



# Death & Democracy in a Divided City: Structural Racism & Police ‘Pacification’ in 21st Century Rio de Janeiro

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## **ABSTRACT**

Beginning in 2008, the government of Rio de Janeiro introduced Pacifying Police Units (Unidades de Policia Pacificadora, or ‘UPPs’) in dozens of the city’s favelas, the disproportionately non-white slums that house Rio’s most impoverished residents. This policy of state intervention was meant to bring lasting peace, social development, and rule of law to communities long plagued by state neglect, social exclusion, and high rates of drug-related violence and police brutality. This paper evaluates Rio’s pacification program from a post-colonial perspective, concluding that UPPs not only failed to meet their progressive objectives but upheld entrenched dynamics of structural violence inherited from Brazil’s early foundations as a slave colony. By tracing Brazilian authorities’ long history of repressing the ‘insurgent’ racial ‘other’ under the guise of ‘pacification,’ this paper argues that UPPs represent the recovery of an internal colonization model used to consolidate state control over territories and populations for purposes of capital growth. This analysis has significant implications for our understanding of racism and inequality in Brazil: the structural and normative legacies of Portuguese settler-colonialism remain embedded in Brazil’s supposedly race-neutral democracy, where security forces still criminalize the Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous lower-class in order to promote a neoliberal capitalist agenda.

## Introduction

Once the largest slave colony in the Americas, Brazil today remains home to the largest Afro-descendant population in the Western hemisphere. Given its seemingly smooth trajectory from slave society to proud multi-racial nation, Brazil was traditionally characterized as a positive model of post-racial citizenship in Brazilian and North American scholarship. The Brazilian state is viewed as having transcended the race-based stratification, prejudice, and violence that has long plagued its Northern counterpart, the United States (Telles 2006). The popularity of this narrative in Brazil masks a far more complicated reality of insidious structural violence, preventing a much-needed societal reckoning over the country's long hidden race problem. Since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the paradox of Brazilian race relations has been the harmonious image of “racial democracy” superimposed over a stark reality of social apartheid (Telles 2006, 24). The myth of racial inclusivity has been so successfully internalized in the Brazilian psyche that highly visible racial disparities remain politically invisible even in a formally democratic context, preserving deep-seated patterns of racialized violence that continue to shape the modern state's public security policy (Telles 2006). Two hundred years after decolonization and around forty years after democratization, the basic dimensions of the colonial power matrix endure in 21st-century Brazil. A nation initially built on the imperial exploitation of Indigenous and African slave labour has matured into a neoliberal police state that continues to marginalize and brutalize its predominantly Afro-descendant underclass to

serve elite capital interests.

In few places are these dynamics more salient than in the ‘divided city’ of Rio de Janeiro, a patchwork of extreme intersectional inequality where police brutality is a function of racial and socioeconomic status. Afro-Brazilians are almost three times more likely to be killed by Rio's notoriously deadly Military Police, and the overwhelming majority of criminal and police violence is confined to the hundreds of Black-majority *favelas*, low-income shantytowns, woven into the fabric of the “formal city” (Poets 2015, 184). These historical asymmetries hardened over the past four decades in the context of the ‘War on Drugs,’ a US-led international campaign to combat the growing illegal drug trade through counter-insurgency tactics. Rio's emergence as a major site of narcotics trafficking in the 1980s transformed the city's slums into battlegrounds between hyper-militarized state and non-state actors, with devastating consequences for the inhabitants of these neighborhoods (Larkins, 2015). To cope with this escalating security crisis, the state's introduction of UPPs — *Unidades de Policia Pacificadora*, or Pacifying Police Units — was promoted as a radical break from past police practice. First implemented in 2008, then widely deployed in scores of *favelas* prior to Rio's hosting of two major global sporting events (the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics), UPPs aimed to expel drug traffickers, establish a permanent community-oriented police presence, and bring rule of law and social development to the city's most marginalized spaces and residents (Poets 2015).

This paper argues that contrary to the paci-

fication program's inclusionary objectives and the high expectations it generated, UPPs merely gave new logic to old security models, legitimizing the violent control of post-colonial 'others' in order to promote the neoliberal order rather than protect and integrate its most vulnerable citizens. The perpetuation of racialized police governance has significant implications for our understanding of how colonial legacies shape the parameters of democratic citizenship in Brazil, where the descendants of those subjugated by the colonial order remain otherized and victimized by the modern state despite their formal inclusion under the law.

### **Racial Violence in Colonial Brazil**

Many Brazilian scholars have attempted to align Brazil's colonial past with the sanitized portrait of "racial harmony" central to the nation's modern self-image. In truth, however, its centuries-long colonial period was rife with the genocide, oppression, and enslavement of Indigenous peoples and millions of imported Africans (Telles 2006; Langfur 2018). From when the Portuguese first landed on Brazilian shores in 1500, slavery was at the heart of the colonial enterprise. The colonial order was designed to maximize resource extraction and capital accumulation for imperial enrichment, and racialized violence was integral to consolidating Portuguese territorial sovereignty and securing access to a cheap, submissive labour force (Telles 2006; Neocleous 2013). Brazil's economic ascendance was built on the backs of the enslaved: Portuguese settlers' rabid consumption of slave labour fed the colony's massive export economy, anchored in labour-in-

tensive sugar cultivation. The grim calculus of cost-effective production meant that slave turnover was incredibly high on Brazilian plantations; it was common practice to work slaves to death and replace them with cheap new arrivals, accounting for Brazil's intake of almost half of the approximately twelve million slaves brought to the 'New World' over 350 years (Langfur 2018).

Population control was a perpetual concern in a context where dark-skinned slaves quickly outnumbered white elites. The constant specter of rebellion encouraged authorities to treat the entire under-class as a potential security threat, and this "securitization" of racial identity and poverty would become — and remain — central to the stability of the Brazilian regime. The foundations of Brazil's modern security apparatus and rule of law were shaped by the early orientation of these institutions to protect European-descendant elites and contain the insurgent racial 'other' (Darke & Khan 2021). Achillé Mbembe's concept of "necropolitical" governance best captures this framework of colonial rule, which hinged on the state's ability to deploy racism in order to sustain and reproduce an economic system based on extreme exploitation (Mbembe 2019, 82). Mbembe defines "necropower" as the sovereign capacity to dictate which groups are worthy of state protection and which are designated as killable (Mbembe 2019, 78). The sociopolitical order normalizes the disposability of targeted populations by 'otherizing' them in the cultural imaginary, and subjecting them to dehumanizing living conditions indicative of their 'exceptional' status. Where terror, deprivation, and confine-

ment become routine for whole classes of people deemed enemies of the state, “nobody bears even the slightest feelings of responsibility or justice toward this sort of life or, rather, death” (Mbembe 2019, 38). Dominance over Brazil’s massive slave population was maintained through a culture of normalized death, institutionalized violence, chronic vulnerability, and the repression of kinship communities (Larkins 2015). In Rio, the first formal police force — the Royal Guard — was established in 1809 with the primary aim of policing the city’s majority Black population and preventing a slave uprising, and historical records register no arrests of any whites for the first several decades of its existence (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

‘Pacification’ was central to the logic of colonial necropolitics and was prominent in the administrative, political, and security vocabulary of colonial authorities (Oliveira 2014). The term first emerged to justify the brutal treatment of Indigenous populations resisting Portuguese invasion, and the concept reflected the Catholic Church’s central role in defining the parameters governing the permissible use of force (Langfur 2018). Jesuit missionary zeal, racial prejudices, and imperial ambitions together created a powerful rationale for colonization, recasting the Portuguese advance as a divinely ordained ‘civilizing mission’ (Oliveira 2014). Reimagined as pacification, the slaughter and enslavement necessary for empire-building became righteous and edifying, and the circular reasoning of the ‘civilizing’ imperative made its ‘mission’ never-ending. Because poor material conditions and ethnocultural differences were considered evidence of Indigenous and

African depravity, and because the nature of subjugation preserved these markers of inferiority, the endless need to ‘pacify’ translated into a self-sustaining policy of mass social control (Oliveira 2014). Over generations, this paternalistic process combined straightforward brute force with religious-based social engineering, in a strategy geared to neutralize internal threats and build a secure foundation for capital accumulation. Portuguese colonizers developed a race-based “coercive pedagogy” that sanctioned white violence as a tool used to teach “morally weak” non-whites to submit to the colonial order, justifying the elimination and policing of “savage” populations viewed as an integral workforce but inherently unruly and suspect (Langfur 2018).

Beginning with the submission of the Tupinambá tribe in the 1550s, “pacification” campaigns were the primary mode of conquest (Oliveira 2014, 131). In a pattern reproduced across the frontier, colonizers invaded and occupied Indigenous settlements, then ‘domesticated’ the inhabitants through a ‘constructive’ process of violent repression, political-economic penetration, and Catholic cultural “tutelage” (Oliveira 2014, 128). The establishment of militarized “guardianship” and economic development was framed in progressive terms (Oliveira 2014, 130), but these ‘pacifying’ practices were designed to permanently appropriate Indigenous land, monopolize colonial markets, and subordinate native populations. Surviving Indigenous peoples were often simply relocated to more peripheral Catholic missions, where colonists requisitioned their labour (Oliveira 2014). Pacification policies

became more maintenance-oriented over time, but the sporadic rise of Indigenous and African insurgent communities kept the external colonization paradigm alive through the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Invoking notions of ‘just war’ and ‘law and order,’ imperial authorities treated African and Indigenous people who resisted or undermined Portuguese control as threats to “peace and civil conformity,” justifying the “defensive” repression of these communities (Darke & Khan 2021, 728).

### **From Slavery to the War on Drugs: Independence, Modernization, and Democratization**

Brazil never faced a revolutionary restructuring of the social status quo. Neither Brazilian independence in 1822, nor the abolition of slavery in 1888 fundamentally transformed the socioeconomic and racial structure of the Portuguese colonial system, oriented around the pillars of large landholding, a racialized labour hierarchy, and global capitalism (Darke & Khan 2021; Telles 2006). Decolonization was a smooth process of rearticulating colonial power dynamics on new grounds, and the gradual transition from slavery was an elite-sanctioned development based more on the shifting economic landscape than grassroots pressure. Neither involved the violent rupture of the racial hierarchy or a reconfiguration of the existing aristocratic order, and the state implemented no policies to promote the self-sufficiency or integration of former slaves post-abolition (Darke & Khan 2021; Telles 2006). Instead, Brazil’s transition to modernity represented a hardening of colonial power structures, led by elites who

recognized that “something needs to change so that everything can remain exactly as it is” (Darke & Khan 2021, 726). Formal slavery was replaced with serf-like economic dependence and criminalization, generating a new basis for Brazil’s asymmetric power relations and the selective repression of Indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, and mixed-race populations (Darke & Khan 2021). This social architecture was solidified by national elites who eventually embraced Brazil’s long history of miscegenation, accepting legal racial equality and abandoning explicit “whitening” policies (Telles 2006, 28). By proactively eliminating formal racial barriers and rhetorically promoting a multiracial nationalism, the Brazilian state left the colonial racial hierarchy intact while denying the salience of race in social relations or structural inequalities (Telles 2006).

*Favelas* are a particularly powerful manifestation of the intersectional inequalities inherited from the colonial period. In staggered phases of modernization and urbanization spanning from the late 19<sup>th</sup> through the 20<sup>th</sup> century, streams of Afro-Brazilian former slaves and their descendants moved from the rural countryside to industrial city-centers. With few opportunities for upward mobility, these migrant flows led to the mushrooming of squatter settlements on urban peripheries, excluded from basic public services including access to water and sanitation systems (Telles 2006; Poets 2015). Relegated to the lowest rungs on the social and occupational ladder, *favela* residents constitute a substantial informal workforce in the cities they occupy, providing cheap labour for the urban elite while their own humanity is degraded by

the vulnerabilities endemic to extreme poverty, including substandard infrastructure; poor healthcare, nutrition, and education; and high rates of crime (Larkins 2015). Like the nation itself, the physical landscape of modern Rio reflects a society divided along parallel axes of racial identity and socioeconomic status. The affluent majority-white districts of the city exist side-by-side with clusters of majority-Black *favelas* — neighbourhoods viewed since their inception as hindrances to modern urban development and sources of crime, social decay, and recurring public security crises (Salem & Bertelsen 2020; Larkins 2015).

The solution to Rio's "*favela* problem" has traditionally been seen as removal rather than development (Larkins 2015, 7). In the 1940s, populist housing resettlement programs set a precedent of expulsion that paved the way for aggressive *favela* eradication campaigns under Brazil's military regime in the 1960s-1970s (Larkins 2015). *Favelas* can be considered post-colonial formations, representing the enduring symbolic and material divide between "savage" non-white spaces and "civilized" European-descendant spaces (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 86). The state's systematic neglect of these communities perpetuates the poor living conditions, lawlessness, and socio-spatial exclusion of the so-called "dangerous classes," creating a self-fulfilling security crisis that reproduces the necropolitical dynamics of colonial governance (Poets 2015, 184). The precariousness of life at the fringes of society breeds the very social problems that justify the continued marginalization and repressive control of these populations, who are valued as labour pools but other-

wise considered burdensome and problematic. In an echo of colonial strategies of population management, the state maintains its free-market economic order by demonizing and policing the victims of extreme inequality — *favela* poverty upholds patterns and perceptions of non-white criminality, which in turn legitimize the police state's targeting of the urban poor in the name of preserving public order (Poets 2015).

The securitization of Rio's *favelas* only became more pronounced following Brazil's transition back to democracy after three decades of military dictatorship, a process which began in the mid-1970s and solidified in 1985. During the military regime, "pacification [was] the dominant concept for targeting so-called "subversives" through counter-insurgency policing" (Müller 2018, 224), and the nation's hyper-militarized police institutions survived the elite-led democratic opening. In Rio in particular, the authoritarian police tactics honed to root out political enemies during the Cold War were superimposed onto the new war against organized crime (Müller 2018). As the democratic state aligned itself with the neoliberal orthodoxy of the 1980s, economic austerity policies worsened urban inequalities. Professional drug trafficking organizations embedded themselves in Rio's extensive network of hillside slums, the density of which increased dramatically as the number of residents ballooned to almost a quarter of the city's population (Poets 2015; Larkins 2015). The arrival of the 'War on Drugs' gave new logic to the discursive construction of *favelas* as "enemy territory," and the state's militarized response drew on a long



history of counter-insurgent practices dating back to the colonization of Brazil's hinterlands (Larkins 2015, 9; Poets 2015). Through the turn of the century, *favelas* became open warzones between armed 'narco-state' actors and Rio's Military Police. Consequently, young, Black males were the main victims of soaring rates of urban violence and homicide (Muller 2018; Oliveira 2014).

While estimates suggest that only one to three percent of the roughly 1.5 million who inhabit the city's *favelas* are involved in organized crime, *favelados* remain collectively stigmatized by the state and public alike. The derogatory, colloquial term *favelado* ('slum-dweller') embodies the deep prejudices attached to the criminality of the *favelas* and their residents in the public imagination. Widespread calls for hardline security policies are demonstrative of the enduring cultural tendency to associate poverty with moral deficiency and disciplinary violence with public order (Larkins 2015). The popularity of '*linha dura*' ('hardline') discourses has long justified the extreme lethality of the elite patrol unit formed to combat narco-traffickers, Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais (BOPE). A direct descendant of the death squads deployed during the dictatorship, BOPE has openly "retained the right to destroy the enemy without risking punishment," and the unit's blatantly inhumane tactics give clear expression to the democratic state's capacity to kill particular groups at its discretion (Larkins 2015, 62). Over roughly three decades, periodic BOPE incursions into trafficker territory failed to dislodge the criminal gangs, and the deadly cycle of irregular warfare only reified the

*favelas*' status "as the natural dwelling place of violent enemies of state and society" (Larkins 2015, 9).

### From *Linha Dura* to Pacification

By the early 2000s, the internationalization of Rio and nationwide democratic advances — notably, the rise of the leftist Worker's Party and election of President Lula de Silva — encouraged a re-evaluation of the iron-fisted approach to managing the *favela* crisis. Political and international momentum favored the development of a more humanitarian "community policing" model, oriented to improve state-society relations and promote a socially inclusive, globally-oriented image of Brazilian modernity consistent with a democratic, world-class city (Müller 2018; Dias Felix & Hilgers 2020). Pacifying Police Units (UPPs) were conceptualized as a new public security paradigm at the nexus of "proximity policing" and social development (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 88). Security objectives were to be combined with long-awaited infrastructural projects and provision of public services, all in collaboration with locals. The goal was to liberate Rio's *favelas* from drug traffickers and install a permanent, resident-friendly police presence, followed by the integration of *favela* territories and inhabitants into the city's formal economy and society (Poets 2015). In what appeared to be a repudiation of urban militarism and police impunity, Rio's officials presented the UPP program as a policy oriented to promote "hope and citizenship, (...) symboliz[ing] all the appreciation we have for human life" (Müller 2018, 222). For both domestic and international observers, this



policy marked the promising arrival of democratic security governance, heralding “a new culture of more peaceful policing methods” with the potential to become a “model for the region and the world” (Müller 2018, 222). The state launched the flagship UPP in December of 2008 in the *favela* of *Santa Marta* and institutionalized the program in 2011. Following a handful of publicized successes, UPPs were widely implemented directly prior to Rio’s hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Summer Olympics (Saborio 2013). By early 2014, 38 UPPs with 9,543 pacification officers had been installed throughout Rio’s *favelas*, reaching ~160 ‘pacified’ communities (Muller 2018).

In practice, the pacification program has been far less of a paradigm-shift than implied. The process of rolling out a UPP begins with a military-esque invasion of BOPE forces to “cleanse” the territory of drug traffickers, after which an official UPP unit takes over community patrolling (Larkins 2015, 68). Contrary to its stated objectives, *favela* pacification has primarily consisted of endless military occupation, never developing into the communitarian, development-oriented public security model that was envisioned. Because the program operates *within* the logic of the ‘War on Drugs’ rather than challenging it, it draws on the same stigmatized representations of *favela* residents that requires their permanent management or elimination (Poets 2015). With all *favelados* considered potential criminals, UPP officers have prioritized reimposing state authority over “enemy” areas through blanket repression, retaining the same warlike mindset and count-

er-insurgency tactics that characterized past police practices (Poets 2015, 185). The revival of ‘pacification’ as an explicit administrative concept is telling: the UPP program operated as a conquest mission reframed to suit modern sensibilities, consisting of the deployment of state units to seize and tame ‘insurgent’ non-white territories in the name of preserving liberal democracy (Müller 2018; Oliveira 2014; Salem & Bertelsen 2020). UPPs ultimately reproduce the same security discourse that criminalizes poverty and excludes underclass spaces from the boundaries of normative rule of law (Poets 2015). Within these “zones of indistinction,” collateral damage and mass suspension of civil rights are legitimate tactics appropriately calibrated to defend the moral national community against a depraved enemy (Poets 2015, 185). While most UPPs succeeded in temporarily reducing rates of violent crime and homicide, UPP occupation merely constituted a new form of necropolitical governance. “Pacified” *favelas* exist as islands of military authoritarianism in the middle of democratic Rio, where inhabitants live under surveillance in a perpetual “state of exception” (Poets 2015, 189), and order is maintained through routine repression and terror (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

The dynamics of UPP occupation have directly mirrored aspects of the settler-colonial ‘civilizing’ process, particularly in the combination of violent repression and pseudo-benevolent cultural re-education (Oliveira 2014; Salem & Bertelsen 2020). Just like colonial “guardianship,” UPPs have primarily been oriented to promote social control and conformity rather than social welfare and integration

(Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 94). The community development objectives originally meant to accompany the permanent state police presence have been almost entirely absent from the pacification process. The UPP Social, the parallel program responsible for the infrastructural development and public services component of the policy, never fully materialized. As a result, “no significant policies in healthcare, education, or concerning basic needs have followed the implementation of the UPP” (Saborio 2013, 139). Instead, UPP officers have been the main mediators of limited public service provision, turning welfare into an instrument of security policy coercively wielded to “conquer” communities (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 93). Considering their primary goal of maintaining ‘peace’ and ‘public order,’ the UPPs’ quasi-social role encourages officers to engage in arbitrary cultural policing and ideological surveillance, often animated by their own chauvinistic religious moralism and the assumed immorality of *favela* culture (Salem & Bertelsen 2020; Oliveira 2014). UPP agents have commonly understood their duties to include the “domestication” of residents and defense of traditional hierarchies, turning “uncivilized” *favelados* into “*cidadãos de bem*”, ‘good citizens’, by enforcing a state-sanctioned culture based on respect for authority, Christian conservatism, and heteropatriarchal normativity (Salem & Bertelsen 2020, 98). This has often resulted in the repression of ‘subversive’ Afro-Brazilian cultural expressions and *favela* sociality, neutralizing the organizational capacity of otherwise marginalized citizens. With residents lacking meaningful political outlets, UPP scru-

tiny cripples the communal solidarity needed for grassroots resistance against police abuse or eviction orders. While unpacified *favelas* have been sites of passionate collective protest when targeted for removal, their pacified counterparts have largely surrendered quietly when facing eviction (Salem & Bertelsen 2020).

At root, the pacification experiment has largely served the demands of elite-oriented capitalist growth. UPPs were primarily devised to promote an image of Rio as safe and attractive for foreign investment, as part of a larger entrepreneurial globalization strategy which was jeopardized by the city’s high-profile ‘*favela* problem’ (Saborio 2013; Poets 2015). The policy was only developed following the approval of Rio’s bids to host two consecutive “mega-events,” with the significant international scrutiny and promotional potential that these showcasing opportunities entailed (Saborio 2013, 133). The needs of local communities were at best secondary considerations subordinated to the interests of domestic and foreign capital. Revealingly, *favelas* selected for pacification did not correlate with levels of crime but with proximity to high-profile, wealthy districts ripe for real estate speculation and foreign traffic (Saborio 2013). While some centrally located *favelas* were simply bulldozed for event construction and peripheral neighborhoods were ignored completely, the communities that came under UPP control formed an “urban security belt” surrounding the venues where the World Cup and Olympic Games were held (Saborio 2013, 133). The commercial component of the pacification program was evident in the exploitative marketing of success stories: pac-

ified *favelas* like *Rocinha* were superficially “beautified” and promoted as tourist attractions, commodifying urban poverty for foreign consumption while meaningful improvements in public welfare and service provision were neglected (Larkins 2015, 17). UPP successes have often amounted to militarized gentrification, enabling capital expansion by submission and dispossession. The securitization of *favelas* legitimizes the repression, exploitation, or outright removal of the “inconvenient populations” that inhabit them (Müller 2018, 238). The initial ‘shock of peace’ sets the stage for a subsequent ‘shock of order’ — the pacification of a community is followed by market penetration of the *favela* space, seen in the arrival of private service providers and the gradual encroachment of land by property developers (Larkins 2015, 151). This supposed ‘integration’ of a *favela* into the surrounding city simply entails the latter overtaking the former, in a “formalization” process that reproduces the neoliberal order in zones previously beyond its reach (Poets 2015, 191). Inevitably, this final stage of pacification intolerably increases costs of living for most indigent residents, forcing them to relocate to more peripheral *favelas* and achieving the total recapture of coveted land (Saborio 2013; Poets 2015).

### **Conclusion: Disjunctive Citizenship in Democratic Brazil**

Despite being widely hailed as a progressive innovation in Brazilian policing, UPPs reflected more continuity than change (Dias Felix & Hilgers, 2020). In practice, Rio’s pacification program was less oriented towards the so-

cial inclusion and democratic empowerment of *favela* residents than towards their coerced submission to a neoliberal state order that confines them to conditions of permanent marginality and insecurity. There are striking parallels between patterns of dehumanization and subjugation of non-white ‘savages’ in Brazil’s colonial past and the otherization and criminalization of their descendants in the present: even under an entirely different political and legal regime, Brazilian society remains dichotomized between ‘true Brazilians’ deemed worthy of full protections and post-colonial ‘others’ considered socially expendable at best and threatening at worst (Oliveira 2014; Poets 2015).

The colonial dimensions of the UPP program demonstrate the insidiousness of embedded social norms and power dynamics even in a reform-minded democratic context, a fact which questions the true extent of Brazilian democratization. While Brazil’s official history of republican democracy has been one of universal formal membership in the nation-state, Brazilian citizenship remains highly exclusionary in practice. Full citizenship status — and the rights that it entails — operates as an ascriptive category, exercised as the privilege of particular social groups. Disjunctive citizenship is the consequence of disjunctive democratization: formal political liberalization alone will not deliver substantive democratic equality if citizens remain unprotected, devalued, and disenfranchised in the civil sphere (Holston & Caldeira 1998). As a concept, UPPs represented an opportunity for meaningful progressive change, setting a precedent for a community-oriented public security policy that acknowledged the

importance of social services and redefined the role of the police as one of democratic law enforcement rather than arbitrary authority enforcement. In practice, however, they merely demonstrated the tension between democratizing forces and reactionary affirmation of traditional hierarchies, which leaves society stuck in a state of half-baked democracy and stunted reform.

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