the monarchy—which derives its authority from Islam—in Moroccan politics, Amazigh communities are largely depoliticized, as they are accused of being inherently opposed to national unity (Silverstein 2012, 131). In addition to these historical and political factors, geography has played a crucial role in the gradual acceptance of Amazigh minorities in Algeria, many of whom have moved to find work in major cities. In contrast, the larger, more isolated Amazigh communities in Morocco remain relatively concentrated in the Sahara Desert and surrounding mountainous regions. Finally, the Amazigh language, known as Tamazight, and the degree to which the language has been politicized, also illustrates different perceptions of Amazigh identity in Algeria and Morocco.

**Explanation of Amazigh Identity**

To understand how and why Algeria and Morocco treat Imazighen differently, it is first essential to establish the meaning of “Amazigh identity” and what constitutes Amazigh culture. Most Imazigh in North Africa are Sunni Muslim, though there is a long history of conversion to Christianity and Jewish Imazighen in France, many of whom emigrated in the 1960s and 70s (El Aïssaï 2001, 60). Some contemporary Amazigh communities currently rely on farming and herding livestock in the mountainous regions of North Africa, whereas others are primarily nomadic. Their ancestral roots are in the Horn of Africa, but large numbers of Imazigh migrated westward across North Africa, settling in the area between Egypt and Mauritania (Seligman 1930, 133-137). Nomadic practices continue to inform contemporary expressions of Amazigh culture, which is not spatially confined or isolated within sovereign borders. Moreover, the Amazigh do not closely resemble Central Africans or other “Arab” Muslims of the Middle East and North Africa; until the twentieth century, European settlers controversially referred to Imazighen as “Caucasoid” or “pseudo-white,” suggesting their greater proximity to “whiteness” compared to their Arab counterparts (Fage & Tordoff 2013, 155). Observations about the physical and cultural differences between Imazighen and Arabs have historically served as a basis for “othering” Amazigh communities as an ethnic group that is separate and distinct from the rest of the modern Arab World.

**Path to Self-Governance**

Algeria and Morocco’s distinctive paths to independence help explain the differing roles played by Imazighen in their respective political spheres. Whereas Algeria experienced arduous French colonial rule throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Morocco was colonized later and for a shorter time. The institutions put in place by France in Algeria greatly affected the Amazigh communities and the lengthy French presence in Algeria also inadvertently caused the Amazigh people to band together with Arab peoples against their common enemy. Because Morocco evaded some of the unyielding, drawn-out colonial practices in Algeria, Amazigh and Arab Moroccans had fewer incentives to unify in the face of an external threat. Though both countries continued to “other” and oppress Amazigh demographics after the colonial era, this distinction helps explain why divisions between Arabs and Imazighen are currently more prominent in Morocco than Algeria and why they have been politicized to different degrees.

Following France’s annexation of Algeria in 1848, approximately 7 per cent (roughly 110,000) of the Algerian population was European (Hargreaves 1997, 41). Once the French had successfully captured and quelled all of present-day Algeria, they began implementing specific measures to fragment the native population. The French colonial government’s main goal was to “eradicate Islam from the Algerian identity,” while at the same time “the Amazigh seemed keenly determined to renounce their Muslim legacy, as they more closely resembled the French” (Calvet 2018). The perceived “whiteness” of Imazighen and France’s strategic decision to rule over a divided populace informed the French government’s relatively preferential treatment of Amazigh communities over Arab ones. Consequently, Amazigh tribal leaders were elevated to positions of authority in Algeria throughout the 1850s and 60s (Calvet 2018).

The French use of Imazighen as proxy leaders led to greater interaction between Amazigh communities and French officials. The provinces awarded to the “Caucasian” Imazighen were meant to drive a wedge between them and Arab Muslims, it also facilitated the diffusion of Amazigh identity and culture throughout Algeria. As Amazigh communities integrated into Arab ones, the amalgamation of cultures created a discursive landscape wherein the Algerian Amazigh could later advocate on behalf of their formal recognition. This early bondedness of Arab and Amazigh communities can explain why Imazighen are less politicized in contemporary Algeria than Morocco; the French colonial era forcibly unified different ethnic groups in Algeria that had previously lived in isolation from one another, and while said unification did not lead to immediate policy upheaval, it effectively laid the groundwork for future efforts by the Amazigh to gain cultural recognition in the decades that followed. While Imazighen were considered “less Muslim,” and therefore better candidates for integration into positions of authority and assimilation into French culture, the success of French divide-and-rule policies in Algeria were ultimately short-lived. By the late nineteenth century, many Amazigh communities had already started to openly defy French rule in tandem with Arab protests and organized political dissidence (Yezza 2013). Tensions in Algeria erupted shortly after World War Two, igniting a lengthy war of independence between French forces and the native Algerian population. The war, beginning in 1954, begat thousands of Algerian casualties as anti-colonial associations fought for the right to self-govern, which they finally achieved when an armistice was reached in 1962 (El Aïssaï 2001, 60). While issues of Amazigh recognition were not central to Algeria’s
war for independence. Amazigh identity gradually became more prevalent throughout Algeria during the war. The Amazigh, together with their Arab allies, worked to expel the Europeans during the war and later rebuild the contemporary Algerian state (Yezza 2013). Struggle born and necessity driven, the Amazigh of Algeria were critical in the dismemberment of French colonial establishment that had plagued the country for over a century. The struggle and resistance to French colonial rule, as well as their assigned role in French efforts to suppress Arab identity, Amazigh people and their culture became effectively entrenched in the fibre of modern Algeria. Once the French were expelled from Algeria, Algerian politics became increasingly close to animosity as the government was forced to rebuild itself; these tensions culminated in violent outbursts between Amazigh communities and Arab ones. However, the gradual reconciliation of some of these factions has led to greater recognition of Amazigh identity. Amazigh identity is not wholly accepted in Algeria today, but important landmarks in the history of Algeria—such as the War of Independence—can account for why Imazighen are relatively more accepted and less politicized in Algeria.

While the story in Algeria is one of a historically rooted, inextricable—though not always amicable—linkage between Imazighen and Arab demographics, the situation in Morocco throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was relatively different. Prior to European expansion into North Africa in the late 1800s, Morocco was ruled by a series of dynasties with a Sultan as the official head of state (Fage and Tordoff 2013, 563). Morocco’s largely non-violent struggle for self-rule did not yield the same level of Arab-Amazigh cooperation as it did in Algeria. Accordingly, Amazigh identity was not embedded into Moroccan society throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries since there was no colonial enterprise or modern nation-building project that warranted a unified populace.

While both Algeria and Morocco endured French colonial leadership, their respective experiences under colonial rule impacted Amazigh communities differently. Amazigh identity was more accepted in contemporary Algeria as Amazigh culture was compelled to mix with Arab culture throughout the twentieth century to resist French colonial rule. While said resistance did not immediately lead to the formal recognition of Amazigh identity since the Algerian government essentially had to rebuild its governmental institutions, it would serve as a precursor for Amazigh-Arab relations in the decades that followed. It is also important to note that, even though French colonial rule provided a framework for greater Arab-Amazigh unity in Algeria, the formal recognition of Amazigh identity was not an immediate consequence of the War of Independence. Rather, this colonial legacy resurfaced in the decades that followed amid state efforts to Arabize Algerian society at the expense of minority demographics, ultimately allowing Algerian Imazighen to mobilize and reassert their presence in the national political sphere. Conversely, the lack of prominent French rule in Morocco precluded the same level of integration, both during and after the colonial era. Thus, each country’s path towards independence can account for why the Amazigh became more politicized in Morocco during the second half of the twentieth century.

**Topography and Demographics of the Region**

In addition to Morocco and Algeria’s respective paths to independence, their unique trajectories towards the increased acceptance of Amazigh minorities can be further illustrated by topography and demographic divides. In Algeria, large proportions of the Amazigh population live in the Atlas Mountains that spread across North Africa. However, an even larger number of Imazighen live in cities, alongside the Arab majority (Silverstein 2009, 170). In Morocco, Amazigh and Arab communities were not induced to integrate during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the same extent as their Algerian counterparts, given that neither the French colonial government nor the Moroccan monarchy initiated centralization or unification efforts. The prolonged bifurcation between Morocco’s Amazigh and Arab demographics has profoundly impacted the living situations of Imazighen in contemporary Morocco, the vast majority of whom live in scattered “tribes,” extending from mountains and valleys to the Western-most regions of the Sahara Desert bordering Algeria and Morocco (Silverstein 2009, 173). Furthermore, the three wealthiest cities in Morocco and on the African continent—Tanger, Marrakech, and Casablanca—located along Morocco’s North-Western coast, all carry significant political clout, though none of them are home to substantial numbers of Amazigh residents (Silverstein 2009, 170). Taken together, these geographic factors, and the varying degrees of dispersion of the Amazigh populations in Algeria and Morocco, have greatly impacted the degree to which Imazighen are accepted in each country.

The French occupation of Algeria allowed for a more extensive diffusion of Amazigh culture across the North African country. Because the French instituted Amazigh citizens as local leaders, many Amazigh communities travelled from their relatively secluded homes to cities that were predominantly populated by Arab citizens (Calvet 2018). One of the largest Amazigh groups in Africa, the Kabyle, have occupied the mountainous landscape of Northern Algeria for centuries. The region from which they get their name, Kabylia, was, and continues to be, particularly relevant as it is the birthplace of the Amazigh cultural renaissance and the Berber Spring of 1980. In spite of Kabylia’s significance—and that of similar mountainous regions in the Alpine region during the French occupation and the subsequent quest for independence, many Kabyle communities migrated southward into cities like Algiers, where Imazighen are estimated to constitute over 50 per cent of the population (Encyclopedia Universalis). With such an indisputable presence in the nation’s capital, it is impossible for the Algerian government to wholly disregard issues of Amazigh importance. Indeed, early efforts to do so during the 1960s and 1970s proved unsustainable, contributing to the increased politicization of the Amazigh cause since the 1980s. It is important to recall, however, that while Imazighen are recognized throughout the country, this plied acceptance does not necessarily translate to political leverage. Amazigh people in Algeria may not be overtly politically ostracized today, but that does not mean that they carry political clout that is comparable to that of their Arab counterparts in the region.

French occupation was neither persistent nor fully realized in Morocco. As such, Amazigh communities had fewer incentives to integrate with the Moroccan Arabs at the time. This led the majority of Amazigh communities to remain in their ancestral homes, far removed from the predominantly Arab cities of coastal Morocco (Silverstein and Crawford 2004, 47). Some groups in the country have tried—with little success—to connect these scattered Amazigh communities with the Arab government at large. Most notably, the Movement Populaire, a political party that does not “identify itself strictly as representative of the Amazigh but rather of Moroccan rural people,” strives to represent marginalized Imazighen who are afforded limited political representation due to their rural status (UNHCR). The relative lack of interdependence between Moroccan
Imazighen and Arabs is a significant obstacle stymieing effective political representation for Amazigh communities. For instance, most high-ranking officials who are capable of influencing national politics and the economy live in coastal cities like Marrakesh or Tangier, and are therefore more likely to overlook Amazigh interests and concerns. Moreover, the two ethnic groups are separated by a complex topography of desert and mountains, on which represent additional divides between the two cultures. The geographical separation of the Imazighen and Arab Moroccans has allowed the central government to shun Amazigh identity under the banner of “otherness,” making it all the more politicized.

The demographic makeup of key political cities in Algeria, such as Algiers, is distinctly more Amazigh due to the country’s history. Meanwhile, in contemporary Morocco, Amazigh grievances can more easily be disregarded as rural and “tribal” issues given the limited Amazigh presence in politically significant cities such as Marrakesh and Casablanca. The lack of Amazigh representation in the Moroccan government allows policy makers to scapegoat the Amazigh for political inefficiency (Silverstein 2012, 131). Amazigh people in Morocco are regularly depicted as being political agitators, insurgents, and renegades whose morals are not closely aligned with those of the Arab elites. Comparably, Amazigh communities in Algeria are not politicized to the same degree and they are more integrated into public discourses and policy decisions.

Political Organization

Along with the historical and geo-political underpinnings of contemporary disparities between Imazighen and Arabs in North Africa, Algeria and Morocco’s political frameworks have also contributed to the degree to which Amazigh identity has been able to achieve recognition. While Algerian society continues to grapple with issues of Amazigh acceptance (carrying the Berber flag is still met with hostility in some regions), the Moroccan political system, which remains deeply connected to the monarchy, is generally less accepting towards Amazigh identity compared to Algeria. While neither country’s governments formally recognize the existence of explicitly Amazigh political parties, Amazigh civil society groups are permitted in contemporary Algeria. Collectives such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Mouvement Culturel Berbère (MCB) are able to, “advocate for greater recognition and acceptance of a distinct Amazigh culture and language in public and political spheres, for the protection of Amazigh human and legal rights” (Chattou 2019). This acceptance of non-Arab identity in Algeria is largely due to the country’s recent, brutal civil war that ended less than 20 years ago; with its associated destruction still in the collective memory of Algerian society, the government is more careful, and it conducts itself in such a way so as not to anger minority groups.

In addition, some parties in Algeria are able to indirectly cater to Imazighen without being banned outright. One of these parties, the Socialist Forces Front, even has four seats in the Council of the Nation and 14 seats in the People’s National Assembly—the two chambers of Algeria’s legislature (El Assari 2001, 65). Following the Algerian Civil War, Algerians sought an agreement to better reconcile the country’s political system with its constitution. One outcome of the civil war was the Sant’Egidio platform of 1995, formed by opposition parties and adopted largely by the Socialist Forces Front, the aforementioned Amazigh-sympathetic party. The goal of the platform was to bring together more inclusive civic discourse, embracing Arab and non-Arab identities alike (Naylor 2000). The Algerian Civil War thus had a profound impact on domestic politics, planting the seeds for further mobilization during the Arab Spring. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Amazigh grievances were similarly recognized as being critical to national stability, albeit in a more diminished capacity than Arab ones (Maddy-Weitzman 2015, 2500). During the periods of reconstruction that have taken place in Algeria over the last two decades, Amazigh issues have remained a topic of interest in the country. Algeria’s history, coupled with its political structure—one that permits the existence of informal Amazigh parties and Amazigh civil society groups—have contributed to a latent acceptance of Amazigh identity in the country.

In Morocco, the perceived “role” of Imazighen is one of insubordination and political unrest. The political sphere in Morocco is less accepting of Amazigh communities, which has led Amazigh identity to be politicized and equated with civil unrest. The overt, political ostracization of Amazigh communities in Morocco began during the 1960s and 70s, when an era of social reform swept across the Middle East and the ideology of Arabization began to take shape. The notion of a Pan-Arabic identity was particularly popular in Morocco where “the hegemonic narrative propagated by ruling elites advocated for the full Arabization of society and the reduction of Berber culture to folklore status” (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 109). The Moroccan governments desire to conform to a Pan-Arabic identity led to the ostraging of Amazigh communities and other minority groups. Since the mid-twentieth century, Amazigh identity has been politicized further, as protestors in Morocco often don Amazigh flags as a symbol of government resistance and counter-establishment ideals (Chattou 2019). These protestors are often arrested publicly, causing Amazigh culture to be further scapegoated and depicted as a source of political instability (Maddy-Weitzman 2012, 113). Even though around 50 per cent of Morocco is believed to be Amazigh, the Arab elites of the country have persistently sought the installation of Arabization policies in government and society. The Moroccan government ignores the Imazighen and their identity unless it is being used as part of a political protest.

Politization of the Amazigh Language

The differing degrees of Amazigh-

policitation present in Algeria and Morocco can also be explained by each country’s willingness to formally recognize Tamazight, the predominant Amazigh language. While neither country has wholly integrated Tamazight into the socio-political realm, the Algerian government permits the use of Tamazight more so than its Moroccan counterpart.

The politicization of Tamazight is an incredibly relevant topic in Algeria. Although the Algerian government formally recognized Tamazight as a second official language in 2016, this ostensibly progressive reform remains largely aspirational. Two years later, in 2018, the Algerian parliament vetoed an amendment that would have formalized the teaching of the Tamazight language in local schools. The rejection of Tamazight was met with protests by students and other activists who wanted the Algerian government to fund the teaching of Tamazight formally (Kessler-D’Amours 2017). This incident exemplifies how Amazigh identity continues to be politicized in Algeria despite the many improvements that occurred since its independence from France in 1962. However, it also illustrates Amazigh activists’ capacity to protest decisions that negatively impact their communities.

In addition, the very presence of a referendum on Tamazight effectively illustrates the recognition that Amazigh identity is allotted in Algeria. Compared to Algeria, the Moroccan government has proved to be more unyielding towards Amazigh communities, especially in the contexts of peaceful protests and language recognition. Protests in Morocco have largely had little advancements in the Amazigh language are typically met with immediate, sometimes violent police suppression. Government space, school classes, and office meetings must be conducted exclusively in Arabic, and the use of Tamazight in public can even lead to arrest (Chattou 2019). Amazigh identity is extremely politicized in Morocco, so it is no surprise that the Amazigh language is similarly suppressed and ostracized. Although the Moroccan government ostensibly made strides regarding the acceptance of Amazigh identity and language in recent years, in reality, Amazigh identity is still heavily politicized in Morocco.

Following the Arab Spring in 2011, the
Moroccan monarchy recognized Tamazight, the language spoken by many native Amazigh people, as the second official language of Morocco (Sater 2011). While Moroccan law formally recognizes Tamazight, the language is at risk of extinction due to the ongoing politicization and vilification of it across North Africa (Ennaji 2014, 94). This vilification primarily reflects Mohamed VI's mandate that limited Tamazight to the traditional Tifinagh alphabet, thus limiting its use and appeal compared to the Latin or Arabic scripts. This decision ultimately "domesticated the Amazigh cause" by relegating it to a smaller subset of the population (Sater 2011). The formal recognition of Tamazight in Morocco was borne out of the monarchy's desire to quell civil unrest instead of advancing the liberties of the Amazigh people. Even though the monarchy recognized Tamazight, the language continues to be publicly shunned along with the Amazigh communities that speak it (Ennaji 2014, 95). While Tamazight is seen as taboo and a threat to the Arabic language in both Algeria and Morocco, Amazigh communities in Morocco are allowed to protest their language-suppression and subsequent push-back. Overall, the Moroccan government has been less accepting of Amazigh communities, so their identity has become more politicized. In Algeria, tensions between Arabs and Imazighen are less apparent but still present.

The differing treatment of Imazighen in Algeria and Morocco reflects four main factors. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, each country's historical context, namely during the colonial era, illustrates how and why Amazigh identity plays a different role in each case. Additionally, Algeria and Morocco's unique geographic features have contributed to different perceptions of Amazigh communities by informing each country's contemporary demographic makeup. Lastly, Algeria and Morocco's respective political systems provide distinct frameworks for Amazigh-Arab relations, shaping Amazigh activists' capacity to advocate against language suppression. These factors can be synthesized to explain the varying ways Amazigh identity became politicized in Algeria and Morocco and the extent to which Imazighen are accepted in society. Whereas Algeria's colonial past and centralized topography contributed to the gradual integration of Imazighen into contemporary political discourse, Morocco continues to suppress the expression of Amazigh identity, undermining the potential for multiculturalism at the national level. Both countries' political trajectories have similarly been informed by these differences, causing Amazigh communities to be more accepted in Algeria and more ostracized in Morocco. Moreover, while neither country readily embraced the Amazigh language of Tamazight, the Moroccan government has gone to greater lengths to ensure that the language remains second-class and ultimately subservient to Arabic. In light of these factors, it is clear that Amazigh communities and by extension other ethnic minorities— are more politicized in Morocco than Algeria.

Conclusion

As Amazigh identity is more politicized in Morocco than in Algeria, Moroccan Amazigh communities influence societal discourse more significantly. In contemporary Algeria, where roughly 25 per cent of the population is believed to be of Amazigh descent, many Amazigh groups are currently pushing for increased cultural acknowledgement (Ennaji 2014, 96-97). Conversely, in Morocco, where as much as 60 per cent of the country is Amazigh, current political tensions can more often be attributed to Amazigh suppression and subsequent push-back. Overall, the Moroccan government has been less accepting of Amazigh communities, so their identity has become more politicized. In Algeria, tensions between Arabs and Imazighen are less apparent but still present.

The differing treatment of Imazighen in Algeria and Morocco reflects four main factors. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, each country's historical context, namely during the colonial era, illustrates how and why Amazigh identity plays a different role in each case. Additionally, Algeria and Morocco's unique geographic features have contributed to different perceptions of Amazigh communities by informing each country's contemporary demographic makeup. Lastly, Algeria and Morocco's respective political systems provide distinct frameworks for Amazigh-Arab relations, shaping Amazigh activists' capacity to advocate against language suppression. These factors can be synthesized to explain the varying ways Amazigh identity became politicized in Algeria and Morocco and the extent to which Imazighen are accepted in society. Whereas Algeria's colonial past and centralized topography contributed to the gradual integration of Imazighen into contemporary political discourse, Morocco continues to suppress the expression of Amazigh identity, undermining the potential for multiculturalism at the national level. Both countries' political trajectories have similarly been informed by these differences, causing Amazigh communities to be more accepted in Algeria and more ostracized in Morocco. Moreover, while neither country readily embraced the Amazigh language of Tamazight, the Moroccan government has gone to greater lengths to ensure that the language remains second-class and ultimately subservient to Arabic. In light of these factors, it is clear that Amazigh communities and by extension other ethnic minorities— are more politicized in Morocco than Algeria.

References


Two Birds, One Policy: The Establishment of the National Supervisory Commission as a Factional and Centralizing Tool

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ABSTRACT - Xi Jinping has made “anti-corruption” campaigns a hallmark of his leadership. The campaigns promise to target both “tigers” - senior party, government, and military leaders - and “flies” - local party and government officials. This practice has included a drastic restructuring of China’s anti-corruption and judicial agencies, culminating in their centralization under the National Supervisory Commission (NSC) in 2018. Many scholars have debated whether Xi’s campaigns and the NSC are genuinely intended to combat corruption or are instead a tool to eliminate political opponents and consolidate power. The NSC’s establishment is considered in relation to the two predominant models of anti-corruption drives conducted in China, the “Chongqing” model, and the “Guangzhou” model. By deliberately reproducing the Chongqing model’s accountability defects, eliminating political opponents appears to be a core objective of the NSC’s establishment. However, owing to its centralized nature, the NSC also strengthens the central party’s power over local authorities. Local party branches are far less trusted by the population than their national counterparts. Thus, strengthening the party’s credibility - including a genuine attempt to decrease corruption - and strengthening local government oversight appears to be another objective of the NSC’s establishment.
The National Supervisory Commission: The Basis of its Inception and Its Implications

Prior to Xi Jinping’s recent reforms, two disciplinary agencies existed: The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the Anti-Corruption Force of the People’s Procuratorate (PP) (Li and Wang 2018, 2). The PP investigated criminal behaviour and exercised legal supervision over the CCDI; whereas, the CCDI investigated corruption cases especially involving senior Party officials, coordinated anti-corruption initiatives, and collected information regarding violations of Party discipline (4). The CCDI’s mandate was included “into promoting internal party discipline and Party disloyalty such as having a mistress or speaking ill of the Party. While such behavior is not corrupt in a legal sense, in China it is seen as moral corruption and an indicator that the person might engage in criminal activity (7). Perhaps more significantly, it defines partisan disloyalty as a form of corruption, which stands in sharp contrast to Western conceptions of corruption.

While the two institutions were often able to collaborate, the dual-track system led to competition and conflict (Li and Wang 2018, 2). Moreover, the CCDI’s lack of autonomy from the Party constrained its ability to investigate officials (Guo 2014, 598). The CCDI was subordinate to the Politburo of the Communist Party; in some cases, investigations could only be conducted with the latter’s consent (599, 607). Moreover, the CCDI’s local government-level branches—the Disciplinary Inspection Committees (DICs)—were hugely reliant on the local Party committees they were supposed to be supervising (611). Party committee leaders were able to determine the salaries, housing, benefits, and retirement packages of DIC officials (611). This relationship created a fatal conflict of interest for DIC officials. Instead of investigating party committees, DIC officials often chose to defend or cover up the improper activity of their party committees in exchange for benefits. In 2004, this flaw was recognized and the DICs were brought “under a vertical chain of command” where they reported solely to the DIC level superior to its own (611).

In practice, DICs, especially at prefecture and county levels, lacked resources and its personnel lacked legal training and academic qualifications to conduct investigations. This often led them to collaborate with the People’s Protecutorate, who would provide experience and advice on legal and evidential issues (Li and Wang 2018, 6). However, the overlap between the two institutions often led to competition. For example, the PP was “ranked and rewarded” by the number of cases investigated, docketed, and prosecuted, as well as the withdrawal rate, prosecution rate, and conviction rate, and the most highly ranked officials were rewarded both through monetary and non-monetary means (Li and Wang 2018, 14). Additionally, when both agencies did investigate the same case, there was only an informal tradition for allocating responsibility, namely, that the institution that spent the most time and effort and achieved the most progress kept the case; this lack of adjudication worsened competition. According to Li and Wang (2018), interactions between these two mechanisms created conflict over resources as the CCDI would want to borrow personnel from the PP, as they had their own cases to investigate (11). Moreover, both agencies blamed the other when investigations went awry, weakening the accountability of both organizations.

Recognizing the difficulties of this dual-track system, the CCP established a new supervisory system, rolling out Supervisory Committees (SCs) in Beijing, Shanxi, and Zhejiang provinces in 2016 (Deng 2018, 59). In 2018, the CCP went a step further and created the National Supervisory Commission (NSC), which integrated the former two systems (Li and Wang 2018, 14). This transformed the former disciplinary system “into a single anti-corruption system”; SCs now exist at provincial and county levels, with the NSC at the top (Deng 2018, 59). By combining the dual-track system under one overarching disciplinary body, the Party aims to eliminate the conflict between the two former systems.

However, the National Supervisory Commission comes with its own challenges; it enhances the political control of the CCP’s central leadership, as the People’s Procuratorate has been absorbed into the Disciplinary Inspection Committees, and the DIC system is continuing under the NSC (Deng 2018, 69, 70). The CCDI played a key role in drafting the National Supervision Law, which places China’s ongoing anti-corruption campaign under legal procedures, expanding its powers of investigation while reducing the authority of other agencies. Consequently, the CCP now exercises significant influence on the operation of the criminal justice system, weakening the independence and capacities of the courts and the People’s Procuratorate, potentially making the process of prosecution and trial unjust (Li and Wang 2018, 17). The creation of a solitary disciplinary system under the auspices of the NSC, raising issues about who will supervise the NSC itself. The Party instead emphasizes internal supervisory mechanisms, including “the separation of case investigations and case resolutions, the establishment of a self-supervision department, and the issuance of Party rules regulating the SCs’ behaviors” (Deng 2018, 70).

Lastly, a controversial feature of the new law is that it grants the NSC the legal power to detain suspected bribe givers and seekers for three to six months. This not only violates human rights but also potentially harms the local economy by creating a risk-averse culture within the public service, as individuals would be more reluctant to push boundaries out of fear of being accused of bribery and suffering consequent prosecution. The National Supervision Law also increases the CCP’s ability to control corruption by removing public officials’ constitutional rights, including their access to lawyers (Li and Wang 2018, 19, 20). The extremity of the NSC’s power to oversee the operation of the local government may also weaken local government authority and ironically create new conditions for corrupt behaviour (18). Xi Jinping’s reforms are duplicitous; under the auspices of an anti-corruption agenda, he has consolidated his power and that of the CCP, while weakening human rights protections and the rule of law.

Anti-Corruption as a Mechanism of Factional Conflict

On the surface, Xi Jinping’s reforms are designed to address the rampant corruption in China; however, there is evidence that the underlying motivation may be to target his opponents in rival political factions. Scholars
In China, two general models of anti-corruption have been studied and compared: the Chongqing model, which is predicated on aggressive, centralized, top-down policing, and the Guangzhou model, which relies on introducing financial transparency in the government, allowing citizens to report corruption. The latter has been more effective, as the proportion of misused funds in Guangzhou declined from approximately 28 per cent to 2 per cent after the implementation of the policy, whereas in Chongqing it increased from approximately 7 per cent to 11 per cent. If the central leadership was solely concerned with combating corruption, the Guangzhou model would have been adopted. Instead, the NSC, as the NSC strengthens Party oversight of its officials without external checks on its power (Stromseth et al. 2017, 108). The same problems that befell the Chongqing model—namely, that the monopolization of investigative power over officials by the police led to the politicization of the entire system, and ultimately more corruption—are at risk to the NSC, which has consolidated the Party’s power, with Xi Jinping at its head.

The Depth and Pervasiveness of Corruption in China

While anti-corruption mechanisms can be seen as political tools that serve to purge Xi Jinping’s rivals, corruption remains a substantial issue in the Chinese state. In 2016, 83 per cent of the Chinese population believed corrupt officials were a significant issue in Chinese politics, topping the list of all other public concerns (“Corrupt Officials are Top Chinese Concern” 2016). Additionally, political corruption has worsened since the introduction of the market reforms in the 1980s. The characteristics of corruption were significantly reshaped and expanded as a result of the decentralization and increased autonomy of the economy under the reforms led by Deng Xiaoping. In addition to systemic corruption, which commonly took the form of embezzlement and bribery, new sources of exploitation arose, driving harsher forms of profiteering, squandering, negligence, and privilege seeking (Sun 2018, 51). Officials no longer sought private gain. Instead, corruption is more likely to emerge with officials who have regulatory and allocative powers such as decision-making powers over matters like credits, trade, contracts, land, and privatization (Lu 2018, 52). Despite the inherent weaknesses in the anti-corruption campaign noted above, the establishment of the NSC remains, at least in part, a genuine attempt to address public concern with systemic corruption in China. Xioabo Lu depicts corruption as consisting not of multiple cases of individual misconduct, but as a part of a larger official deviance from organizational norms. Referring to this phenomenon as “organizational involution,” he characterizes the Party’s evolving inability to maintain transparent and committed officials at different levels of government as a result of “the party’s new institutions, policies, and norms’ failure to meet the challenges of post revolution routinization” (Sun 2001, 847). Consequently, traditional patterns of behaviour, such as parochial loyalty, personal networks, and kinship ties are reinforced. Lu’s characterization of corruption as a prevalent organizational norm coupled with the mounting public concern about official misconduct that the previous disciplinary bodies targeted to curb corruption, namely the CCDI and PP, had been ineffective in eradicating corruption. Xi’s new anti-corruption reforms, sweeping as they are, cannot be dismissed as solely designed to support his efforts to consolidate his power; Xi has to be seen as making an earnest attempt at anti-corruption. Additionally, Lu’s understanding of corruption to be inherent in all levels of government also explains why over 70 per cent of purges occurred at the local (township and village) level (“Visualizing China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign” 2018). This challenges the factional argument that the NSC serves simply to eliminate high-level officials and strengthen the Party’s (and Xi’s) grip on the central government.

The NSC as a Factional and Centralizing Tool

On balance, it appears that the NSC has multiple objectives that are often in conflict with one another; this is ironically illustrated by Cheng Li in his defense of the anti-corruption campaign’s legitimacy. Li argues that the appointment of Wang Qishan as the head of the CCDI in 2013 is evidence of the meritocratic, non-factional nature of the policy given Wang’s reputation as a “respected, competent leader” (US-China Policy Foundation 2014). However, Wang, who was trained as an economic planner, had zero experience in anti-corruption before his appointment (Li 2018, 1). While Wang had become popular due to his successful execution of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, his popularity was not unique among Chinese leaders and alone does not justify his rise from a meritocratic perspective (1, 2). What is unique is Wang’s close relationship with Xi Jinping,
which dates back to the Cultural Revolution, when they were roommates (1). Wang’s appointment is thus, far more consistent with appointing a staunch loyalist to carry out a political purge than that of a highly qualified official heading a politically neutral, investigative body. Yet again, factionalist motivations and cronyism do not in and of themselves negate an anti-corruption agenda—officials may be both corrupt and threaten Xi’s power, with the official’s justification for a purge.

Rather than being mutually exclusive visions of the NSC’s purpose, the factional warfare argument and the argument illuminating a genuine concern with corruption in China appear to describe different levels of the NSC’s operations. At the “tiger” level, the NSC plays an inherently factional role, centralizing investigative and prosecutive authority more directly under the President and his allies’ control. At the “fly” level, the NSC serves to lend the Party a cloak of legitimacy and shore up the central leadership’s credibility with the public.

The difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of local government is often overlooked or completely underestimated. As Yi-Chong and Weller (21) note, “the Premier has to persuade ministers and governors of provinces, regions, and municipalities to cooperate” (9). In one notable outburst, Premier Zhu, who served under Jiang Zemin, complained that “low-level bureaucrats decided to ignore all instructions, regardless of whom they are from” (10). Given the broad centralizing thrusts undertaken by Xi, it is reasonable to expect he would also attempt to consolidate power over local governments.

Western scholars often overlook the fact that corruption is not a clear, legally defined concept in China as it is in most Western countries. The acceptance of illegal gratuities, for example, is not criminalized; instead, anti-corruption is defined merely as the acceptance or gift of “property from others” (Deng 2018; 68). This definition is not only vague, it also overlooks other significant benefits beyond the scope of criminal corruption, including career advancement and sexual favours; moreover, conflict of interest laws do not exist. While anti-bribery guidelines exist, these have been weakened rather than strengthened over time. Before 1997, the Supreme People’s Court suggested a “gift” of 5000 RMB should constitute a criminal offense. In 2004, this guideline was lifted to 30,000 RMB, which is the equivalent of over CA$5,600. The 1997 criminal law reform regarding bribery replaced numbered amounts with the categories “relatively large,” “huge,” and “extremely huge” (68).

With corruption ill-defined in China, anti-corruption policies and agencies are similarly ill-defined. This leaves open the possibility for what Deng terms “leading control,” which is the concept that “party leadership in anti-corruption efforts is legitimate under China’s legal framework, as China’s constitution upholds the party’s leadership in every aspect of the country’s governance” (Deng 2018, 66). This suggests anti-corruption in China may have a more expansive moral connotation than in the West, in that it may refer to a more general installation of moral authority. Anti-corruption could therefore be conceived of as a tool for extending the morally superior influence of the central leadership into local governance. By centralizing power over towns and villages, the CCP overcome their as well as the local government distrust of local-level governance. According to data collected in the Asian Barometer Survey, the Chinese population trusts the local government (68 per cent) far less than the central government (96 per cent) (Wu and Wilkes 2017, 440). When the Party attempts to respond to popular opinion by enacting environmental reforms or anti-corruption efforts, there is evidence to suggest the local government distrust of such reforms gives the Party a bad name. For example, the case of Yang Dacai, also known as “Brother Watch,” is an archetypal case of local officials blatantly living beyond what is financially possible for their pay bracket. Brother Watch became famous for wearing at least eleven luxury watches valued between US$3,000 and US$12,000, each on a salary of less than US$1,000 per month (Zhai 2014). However, this is not an isolated case and the CCDI libraries are replete with examples of such reformist anti-corruption efforts.

References


“Corrupt Bureaucrats and Bloodlines: Commoners-officials Fall to Earth, the Red Second Generation Is Untainted” [video] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Nc6fGBTAXs>.

Stromseth et al. (2017) state, “China’s history can be seen as a long, cyclical struggle to rule such a vast kingdom […] the most important job of all for the state was to control locals” (33). As both rival factions and insubordinate or corrupt local officials threaten Xi and the central leadership’s hold over local government, the NSC is clearly compatible with both factional and anticorruption imperatives. The difficultly in obtaining the cooperation of local government is often overlooked or completely underestimated. As Yi-Chong and Weller (21) note, “the Premier has to persuade ministers and governors of provinces, regions, and municipalities to cooperate” (9). In one notable outburst, Premier Zhu, who served under Jiang Zemin, complained that “low-level bureaucrats decided to ignore all instructions, regardless of whom they are from” (10). Given the broad centralizing thrusts undertaken by Xi, it is reasonable to expect he would also attempt to consolidate power over local governments.

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The West Bank Barrier: Origins, Implementation, and Consequences

Ilona Metais
Edited by Amir Hotter Yishay and Avery Franken

ABSTRACT - The Israelis call it a “security fence,” but the Palestinians call it the “apartheid wall.” From the original idea to its construction, the West Bank barrier, which separates Israel from the West Bank, is hugely controversial. This article begins by unpacking Israel’s motivations to build such an edifice, arguing that, despite its purported security purposes, evidence suggests that the barrier may also have been intended to prevent an influx of Palestinians living inside Israeli territory that would have threatened Israel’s claim to be a Jewish State. This research investigates the political, social, and economic consequences of the barrier for Palestinians, concluding with a discussion of the barrier’s implications for the Israeli-Palestinian relationship overall.
Before 2000, nothing would have convinced a right-wing Israeli politician to build a barrier separating Israel from the West Bank. Indeed, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who fervently supported Israel’s territorial expansionism and strived towards Eretz Israel or Greater Israel—which would include all of Judea and Samaria—would have never welcomed the idea of relinquishing this biblical part of Israeli territory to the Palestinians (Usher 2006, 18). However, this idea grew into a reality when the violence of the Second Intifada (Palestinian uprising), starting in 2000, gave birth to a campaign of suicide bombings by Palestinian militants, killing 200 Israelis in the first year and 400 in the second (Jones 2009, 10). In the summer of 2002, the Israeli government approved the construction of a 723 kilometer-long barrier between Israel and the West Bank, claiming its purpose was to halt Palestinian suicide bombers’ infiltration into Israel. However, this stated purpose is the object of substantial controversy worldwide. Was internal security the only reason why Israel erected the barrier? What impacts did it have on the Palestinians and their right to self-determination? What were the project’s consequences on Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israel’s international reputation?

Firstly, this essay provides an overview of the process leading to the construction of the wall. Secondly, it will explore the perceptions of Israelis and Palestinians vis-à-vis the fence/wall’s objective and impact. The former sees the fence as a defense mechanism against a once very palpable terrorist threat. In contrast, the latter view the wall as a hindrance to its economic, social, and political development. Thirdly, this research shows that Israel had motives aside from its security concerns to build the West Bank barrier, namely demographic and political imperatives.

Lastly, this paper will highlight the consequences the barrier had on the Palestinians’ economic, social, and political developments and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’s evolution, focusing on heightened resentment on the Palestinian side that gave birth to the Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions (BDS) movement. Overall, this article aims to unpack Israel’s motives for building the barrier and its consequences on Palestinian society and relations between Israelis and Palestinians.

The West Bank Barrier: From the Idea to the Implementation

This section gives a factual background of the process leading to the completion of the West Bank barrier, focusing on how the barrier’s deviation from the Green Line makes it an object of controversy and contention. The Green Line is the boundary demarcation that resulted from the 1949 armistice between Israel and Jordan after the 1948 war. Jordan occupied the West Bank between 1948 and 1967 before it came under Israeli control after its victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. Since then, the Green Line has ceased to be an international boundary between Israel and the potential Palestinian state. The West Bank barrier was built gradually during the years following the failure of the Oslo Accords and the beginning of the Second Intifada. Yitzhak Rabin first proposed the idea of the West Bank barrier in 1995, along with the creation of the Palestinian Authority. However, actual implementation occurred progressively, starting in March 1996, when the Israeli government erected checkpoints along the seam area guarded by a special Border Police to reduce Palestinians’ infiltration into Israel. Second, after the outbreak of the Second Intifada, Prime Minister Ehud Barak established a “barrier to prevent the passage of motor vehicles” in November 2000 from the northwest end of the West Bank to the Latrun area (Saddiki 2017, 11). It was only in June 2002, two years into the Second Intifada—which had already killed 500 Israelis—that the government approved the construction of a continuous barrier separating Israel from the West Bank (Frisch 2007, 10). The government decided to start the construction in the northern part of the West Bank, near Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarem, because these were the major centers of terrorist operations and the Israeli towns close to the Green Line, like Netanya and Hadera, were the most vulnerable to suicide bombings (Frisch 2007, 10). Finally, in 2003, the Israeli government decided to extend the barrier to the West Bank’s whole perimeter (Frisch 2007, 10).

Today, the barrier is 723 kilometers long (Jones 2009, 10). Its path is tortuous, incorporating as many Israeli settlements as possible and thus separating Palestinian communities from each other and from the West Bank itself (Cohen 2006, 684). Most of the barrier is fences, barbed wire, and other obstacles; only 6 per cent is a solid concrete wall (Frisch 2007, 684) standing five to eight meters in height (Frisch 2007, 12). Presently, the main point of contention between Israel and Palestine (and between Israel and the wider international community) concerning the barrier is that it does not follow the Green Line.

The nomenclature of this barrier has always been extremely controversial. The Israeli government called it a “security fence” or a “separation fence,” implying that it is temporary and almost neighborly, giving Israel more legitimacy in its management of the terrorist threat (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 203). In contrast, the Palestinian Authority’s nomenclature sounds more brutal: the official Palestinian term is “apartheid wall,” suggesting its permanence and similarities with segregationist policies adopted by the former South African regime (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 204). This essay uses the term “West Bank barrier” as a default, non-partisan designation as employed by the UN in its report on the Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier (UNOCHA and UNRWA 2008). The significance of the different denominations of the barrier will be used in this paper to expose each side’s perceptions of it.

The “Security Fence” Against the Terrorist Threat

Against the backdrop of the Second Intifada, the Israeli government’s decision to build the security fence in the summer of 2002 is an ostensibly rational response to an urgent terrorist threat and increasing pressure from the population to implement enhanced security measures. Between 2001 and 2002, Palestinian suicide bombings killed 299 Israelis, who were casualties in violent attacks (Saddiki 2017, 16), like the seder massacre in Netanya on March 28, 2002, which killed 31 Israelis (Jones 2009, 7). Between September 2000 and August 2003, Israel was the victim of 116 suicide bombings, of which 115 originated from the unfenced West Bank (Rynhold 2004, 62). Thus, it seems legitimate that Ariel Sharon’s government coined the term “security fence” to refer to the West Bank barrier (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 203). Such a violent wave of terrorist attacks brought fear to the public, focalized around the West Bank barrier, which in turn, pressured the government to build a fence to insulate Israel from Palestinian infiltration. It is estimated that 80 per cent of Israelis supported the building of a security fence in the West Bank following the failure of the Oslo Accords (Rynhold 2004, 60). According to the head of the General Security Service, Avi Dichter, the barrier “is the key to Israel extricating itself from the terrorist quagmire” (Rynhold 2004, 60). Since it was erected, many credit the security fence for reducing the number of successful suicide bombings in Israel, as only 24 Israelis were killed by them between 2003 and 2004 (Jones 2009, 10). This dramatic decline in fatalities further reinforces Sharon’s government statement that the fence “is a security measure, not an expression of a political or any other kind of border” (Rynhold 2004, 61). Furthermore, the decreasing number of victims enhanced Israeli public morale as their fear of suicide bombings faded, signalling a return to normalcy (Avineri 2005, 72). Therefore, the Israeli government’s security argument for building the fence seems valid as there is a correlation between its construction and the decline in Israeli civilian fatalities.

The “Apartheid Wall’s” Problematic Route

The West Bank barrier’s geographical route has (and continues to) elicit vehement opposition from Palestinians regarding the construction and existence of the barrier. Instead of running along the Green Line, created and agreed upon in 1949 with Jordan in the aftermath of the 1948 war (Cohen 2006, 688), 87 per cent of the barrier runs inside the West Bank and East Jerusalem (UNOCHA and UNRWA 2008, 4), prompting
Palestinians to claim that Israel willingly annexed parts of the West Bank. According to BTselem, an Israeli NGO that self-identifies as the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, the barrier directly harms at least 210,000 Palestinians living in sixty-seven villages, towns, and cities (Lein 2003, 9). Even though only 6 per cent of the West Bank barrier consists of actual concrete walls, the “apartheid wall” is the PA’s preferred nomenclature (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 204) to describe the barrier because it encompasses the barrier’s ideological impact. The wall does not allow Palestinians to move freely like their Israeli counterparts, leading to widespread criticism of the barrier as a racist mechanism that subordinated Palestinians to Israeli control (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 204).

Furthermore, the land confiscation from many Palestinian farmers gave Israelis increased access to agrarian land compared to Palestinians. Finally, this denomination was chosen by the PA because it believes that the barrier’s main purpose is to separate two peoples, much like apartheid policies in South Africa. Accordingly, the barrier is seen by many Palestinians as a form of forced displacement and ethnic cleansing (Saddiki 2017, 21).

The “Separation Fence” Against the Palestinian Demographic Threat

This section discusses the evidence that Israel also constructed the barrier in response to the threat of ultimately being outnumbered by Palestinians, which would undermine Israel’s status as a Jewish and democratic state. Israel is regulating this demographic threat through the “Right to Return” of all Jews in the world, who are immediately granted Israeli citizenship when making their Aliyah (“the act of going up”) when Jews immigrate to Israel, and through stringent restrictions on citizenship to Palestinians (Usher 2006, 20). The “Separation Fence,” as Yitzhak Rabin called it (Rogers and Ben-David 2010, 203), could also represent a solution to demographic threats faced by the Jewish state.

Beyond immediate security threats, the difference in population growth between Israelis and the Palestinians motivated Israel to build the barrier to ensure its survival as a Jewish state. The rate of natural increase of the Muslim-Palestinians is estimated at 3.5–4 per cent per year, whereas that of Israel’s Jewish population is 1 per cent per year. It only reaches 2 per cent when accounting for the Jewish population that makes Aliyah (Jones 2009, 11). Given these statistics, estimates projected an equal number of Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank by 2012. By 2025, Palestinians would have constituted a majority (Usher 2006, 20). Hence, the prospect of Israel’s survival as a Jewish State was threatened, and then Prime Minister Sharon was aware of it. Therefore, the West Bank barrier provided Israel with an efficient way to regulate this Arab demographic boom in its territory by closely controlling who passed the barrier into Israel and who did not.

The long-term purpose of the barrier can thus be seen as a means to separate two populations and create two distinct territories (Cohen 2006, 686). For Israel, this physical obstacle between Israel and the West Bank also marked the ideological border of Zionism (Jones 2009, 13). The barrier quelled the aspirations of the Israeli right-wing politicians to attain Eretz Israel, or in other words, the complete annexation of all of the West Bank and Gaza to restore the biblical territory of Israel. This ambition had to be held back because of the demographic realities on the ground. Indeed, because of the high birth rate of the Palestinian Arab population, Israel could not continue to aspire to a Greater Israel (which would have included the West Bank) and a majority Jewish state. Just as Israel’s disengagement from Gaza was partly motivated by the fear of being responsible for 1.3 million Palestinian residents (Usher 2006, 20), Israel could not also exert control over West Bank Palestinians who would soon have outnumbered Israelis. In the same vein, Ariel Sharon’s successor, Ehud Olmert, stated that “the most important and dramatic [step] facing us [is] shaping the permanent borders of Israel. We must create a clear border that reflects the demographic reality that has been created on the ground as soon as possible” (Jones 2009, 15). Therefore the idea of the separation fence also entails the logic of finite physical and ideological borders to the State of Israel and Zionism.

The Consequences of the Barrier for Palestinians

The barrier’s route is problematic for the Palestinian economy because it separates some Palestinian communities from their agricultural land. In October 2003, the area between the West Bank barrier and the Green Line, designated by the Israeli government as the “seam zone” (Saddiki 2017, 15), was closed by military order. Only those who are granted a permit can access this area. As a result, in the northern West Bank, less than 20 per cent of the Palestinians who used to farm their lands in the “seam line” were granted permits and could resume their activities (UNOCHA and UNRWA 2008, 6). According to a UN report on the Humanitarian Impact of the Barrier, about 35,000 West Bank Palestinians are located between the barrier and the Green Line (UNOCHA and UNRWA 2008, 6). Furthermore, the Palestinian governorates in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Qalqilya, once considered the “breadbasket of Palestine” as they represented 37 per cent of the West Bank’s agricultural land, are the most affected by the building of the barrier (Saddiki 2017, 20). The separation barrier also deprives the Palestinians of valuable water resources in the “seam area.” Palestinians argue that with the wall’s construction, Israel could dominate all the strategic sites of freshwater in the region, especially those located in Jenin, Qalqilya, and Tulkarm (Saddiki 2017, 21). Consequently, the barrier is hindering the economic prosperity of these areas by preventing farmers from reaching their lands.

The social impact of the barrier on Palestinian communities is also dramatic because it severely restricts hundreds of thousands of Palestinians’ freedom of movement. For instance, Palestinians require permits to go to the six specialist hospitals inside Jerusalem. The difficulty and time it takes to get a permit have entailed a 50 per cent decline in the number of patients going to these hospitals (Saddiki 2017, 18). This restriction in mobility thus affects West Bank Palestinians seeking to go to schools, universities, and hospitals situated on the other side of the wall.

For the Palestinians, the barrier and its route are exceptionally politically sensitive because they consider it an annexation of some of the West Bank as the barrier fails to follow the Green Line. Indeed, BTselem estimates that Israel annexed 10 per cent of the West Bank during the construction of the barrier (Jones 2009, 10). Therefore, many international humanitarian organizations and voices within Israel have supported the wall’s construction only if it was along the Green Line (Cohen 2006, 685). For instance, while the International Court of Justice (ICJ) condemned the construction of the barrier inside the West Bank and deemed that it disproportionately harmed the Palestinians in its current state, it issued an opposition statement to its construction along the Green Line (Jones 2009, 4). Palestinians argue that this unilateral annexation by Israel of parts of the West Bank undermines the PA’s credibility (Cohen 2006, 693) as a political body because it was merely helpless in preventing Israel’s wall from deviating from the Green Line into the West Bank. As a result, the PA’s strength weakened, hindering the creation of an independent Palestinian state and thus undermining Palestinians’ fundamental right to self-determination.
Consequences of the Barrier on Israeli-Palestinian Relations

For Israel, placing the barrier on the Green Line would have meant either evacuating the settlements on the eastern side of the Green Line or abandoning them on the Palestinian side of the wall. The former was not an option because Israeli governments generally struggle to fight against the settler lobby (Rynhold 2004, 69). Furthermore, leaving the settlements on the Palestinian side of the barrier would have created an alternative source of friction between Israelis and Palestinians. The settlers would have been more vulnerable to suicide bombers as they would have chosen them as a substitution (Frisch 2007, 8) for their other targets beyond the wall and inside Israel. To defend itself, Israel assigns responsibility for constructing the barrier and its effects on the Palestinians, branding the argument “no terror, no fence” (Cohen 2006, 691). This claim essentially implies that the need for a barrier is due to the Palestinian Authority’s inability to prevent terrorist suicide bombers from entering Israel.

The barrier’s construction along its controversial route heightened Palestinian animosity towards Israel and gave birth to the Boycott, Divestment, Sanction (BDS) movement. In 2005, a group of Palestinian intellectuals created the BDS movement to compel Israel to respect international law in a non-violent manner (Chomsky 2014, 20). This would be done by “(1) Ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands occupied in June 1967 and dismantling the Wall; (2) Recognizing the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination; (3) Ending the illegal transfer of the Palestinian people to other lands; (4) Reverting the Palestinian refugees right to return to their homes and properties; (5) Recognizing the Palestinian refugees right to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN Resolution 194 C. (Chomsky 2014, 20). According to Noam Chomsky, there is “near universal-support” for the end of the Israeli occupation of post-1967 colonized Arab land and for the dismantling of the West Bank barrier. The BDS movement has had wide-ranging impacts on sports in South Africa, Sweden, and India. Furthermore, the BDS pressure has been key to the EU’s introduction of rules that prevented its members from funding Israeli companies based in illegal Israeli settlements (BDS Movement 2020). These events undoubtedly affect Israel’s image, vis-à-vis the international community, and hinder its efforts to improve it. However, the recent normalization efforts between Israel and other Arab countries such as the United Arab Emirates or Bahrain through the Abraham Accords (United States Department of State 2020) could provide reasons to question the continued efficacy of the BDS movement and its ability to rally support for the Palestinian cause amongst its Arab neighbors. The question now is whether or not the BDS movement will adapt to these changing dynamics and stay relevant as an international organization defending Palestinians’ rights.

Conclusion

While Israel’s short-term and urgent reason to build the barrier was to respond to the suicide-bombing campaign triggered by the Second Intifada, the barrier also served Israel over the long-term by countering the Palestinian demographic threat. However, on the Palestinian side of the barrier, the consequences were dramatic economically, socially, and politically because it undermined their right to self-determination. This essay has shown that the West Bank barrier has had very different repercussions on the Israelis and the Palestinians. The barrier provided more security for the former as the number of successful suicide bombings decreased dramatically after its establishment, justifying the “security fence” denomination. It also provided a way for Israel to respond to a more long-term threat to Israel’s existence as a majority Jewish state. Therefore, it seems that Israel acted as a rational, utilitarian political actor by establishing the barrier as it maximized its people’s security and ensured the survival of its state. Indeed, the lack of diplomatic recognition of Israel’s building of the wall from the PA or the Arab world, the ICJ condemnation of the barrier, and the abandonment of Eretz Israel as an ultimate goal seemed a small price to pay for the guarantee of Israelis’ safety and the state’s survival. Therefore, by building the barrier, Israel succeeded in fulfilling its part in its citizens’ social contract with its citizens of keeping them safe. However, for the Palestinians, the barrier was yet another catastrophe and led to bitter resentment. The barrier’s tortuous route harmed hundreds and thousands of Palestinians on a personal scale. The barrier inflicted high economic and social costs on the Palestinians as it deprived farmers of their land and prevented them from reaching their schools and hospitals. In political terms, the PA has chosen the “apartheid wall” denomination because it sees it as a direct, racist attempt to impede Palestinians’ human rights. The barrier has decreased the chance for Palestinian self-determination in concrete terms because it weakened the PA as a credible negotiating partner. Such violation of international law only increased the Palestinians’ resentment vis-à-vis the Israelis and has led to the creation of movements such as the BDS, which took an international magnitude.

Today, Israelis and Palestinians have not had any successful peace agreement since the Oslo Accords, and the situation is at a standstill. The barrier impedes peace talks because it represents a unilateral annexation of parts of the West Bank to Israel and serves to demean the PA and the Palestinians. However, had the barrier been built along the Green Line, Israel would have had to evacuate some of its settlements from the West Bank, potentially leading to more fruitful negotiations and establishing an independent Palestinian state. In that way, Israel could have prevented long-term rising tensions and resentment with the Palestinians and international disapproval of the barrier’s route, but this was a price that Israel was willing to pay to ensure its safety.

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